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This thesis charts the development of the parties of the contemporary European 
radical left over the period 1989-2013. Its aim is to provide a convincing interpretative 
framework on the topic and an innovative contribution to the scholarship on 
comparative party analysis. The discussion will focus on three case studies (Germany, 
France and Italy), selected for their central importance within the European Union and 
for the diversity of their starting points and trajectories. 
The analysis addresses three main research questions. Firstly, what is the relevance of 
radical left parties within contemporary political systems and societies (their societal 
weight) and what are the main determinants of their growth and decline? Secondly, 
how can we make sense of the evolution of their political nature, namely the 
transformations in their ideology, sociology, organisation and strategy? Thirdly, what 
are the key drivers behind the tendencies to regroupment and fragmentation? I 
answer to these interrogatives by placing the development of the contemporary 
radical left firmly within the context of a process of neo-liberalisation of Western 
European societies and of an emerging vacuum of political representation of working-
class and welfarist constituencies. Moreover, I show how an aggregate, multi-
dimensional and multi-level approach can help to further our understanding of radical 
left dynamics and contradictions. 
The first chapter will provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the radical left as a 
political space defined by representational contents and by its relationship with the 
moderate left. The second chapter will present an overview of its historical roots (since 
1914) and of its broader Western European context. The central chapters (three, four 
and five) will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of the three country studies. The final 
chapter will explicitly compare the German, French and Italian trajectories, draw 
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION. 
TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY RADICAL LEFT. 
 
The historic change represented by the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 was 
famously hailed by the neo-conservative scholar Francis Fukuyama (1989) as 
representing "the end of history" and as paving the way for a shift toward a de-
ideologised, pacified and consensual policy-making built on the cornerstones of free-
market capitalism, liberal-democratic institutions and technocratic neo-liberal policies. 
From the other hand of the political spectrum, social democratic political scientist 
Herbert Kitschelt (1994) underlined the continuing importance of political competition 
between left and right on cultural and post-materialist issues but agreed that the 
success of the welfare state, the constraints of globalisation and the post-industrial 
shift meant a substantial end of the traditional class and redistributive conflicts.1 
In the subsequent two decades, however, slow economic growth and attempts by 
firms and governments to dismantle the achievements of the post-war social 
compromise have brought the issues of class conflict and alternative developmental 
models back to the forefront. First, proposed policy reforms have regularly been met 
with massive social mobilisations, leading in cases like France and Greece to a veritable 
revival of labour militancy (Kouvelakis, 2007 and 2011). Second, resistance to neo-
liberalism has led to the emergence of new waves of social movement activism and 
connected intellectual efforts: for instance, the French-centred mouvements des sans 
(Mouchard, 2009), the alter-globalist movement (Agricoliansky et. al., 2005; Della 
                                                     
1
 The text is worth an extensive quotation: "traditional social democratic policies ought no longer be 
pursued, because they cannot be successfully implemented in the socioeconomic and cultural 
environment of advanced capitalism" (p. 5); "the new challenges of international market competition 
and the fragmentation of occupational groups and industrial sector force the parties to give up far-
reaching objectives to change economic property rights and income equalization. What remains of 
social democratic economic leftism is the defence of basic principles of the welfare state [...] Socialist 
parties, however, are compelled to abandon demands for the nationalization of enterprises or for 
workers' control of corporate investment decisions in order to remain electorally viable. Instead, social 
democratic parties will embrace an agenda of economic policies that offers public investments to 
enhance the capacity of private market participants to compete internationally. [...] In advanced 
industrial democracies, parties can no longer offer voters stark alternatives on the distributive 
dimension" (p. 297).  
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Porta, 2006) or more recent anti-crisis mobilisations of the youth such as the 
indignados and occupy (Current Sociology, forth.). Thirdly, the diminishing goods and 
prospects distributed by the mainstream of the political system have led to an 
important decline of their legitimacy, appeal and electoral support (Mair, 2006) and 
the rise of political disengagement and anti-establishment challengers.  
 
Within this landscape the parties of the radical left have experienced a certain revival 
of electoral support and of scholarly attention. On the first account, the post-1989 
radical left has remained a medium-small party family weighing between 6% and 7% of 
the Western European electorate but has proved wrong the widespread expectations 
of its inevitable demise and, in some countries at least, has experienced significant 
phases of growth (see chapter 2). On the second account, twenty years ago the topic 
tended to be viewed as a marginal research object, rather a mere curiosity, relic of the 
past or anachronism than a subject worthy of the attention of political and social 
scientists. Progressively, however, interest has been growing and has become 
embodied in a large of number of scholarly articles, monographs, book chapters and 
edited volumes.  
The attempts at a general synthesis have focused on three main aspects. 
First, the initial tendency toward a decline of overall electoral and societal relevance of 
the radical left, especially as far as traditional communist parties are concerned (Bell, 
1993; Bull, 1994 and 1995; Moreau et al., 1998; Ramiro, 2003; Botella & Ramiro, 
2003b).  
Second, a profound transformation of the identity, ideology, programmes, image, 
strategy, organisation, sociological profile and systemic role of most parties, either 
through the mutation of former communist organisations, processes of regroupment 
and the emergence of new forces (Marantzidis, 2003; March & Mudde, 2005; March, 
2008 and 2011). 
Third, the tentative emergence, on the ruins of the old communist party family, of a 
new "radical left" grouping which is certainly less coherent and radical of its 
predecessor but at the same time reverses the trend toward decline, links up with 
contemporary social mobilisation and often reaches new peaks of electoral and 
political influence (Hudson, 2000 and 2012; Callinicos, 2002, 2008 and 2012; Brie & 
Hildebrandt, 2005 and 2006; Pina, 2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008; March, 2008 and 
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2011; Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009; Olsen et al., 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Videt, 
2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Ducange et al., 2013). 
I intend to contribute to this body of literature by providing a detailed analysis of the 
partisan radical left in the period 1989-2013 in three core countries of the European 
Union: Germany, France and Italy. In the rest of the chapter I will outline my analytical 




1.1 Theoretical approach  
 
 
A preliminary question needs to be addressed here: is the concept of a "contemporary 
radical left" meaningful and useful? Are we talking of a coherent party family (Mair & 
Mudde, 1998) or of a motley crew linked only by the fact of being to the left of the 
mainstream socialist parties? Many facts seem to militate against the first perspective.  
On the one hand, the parties commonly identified under this label seem to present a 
marked degree of diversity and large ideological, relational and organisational 
differences. A first symptom of this is the instability of definitions and connotations 
used by parties and external observers alike2. A second problem is the different 
ideological heritage of the parties, which ranges from left social-democracy to 
Trotskyism passing through Euro-communism, orthodox Communism, Maoism, eco-
socialism and various "new left" traditions. A third problem is the different degrees of 
radicalism in their goals (from mild reformism to vocal anti-capitalism) and in their 
parliamentary collocation (from governmental collaboration to anti-systemic 
opposition). A final problem is the absence of any solid and inclusive form of 
coordination at the supra-national level beyond the loose "technical" function of the 
GUE/NGL European parliamentary group3. The best summary of this scepticism is 
provided by Bull (1994): "the erstwhile fragmentation has become separation and […] 
it will no longer be possible to generalise about these parties as a "family", nor fruitful 
to study them within the same analytical framework". (p. 211) 
On the other hand, there seem to be good arguments for either restricting the use of 
the term to ideologically anti-capitalist and/or relationally intransigent parties (the 
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 The most common term, "radical left", is rejected by some because it implies an exaggeration of the 
ideological radicalism of these parties or because of its association with anti-systemic extremism 
(especially in Germany). Popular alternatives have been "alternative left" (especially during the Nineties) 
and, increasingly, "left" tout court. Other terms tend to focus on a smaller range of organisations, like 
"post-communist left" or "far left". Finally, some authors see a dichotomy between an "anti-neoliberal 
(or radical) left" and an "anti-capitalist (or extreme) left" (March, 2011).  
3
 The late attempt to follow the lead of other party families by establishing a transnational EPF 
(European Party Federation) led to the creation in 2004 of the Party of the European Left (PEL). The 
coordination remains however loose and with a patchy coverage (Dunphy & March, 2012). More 





Trotskyist far left; orthodox communist parties; radicalised forces from a communist or 
socialist background), thereby treating the more moderate and institutionalised 
parties as social democratic satellites, or identifying two distinct party families: an anti-
capitalist (or revolutionary, antagonist) left and an anti-neoliberal (reformist, neo-
social democratic) left.  
My opinion is that a specific and coherent, albeit contradictory, radical left space does 
in fact exist and over-determines the behaviour of its component organisations, linking 
them together in a common party family. Four key elements must here be spelled out. 
Firstly, all radical left parties compete on a very similar political and electoral space and 
their success is predicated on their ability to provide a credible representation to a set 
of socio-economic issues which have been deserted by the mainstream political parties 
(notably by the "new" social democracy). Secondly, they all share the same strategic 
dilemmas: in particular, the tension between the defence of their anti-neoliberal 
programme and the desire for a common front against the right (in the terminology of 
the Italian PRC, the tension between radicality and unity). Thirdly, almost all parties 
and sensibilities – some to a greater, other to a smaller degree – have indeed tended 
to converge on a similar mid-term programme (an anti-neoliberal platform focusing on 
working-class, welfarist and left-libertarian issues), identity (left instead of communist) 
and organisation (loose, inclusive and pluralist). Fourthly, the diversity of historical 
traditions, ideological beliefs and practical orientations has tended to coexist within a 
common organisational framework, either under the form of broad left parties (e.g. 
PRC, PDS, DIE LINKE) or of semi-structured fronts or alliances (e.g. IU, Syriza, FdG, 
Respect).4 Radical left unity tended to be rational and profitable, so far as the diversity 
of long-term goals was overshadowed by common short-term mobilisations and a 
collocation in the opposition enabled a large margin of ambiguity; division, on the 
other hand, tended to resurface only when faced with the hard choices with regards to 
governmental participation.5 
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 Indeed, the tendency toward regroupment has involved most of the existing radical left organisation, 
including the vast majority of Trotskyist groups. The IMT, for instance, has sought (outside Britain) to 
build Marxist tendencies within post- and neo-communist parties; the IST has generally argued for the 
establishment of broad left coalitions conceived as "united fronts of a special kind" (Rees, 2002; 
Callinicos, 2004); the USFI has oscillated between a call for "broad left parties" (Smith, 2003) and that 
for "broad anti-capitalist proletarian parties" with stricter delimitations (USFI, 2003).   
5
 Or when the leading radical left party was unwilling (Greece, Portugal) or unable (France) to provide a 




The analysis will be based on an understanding of political parties (and, by extension, 
party families) primarily as specific tools enabling collective action and mediating 
between society and public authoritative decision-making. In this sense, both the role 
of parties as mechanisms of selection of political personnel and tendency toward 
autonomisation and self-serving behaviour of specific groups, levels or entire 
organisations must be considered as by-products of their primary function.6 
 
The thesis will focus on three broad research questions/themes. 
The first one concerns the political nature of radical left parties. This point 
encompasses the most virulent discussions on their character: anti-neoliberal or anti-
capitalist, working-class or post-materialist, conciliatory or intransigent, integrated or 
anti-systemic, electoral or social, useful or useless, moved by a coherent vision or by 
passive reactions to their external environment, and so on. The use of a multi-
dimensional, multi-level, aggregate and comparative approach will facilitate the 
identification of provisional answers to these debates which, albeit largely fuelled by 
legitimate analytical differences, are partly due to a non-declared implicit focus on 
specific parties, levels and dimensions to the detriment of the larger picture.  
The second one concerns the societal weight of the radical left and an understanding 
of its determinants, consequences, potentialities and obstacles.  
The third one concerns the unifying features and contradictions of the radical left 
space. The identification of the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies of this space will 
help to explain the divergent trajectories of the three radical lefts in terms of 
fragmentation and regroupment: the progressive breakup of the PRC in a myriad of 
competing organisations in Italy; the preservation of a unitary framework in Germany; 
an early and persistent competition followed by an abrupt late regroupment in France. 
 
The analytical approach I will employ is characterised by three main characteristics: it 
is aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level. 
In contrast with the general tendency of the literature on the topic, I argue for the 
superiority of an aggregate approach focusing on the radical left political space (or 
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 An excellent discussion of political parties as sites of power struggles and the possible ways to theorise 
power within political parties is provided by the PhD thesis of Danny Rye (forthcoming). 
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field), within which various party organizations and tendencies (big and small, 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) operate and compete, over an ideographic 
comparison of individual radical left parties. This procedure has two great advantages. 
On one hand, it enables us to identify the general trends lying behind party-specific 
idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, it improves the national and international 
comparability of our findings: that is, with other national party families and between 
the radical left of one country and those of other countries. For the same reason, the 
discussion of measures of societal weight (e.g. membership, votes and finances) will 
eschew from any threshold of relevance.7 This choice makes little difference in cases of 
a cohesive radical left (Germany) but greatly improves the results in cases of high 
fragmentation (France and Italy).  
I also stress the multi-dimensionality of the analysis. Existing research has tended to 
focus on one or two dimension of party activity at a time: organisation (Bosco, 2000; 
Bertolino, 2004; Keith, 2010); electoral results (Ramiro, 2003; March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012); ideological evolution (March & 
Mudde, 2005; March, 2011); governmental participation (Hough & Verge, 2009; 
Daiber, 2010; Daiber et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & 
Bale, 2011); role in the party system and political activity strictu sensu (most of the 
case-studies); civil society linkages (Andolfatto, 2008). My work will endeavour to 
survey all relevant dimensions of party politics and put them in relation with each 
other.  
Finally, the individual radical left parties must necessarily be analysed within a multi-
level framework reproducing the connections and contradictions between the various 
internal layers and external constraints of party activity. In particular, it is important to 
differentiate between the party-organisation (e.g. leadership, activists, members, 
collateral organisations), the party-constituency (e.g. financial supporters, 
sympathising individual and organisations, voters), the external actors (potential allies 
and adversaries) and the structural environment (e.g. political system, national 
societies, international framework). 
In the next paragraphs I'll expand on each of these points. 
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 Unlike March and Mudde (2005) and March (2009), which set it at 3% of the vote and one seat in at 
least one parliamentary election, or De Waele and Vieira (2012), which set it at one parliamentary seat. 
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1.2 The radical left political space 
 
1.2.1 Features and boundaries 
 
At the heart of this research lies the hypothesis of the existence of a radical left 
political space populated by a variety of different partisan organisations. What are its 
features and boundaries?  
 
Unlike the 20th century communist movement, contemporary radical left parties are 
not bound together by a strong organisational link (the Comintern in 1919-1943, 
informal links to the Soviet Union afterwards), identity (Communism) or ideology 
(Marxism-Leninism). What unites this wide array of forces, ranging from those 
advocating limited reforms within the capitalist system to those advocating an anti-
systemic opposition and the development of anti-capitalist alternatives, is their 
continuing reference to the class cleavage at a time when the social democratic party 
family has moved elsewhere. More specifically, they are characterised by a broadly 
similar mid-term anti-neoliberal programme which can be summarised by a triple 
claim: the appeal to a specific representation of wage earners' class interests; the 
rejection of neo-liberal policies; the advocacy of a more egalitarian social order (hence 
the key value of "social justice"). 
 
This definition gives rise to two problems. 
Firstly, is this not the classical definition of the traditional social democracy and, to a 
less extent, of the left tout court? Indeed it is.8 It is not accidental that most of the 
parties in question are engaged precisely in an attempt to adopt a broad left posture, 
                                                     
8
 Fülberth (2008: 153), for instance, defines the two functions of social democracy as "the 
representation within capitalism of the interests of the people exclusively dependent from incomes 
from wage-labour or from public transfers" and "the stabilisation and flexibilisation of the capitalist 
system, particularly via infrastructure, social and demand policy and the integration of the lower 
classes". Anthony Crosland similarly defined social democracy as "political liberalism + mixed economy + 
welfare state + Keynesian economic policy + commitment to equality" (quoted in Moschonas, 2002: 15). 
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to rebrand themselves from communist or socialist to "left parties"9 and to expunge 
the moderate left from this framework with labels of "neo-liberalism" or "social-
liberalism". In this sense we are witnessing a progressive shift of the whole political 
system to the right, with the radical left taking on the role of a neo-social democracy. 
Despite this ideological shift, however, two important factors tend to starkly 
differentiate the post-1989 radical left space from the post-1945 social democratic 
space, putting contemporary radical left parties in a position which is very different 
from that of classical social democratic parties and more similar to that of far left 
organisations. On the one hand, the major mainstream left parties (the German SPD, 
the Italian DS and the French PS) have largely de-socialdemocratised their outlook and 
their social base, but have retained some memory of their traditional programme, 
internal left-wing tendencies, an important working-class electoral support and, 
crucially, key links with the organised labour movement (Moschonas, 2002; Walter, 
2011; Bellucci et al., 2000; Lefebvre and Sawicki, 2006). On the other hand, in the 
current conjuncture the opposition to neo-liberalism appears to have an almost anti-
systemic character (Kouvelakis, 2007).10 Hence the small size of the partisan radical left 
vis-a-vis the social and cultural left; hence the dilemma between competition with the 
moderate left and the politics of united front; hence the appropriateness of the 
"radical" left label despite the apparent lack of radicalism of many of its components. 
Secondly, how should we interpret this refusal of neo-liberal policies, given that many 
contemporary radical left parties bear some responsibility for their very 
implementation? In the name of lesser-evilism and damage reduction, some parties 
have directly participated or externally supported centre-left governments while some 
others have indirectly facilitated their conquest of a parliamentary majority through 
                                                     
9
 In Germany the Party of Democratic Socialism renamed itself The Left Party (2005) and then The Left 
(2007); in Italy the Party of Communist Refoundation almost dissolved itself into the Rainbow Left 
alliance (2008); in France the French Communist Party entered the coalition Left Front (2009). This trend 
is by no means limited to the less radical parties, as the cases of the Left Bloc in Portugal (1999) or 
Critical Left in Italy (2007) prove. 
10
 Kouvelakis argues that "any serious anti-neoliberal approach, as demanded by the needs of the 
present conjuncture, any measure which takes on, even partially, the dominant choices and which does 
not pull back before its consequences, leads out of internal necessity to a general break with capitalism" 
(p. 292) and that "the elaboration of an effective anti-neoliberal politics constitutes the principal 
demarcation dividing, at every level, the social, intellectual and political forces in their entirety. Its 
implementation by a majority popular bloc at the level of existing institutions (including governments) 
cannot but lead in the short-term to class confrontation of large scope. Confrontations which will 
inevitably lead to pose the question of the property of the main means of production, exchange and 
communisation, as well as of the structure of power and of the state apparatuses" (p. 259-260). 
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electoral alliances or tactics. Should we exclude these conciliatory parties from our 
definition of the radical left? This does not seem appropriate if we take into 
consideration that those conjunctures are precisely the ones provoking an electoral 
and identity crisis in these parties, which are deserted by their social constituency and 
need to re-assert their autonomy either with a real shift to the opposition or with a 
verbal shift toward a more confrontational stance. Instead of interpreting this 
contradiction through the lenses of a trahison des clercs, it makes more sense to 
interpret it as a further reflection of a real contradiction within the radical left 
constituency, torn between the pursuit of its principles (values, interests) and the 
pursuit of unity against the right centred on the largest left-of-the-centre party. Here 
again, the boundaries of the radical left are largely determined by the nature of 
contemporary social-democracy, which prevents the formation of a clear-cut cleavage 
between anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist, conciliatory and intransigent forces. 
 
This discussion leads us to the only possible conclusion: the empirical referent of the 
term "contemporary radical left" is represented by all forces trying to represent left-
wing positions outside and to the left of moderate left parties. The concept is not just 
an empty label but on the contrary delimitates an unstable but coherent political space 
torn between the rejection of neo-liberalism and the imperatives of centre-left unity. 
An anti-capitalist pole is active within it but cannot be considered an independent 
space, as its action is inscribed within the same field of forces and it largely coexist 
within the a common organisational framework.  
 
What are then the criteria to determine the belonging of a specific organisation to the 
radical left?  
Firstly, it needs to position itself outside and to the left of the main moderate left party 
(the German SPD, the French PS, the Italian PD), i.e. the main left-of-the-centre party 
characterised by a neo-liberal programmatic and at the same time the maintenance of 
a sizeable left-wing constituency. What about left-wing or Marxist tendencies 
operating within these parties, though? My choice is to exclude them because, despite 
the ideological belonging to the non-liberal left, their action responds to a completely 
different set of constraints and presuppositions; would they succeed to influence the 
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parties they operate in, they would in fact reconfigure the whole left landscape and 
permanently either incorporate or marginalise the radical left.  
Secondly, it must have as its priority the political representation of wage-workers as 
such, that is with a class appeal. We can thus generally distinguish the radical left from 
class-less progressive post-materialist organisations (e.g. most ecologist parties), 
progressive nationalist organisations (e.g. the SNP) and far-right organisations with 
important working-class support (e.g. the FN or the Lega Nord). 
As a consequence the definition encompasses a large variety of organisations, from 
conciliatory left-socialist parties (such as the Danish SF or the Italian SEL) to 
revolutionary Marxist groups (such as the French LO and NPA). At the same time, the 
boundaries are fairly clear-cut and the number of parties with an uncertain collocation 
is small and mostly transitional.11 
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 Uncertaintly boils down to two main groups. On the one hand, parties oscillating between the radical 
left and the socialist family (e.g. the French MdC) or the green family (e.g. the Dutch GL, the Danish SF, 
the Catalan ICV). These parties generally choose one way or the other after a brief transitional period. 
On the other hand, left-wing nationalist parties (e.g. the Basque abertzale left and the Irish SF), which 
have a mixed class/national appeal. They will be generally included in our definition.    
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1.2.2 Partisan and other components 
 
In his masterly survey of the long-term evolution of the "class left" Bartolini (2012) 
identifies two main components: a "political channel" (parties) and a "professional 
channel" (trade unions). March and Mudde (2005), on their part, identify a within the 
radical left a political component (parties), a civil society component (non-party 
organisations such as trade unions, associations or social movement networks) and a 
subcultural component.12 Raynaud (2006), similarly, explores the French far left from 
the point of view of both political parties and their broad cultural environment 
(intellectual production and trends). These welcome remarks remind us of the 
pervasivity and multi-dimensionality of political engagement, which can be lived in a 
variety of ways and degrees: from passive reception to activism; from identification 
with a specific organisation to belonging to a broad subculture; from election-oriented 
to social or cultural work.  
This work will be exclusively concerned with the partisan component of the radical left 
and will examine the other components from the point of view of radical left political 
parties.  
 
My focus on political parties should not be taken as sanctioning conventional 
separations between societal domains – the political and the economical, state and 
civil society, public and private sphere – or as reducing political activity to party politics 
or, worse still, to electoral and institutional politics.13 Quite the contrary. 
Firstly, political parties have historically made recourse to a large variety of avenues to 
exert an influence on the political decision-making process: work within representative 
and executive institutions; electoral mobilisation; cultural/ideological mobilisation; 
workplace mobilisation; street mobilisation; military action, and so on. Moreover, 
these activities have mainly targeted the state as a key centre of social power and 
regulation, but have also often aimed at promoting social change without its 
                                                     
12
 The use of the term by the authors is slightly confusing, as they seem to refer almost exclusively to 
organised activist networks (the "new fringe"). It would be more appropriate to understand it more 
traditionally as the broader constituency sharing with the parties specific sets of beliefs, values and 
practices. 
13
 For a rich overview of the "essentially contested" character of politics see Leftwich (2004). 
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mediation, for instance by directly affecting the functioning of civil society institutions 
(the company, the church, the family, etc.) or people's ideas and interpersonal 
behaviour (the promotion of identities and values).  
Secondly, the behaviour of non-party organisations (lobbies, professional associations, 
churches, movement networks), social groups and individuals is directly political and 
crucially affects the working of the state, whatever claim of apoliticity or autonomy 
they might advance.  
Thirdly, the morphological and teleological difference between political parties, civil 
society organisations or institutions and informal groups is historically and 
theoretically very thin; it was only under the impact of state legislation (Barbet, 1991) 
and growing organisational requirements that a progressive differentiation and 
specialisation was produced. Still, these different forms of social organisation routinely 
entertain relations of paternity, interpenetration, division of labour and even 
indistinction. 
One of the interesting features of the parties of the radical left is precisely the fact that 
they theorise and practice a broad conception of political activity including electoral 
and non-electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, state-directed and civil 
society-directed mobilisation, thus forcing us to rethink reductionist views of parties as 
mere electoral/institutional organisations. As a consequence, the choice of the 
partisan radical left as the object of this thesis must be conceived as a mere point of 






1.3 Political nature 
 
My first research question deals with the political nature of the radical left. How does 
this concept fit in the scholarship on political parties and what are its characteristics? 
 
Political parties have traditionally been analysed according to four key (and often inter-
related) dimensions: the ideological dimension, the sociological dimension, the 
organisational dimension and the functional dimension. 
 
The ideological dimension relates to the identity, political culture, goals and 
programmatic of political parties.  
An important line of research has focused on the collocation of parties along a linear 
and uniform left-right continuum. This intuitive yet elusive notion has led to both 
theoretical inquiries of a philosophical (Bobbio, 2004) and politological (Downs, 1957) 
kind and empirical efforts of operationalisation and analysis. The Manifesto Research 
Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP)14 represents the most advanced 
attempt to quantify the left-right collocation of OECD parties through an analysis of 
their party manifestos. This approach, despite its tremendous achievements, suffers 
from three major flaws. Firstly, the party programmes rarely reflect the real policy 
options of the parties. This is acknowledged by scholars of the topic, which consider 
party programmes as a mere theoretical starting point of the analysis. Secondly, the 
left-right scale is not necessarily a linear, continuous and coherent phenomenon, being 
often marked by qualitative breaks and problems deriving from the aggregation of 
unstable or incoherent individual preferences (Arrow, 1950). Thirdly, the left-right 
divide has been repeatedly proven to be multi-dimensional (Kitschelt, 1994), but the 
attempts to represent it in a bi-dimensional (e.g. class and religiosity, or economic 
egalitarianism and cultural libertarianism) or multi-dimensional model only compound 
the theoretical and geometrical problems of simple the one-dimensional model. 
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Another line of research has instead focused on the identification of a limited number 
of party families (e.g. socialist, communist, Christian-democratic, liberal, ecologist) 
united by a common name, ideology/policy, origin/sociology or organisational link 
(Mair & Mudde, 1998).  
 
The sociological dimension relates to the ascriptive characteristics and constructed 
identities of the different layers of people making up the living organism of a political 
party. Research has thus focused on groups such as elected representatives, 
cadres/delegates (Bordandini, 2013b), activists (Subilieau, 1981; Siméant & Sawicki, 
2009), party members (Spier et al., 2011) and party voters. The electorate in particular 
has been the most studied level of party research, producing both single-election post-
electoral analyses combining rich survey data and qualitative observation (e.g. ITANES, 
2009; Perrineau & Ysmal, 2002; Gabriel et al., 2009)15 and broader attempts at gauging 
the long-term patterns of voting behaviour. Particularly interesting to this end is the 
cleavage tradition (Rokkan & Lipset, 1967; Flora, 1999; Bartolini, 2012), which seeks to 
explain the birth, consolidation, electoral success and patterns of alliances of the 
different party families (see above) with reference to macro-historical processes, deep-
seated societal conflicts of interests and their mobilisation and structuring by political 
entrepreneurs.  
 
The organisational dimension has been fundamentally approached with the intent of 
building broad diachronic typologies explaining the long-term change of party systems. 
The analysis of Duverger (1951: 105-114) saw the 19th and early 20th century process of 
democratisation and industrialisation reflected in the transition between two party 
models: the cadre party (typically liberal and conservative, based on the caucus, with a 
decentralised and little articulated structure and characterised by the quality of its 
support by social notables) and the mass party (typically socialist and confessional, 
based on the branch, with a centralised and articulated structure and characterised by 
the quantity if its support by the masses). Two additional models, the (typically 
Communist) cell-based party and the (typically Fascist) militia-based party, 
represented on the other hand a sort of developmental dead-end characteristic of the 
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 Post-electoral surveys and electoral panels are regularly conducted by institutions such as ITANES in 
Italy, CEVIPOF in France and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Germany. 
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inter-war period and largely overcome by the post 1945 liberal democratic 
stabilisation.16 Kirchheimer (1966) weighted in by interpreting the economic boom, full 
employment and welfare state expansion of the golden age of capitalism as the cause 
of a transformation of the mass (social-democratic and Christian-democratic) party 
into a catch-all or people's party (Volkspartei), characterised by ideological de-
radicalisation and convergence, inter-classism, an increased electoral focus, and a 
growing autonomy of the leadership from the membership. Panebianco (182:481) 
pointed out to a further evolution toward the model of electoral professional party 
based on the centrality of hired professionals, weak vertical links, the primacy of a 
personalised public office leadership and financing through interest groups and public 
subsidies, although he recorded the survival of some mass bureaucratic parties (based 
on the centrality of party officials, strong vertical links, the primacy of a collegial 
central office leadership and self-financing through the membership). The growing 
signs of organisational crisis of all (especially mass) Western parties which emerged 
since the late Seventies (Ignazi, 1996; Webb 2002: 2-3), however, pushed scholars to 
move beyond these classical models and to engaged in a frantic search for a new 
paradigm, resulting in a proliferation of "new" party models. Poguntke (1987)'s new 
politics party is characterised by the organisational flexibility and by the upholding of 
basis-democratie principles. Koole (1995: 298-9)'s modern cadre party combines mass 
(strong vertical links, financing through members, internal democracy) and elitist 
(small membership, primacy of the parliamentary party and hired professionals, large 
public financing) elements. Katz and Mair (1995: 50-51) put forward the theory of the 
cartel party, indentified by oligopolistic collusion, the fusion with the state (financing, 
personnel, access to the media), the primacy of the public office leadership, a 
stratarchical structure and forms of plebiscitary internal democracy. Hopkin and 
Paolucci (1999) further develop Panebianco's model into the business firm party, 
created from scratch by political entrepreneurs to further their own personal aims. 
Heidar and Saglie (2003)'s network party underlines the growing tendencies toward 
organisational flexibility and informality (thematic networks, participation of non-
members, teledemocracy). Finally, in Carty (2004)'s franchise party organisation is 
conceived as a franchise between the central party (responsible for the brand, know-
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 Duverger (1951:113) conceived them as a sub-set of the mass party model tending toward the elite 
party ("the marching wing, the spearhead, the 'most conscious part' [of the masses]"). 
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how and standards) and autonomous local units (responsible for the localisation and 
marketing of the product), with a resulting high degree of stratarchy and ambiguity. 
Attempts to synthesise the richness of this tradition of research into a comprehensive 
and coherent framework have been made (Wolinetz, 2002; Günther & Diamond, 2003; 
Krouwel, 2006) but remain discordant and incomplete. 
 
The functional dimension, finally, has been generally understood as the role played by 
parties in the ensuring the linkage between state and society (Lawson, 1980; 
Poguntke, 2002; Römmele et al., 2005). 
Three authors are particularly relevant to this discussion. Neumann (1956) categorised 
parties according to their position in the conflicts around the broadening and 
democratisation of the European liberal political systems, thus distinguishing between 
individual representation parties (representing in the parliament the census elites of 
the liberal age), democratic integration parties (integrating the masses in the 
democratising political system) and the total integration parties (integrating the 
masses against the broadening liberal-democratic system).17 Kirchheimer (1966) 
identified three main functions of political parties: the selection and circulation of the 
political class; the aggregation and articulation of popular consent; the democratic 
participation of citizens. The emergence of the "catch-all (people's) party", which 
aimed not at the moral integration of the masses but at the mere electoral success in a 
non-ideological world, was looked upon with concern because, it threatened to restrict 
the latter and leave an excessive say to the “functional power-holders in army, 
bureaucracy, industry and labor”. Mair (1994) and Katz and Mair (1995), finally, 
described the historical trajectory of Western political parties as moving from agents 
of civil society (up to the 1950s), to brokers between civil society and the state (the 
Fordist period), to agents of the state (after the 1970s). 
 
As I already stated in the section 1.2, my understanding of political parties focuses on 
their primary function as organisations mediating between society and the state. In 
order to productively link political parties to their broader social and political 
environment and to reconcile the above-mentioned dimensions of party research into 
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a unitary framework, I propose to base my functional approach on the notion of the 
political nature of parties. 
This concept is defined by the interaction of three main dimensions: the social 
constituency; the political project; and the organisational-strategical mediations. 
The first dimension (social constituency) identifies the specific social groups a party 
endeavours to offer political representation to. As Bartolini (2012:27) has remarked, 
this representation has both a normative and an empirical face and, within the later, 
can be predominantly electoral or predominantly organisational. It is therefore 
necessary to differentiate between three sub-dimensions: the ideological 
interpellation of parties, their concrete electoral support and their organisational 
encapsulation. The interaction between these sub-dimensions defines both the 
boundaries of the specific coalition of social groups making up the social constituency 
of a party (e.g. the middle and lower salaried strata) and the more precise internal 
composition of it (e.g. a popular electorate led by an organisation of intellectuals). 
The second dimension (political project) refers to the articulation of the interests of 
their social constituency in a coherent set of long-term and short-term goals. As a 
matter of fact, the same social constituency can be mobilised with very different 
political project: the interests of a national bourgeoisie, for instance, can be 
legitimately conceived in the framework of both a nationalist and an internationalist 
developmental model. 
The third level (organisational-strategical mediations), finally, refers to type of 
organisational solutions, means, strategies and tactics employed by parties in the 
pursuit of the interests of their constituency and of their political vision. These can be 
more or less coherent and more or less effective.  
 
Some clarifications are here needed. Firstly, the social constituency of political parties 
can be based on different kinds of appeal: on the traditional cleavages 
(centre/periphery, state/Church, land/industry, owner/worker) identified by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967); on "new" post-industrial cleavages, such as materialist/post-materialist 
values (Inglehart, 1977), authoritarian/left-libertarian (Kitschelt, 1988) or globalisation 
winners/losers (Kriesi et al., 2006); on other socio-cultural (men/women, young/old, 
natives/immigrants) or socio-economic (private/public sector, big/small enterprise, 
old/new elite) conflicts; on specific issues (e.g. euro-scepticism); or on less defined and 
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more fleeting themes (e.g. anti-establishment populism). Secondly, both the 
constituency and the project can be strongly or weakly structured and tend to shift 
over time, being a site of struggle and compromise between party layers, social groups 
and ideological tendencies, each with its own interests, understanding and normative 
outlook. Thirdly, a political party – as any instrument – can prove more or less efficient 
in performing its work, leading to innovation, substitution or abandonment. Finally, 
political parties tend to shape social interests as much as they represent and serve 
them. 
 
The political nature of the communist movement in the early 20th century was 
identified by Bartolini (2012: 697-8) as a working-class anti-systemic radicalism which 
emerged in relatively back-ward or late-coming industrial societies where the class 
cleavage overlapped with the anti-state and anti-Church conflicts and the perspectives 
of an integration of the working-class in the liberal-democratic system appeared as 
little plausible and effective.18 The post-war construction of a successful welfare state 
largely blurred the division between anti-systemic and reformist socialism, as the 
perspectives of a radical break were toned down (Pudal, 2002) and the competition 
tended to revert on the ability of each organisation to defend and gradually expand 
the social conquests won within the system. The neo-liberal turnaround of the 1980s, 
on the contrary, led to a general shift to the right of the political system but at the 
same time started to de-integrate again the lower and middle sections of salaried 
strata, which enjoyed diminishing material prospects and became increasingly 
neglected by their traditional political representatives. What are the characteristics of 
the political nature of the contemporary radical left? How does it differ from that of its 
20th century communist, socialist and far left predecessors? Is it still primarily linked 
with the class cleavage? These questions will be explored throughout the thesis.  
                                                     
18
 "Communism was the social expression of the combined support of advanced sectors of the industrial 
working class of economically delayed or backward societies, of an intelligentsia of developing middle 
classes and of considerable sectors of rural world which resisted or survived their complete 
transformation in a capitalist commercial direction. This potential basis was not able to support a 
communist split except when the socialist movement was characterised by a weak organisation, a weak 
institutional integration and a weak coalition potential. [...] The ideological radicalism of a communist 
type did not emerge from the class conflict as such, i.e. from the opposition on the market to the 
interests of business and bosses, but only when a failed political-institutional integration led to the 




1.4 Societal weight, fragmentation and 
regroupment 
 
My second research question deals with the societal weight of the radical left. The 
concept refers to the ability of a political party (or group of political parties) to exert an 
effect on its external environment in all its multifarious dimensions (electoral results, 
waves of contention, national state policies, social relations of power within 
institutions and between groups, ideological hegemony, content of 
international/transnational regimes, and so on). It is therefore the end-result of the 
activities of parties and their success in developing their internal organisation, their 
strategies of electoral and social mobilisation, their parliamentary work and their 
policy of political and social alliances. 
The resources – raw material preconditions – of societal weight are in principle easily 
identifiable and open to empirical operationalisation and quantitative measurement. I 
will therefore collect, standardise, make available (see statistical appendix) and 
analyse a wide range of statistical data, organised around the three macro-groups: 
organisational resources (membership, finances, communication, collateral 
organisations); institutional presence (parliamentary and executive offices); and social 
constituency (electoral support and organisational linkages).  
The assessment of the translation of abstract resources into concrete influence, on the 
other hand, necessarily remains a more subjective and uncertain enterprise. 
This caveat notwithstanding, the thesis will chart the evolution of the societal weight 
of the radical left in the different domains, shed some lights on its determinants and 
assess the internal and external obstacles to a further growth. Particularly interesting 
is the question of its success or lack thereof in competing with the moderate left 
("filling the vacuum") and/or in exerting an effect on the direction of the political 
competition ("left-ward pull"). 
 
My third question deals with the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies leading the 
processes of fragmentation and regroupment of the radical left. What are the political, 
organisational and environmental conditions for a unified radical left along the lines of 
broad left parties (e.g. the Italian PRC or DIE LINKE) or of broad left coalitions (e.g. the 
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Spanish Izquierda Unida or the French Front de Gauche)? What are, on the contrary, 
the explanations of an internal split or of the emergence of new external competitors? 





1.5 Case studies and time frame  
 
The rationale for the selection of my case studies (Germany, France and Italy) is not 
the relevance of the radical left in specific European countries: Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, the Netherlands and Denmark would have made an ever better case from 
this point of view. It is instead the central demographic, economic, political and 
cultural position of the countries themselves within the European project (the 
Eurozone and the EU), which lends their radical lefts an objective weight, interest and 
influence on other countries.19 Moreover, the choice of Germany, France and Italy will 
enable me to check for a broad variety of variables which characterise the landscape of 
the Western European radical left: strong/weak, unified/fragmented, 
Western/Eastern, national/regional. The three cases, however, do not capture the 
whole complexity of this cadre20 and the results are therefore not immediately 
applicable to the rest of the continent. 
 
The time-scale of the research covers the period from 1989 to 2013. The main 
characteristics of the contemporary radical left are actually to a large extent the 
product of processes well anterior to the fall of the Berlin Wall: in particular, the 
cultural shift expressed by 1968 and by the emergence of the "new" social 
movements; the post-Fordist and post-industrial shift of advanced capitalist economies 
(1970s); the erosion of the organisational power and militancy of the working class 
(late 1970s-early 1980s); the ideological, organisational and electoral decline of the 
traditional communist parties; the progressive turn of governing parties toward wage 
restraint and neo-liberal policy solutions. In this sense, 1989 merely acted as an 
accelerator and detonator of long-term tendencies which had been going on since the 
1970s. It is however true that its immediate aftermath determined an historical low 
                                                     
19
 In particular PRC, PDS/DIE LINKE, PCF and LCR/NPA have been among the most discussed "models" 
and "anti-models" for the European radical left, have played a disproportionate role in trans-national 
mobilisations (social fora, counter-summits) and theoretical discussions (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung) and 
have assumed the leadership in the institutional pan-European coordination (GUE-NGL, PEL).  
20
 On one hand, the existence of independentist/regionalist (Euskadi, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Spain), 
minority-based (Latvia, England) and orthodox communist (Greece, Portugal) radical left parties. On the 
other hand, the peculiar features of Scandinavian and Hellenic parties, rooted in their distinctive 
national histories and political economies.  
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point in the radical left influence and forced the communist parties out of their inertia, 
leading to important ideological and organisational reforms and paving the way for the 
emergence of new forces and unprecedented processes of regroupment.  
  
As already stated, most of the discussion will centre on the interaction of all radical left 
forces without discriminating for their parliamentary presence, electoral size or 
societal relevance. The following table includes instead a list of the most important of 
these parties, which will be singled out more regularly for a specific discussion of their 
political nature and societal weight. 
 
TABLE 1.1 Major radical left parties 
NAME SHORTHAND PERIOD 
GERMANY   
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands  SED 1946-1989 
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus  PDS 1989-2005 
Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative  WASG 2004-2007 
Die Linkspartei.PDS  DIE LINKE.PDS 2005-2007 
DIE LINKE DIE LINKE. 2007-2009 
ITALY   
Partito Comunista Italiano  PCI 1921-1991 
Democrazia Proletaria  DP 1978-1991 
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista  PRC 1991-present 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani  PdCI 1998-present 
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà  SEL 2009-present 
FRANCE   
Parti communiste français  PCF 1920-present 
Lutte ouvrière  LO 1956-present 
Ligue communiste révolutionnaire LCR 1966-2009 
Nouveau parti anticapitaliste NPA 2009-present 
Parti de gauche  PG 2008-present 
Front de gauche  FdG 2008-present 











The hypothesis of the emergence of a "new" radical left from the twin crisis of the 
communist movement and of the social democratic left in a conjuncture marked by 
slow growth and neo-liberal reforms will be tested with reference to the case-studies 
of Germany, Italy and France. 
The purpose of the enquiry is to shed light on the features and contradictions of what I 
define the radical left space and, more precisely, to reach an improved understanding 
of the political nature of these political parties, of the potential and limits of their 
societal weight and of their dynamics of regroupment and fragmentation. 
The analysis will have a predominantly aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level 
character, thus avoiding the tendency of much of the literature on the topic to 
generalise conclusions derived from the analysis of a single party, dimension or level. 
The work is primarily intended as a contribution to the scholarship on the radical left 
party family but, hopefully, it will also help to broaden our understanding of Western 
European politics and of contemporary history.  
 
The organisation of the thesis will be the following.  
In the second chapter I will provide a historical and geographical contextualisation of 
my topic. The development of the radical left in the three countries will be therefore 
situated in the context of the long-term history of socialism in each nation-state and 
the broader post-1989 Western European trends. 
In the third to fifth chapter I will discuss the trajectory of the German, Italian and 
French radical lefts, showing the interplay of common dilemmas and nation-specific 
contexts and characteristics. 
In the sixth chapter I will offer a final comparative analysis of the three case studies 
and spell out the overall findings and open questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO. HISTORICAL AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
In order to situate my three case-studies in their historical and geographical context, it 
may be useful to start my investigation with a discussion of its long-term roots and 
precursors (since 1917) and of the broader landscape of the contemporary Western 
European radical left (since 1989). This chapter will thus serve manifold purposes: to 
pinpoint the key discontinuities between the old Communist movement and the new 
radical left galaxy; to illuminate the political, cultural and organisational legacies of the 
20th century which continue to reverberate in the parties; to identify the broader 






2.1 A secular overview 
 
The history of European socialism has already been the object of a number of excellent 
syntheses (Hobsbawm, 1978-1982; Sassoon, 1996 and 2010; Eley, 2002; Bartolini, 
2012;). In the present section I will limit myself to a sketch of the features which are 
essential to understand this evolution and which are relevant to the discussion of the 
contemporary radical left. 
 
The analysis of the long-term evolution of the different strands of "class left" (Bartolini, 
2012: 27) in Germany, France and Italy will be organised around three broad historical 
phases, separated by key geo-political breaks (the Second World War in 1939-1945 
and the fall of the Eastern bloc in 1989-1991).  
The first period (1917-1939) was primarily characterised by the difficult integration of 
the masses in the framework of industrialising capitalism and mass democratic politics 
(Azéma & Winock, 1986; Hobsbawn, 1995; Winkler, 1998; Chabod, 2002; Overy, 2007). 
The second period (1945-1988) was in large part marked the "golden age" of economic 
development and the concomitant redistribution of the fruits of that growth in the 
form of growing living and working standards and of the construction of developed 
welfare states (Ginsborg, 1989; Hobsbawn, 1995; Gildea, 1996; Fülberth, 2007). The 
third period (1991-present), on the contrary, covers the attempts at a neo-liberal 
reconfiguration of European societies (Harvey, 2005; Vail, 2010). In each period it is 
necessary to single out the following elements: the historical context, the main 
features of the radical left (political nature, societal weight and fragmentation) and the 
legacies for the present.  
 
First of all, however, I need to clarify how the boundaries of the "radical left" and its 
relationship with moderate rivals or allies have changed over time.  
In contrast with other types of left-leaning parties (of a liberal, Christian democratic or 
ecologist type), the parties of the socialist left (of social democratic, labour, communist 
or far left leanings) have long shared a series of important commonalities. First, they 
trace their organisational or ideal origin in the pre-WWI socialist workers' movement, 
famously defined by Kautsky (1908) as "merger of the workers' movement and 
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socialism". Second, until recently they all shared a formal commitment to the long-
term goal of some form of socialist society essentially conceived in terms of 
redistribution, de-commodification, political and socio-economic democratisation. 
Third, they were the organic expression of a primarily working-class constituency and 
they maintain to this day key links with the organised labour movement. This 
commonality of constituency (the handicraft, industrial and later post-industrial 
proletariat) and of broadly-defined goals (democratic socialism) provided the grounds 
for the collaboration between different ideological tendencies and, to a large extent, 
for their coexistence within a common organisational framework (the First 
International, the parties of the Second International, the socialist trade unions, 
cooperatives and subcultural mass organisations).  
Since WWI, however, the movement has been permanently split in at least two main 
grouping: mainstream socialist, social democratic and labour parties versus radical 
communist parties. Smaller intermediate or far left groups have also featured from 
time to time, although with a limited societal weight. 
The initial reasons for the division were the crucial questions of internationalism and 
socialist revolution. In August 1914 the Second International had crumbled like a house 
of cards and the vast majority of "reformist" leaders had rallied to the war efforts of 
their own national aristocracies and bourgeoisies; only the Bolshevik and small 
"revolutionary" minorities continued to oppose it and worked for "the conversion of 
the present imperialist war into a civil war" (Lenin, 1915); a growing number of 
"centrists" took an intermediate position. As the war ended, the conflict shifted on the 
attitude to be taken vis-a-vis the surge of pre-revolutionary ferment sweeping Europe 
and the victorious Russian revolution. While the communists argued for the deepening 
of movement and the replacement of existing state institutions by workers' councils, 
the socialists tended contain it within the boundaries of partial democratic and social 
reforms and, in some cases (Germany), did not shy from overt repression against the 
radicals. 
From the 1920s to the 1980s these original reasons maintained their importance but 
their exact meaning shifted over time. On the first issue, the extent of the 
accommodation of the socialists with the colonial and military policy of their own 
nation-state varied, with frequent shifts from pacifist/neutralist to 
nationalist/Atlanticist tendencies, while the communists increasingly conceived 
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internationalism as the alignment with the Soviet-led camp of "socialist" states. On the 
second issue, the need of a stark choice between reforms and revolution became 
salient only in period of acute crisis and social mobilisation (1919, 1936, 1945, 1968); in 
"normal" periods the two could in principle be reconciled by a common struggle for 
immediate or structural reforms. Thus, the relationship between socialists, 
communists and other minor groupings oscillated between phases of collaboration 
(the "united front" period in the mid-1920s, the "popular front" period in the 1930s, 
the anti-fascist coalitions of 1941-1947, the Italian alliance of the 1950s, the French 
alliance of the 1960s and 1970s) and phases of acute conflict (the "social-fascism" 
period of 1928-1934, the post-1947 cold war years in Germany and France, the 1970s 
repression of radicals in Germany and Italy). The "long boom" of 1947-1973 provided 
the material common ground for an understanding centred on redistributive labour 
struggles, the expansion of the welfare state and Keynesian macro-economic policies. 
Between the 1980s and the 1990s, finally, the relationship between radical and 
moderate left fundamentally changed its nature. Up to this moment socialist parties 
had de facto become integrated in the mechanism of liberal-democratic capitalism, 
although many of them had retained a formal long-term commitment to its 
overcoming; nevertheless, they could be credited with significant efforts in "civilising" 
it (Sassoon, 1996: 768), improving the working and living conditions of wage workers 
and accompanying the democratisation of political and social relations. Afterwards, on 
the other hand, they increasingly moved in the opposite direction. The reforms 
championed by the modernist and "third way" socialist were more and more counter-
reforms which, while falling short of dismantling the achievements of the Fordist 
period, tended to worsen the levels of social protection (labour flexibility, pension 
reforms, welfare retrenchment, wage containment). The contemporary radical left was 
thus reconstituted as the haven for all the opponents of this shift, ranging from reform 
communists to left-wing socialists, Trotskyists, orthodox communists and "new left" 







2.1.1 The inter-war period (1917-1939) 
 
The first half of the Twentieth Century was a period of wars, revolutions, social and 
political upheavals and manifold crises (Hobsbawm, 1995; Carr, 2001; Overy, 2007).  
The pre-war socialist workers' movement, which had been developing for decades 
within a complex but mostly unified cadre, did not survive the shock of WWI. The 
explosion of the Russian Revolution in 1917 sharpened this differentiation and 
favoured the crystallisation of a long-term ideological and organisational split of world 
socialism, with a growing integration of the moderate wings in the institutions of 
liberal-democratic capitalism and the rallying of the radical wings around the newly-
created Third Communist International – the Comintern – and its national sections 
(Broué, 2003). 
The young communist movement hoped to rapidly accomplish the task of a world 
revolution and medium-sized communist parties were established and consolidated in 
each country: the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in Germany (Mallmann, 
1995 and 1996; Weitz, 1997); the Parti Communiste (PC) in France (Martelli, 2009 and 
2010; Courtois & Lazar, 2000); the Partito Comunista d'Italia (PCd'I) in Italy (Agosti, 
2000; Vittoria, 2006). However, the post-war revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 abated 
leaving behind only one surviving proletarian state, Soviet Russia, and its allies pained 
in adapting to a more long-term perspective of societal transformation.  
On the one hand, the contradictions thrown up by the overlapping of class struggle, 
geo-political conflict, economic crises, mass politics and weak institutions continued to 
prevent a stabilisation of the new political regimes, but ultimately benefitted not the 
left but the right, leading to a rising wave of authoritarian and totalitarian right-wing 
regimes. 
On the other hand, the consolidation of a new state-socialist regime under Stalin 
meant the partial subordination of the communist movement to the changing interests 
of the Soviet diplomacy, foreshadowing the future competition between a capitalist 
and a communist international camp. 
In the end, these contradictions were solved through another devastating world war 
(1939-1945). The post-war settlement laid the ground for a radically different Europe 




Political nature: the revolutionary wing of the workers' movement 
 
The social constituency of the inter-war communist parties was firmly anchored in the 
pre-war socialist subculture and did not differ much from that of their moderate rivals. 
The industrial proletariat, encompassing skilled and unskilled manual workers active in 
the modern industry and in the traditional handicraft production, held the hegemony 
within this coalition. A more subordinate role was played by the rural proletariat, 
sections of the peasantry (mostly sharecroppers – mezzadri, métayers, Pächter – and 
small peasants) and the numerically small strata of urban non-manual workers, 
artisans and intellectuals. 
The political projects of communists and socialists were similar in their broad contours 
but differed in important respects. Both parties wished to protect the short-term 
interests of their constituency (working and living conditions, democratic freedoms), 
were committed to theory of class analysis and a practice of class struggle and held a 
common long-term commitment to the establishment of socialism. On the contrary, at 
least four key differences can be identified. First, the precise contours of the future 
socialist society remained largely fuzzy, as few concrete experiences of prefigurative 
experimentation and economic and political management were at hand and 
theoretical reflection was highly abstract and divided. On the political level, however, 
the communists started to conceive it along Leninist (the replacement of the state 
machinery by new organs of workers' power, the councils) and then Stalinist (the 
monopoly of power to the communist parties) lines, while the socialists tended to view 
it as an extension and reform of existing liberal-democratic institutions. Second, the 
former saw the question of the revolutionary transformation and of the building of 
organs of workers' counter-power as an immediate and urgent task, while the latter 
expounded more modest and gradual short-term goals. Third, the former had a clear 
internationalist outlook, while the latter wavered on national and colonial questions. 
Fourth, the moderate and conciliatory stance of the socialist leaders was presented as 
a more realistic road to socialism, but their readiness to compromise on programmatic 
and relational grounds often cast doubts on their actual intentions, especially at times 
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when their stabilising activity seemed to stand in the way of more far-reaching 
transformations (e.g. Germany 1918-1923 and Italy 1919-1920).  
Where the two strands really clashed was at the level of organisational-strategical 
mediations. On the level of strategy, the socialists followed a parliamentary road and 
were open to cross-class alliances (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 3-38) while the communists 
were more intransigent on both accounts. In particular, the goal of the "dictatorship of 
the proletariat" tended to be conceived by the latter in a marked insurrectional and 
monopolistic mould which, along the Russian example, tended to focus on seizing the 
correct moment for the armed seizure of power while disregarding the pursuit of an 
electoral majority and the rights of non-proletarian and non-communist oppositions. 
On the level of organisation, the communists sought to forge disciplined, centralised, 
combat organisations strongly anchored in the key industrial and urban centres21 while 
the socialists tended to carry on with their pre-war national traditions of more 
uncoordinated, decentralised, electoral-oriented and pluralistic parties.   
  
Societal weight: medium parties between hopes and marginalisation 
 
In the period 1918-1939 Communist parties managed to emerge in all three countries 
and to build up a medium (Germany, France) or weak (Italy) level of social influence, 
but remained everywhere dwarfed by their moderate socialist competitors (see TABLE 
2.1). 
A series of problems greatly limited their initial success: their emergence from small 
pre-war radical minorities with weak positions within the recognised leadership of the 
socialist workers' movement; their failure to win the battle for hegemony within the 
traditional socialist parties (Germany, Italy) or their inability to retain it (France); their 
late crystallisation as independent political parties (1920-1921), which took place as 
the height of the post-war revolutionary wave was already abating. By 1925, when the 
                                                     
21
 The pursuit of efficacy ("democratic centralism") did not necessarily entail authoritarian internal 
structures and a lack of internal differentiation. On the contrary, the early communist parties were born 
of a confluence of heterogeneous traditions (revolutionary Marxism, left-wing socialism, syndicalism, 
anarchism, pacifism) and developed a culture of healthy debate between different strategic and tactical 
options. In time, however, a tendency toward ideological homogenisation and bureaucratic centralism 
asserted itself and led to the departure or expulsion of all opponents of the international leadership 
grouped around Stalin.    
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social and political situation was largely stabilised, the emerging communist parties 
represented everywhere a not negligible but clear minority of the socialist camp. 
The effects of their modest starting point and of state repression were compounded by 
a series of disastrous strategic and policy choices: the penchant for adventurist 
insurrections in Germany22, sectarian attitudes toward social democrats and anti-
fascists (especially the early "ultra-left" course of the Italian and German parties and 
the "third period" policies of 1928-1935) and narrow and authoritarian party-building 
methods (e.g. the "Bolshevisation" and "Stalinisation" campaigns).  
In the following years, their fortunes oscillated between brief periods of renewed 
hopes and the threat of marginalisation. In Italy the weak influence of the PCd'I was 
wiped out early by the fascist dictatorship (1922-1925). In Germany the well-organised 
KPD was given a second chance after 1929, but was ultimately out-manoeuvred by the 
National Socialists (1933). In France, finally, the PC experienced an extraordinary 
revival in the mid-1930s, characterised by the turn toward an organic alliance with the 
socialist party, the general strike of Mai-June 1936 and the Front Populaire 
governments (1936-1938). Even these progresses, however, were largely obliterated in 
1939-1940 by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and by the German invasion. 
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 January 1919 in Berlin, April-May 1919 in Munich, March 1920 in the Ruhr area, March 1921 in 




TABLE 2.1 Societal weight, inter-war period (1920-1939) 
 GERMANY   FRANCE   ITALY   
 Aver. Max. Min. Aver. Max. Min. Aver. Max. Min. 
          
Radical left KPD   PC   PCd'I   
Votes 11.4% 16.9% 2.1% 11.2% 15.3% 8.3% 4.2% 4.6% 3.7% 
 1920-1933 Nov 1932 1920 1924-1936 1936 1932 1921-1924 1921 1924 
          
MPs 11.5% 17.1% 0.9% 5.0% 11.8% 1.6% 3.2% 3.6% 2.8% 
 1920-1933 Nov 1932 1920 1924-1936 1936 1932 1921-1924 1924 1921 
          
Members 153,147 282,571 118,661 85,099 269,000 28,825 23,739 42,956 9,000 
 1921-1932 1932 1929 1921-1938 1937 1933 1921-1925 1921 1923 
          
Moderate left SPD   SFIO   PSI+PSU   
Votes 22.9% 29.8% 18.3% 19.6% 20.5% 18.0% 17.8% 24.7% 10.9% 
 1920-1933 1928 1933 1924-1936 1932 1928 1921-1924 1921 1924 
          
MPs 23.4% 31.2% 18.5% 20.1% 24.4% 16.5% 18.6% 28.6% 8.6% 
 1920-1933 1928 1933 1924-1936 1936 1928 1921-1924 1921 1924 
          
Members 1,001,795 1,261,072 806,268 127,338 286,604 49,174 ca. 160,000 - - 
 1920-1933 1923 1925 1921-1938 1937 1922 1921   






Fragmentation: "centrist" socialists, ultra-leftists and other dissidents 
 
The inter-war period was characterised by a high degree of initial fragmentation on the 
radical left, which by the mid-1920s was however largely re-absorbed. 
On the one hand, the battle for the hegemony within the socialist movement tended 
to give birth not to two but to three groups: a "reformist" wing, a "revolutionary" wing 
and an intermediate "centrist" wing. The latter group was supported by considerable 
sections of the socialist leaders, members and voters: the tendencies of Faure in 
France (SFIO) and of Serrati in Italy (PSI) maintained the control of the respective 
socialist parties, while in Germany the pre-war leadership of the SPD (Haase, Kautsky, 
Bernstein) established a short-lived but very influential autonomous Unabhängige 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (USDP, 1917-1922)23. "Centrist" parties found 
an international expression in the Vienna International (1921-1923) but their 
collocation soon proved to be unstable and soon re-joined either the Second or the 
Third International. 
On the other hand, in the very same period significant syndicalist, anarcho-syndicalist 
and left-communist groups remained active at the flanks or outside of the Comintern 
(Gianinazzi, 2006; Bock, 1993). Particularly influential were for instance the Italian 
Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI-AIT), the German Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands 
(FAUD) and the German Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (KAPD).24 As the 
previous category, they rapidly lost ground as the post-war crisis abated. 
In the following decades several dissident groups emerged from the growing purges of 
the Communist parties and from the radicalisation of socialist sectors: PUP and PSOP in 
France, KPD-O and SAPD in Germany, the Trotskyist Fourth International in 1938., 
However, they always remained marginal grouplets and did not survive the 
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 See Krause (1975). In the immediate post-war years the party almost overtook the reformist (M)SPD, 
soaring in 1920 to 20.0% of valid votes (1920) and about 750,000 members. 
24
 With respectively, at their peak, 500,000 members (1920), 150,000 members (1922) and 80,000 





The inter-war period left an important but contradictory legacy. The re-construction of 
the radical left after the caesura of fascism and war was largely undertaken within a 
framework dominated by the theoretical and historical references, practices and 
organisational and biographical continuities with this period: the hatred for the 
betrayals of social democracy and the desire for unity on common labour or anti-
fascist fronts; Leninism and Stalinism; the Russian model of socialism; class versus 
cross-class alliances; the experience of great social mobilisations (1918-1921, 1936, 
1943-45). These elements continued to play a fundamental role well into the 1980s 
and their re-interpretation still affect the identity and outlook of the contemporary 
radical left. After the war, however, both the nature and societal weight of communist 




2.1.2 The welfare-state period (1945-1991) 
 
Unlike its predecessor, the post-WWII settlement paved the way for the most 
extraordinary period of growth of all history, the so-called "golden age" of capitalism 
(1948-1973). The Cold War (Hobsbawn, 1995; Gaddis, 2005) repeatedly brought the 
world on the brink of nuclear catastrophe and fed innumerable conflicts in the 
periphery; in the countries of the core, however, economic development was 
accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of living standards, an increase of social 
equality and mobility and the creation of wide-ranging systems of social insurance and 
welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The Fordist regime of accumulation started to reach its limits after 1967 (Gordon et al., 
1987), as growth slowed down, the international hegemony of the USA was challenged 
and the national class compromises were shaken by mounting struggles of the 
industrial working class, of the growing white-collar salaried strata, of students and of 
every kind of oppressed minority. The Seventies, however, actually represented the 
peak of the post-war developmental model – mixed economy plus welfare state – and 
led to a further democratisation of European societies.  
The Eighties, on the contrary, marked a turn of the tide. Production shifted toward a 
post-Fordist and post-industrial regime of accumulation; slow growth, high 
unemployment and stagnating wages prevailed; and a process of neo-liberalisation 
started a progressive reconfiguration of systems of regulation and of the state itself, 
which will become pronounced after 1989 (Harvey, 2005; Brenner, 2006; Brenner et 
al., 2010; Duménil & Lévy, 2011). 
These enormous economic, social and political transformations radically changed the 
environment within the inter-war workers' movement had developed. While 
vigorously supporting the state-socialist model in the East and the South, communist 
parties gave up the perspective of violent revolution in the West and rethought the 
road to socialism as a long-term process of structural economic, social and political 
reforms of the existing welfare states. The German KPD was severely affected by the 
geo-political context: its Eastern wing went on to become the ruler of the GDR under 
the name of Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, 1949-1990) while its 
Western wing was rapidly marginalised (Herbst et al., 1997; Fülberth, 1990). The 
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Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in Italy and the Parti communiste français (PCF) in 
France, on the contrary, managed to acquire a mass character and a clear 
predominance on the left (Lazar, 1992). The three cornerstone of this construction – 
the cohesion of the industrial working class, the alliance with the new white-collar 
strata and the indirect influence of the Soviet Union – were however slowly 
undermined during the Eighties by the changed social and economic environment. 
With the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989-1991 the history of the 20th century 
communist movement was rapidly brought to an end and a quantitatively and 
qualitatively different contemporary radical left had to take its relay.  
 
Political nature: the radical wing of welfarism 
 
The social constituency of the post-war communist parties was, as in the previous 
period, overwhelmingly popular. Its internal composition, however, changed 
significantly over time in response to the broader socio-economic trends: industrial 
workers remained the most important, although declining, social group and were 
especially prominent among the membership; the role of peasants rapidly declined 
after the 1950s; the influence of the white-collar salaried strata rose rapidly in the 
1960s and afterwards. Another important trend was the rise of economically non 
active strata (housewives, pensioners and students), unemployed workers and 
women.25 This set-up was quite similar to that of continental or Northern social 
democratic countries, while the weaker Italian and French socialist parties tended to 
be rely more on the relatively privileged strata of wage labour (civil servants, teachers, 
white-collar workers, public sector workers) and on non-salaried groups.26 
With the renunciation of insurrection, the acceptance of a gradual parliamentary way 
to socialism and the rethinking of the goal of a Soviet-style socialist society as vague 
long-term objective, the political project of communist parties lost its revolutionary 
character and morphed into a radical version of welfarist project of the times. The 
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 The latter could not be ignored anymore since the gain of the right to vote (1945 in Italy and France) 
and their growing participation to the workforce. Communist membership and electorate, however, 
remained significantly masculine. 
26
 On the French PS see Rimbert (1955), Cayrol (1975), Hardouin (1978), Garraud (1978), Saudon (1988), 
Bergounioux (1989) and Bergounioux and Grunberg (2007).  
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fundamental fracture of the inter-war period was essentially overcome, as both 
communist and socialists became the staunchest supporters of the republican-
democratic institutions while pursuing short-term ameliorative and mid-term 
structural reforms (social security, welfare provisions, public services, nationalisations, 
redistribution, state planning). What divided them in this respect was at most a certain 
degree of radicalism and willingness to accept compromises, which was however 
mostly a by-product of the clear-cut refusal of the rest of the political system – under 
US pressure – to envisage any form of collaboration with the communists. As it was, 
alliances were frequent at the local and even at the national level (Italy in 1945-1956, 
France after 1962). Where a fundamental difference persisted was not on domestic 
but on foreign policy, as the socialists tended to adopt an Atlanticist (and, in France, 
pro-colonial) stance while the communists distanced themselves from the URSS only at 
a snail's pace.  
Important differences also remained on the level of organisational mediations, as the 
shift toward mass communist parties did not entail a revision of the Stalinian modes of 
organisations; PCF, PCI, KPD and DKP continued to reject the formalisation of internal 
pluralism and to expel dissidents. On the level of strategical mediations, on the other 
hand, the parties accepted the need of broad "anti-monopolistic" alliances including 
socialist, liberal and Christian-democratic forces. 
 
Societal weight: the rise and fall of mass communism  
 
The period 1945-1989 represented the historical peak of European communist parties 
(see TABLE 2.2). While in countries such as West Germany their influence waned in the 
early 1950s, in Italy and France they managed to retain a veritable mass influence and 
a clear hegemony over the workers' movement, assuming a position analogous to that 
of the central and northern social democracy.  
The immediate post-war years determined a qualitative change in the patterns of 
communist influence, as the parties were the prime beneficiaries of the climate of anti-
fascist unity and the popular aspirations of social and democratic renewal. In the years 
1944-1947 the PCI, the PCF and KPD all soared at a similar pace, following a path of 
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exponential growth of their membership, electoral results, organisational linkages and 
institutional presence27.  
The onset of the Cold War in 1947 represented a first setback. In Germany the division 
of the country led to a consolidation of a SED-led dictatorship in the East but wiped out 
the KPD in the West28 (Fülberth, 1990). In Italy the Fronte Democratico Popolare 
alliance (PCI, PSI and smaller left-wing parties) was severely defeated at the 1948 
elections. In France the PCF limited the electoral losses but was permanently excluded 
from power and lost its potential socialist ally (SFIO), which adopted a course of 
centrist alliances. 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s the parties tended to stagnate, preserving a very 
important level of support but lacking allies and strategic perspectives. In Italy the 
Socialist Party broke away from the alliance and slowly moved toward the option of 
centre-left governments with the Christian Democrats (1956-1963); in France the 
coming to power of Charles De Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic 
(1958-1962) led to a significant downsizing of both the PCF and the other left forces, 
but posed the preconditions for the future unity of the left. 
The post-1968 decade, on the contrary, led to a sustained membership (France, Italy) 
and electoral (Italy) growth of the communist parties, despite their often ambiguous 
attitude toward the new wave of labour and social militancy. Only the re-established 
German DKP (1968) failed to break through (Fülberth, 1990). The period also saw the 
explosion of a significant "new left" of left-socialist (PSU, PSIUP), left-communist 
(Trotskyists, Maoists, operaisti) and movementist type, which was partially re-
absorbed by the turn of the decade but left behind a rich cultural, social movement 
and partisan legacy. 
 In 1978, finally, a process of more gradual (Italy) or rapid (France) erosion set in. 
Economic crisis, productive restructuring and social change sapped the strength, 
militancy and homogeneity of the labour movement; the experiences of communist 
governmental participation (1976-1979 in Italy, 1981-1984 in France) provoked 
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 As expressed among other things by the communist participation to the early national cabinets in Italy 
and France (1944-1947) and to many regional governments in Germany (the five Eastern regions, Berlin 
1945-1948, Bayern 1945-1946, Bremen 1945-1946 and Niedersachsen 1946-1948).  
28
 The KPD failed to enter parliament in 1953 and was outlawed in 1956. In the subsequent years it 
continued to work illegally behind coalitions such as the Deutsche Friedensunion (DFU, 1961-1984) or 
the Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt (1968-1969). It was later re-established under the name of 
Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, 1968-present). 
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widespread disillusionment; other political forces proved quite effective appealing to 
the rising upper-middle strata of the white-collar wage-workers (the PS in France, the 
PSI in Italy) or to the shrinking lower strata of the blue-collar industrial proletariat (the 
FN in France); the Soviet model, finally, rapidly lost its appeal. At the time of the events 
of 1989-1991, the German radical left remained utterly marginal and the PCF had been 
halved. The PCI, on the contrary, had resisted quite well, but was in the midst of a 
wide-ranging ideological revision which would soon lead it to a complete rejection of 
its communist nature (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009).  
 
 
TABLE 2.2 Societal weight, golden age (1945-1988) 
 GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
 Aver. Max Min Aver. Max Min Aver. Max Min 
          
Radical left KPD/DKP   PCF   PCI   
Votes 1.2% 5.7% 0.0% 20.9% 28.3% 9.5% 25.5% 34.4% 15.5%* 
 1949-1987 1949  1945-1988 Nov 1946 1986 1946-1987 1976 1948 
          
MPs 0.3% 3.7% 0.0% 14.8% 29.0% 1.7% 26.6% 36.2% 15.9%* 
 1949-1987 1949  1945-1988 Nov 1946 1958 1946-1987 1976 1948 
          
Members 63,008 342,000 0 355,955 566,492 220,000 1,768,961 2,252,446 1,462,281 
 1945-1988 1947  1945-1988 1978 1952 1945-1988 1947 1988 
          
Moderate left SPD   SFIO/FGDS/PS   PSI   
Votes 37.7% 45.8% 28.8% 21.3% 36.0% 12.5% 13.3% 20.7% 9.6% 
 1949-1987 1972 1953 1945-1988 1981 1962 1946-1987 1946 1972 
          
MPs 39.2% 46.4% 31.0% 24.2% 54.2% 6.9% 13.3% 20.7% 9.0% 
 1949-1987 1972 1953 1945-1988 1981 1962 1946-1987 1946 1976 
          
Members 795,400 1,022,000 586,000 164,579 355,000 68,000 581,353 860,300 437,458 
 1945-1988 1976 1954 1945-1988 1946 1968 1945-1988 1946 1965 
Sources: Votes and MPs: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, www.france-politique.fr, elezionistorico.interno.it. Members: Kailitz (2004), SPD-Parteivorstand (2002), Martelli (2010b), Melchior (1993), 
Simmons (1969), Ignazi and Ysmal (1998), Istituto Cattaneo.  





Fragmentation: the "new left" 
 
Despite moments of internal disarray and external criticism, the official communist and 
socialist parties completely dominated the left camp in the first post-war decades.29  
The situation partially changes in the Sixties, as the growing radicalism of different 
social sectors sought to find new expressions beyond and sometimes against the "old 
left" parties. In particular, two kinds of "new left" milieus emerged and acquired a 
small but not negligible societal weight. The first one was represented by left-socialist 
splinters. In France the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU, 1960-1990)30 opposed the official 
socialist stance on Algeria and Gaullism and elaborated a radical, libertarian and 
participatory brand of socialism (autogestion), remaining vital until 1981. In Italy the 
Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP, 1964-1972)31 opposed the new 
policy of centre-left governments and later split, strengthening both the PCI and the 
far left. In Germany left-socialist currents were active within and outside the SPD but 
never coalesced in autonomous political parties (Fichter & Lönnendonker, 1977; Arndt 
et al., 1990). The second one was represented by the far left grouplets which boomed 
in the decade 1968-1978 (Bock, 1976; Billi, 2001; Koenen, 2002; Thomas, 2003; 
Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Bianchi & Caminiti, 2007-8; Artous et al., 2008). In France 
they were predominantly Trotskyist: two of them, the Ligue communiste 
révolutionnaire (LCR)32 and Lutte ouvrière (LO)33, had a long history behind them, 
survived the subsequent downturn and re-emerged in the Nineties as important 
components of the contemporary radical left. In Italy a variety of neo-communist and 
operaisti groups populated the field: some of them, as il Manifesto/Partito di Unità 
Proletaria per il Comunismo (PdUP, 1969-1984), were in time re-absorbed by the PCI; 
some other chose an anti-parliamentary path and ended up in experiences of armed 
struggle (Curcio, 2006) or retreated to the field of social movement activism (Mudu, 
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 Attempts of dissident groups such as the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt, 1943-1952) and 
the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (1956-1965) in Italy or the Parti communiste internationaliste 
(PCI, 1944-1952), the Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire (RDR, 1947-1949) and the Union 
Communiste (UC, 1944-1949) in France to emerge failed miserably.   
30
 Tavernier and Cayrol (1969), Kernalegenn et al. (2010). 
31
 Miniati (1981), Pol (2006). 
32
 Turpin (1995), Salles (2005), Filoche (2007).  
33
 Choffat (1991). 
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2012); an intermediate group, Democrazia Proletaria (DP, 1975-1991)34, survived as a 
parliamentary far left force and in 1991 was one of the founding groups of the PRC. 
The smaller German far left mostly remained anchored on a movementist stance; 
some groups followed an insurrectional (Della Porta, 1995) or autonomist path 
(Schwarzmeier, 2001; Schultze & Gross, 1997) while the rest formed the subculture 
from which the ecologist party Die Grünen would emerge in 1980 (Klein & Falter, 
2003). 
The "new left", its cultural and social importance notwithstanding, failed to dent the 
supremacy of the traditional left-wing parties and in the 1980s was largely re-absorbed 
by them. Anti-authoritarianism, pacifist, feminist, environmental and self-managerial 
themes were gradually adopted in a selective and de-potentiated form by both the 
political system and by the logic of social and economic regulation (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005). The radicalism of the educated white-collar strata, on the other hand, 
soon lost its force and partially reverted to the re-establishment of income, wealth and 
status differences vis-a-vis the middle and lower sectors of the workforce (late 1970s-




The contemporary radical left directly takes the cue from the period 1945-1988. Its 
organisations largely originated in the mass communist parties of the period (SED, PCF 
and PCI) and in the post-1968 "new left"; the majority of its leaders were socialised 
politically in the 1960s and 1970s;35 its programmatic and theoretical references 
remain firmly rooted in Marxist, welfarist and movementist elaborations of the 1970s. 
From the early 1980s onwards, however, all sections of the left entered into a 
profound electoral, societal and identitarian crisis. The fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-
1991 and the reconfiguration of international (unipolarism; European integration; neo-
liberal globalisation) and national regimes which followed it provided the basis for a 
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 Billi et al. (1996), Gambetta (2010), Pucciarelli (2011). 
35
 Fausto Bertinotti (born in 1940), Arlette Laguiller (1940), Lothar Bisky (1941), Oskar Lafontaine (1943), 
Robert Hue (1946), Gregor Gysi (1949), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (1951), Klaus Ernst (1954), Oliviero Diliberto 
(1956), Pierre Laurent (1957), Franco Giordano (1957), Nicky Vendola (1958) and Paolo Ferrero (1960). 
Older (George Marchais, 1920; Armando Cossutta, 1926) and younger (Olivier Besancenot, 1974; Katja 
Kipping, 1978) generations were rarer.  
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new dynamic of separation and regroupment, moulding the contemporary radical left 




2.1.3 The neo-liberal period (1991-present) 
 
The tendencies toward slower growth, liberalisations and reconfiguration of the 
welfare state which had emerged in the 1980s experienced a sudden acceleration after 
the fall of the Soviet bloc, marking the beginning of what we can term the present neo-
liberal era. 
The notion of neo-liberalism has gained a wide-spread currency in the recent literature 
but tends to remain poorly defined and ambiguously conceptualised (Mudge, 2008; 
Thorsen, 2009).36 Moreover, interpretations of it origin, nature, empirical development 
and political implications differ strongly (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Harman, 2007; 
Brenner et al., 2010; Cahill et al., 2012). I find the emphasis of neo-Marxist accounts 
(Harvey, 2005; Dumenil & Levy, 2011) on neo-liberalism as a political project of the 
capitalist class – in alliance with high-level managerial strata – to restore its power and 
income share quite convincing. Other contentions of the critical literature, such as the 
insistence on the "intellectual face" of this project (Austrian economics, German ordo-
liberalism, American monetarism) and its association with an alleged "roll back" of the 
state, are not.  
Contrary to the "shock therapies" experienced by many weak countries of the global 
periphery, the paths to neo-liberalisation in the advanced economies did not aim at a 
return to a utopian "minimal state"; what was looked for was not so much a 
retrenchment but rather a re-configuration of the state in a context marked by 
different priorities (the private sector, financial rent, international competitiveness) 
and external constraints (slow growth, a more liberal and integrated international 
regime). As Harman (2007) and Bellofiore (2013) have pointed out, states continue to 
play a fundamental role in the processes of social reproduction and capitalist 
accumulation. Far from being an ideologically-driven process led by market 
fundamentalists, neo-liberalisation was a highly pragmatic enterprise. The ideology of 
the market and of competition was mobilised to drive through large privatisations, to 
shift the burden of fiscal policies and the targets of state expenditures in favour of 
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 It is true that, as the latter author argues, the "concept has become, in some quarters at least, a 
generic term of deprecation describing almost any economic and political development deemed to be 
undesirable" (p. 9). 
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capital incomes to slow-down of the real growth of wages and welfare provisions; at 
the same time, states continued to forcefully intervene to boost aggregate demand, to 
subsidise companies, to improve national competiveness and to rescue ailing 
corporations and banks, and the overall weight of state revenues and expenditures on 
the GDP remained at historically peak levels. 
In Germany, France and Italy neo-liberalism was fairly successful in shifting the income 
and wealth distribution upwards and in partially successful in restoring profit rates 
(which remained lower than the in the Sixties); it was on the other hand incapable of 
reversing the slowing trajectories of accumulation, growth and global economic 
ranking. The post-war model of mixed-economy was largely dismantled in Germany 
and Italy and seriously undermined in France by large-scale privatisations (Mayer, 
2006; Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski, 2013). The drive toward pension, welfare and 
labour reforms, on the other hand, met with significant resistance in all three countries 
and had more mixed results. 
 
Political nature: the isolated welfarism 
 
In an acceleration of the trends developing since the 1970s, the social constituency of 
the radical left in this period lost much of its homogeneity. 
Firstly, the leading weight assumed by a relatively homogeneous industrial working 
class in previous periods (e.g. the 1920s or the 1950s) vanished and left behind a more 
heterogeneous coalition of wage workers traversed by stronger distinctions of gender, 
profession, employment status, sector, education, income, status, age and 
unionisation.  
Secondly, the weight of the economically non-active population rose significantly.  
Thirdly, the class composition of the different levels of the parties somewhat reversed 
its traditional set-up. The old communist parties had a membership with was more 
"proletarian" (blue-collar workers, active wage workers) than their electorate; the 
contemporary radical left showed the opposing tendency, with a particularly marked 
over-representation of pensioners. Similarly, while the former endeavoured with a 
certain success to ensure a large representation of ordinary workers within in their 
central and elected office, for instance through developed policies of education and 
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promotion of the cadres (Pudal, 2002), the latter tend to be dominated by the strata 
with a high cultural and social capital (teachers and professors, civil servants, 
professionals, etc.). 
As a consequence, the social constituency of the contemporary radical left should be 
defined rather as welfarist than as working-class, as it binds together all the social 
groups having a stake in the defence of the social conquests of the Fordist period 
("protected" wage workers in the civil service, public sector and in large private 
enterprises; pensioners; students) or bearing the brunt of its restructuring (the 
unemployed; the younger generations).  
The political project of the contemporary radical left was centred on a mid-term anti-
neoliberal programme coupled with a variety of "new left" themes (environmentalism, 
feminism, minority rights, etc.). Most of the parties37 maintained a long-term formal 
commitment to an anti-capitalist future society, but both its features and its link with 
the former became vaguer. What was crucial, however, was the fact that this welfarist 
project remained fairly powerless and isolated. While in the previous period the 
socialist parties and even non-socialist forces stood behind projects of redistribution, 
social protection and state ownership and planning, in the current period the radical 
left remained alone to defend the legacies of the past while the consensus veered 
toward neo-liberal restructuring.  
The organisation-strategical mediations also changed from the previous period. The 
(Stalinist) monolithic understanding of pre-1989 communist parties was largely ditched 
in favour of a pluralist collaboration between different traditions, sensibilities and 
tendencies – in the form of either broad left parties or broad left alliances. The (social 
democratic and communist) model of a close integration between party and 
subcultural mass organisations was also replaced by a more unstable mode of 
collaboration between autonomous entities. Finally, the weak influence and isolation 
of the radical left forced it to a strategic rethinking. How could an anti-neoliberal turn 
be produced? The moderate left, which in the previous phase had represented an 
actual or potential ally, gradually shifted from being part of the solution to being part 
of the problem.   
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Societal weight: a medium-sized galaxy in an uneven recovery 
 
The decomposition and re-orientation of the Communist movement following the 
events of 1989-1991 left behind itself a fragmented and contradictory landscape. 
Altogether, the societal weight of the radical left parties was at its secular low point 
(see TABLE 2.3).  
The seemingly unstoppable decline of the early 1990s did not lead to the 
disappearance of the radical left and soon made room for a pattern of stabilisation and 
limited growth. Determinant to this outcome were three factors: (i) the programmatic 
right-ward shift and the decreasing capacity of integration of the main socialist, social 
democratic and post-communist competitors (Vampa, 2009; Marlière, 2012; 
Nachtwey, 2013); (ii) the shift of seating cabinets toward frontal attacks to the social 
conquests of the post-war period; (iii) the connected revival of labour and social 
counter-mobilisation (Kouvelakis, 2007).  
This recovery, however, was highly unstable and uneven. From a chronological point of 
view, phases of success (mid-1990s, mid-2000s) alternated with phases of decline 
(early-2000s, late-2000s). From a spatial point of view, the upward trajectory of the 
German left contrasted with a tendential decline of the Italian and French ones. From a 
dimensional point of view, finally, partial successes on the electoral level coexisted 
with a continuing decline of membership and organisational linkages. 
 
 
TABLE 2.3 Societal weight, neoliberal age (1990-2013) 
 GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
 Aver. Max Min Aver. Max Min Aver. Max Min 
          
Radical left all parties   all parties   all parties   
Votes 6.5% 11.9% 2.4% 9.2% 12.1% 7.5% 6.5% 8.6% 4.5% 
 1990-2012 2009 1990 1993-2012 1997 2002 1992-2013 1996 2008 
          
MPs 6.3% 12.2% 0.3% 3.5% 5.9% 1.7% 5.1% 9.0% 0.0% 
 1990-2012 2009 2002 1993-2012 1997 2012 1992-2013 2006 2008 
          
Members 108,835 305,382 68,885 182,015 355,139 86,184 116,262 136,323 77,448 
 1990-2012 1990 2004 1990-2012 1990 2012 1992-2012 2006 2012 
          
Moderate left SPD   PS   PDS-DS-PD   
Votes 33.2% 40.9% 23.0% 23.8% 29.4% 17.6% 23.4% 33.2% 16.1% 
 1990-2013 1998 2009 1993-2012 2012 1993 1992-2013 2008 1992 
          
MPs 35.7% 44.5% 23.5% 31.4% 48.2% 9.5% 28.5% 46.5% 17.0% 
 1990-2013 1998 2009 1993-2012 2012 1993 1992-2013 2013 1992 
          
Members 681,649 885,958 489,638 ca.190,000 - - 652,629 769,944 534,358 
 1992-2011 1992 2011 1992-2011   1992-2011 1992 2002 








Fragmentation: conciliatory vs. intransigent attitudes 
 
The internal crisis and external decline of the communist movement paved the way for 
a fundamental reconfiguration of the radical left, which tended to pursue a confluence 
of different historical traditions and programmatic sensibilities into "broad left" parties 
opposed to neo-liberalism. 
This process of regroupment started in some countries already in the late 1980s 
(Spain, Greece) and was greatly accelerated by the fall of the Soviet bloc. Both in Italy 
and in Germany unitary radical left parties were established in 1990-1991; in France a 
larger coalition was envisaged in the early 1990s but failed to be pursued decisively by 
the PCF.  
In time, however, this model was strained by question of the relationship with the 
moderate left. As the votes and seats of the radical left became increasingly crucial for 
the formation of centre-left governmental majorities, the parties tended to explode in 
competing conciliatory or intransigent faction or to open up the space for alternative 
challengers. In the case of Germany, this outcome was averted by the strict policy of 
the SPD against any collaboration with the PDS at the national level. In the case of 
Italy, the PRC progressively fragmented in a myriad of rival grouplets. In the case of 
France, the governmental participation of the PCF (1997-2002) led to a rise of the 
Trotskyist far left and the permanence of a structural fragmentation, which was 












The contemporary radical left regrouped through the confluence of different 
traditions: neo-communist tendencies, far left grouplets, left-wing socialist splinters 
and social movement organisations. 
This organisational and ideological renewal stopped the tendency toward an 
inexorable decline which had been exhibited by the communist movement in the 
1980s and early 1990s; however, it did not provide the bases for a sustained 
reconstruction of its societal weight. The radical left remained a mid-sized political 
















2.2 The Western European landscape 
 
If the previous section has introduced the historical roots of the radical lefts of my 
three case studies (Germany, France and Italy), I will now situate them within the 
broader landscape of the Western European radical left.  
A full examination of the evolution of the contemporary radical left across Western 
Europe falls outside the scope of this work. Good surveys and attempts to 
generalisations from a medium number of cases have already been provided by March 
(2011), Hudson (2011) and Ducange et al. (2013); the more detailed small-N analysis 
that I undertake in this thesis will serve precisely to illuminate dimensions (e.g. 
organisational, functional and systemic aspects), mechanisms (e.g party activities, 
tactics and competition) and nuances that tend to be underestimated by this strand of 
the literature. 
However, in order to understand the significance of my case studies and identify the 
benchmarks for their comparison it is necessary to relate their specific national 
trajectories with the international trends of this political area. While a comparison of 
many dimensions of societal weight is hampered by the availability of quantitative 
data38, electoral data are easily exploitable for comparative purposes. I will therefore 
sketch the main features of the broader Western European context (fifteen countries) 
relying mainly on an analysis of electoral movements. 
 
 
                                                     
38
 For instance, figures on party membership and finances are limited and often unreliable and 
information on organisation, social linkages and strategies/tactics is hard to operationalise.  
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Overall electoral trends 
 
Observers of the radical left have strongly disagreed on how to judge the overall 
direction of its electoral evolution since 1989. Focusing on the results of 
communist/post-communist parties, the majority of commentators had consistently 
pronounced their irreversible decline (Bell, 1993; Moreau et al., 1998; Ramiro, 2003). 
When broadening the analysis to other "new" radical left forces, verdicts of stagnation 
(March & Mudde, 2005) have coexisted with ones of recovery (March, 2011). The 
volatility of the results of many radical left forces and marked national differences 
have thus prompted a variety of appreciations.   
The recent contribution of De Waele and Vieira (2012) represents an interesting 
attempt to define more precisely the overall electoral evolution of the electoral 
support of the Western European radical left. Their data (10-year averages for 
legislative elections across the EU-15 countries) tend to relativise the widely-held claim 
of a decline of this party family. Firstly, the fall from the "golden age" of the 1960s 
(12.7%) to the trough of the 1990s (7.1%) is indeed significant, but leaves way in the 
2000s to a significant recovery (8.0%). Secondly, in most of the countries the entity of 
the decline is much removed from the nightmare scenarios of the Italian PCI and 
French PCF, which heavily inform many of the existing assessments. Thirdly, the 
contemporary radical left remains a significant electoral force – and, in legislative 
elections, stronger than the ecologist family. 
Their methodology, however, is problematic. Firstly, they seem to exclude the 
countries and elections where the radical left obtained no seats from the calculation. 
Secondly, they introduce a threshold of significance (the gain of at least one 
parliamentary seat) which penalises countries with a fragmented radical left or with 
highly majoritarian electoral systems. Thirdly, they focus on unweighted averages, 
therefore assigning the same weight to countries with extremely large differences in 
population sizes.39 The net result is an overestimation of both the overall levels and 
the extent of the recovery of the 2000s. I will therefore provide my own calculations 
and interpretation of the results. 
                                                     
39
 Luxembourg (about 185,000 valid votes) and Germany (about 46.8 million valid votes) thus bring the 





The database of electoral results was built in the following way. 
 
Geographically, it covers traditional fifteen Western European member states of the 
EU (EU15), excluding later accessions to the European Union (EU27) and other non-EU 
Western European countries40. The comparability of pre-1989 and post-1989 results 
requires considering slight variations of the sample. While the analysis of post-1989 
developments will be conducted on the original panel (series EU15), long-term 
consistency require the exclusion of the East German regions (series EU15WG). 
Moreover, because of the disproportionate weight of the pre-1989 Italian Communist 
Party – around half of the total radical left votes – and its sudden "exit" in 1991 it is 
important to check the robustness of the results by excluding Italy as well (series 
EU15WG-ITALY). 
 
Contrary to previous studies (March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2009; March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I choose to include the results of all 
radical left parties without thresholds of significance, as the exclusion of the votes 
received by small or extra-parliamentary parties seriously distorts the overall picture.41 
A limited number of borderline cases where the attribution of a party to the radical left 
or to another (green, regionalist) political family is uncertain do exist. The Danish SF, 
the Irish SF and the Basque HB have been included, the Dutch GL not. 
 
The data refer to the electoral results of the radical left in national legislative elections. 
The decision to prefer these over elections for the European Parliament, which have 
the advantage of being synchronised, derives from their nature of first-order elections 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980) with the highest stakes – the composition of the parliament and 
                                                     
40
 The first category includes ten former Soviet-bloc states (accessed in 2004 and 2007), one former 
Yugoslavian country (accessed in 2004), Cyprus and Malta (accessed in 2004). The radical left is here 
significant only in Cyrpus, East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia, while is marginal or absent in 
all other countries. The second category includes, leaving aside some micro-states, Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland; the radical left is significant in the first two cases.    
41
 Particularly in countries with significantly restrictive electoral systems (France, UK) and with weak and 
fragmented radical lefts. 
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the formation of a governmental majority – and levels of participation. The only 
problem is presented by France and its peculiar semi-presidential system: legislative 
election remain the crucial ones from the point of view of policy, but participation is 
lower than in presidential elections and, especially since the 2002 alignment, their 
outcome tend to be heavily influenced by the result of the former. I have chosen to 
use legislative data also in this case; the radical left would fare batter with the opposite 
choice.  
 
Instead of 10-year averages (De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I use yearly rolling averages.42 
That enables a very precise identification of conjunctural movements and turning 
points, although the fact that legislative elections are not synchronised means that the 
resulting figures probably lag a couple of years behind the real shifts of public opinion 
(as they refer in average to elections held about two years before).  
 
Finally, thee main figures will be provided: the total number of votes; the simple 
average of the shares of valid votes (%); and the aggregate share or weighted average 
(%).43 The most appropriate measure for determining the overall development of the 
radical left is the latter, as it attributes more weight to the largest countries. Attention 
must nevertheless be paid to cases when the aggregate changes are essentially 
determined by the trend in one or two large countries: this phenomenon can be 




                                                     
42
 On any given year, the average of the 15 countries is calculated on the electoral results of that year or 
of the nearest past electoral year.  
43
 The two definitions are equivalent. The measure can be calculated by dividing the total number of 
radical left votes by the total number of valid votes (aggregate vote share) or by weighing the national 
vote shares for the valid votes of each country (weighted average). 
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Evolution and periodisation 
 
The results are provided in the following tables (FIGURE 2.4 and TABLE 2.5). 
 
TABLE 2.4 Radical left electoral results (EU15 series) 
 
Sources: my calculations from official national results. 
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages.  
 
 
The study of the long-term evolution of the radical left (EU15WG series) points to 
three well-defined developmental stages. 
The first stage (from the late 1970s to the early 1990s) confirms the reality of a 
generalised decline of the radical left. The weighted average shows a dramatic 
retrenchment (13.03% in 1979, 9.70% in 1989 and 4.87% in 1993). If we exclude the 
peculiar case of Italy44 the tendency is attenuated but remains clear (8.48% in 1979, 
5.25% in 1989 and 4.70% in 1993). 
 
                                                     
44
 The Italian Communist Party followed a totally divergent path from the rest of the Western European 
radical left: firstly, it preserved an incredibly large electoral constituency, declining only marginally 
during the 1980s (still 28.24% in the late 1980s, which translated into 56.3% of the aggregate EU15WG 
radical left vote); secondly, it was the only Western communist party which after 1989 abandoned the 
radical left party family for the social-democratic one. The two points are of course related, as it was 
precisely the absence of a large socialist party in Italy which made this course possible (similarly to 
Eastern Europe and unlike the rest of Western Europe).  
 
 
TABLE 2.5 Radical left electoral results (all series), selected years 







Total votes 25,349,775 19,339,863 9,923,355 13,376,827 9,874,737 13,582,427 13,825,368 11,463,371 11,758,431 11,783,176 
Simple % 10.51% 8.22% 5.51% 7.38% 6.04% 7.82% 9.03% 6.33% 7.09% 6.93% 
Weighted % 13.03% 9.70% 4.87% 6.60% 4.92% 6.71% 6.96% 5.67% 5.88% 5.87% 
1b) EU15WG WITHOUT ITALY 
Total votes 13,389,926 8,447,318 7,721,927 10,163,079 7,379,995 10,468,866 12,202,296 8,769,848 9,4888,588 9,364,699 
Simple % 8.94% 6.78% 5.50% 7.30% 5.99% 7.80% 9.35% 6.28% 7.17% 6.96% 
Weighted % 8.48% 5.25% 4.70% 6.16% 4.51% 6.37% 7.52% 5.34% 5.82% 5.73% 
2) EU15 
Total votes   10,950,094 15,467,227 11,381,301 15,935,445 16,102,118 13,197,586 13,841,228 13,705,449 
Simple %   5.65% 7.65% 6.23% 8.08% 9.24% 6.56% 7.33% 7.15% 
Weighted %   5.12% 7.25% 5.40% 7.50% 7.76% 6.21% 6.61% 6.51% 
3) COUNTRIES 
AUSTRIA 0.96% 0.72% 0.55% 0.48% 0.64% 1.06% 0.81% 0.39% 0.83% 0.58% 
BELGIUM 3.30% 2.08% 0.67% 0.87% 0.49% 1.43% 1.97% 0.46% 0.96% 1.09% 
DENMARK 11.84% 14.45% 9.96% 10.26% 8.77% 15.20% 16.04% 10.12% 11.14% 11.48% 
FINLAND 18.00% 9.39% 10.30% 11.77% 11.20% 9.61% 8.56% 11.15% 10.41% 10.44% 
FRANCE 23.89% 11.68% 10.96% 12.46% 7.64% 8.03% 7.89% 11.78% 7.84% 9.38% 
W. GERMANY 0.44% 0.04% 0.31% 1.13% 1.08% 4.89% 8.30% 0.88% 4.77% 3.20% 
GERMANY   2.45% 5.12% 4.00% 8.84% 11.97% 4.30% 8.14% 6.05% 
GREECE 12.34% 11.33% 7.65% 15.45% 11.50% 13.93% 31.85% 11.91% 12.51% 15.53% 
IRELAND 1.79% 6.79% 5.06% 6.31% 7.71% 8.20% 12.75% 5.68% 7.97% 8.24% 
ITALY 32.61% 28.24% 5.61% 8.57% 6.72% 8.16% 4.45% 7.11% 6.47% 6.49% 
LUXEMBOURG 4.90% 4.40% 4.40% 3.30% 2.80% 2.80% 4.70% 3.07% 3.75% 3.31% 
NETHERLANDS 2.99% 0.57% 0.57% 3.59% 6.37% 16.58% 9.65% 2.15% 9.68% 7.77% 
PORTUGAL 23.38% 15.38% 11.19% 12.50% 10.70% 15.27% 14.89% 11.40% 15.13% 13.50% 
SPAIN 15.01% 11.97% 10.64% 11.38% 5.04% 5.04% 7.10% 11.16% 4.96% 7.31% 
SWEDEN 6.00% 5.84% 4.15% 11.99% 8.50% 5.87% 5.63% 8.17% 7.15% 7.05% 
UK 0.26% 0.35% 0.27% 0.67% 1.40% 1.21% 0.82% 0.54% 1.30% 0.84% 
Sources: my calculations from official national results. 
Notes: legislative elections, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages. Simple % = simple average of shares of valid votes. Weighted % = weighted average of shares of valid votes. EU15WG 
excludes East Germany and Berlin, EU15 includes them. 
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The twin electoral and identity crisis affected all countries but was most significant in 
the traditional strongholds of Western European communism, where existing 
communist parties either strongly declined (France, Portugal, Finland, Spain and 
Greece) or altogether abandoned the party family (Italy).  
The second stage (mid-to-late 1990s), on the other hand, shows a recovery which is 
strong and similarly generalised. The trend concerned all countries with only one 
exception (Denmark) and, in seven cases, went beyond the pre-1989 results. In 1999 
the weighted average figure rose to 6.60%, excluding Italy 6.15%. The shock of the fall 
of the Soviet bloc thus did not ultimately lead to the disappearance of the communist 
party family but rather to its revival under a new guise.  
The third stage (from 2000 onwards), finally, sees a break-down of common trends and 
a coming to the fore of national specificities and trajectories. The overall development 
is slightly upwards but present violent oscillations (down to 4.92% in 2004, up to 6.71% 
in 2007 then stable to 6.96% in 2012). Similarly, national series are extremely volatile, 
booming to unprecedented peaks (31.85% in Greece, 16.58% in the Netherlands, 
16.05% in Denmark, 12.75% in Ireland, 8.29% in Western Germany) and collapsing to 
unheard-of troughs (3.88% in Spain, 4.45% Italy, 5.63% in Sweden, 7.64% in France).  
Altogether, the average 1990-2013 legislative results of the radical left qualify it as a 
mid-sized political force (5.87%). What in the late 1990s seemed to be a uniform 
tendency toward growth fragmented into a variety of national trajectories, influenced 
in particular by the ability of each party in posing as a credible electoral representative 
of significant social grievances and mobilisations (workers' rights, unemployment, 
economic crisis, anti-EU mood) and by the constraints of alliance and coalition policies. 
 
The study of series EU15 (including Eastern Germany) shows a very similar dynamics, 
but with significant higher levels (1993: 5.12%; 2007: 7.50%; 2012: 7.76%; average: 
6.51%).  
Only if we look at simple averages the setbacks (1999-2004) are attenuated and the 
growth becomes less cyclical and more powerful (1993: 5.65%; 2007: 8.08%; 2012: 








The geography of this new radical left is partially different from that of the old 
communist left (see TABLE 2.6). 
 
As far as electoral strength is concerned, the contemporary radical left consistently 
fared well (more than 9%) in five countries – the traditional strongholds Greece, 
Portugal, Denmark, Finland and France; it remained fairly immaterial (below 2%) in 
three countries – the traditionally weak Austria, UK and Belgium; and fared in-between 
in the remaining seven countries. This group embraces the most surprising 
developments, i.e. the decline of the Spanish and Italian radical lefts and the rise of the 
German, Dutch and Irish ones. As far as weight is concerned, the absolute dominance 
of the Italian Communist Party gave place to a more polycentric set-up where the 
declining Italian, French and Spanish and the rising German, Greek and Dutch radical 
lefts vied for prominence.  
 
The combined weight of the German, French and Italian radical left declined from an 
absolute predominance before 1989 (74.32% of the total radical votes in 1979, 71.15% 
in 1989), to much lower levels in the period 1992-2013 (in average 58.08%). This was 
the consequence of the decline of the French Communist Party in the 1980s and of the 
defection of the Italian Communist party in 1991, which were hardly compensated by 





TABLE 2.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT 







AUSTRIA 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 
BELGIUM 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 
DENMARK 1.5% 2.5% 2.9% 2.3% 2.6% 3.3% 3.5% 2.6% 3.0% 2.9% 
FINLAND 2.1% 1.4% 2.6% 2.0% 2.7% 1.7% 1.6% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 
FRANCE 26.5% 14.8% 25.5% 20.4% 17.3% 13.1% 12.7% 22.6% 14.7% 18.0% 
GERMANY* 0.7% 0.1% 10.4% 16.3% 16.8% 26.2% 32.2% 15.7% 27.5% 22.5% 
GREECE 2.5% 3.9% 4.8% 6.8% 7.1% 6.3% 12.2% 6.1% 6.4% 6.9% 
IRELAND 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 1.3% 1.1% 1.8% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1% 
ITALY 47.2% 56.3% 20.1% 20.8% 21.8% 19.5% 10.1% 20.4% 16.4% 17.6% 
LUXEMBOURG 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NETHERLANDS 1.0% 0.3% 0.5% 2.0% 5.4% 10.2% 5.7% 1.4% 7.8% 4.8% 
PORTUGAL 5.4% 4.4% 5.7% 4.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.0% 4.8% 5.8% 5.3% 
SPAIN 10.6% 12.7% 22.9% 18.4% 12.3% 8.2% 10.9% 18.3% 9.2% 13.4% 
SWEDEN 1.3% 1.6% 2.3% 4.1% 3.9% 2.0% 2.1% 3.3% 2.7% 2.9% 
UK 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 1.3% 3.2% 2.1% 1.5% 1.3% 2.3% 1.8% 
EU15 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sources: my calculations from official national results. 











This political area also shows a significant level of fragmentation (see TABLE 2.7), which 
partly derives from the legacy of historical divisions (e.g. orthodox communists vs. 
heterodox or new left grouplets) and partly from more actual cleavages (e.g. 
conciliatory vs. intransigent stances, regionalism, post-materialism).  





SIGNIFICANT PARTIES  
(>0.50% votes) 





   AVER. 
1990-2013 
MIN. MAX.  
Austria 2 1 – KPÖ 1.07 1.00 (sev.) 1.28 (2002) 96.81% 
Belgium 3 1 - PVDA/PTB 1.88 1.55 (2010) 2.32 (2007) 66.57% 
Denmark 2 2 - SF, EL 1.65 1.32 (2007) 1.95 (2011) 72.42% 
Finland 4 1 – VAS 1.13 1.03 (1995) 1.26 (2003) 94.01% 
France 3 3 – PCF/FdG, LO, LCR/NPA 1.88 1.29 (2012) 2.73 (2007) 72.33% 
Germany 1 1 - PDS/L.PDS/DIE LINKE 1.01 1.00 (2002) 1.03 (2005) 99.34% 
Greece 9 3 - KKE, 
KKE(e)/SYN/SYRIZA, DIKKI 
2.15 1.09 (1990) 3.09 (1996) *39.63% 
Ireland 3 3 - SF, DL, SP 1.94 1.38 (sev.) 2.95 (1997) 63.86% 
Italy 4 3 - PRC, SEL, PdCI 1.47 1.00 (sev.) 2.14 (2013) *63.79% 
Luxembourg 2 2 - DEI LENK, KPL 1.59 1.00 (1999) 1.86 (2004) *58.14% 
the Netherlands 3 1 – SP 1.05 1.00 (sev.) 1.27 (1994) 97.93% 
Portugal 4 3 – PCP/CDU, BE, 
PCTP/MRPP 
1.91 1.52 (1991) 2.25 (2011) 64.21% 
Spain 4 1 – IU 1.13 1.03 (2004) 1.23 (2000) 93.98% 
Sweden 4 1 – V 1.01 1.00 (sev.) 1.03 (2002) 99.65% 
United Kingdom 0 1 – SF 2.31 1.34 (1992) 3.19 (2001) 63.57% 
AVERAGE 3.20 1.80 1.55 1.17 1.97 76.42% 
Notes: "national lists" refers to the maximum number of radical left list present at a legislative election of the period; parties 
present in less than half of the constituencies are excluded (France and the UK are particularly affected); * indicate that the 
leading party ran at least one election as part of a coalition (computed separately), the reported share thus being lower than 
expected. Italy: 1992-2013. 
    
In average, the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) index is 1.55 and the 
leading party gathers 76.42% of the votes. While in six countries the radical left is 
represented by one virtually unchallenged party, the remaining nine countries see the 
competition of two or three viable organisations, often resulting into a whirlwind of 
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 It is notably the case of three strong (Greece, France, Portugal), two mid-sized (Ireland, Italy) and 
three weak (the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg) radical lefts. Only in Denmark two radical left 






As far as origins, ideology and organisational solutions are concerned, the 
contemporary radical left shows a much greater pluralism and diversity than the old 
communist movement (March, 2011). A predominant profile does exist but several 
parties have preserved more distinctive characteristics. 
The majority of forces have their origin in traditional communist parties,46 have 
maintained a loose long-term commitment to a post-capitalist future while developing 
a more modern programmatics centred on a mid-term programme of defence of the 
welfare state, political representation of wage-workers and promotion of left-
libertarian values and have sought to favour the cohabitation under a common 
organisation of different political traditions and sensibilities, often in the form of semi-
permanent electoral coalitions (e.g. IU, SYN/SYRIZA, FdG) or full-fledged mergers (e.g. 
VAS, PRC, EL, BE, DIE LINKE, SEL).47  
 
 
Explaining growth and decline 
 
Is it possible to identify the main drives of the electoral growth and decline of the 
radical left? 
March and Rommerskirchen (2011:200), on the basis of a tobit regression model, point 
to the positive influence of "previous representation in parliament; high opposition to 
the EU; high unemployment; an absence of an electoral threshold; whether the RLP 
operates in a former communist country; the absence of competing radical right and 
green parties; higher multipartism and, finally, higher voter turnout". My more limited 
analysis provides the following results. 
                                                     
46 Others, on the other hand, have a predominantly Trotskyist (BE, LO, LCR/NPA, the Irish SP), Maoist 
(the Dutch SP, PVDA/PTB, PCTP/MRPP), left social democratic (DIKKI, sections of DIE LINKE and of the 
FdG) or left nationalist (the Irish SF) background. 
47
 Again, many smaller parties have instead maintained a more clear-cut commitment to distinctive 
ideological mindsets (e.g. the communist KKE, the Trotskyist LO, the Maoist PVDA/PTB and PCTP/MRPP). 
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Firstly, the increasing involvement of radical left parties into centre-left governmental 
coalitions proved to be a serious obstacle to their further growth (see TAB 2.8).    
 
TABLE 2.8 GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION OF RADICAL LEFT PARTIES, 1965-2013 































GREECE SYN 1989-1990 governmental participation (grand coalition) 




















governmental participation (military cabinets) 
external support 
SPAIN IU 2004-2008 external support 
SWEDEN V 1998-2006 external support 
 
While before 1989 the governmental involvement of communist or post-communist 
parties was severely limited by geopolitical and national consideration (five countries, 
six cases, 21 years), the participation of the parties of the new radical left significantly 
increased both quantitatively (nine countries, fourteen cases, 52 years) and 
qualitatively (more instances of direct governmental participation). This change was 
the product of multiple factors: the loss of salience of anti-communist vetoes; the 
more competitive nature of many national party systems, where the seats of the 
radical left often became necessary for the establishment of a centre-left 
parliamentary majority; the moderate and conciliatory path taken by several radical 
left parties, which preferred pragmatic "lesser evilism" to an anti-systemic stance. 
These experiences (Olsen et al. , 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011), however, were highly 
damaging and tended to provoke large vote losses, splits and internal crises.48 Some of 
them (Italy 2008, France 2002) even turned into a nightmare scenario, where the 
governing radical left party simultaneously lost votes to its left and to its right. In brief, 
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 In all instances of (direct or external) governmental participation radical left parties declined, with 
little difference between the two categories. The loss of share of votes was in average 30.58%. The most 
damaging episodes were those of Italy 2006-2008 (-62.25%), Sweden 1998-2006 (-51.21%) and France 




the very electoral success of radical left parties tended to force them to enter into 
centre-left coalitions, thereby breaking their ascent. 
Secondly, however, the lack of governmental involvement did not automatically 
translate into successes. The adoption of a policy of frontal criticism toward the main 
social-democratic party currently in office generally tended to increase the vote share 
of the radical left, but with numerous exceptions49. Similarly, the radical left tended to 
benefit from the left-wing discontent against seating right-wing cabinets, but again 
with numerous exceptions50. Both the greatest increases (e.g. Greece 2012, the 
Netherlands 2006, Germany 2005, Sweden 1998) and the greatest losses (e.g. Spain 
2000, the Netherlands 2010, Portugal 2011) occurred in every kind of governmental 
constellation. Thus, while governmental participation and external support seem to be 
to be an unquestionably bad choice for radical left parties, their opposition to great 
coalitions, centre-left and centre-right cabinets (in this order) does not yield uniform 
results: although mostly favourable, it leads to strong gains in only a minority of cases 
and it can sometimes accompany significant losses. 
Thirdly, the radical left involvement into wide-ranging social mobilisations (such as 
strike waves or large anti-governmental campaigns) seems to be one of the main 
preconditions for big electoral gains. The presence of large general strikes, waves of 
industrial action and protest movements in the years leading up to the general election 
appears as a crucial factor in helping to catalyse the popular dissatisfaction toward the 
radical left, rather than toward other opposition parties. While not always decisive 
(e.g. Portugal 2011 or France 2007, where large movements were followed by severe 
defeats or stagnations), it was indeed there in all ten instances of significant radical left 
surges51.  
Fourthly, the fragmentation of the radical left has a serious impact on its overall social 
and political impact but not on its electoral results. Large splits which disrupted the 
organisation, activist base and public perception of a party were regularly followed by 
short-term losses (e.g. Ireland 1992, Greece 1993, Italy 2001 and Luxembourg 2004). In 
                                                     
49
 Six out of eighteen cases: Finland 2007, Germany 2002, Greece 2000 and 2004, Portugal 2002 and 
2011.  
50
 Eight out of twenty-six cases: Finland 2011, France 2012, Greece 1993 and 2009, Portugal 1995, Spain 
2000 and 2004, Sweden 2010.  
51
 Defined by a gain of at least 40% of vote share: the Netherlands 2006, Greece May 2012, Germany 
2005 and 2009, Denmark 2007, Ireland 2011, Italy 1996, Portugal 2005, Spain 2011 and Sweden 2008.   
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the long-term, instead, the competition of several radical left parties (especially if of a 




In conclusion, the analysis confirms the reality of both a long and almost generalised 
decline of Western European communism, which set in at the end of the late 1970s 
and exploded in a terminal electoral and existential crisis with the fall of the Soviet 
bloc (Ramiro, 2003), and of the new beginning of a transformed radical left from the 
mid-1990s onwards. The recovery was however limited, unsteady and uneven.  
On the first account, weighted average electoral results of the radical left during the 
entire period 1992-2013 were 5.87% (excluding the former East Germany) or 6.51% 
(including it), still much lower than the communist scores of the late 1980s (9.70%). 
Even if we exclude Italy, which plays a disproportionate role in the sample, the results 
become only barely superior to those before 1989.  
On the second account, party-specific and country-specific results remained highly 
volatile and liable to sudden upturns and downturns52.  
On the third account, the internal geography of the Western European radical left was 
constantly reconfigured, as many of the countries with the strongest communist 
traditions continued to slide or stagnate (Spain, France, Italy and Finland), some with 
weak traditions grew rapidly (Western Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland) and one 
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 The average relative standard deviation was 38.86% and reached in some countries (the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium, Greece, the United Kingdom) more than 50%. From one election to another the 
result could rise by 160.28% (the Netherlands 2006) or 14.06 percentage points (Greece 2012) and fall 





The present chapter has set the stage for the discussion of the specific national 
trajectories of the contemporary German, French and Italian radical lefts by analysing 
their historical roots and their broader geographical context. 
The exceptional importance that their precursors (SED, PCF and PCI) had in the in post-
WWII period was replaced by a more marginal and uncertain role after 1989; 
nevertheless, the three case studies retained a central position within the landscape of 
the Western European radical left. Moreover, the electoral recovery of the mid-1990s 
from the deep crisis of the years 1989-1993 seemed to provide the foundations for a 
renewal of this political family and its shift toward new features and dynamics.  




CHAPTER THREE. THE GERMAN 
RADICAL LEFT: A SUCCESS STORY? 
 
 
3.1 The national context 
 
The developmental path of the contemporary German radical left has aroused 
considerable interest from commentators and political scientists alike. And, indeed, its 
history presents many enticing features for a student of contemporary politics. 
First, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)53 was one of the few former Soviet-bloc 
ruling parties which successfully survived the post-1989 democratic transition as a 
radical leftist parliamentary force. This simple anomaly was transformed into a political 
enormity by the 1990 incorporation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which thereby transferred a piece of communist 
history in a country with deep anti-communist traditions. 
Second, the developments of the period 2003-2009 remain to this day the clearest 
example of success of the radical left in a large European nation. Against the 
background of massive discontent toward the policies of the Schröder government, a 
new splinter movement emerged (the Electoral Alternative Labour and Social Justice, 
WASG)54, allied itself with the PDS in the 2005 federal elections and finally merged with 
the latter in 2007 (The Left, DIE LINKE). The new entity represented the most 
significant European case of a break-up of the "new" social democracy: while in other 
European countries the radical left tended to win over only marginal figures and 
tendencies, in Germany it could count on the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine, the 
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 A legal continuation of the GDR ruling party Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, shorthand SED), it was renamed SED-PDS on December 1989 and then 
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (shorthand PDS) on February 1990. It changed again its name in 
The Left Party.PDS (Die Linkspartei.PDS, shorthand Die Linke.PDS) on July 2005. It will be henceforth 
referred to simply as PDS.   
54
 The group was established in July 2004 as an association (Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale 
Gerechtigkeit e.V.) and transformed in January 2005 in a party (Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die 
Wahlalternative, shorthand WASG).  
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former social democratic candidate for chancellor (1990) and party chairman (1995-
1999). Moreover, DIE LINKE managed to establish a foothold in areas where it started 
almost from scratch (the Western regions of the country) and made large inroads 
among the general public and in particular among the former social democratic 
electorate.  
Third, this electoral success had the effect of destabilising the overall dynamics of the 
German party system. Whereas the rise of the Greens in the 1980s had gradually 
transformed the traditional "two-and-a-half-party system" (Blondel, 1968) into a 
bipolar competition between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, the emergence of 
a fifth relevant party threatened to prevent both camps from reaching a majority55, 
thus ushering in an era of unstable left-right coalitions. The party system has been 
unravelling ever since, with an ailing SPD facing the stark dilemma between a grand 
coalition with the CDU (its choice in 2005-2009), permanent exclusion from power or 
an unprecedented red-red-green experiment, officially rejected but frequently hinted 
at by pundits and second-line politicians (Jesse, 1997; Neu, 2001; Hirscher, 2001; Spier, 
2009; Hough, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010). 
Fourthly, the German radical left has arguably become a sort of role model for its 
brother parties across the EU. The PDS has had a central role within both the European 
Parliament group GUE/NGL and on the establishment of the transnational Party of the 
European Left (PEL) in 2004; its political foundation Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung has 
become an important site of theoretical debate; the experience of DIE LINKE, finally, 
has inspired projects of left regroupment in a variety of other countries such as Italy 
and France.  




The emergence of the post-1989 German radical left cannot be understood but in the 
context of three major historical "shocks" which destabilised the traditional alignments 
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 The threat became a reality twice, in 2005 and 2013. 
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between individual citizens, social organisations and political parties and creating 
fertile grounds for social eruptions and partial de-alignments. 
 
The first shock was the crisis of the GDR in 1989/1990, its rapid incorporation in the 
FRG and the lasting consequences of reunification.  
In the 1980s the GDR regime started to show increasing signs of economic and 
legitimacy crisis, which rapidly accelerated since 1988 and morphed into a full-fledged 
political revolution in the autumn of 1989 (Föster & Roski, 1990; Lohmann, 1994; 
Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2004 and 2006; Segert, 2009; Steiner, 2010). The 
movement briefly propelled at its helm a variety of predominantly intellectual left-
wing civic organisations (Bürgerbewegungen) but the mood soon shifted in favour of 
centre-right forces, which triumphed at the 18 March 1990 Volkskammer elections and 
paved the way for the subsequent currency union on 1 July and unification on 3 
October.  
The successive developments, however, did not entirely live up to the hopes of 
"blossoming landscapes".56 From a socio-economic point of view, the East German 
economy was thoroughly de-industrialised and large swathes of its populations were 
plunged into unemployment, early retirement and internal migration; at the same 
time, a huge influx of public transfers investments avoided a recession and ensured a 
large improvement of monetary living standards (Roesler, 1994; Wiesenthal, 2003; 
Burda, 2013). From a socio-political point of view, the modalities of the unification 
process elicited a growing dissatisfaction. While the discontent was initially largely 
limited to the downardly-mobile former bureaucracy, more and more Ossis 
(Easterners) came to resent the "colonisation" by Western institutions and personnel,57 
their status as "second class citizens", the devaluation of their titles and biographies 
and the disregard for their specific values and interests (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann, 
1996; Bürklin & Rebenstorf, 1997; Wiesenthal, 1998; Fuchs, 1999; Brie, 2000; Neller & 
Thaidigsmann, 2002; Goedicke, 2003; Kunze, 2008; Hodgin & Pearce, 2011). The 
former GDR thus came to occupy a peculiar place within the landscape of the new 
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 In German blühende Landschaften (Kohl, 1990). 
57
 By the mid-1990s Westerners owned 80% of the whole privatised sector and made up more that 40% 
of the top layer of the elite of the neue Bundesländer. 
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Berlin republic and acquired specific economic, social, political and cultural features 
which persist to this day. 
The extent of the dissatisfaction reached its apex in 1992-1993, when a large wave of 
industrial and street mobilisation erupted in response to the privatisation of the 
Eastern state-owned sector by the Treuhand, which resulted not in the revitalisation 
but in the winding-up of much the former state-owned sector (Roesler, 1992; Garms, 
1994; Gehrke, 1997). It was in this context that the initially discredited and declining 
PDS managed to revive its fortunes as a left-wing regional party, claiming the sole 
representation of East German interests against the "Bonn parties". 
 
The second shock was the return to power of the social democratic party in 1998, after 
sixteen years of opposition, and the neo-liberal course staunchly pursued by it in its 
seven years of office (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013). 
The open turn away from traditional values and solutions became soon apparent, as 
exemplified by the replacement of the Keynesian Oskar Lafontaine as Minister of 
Finance (1999), the Kosovo military mission (1999), the tax reform (2000) and the 
pension reform (2001). During the first term, however, dissatisfaction remained 
confined to left-wing activist circles and did not result in heavy electoral losses. It was 
only in March 2003, when the re-elected Schröder cabinet unveiled its ambitious plans 
for a reform of the labour market (AGENDA 2010), that discontent acquired mass 
dimensions. A rift opened within the traditional constituency of the SPD (members, 
voters and collateral organisations) and in 2003-2004 the biggest wave of street 
mobilisations since unification occupied for two years the forefront of the political 
scene (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006). Although the movement 
failed to prevent the implementation of the reform, it provided the backdrop for the 
formation of a new radical left challenger (WASG) and for the electoral successes of 
the radical left along the whole 2005-2009 electoral cycle. 
 
The third shock was the great financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
While milder than in other European countries, the crisis has further undermined the 
stability of the German party system. At the electoral level, in 2009 the number of valid 
votes fell to 69.8% of the electorate and both partners of the outgoing grand coalition 
(CDU/CSU and SPD) collapsed to their lowest vote share since 1949. The following 
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period remained characterised by an extreme volatility, with the emergence of new 
parties (PIRATEN, Alternative für Deutschland) and large oscillations in opinion poll 
ratings and local election results.58 Moreover, the country witnessed another 
impressive wave of contentious politics: the student movement of autumn 2009 
(Himpele, 2009; Sergan, 2009); the huge environmental mobilisations of 2009-2011 
(Roose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Rucht, 2010); and a variety of smaller movements 
(Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010). 
 
Was the radical left able to seize the opportunities offered by these historic turns to 
embark on a path of renewal and growth?  
 
 
Radical left responses 
 
The starting situation of the 1980s was not favourable to the emergence of a strong 
radical left. In the West communist and far left groups had always been quite marginal; 
the extra-parliamentary left largely collapsed in 1989-199059 while the left-wing 
tendencies in the SPD (Walter, 2007) and Greens (Klein & Falter, 2003) also lost 
weight. In the East socialist ideas remained monopolised by the authoritarian practices 
of the SED while oppositional groups remained small and isolated. 
The crisis of 1989-90 had the unlikely outcome of leading to the convergence of many 
of these groups around a reformed rump of the SED, the PDS (Bortfeldt, 1992; Gerner, 
1993).60 The pressure from the streets forced the SED through a rapid process of 
adaptation. After a long internal battle, the new organisation opted for an interesting 
mix of continuities and discontinuities couched around a radical-democratic version of 
"democratic socialism". The legacy of the past made the party unpalatable in the West 
and little appealing in the East; however, its gain of parliamentary representation and 
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 See http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm. 
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 See Fülberth (1990) on the orthodox Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP), Steffen (2002) on the 
Maoist Kommunistischer Bund (KB); Jünke (2001) on the Trotskyist/Maoist Vereinigte Sozialistische 
Partei (VSP); Schultze and Gross (1997) and Schwarzmeier (2001) on the Autonomen.  
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the efforts of its new modernising leadership transformed it into a key future point of 
reference for all kinds of disaffected left-wingers. In the following years (1991-1998) 
the PDS consolidated as a sizeable force in the East (Brie et al., 1995; Neugebauer & 
Stöss, 1996; Barker, 1998; Brie & Woderich, 2000; Oswald, 2002; Gerth, 2002). The 
party survived the initial attempts of political and economic strangulation61 and, by 
1992, experienced a turnaround in its electoral fortunes, intercepting the disparate 
grievances of large sectors of the Eastern population. It thus embarked on a path of 
constant growth which brought it from 2.4% of valid votes in 1990 (East 11.1%, West 
0.3%)62 to 5.1% in 1998 (East 21.6%, West 1.2%). The former Stalinist ruling party had 
become a successful regional socialist party. 
The PDS, however, was not able to fully profit from the tensions produced by the neo-
liberal orientation of the Schröder government (Olsen; 2002; Hough, 2002; Bortfeldt, 
2003; Brie, 2003; Meuche-Mäker, 2005; Thompson, 2005). Despite promising gains in 
the preceding European and regional elections, in 2002 it collapsed to 4.0% (East 
16.9%, West 1.1%) and its representation was reduced to only two MPs. The outcome 
was unexpected and was largely the product of a last-minute swing toward the SPD in 
response to extraordinary circumstances (Stöss & Neugebauer, 2002).63 Moreover, its 
disastrous governmental experiences in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998-2006) and 
Berlin (2001-2011) weakened the local branches and tarnished the global image of the 
party as an alternative and consequently anti-neoliberal force.  
The tide turned again with the 2003-2004 wave of social mobilisation, which led to the 
resurgence of the PDS the East and the rise of a new potential challenger or ally in the 
West: the WASG. Sagely, the initially competitive relationship between the two radical 
left groups was rapidly steered toward an electoral alliance in Spring 2005 and a full-
blown merger in June 2007 (Brie et al., 2005 and 2007; Heunemann, 2006; Hübner & 
Strohschneider, 2007; Spier et al., 2007; Hough et al., 2007; Fülberth, 2008; Jesse & 
Lang, 2008; Patton, 2011). 




 When not otherwise stated, in this chapter the terms will be used with reference to the former 
Federal Republic of Germany territory plus West Berlin (West) and the former German Democratic 
Republic plus East Berlin (East) – and not to the division between old and new Länder of the FRG.  
63
 The key factor was probably the sudden rise of the popularity of Schröder in the East following its 
opposition to the Iraq war and its skilful management of the Elbe floods. The temporary retreat of Gysi 
from the political scene is also likely to have had an important impact.  
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The new party, DIE LINKE, was able to capitalise the wave of revulsion toward the SPD 
and boomed to unprecedented levels, reaching 8.7% in 2005 (East 25.4%, West 4.9%) 
and 11.9% in 2009 (East 28.5%, West 8.3%).  
The largest capitalist crisis since 1929, finally, did not favour DIE LINKE. Firstly, Merkel's 
CDU strongly increased its consent thanks to the quick economic recovery and a 
cautious and non-divisive style of governance. Secondly, the return of the SPD to the 
opposition changed the patterns of political competition and enabled it to recover 
some of the consent it had lost while in government. Thirdly, the lack of tangible short-
term results and strategic perspectives of the radical left led to a demobilisation of its 
electorate and its defection to mainstream or alternative "protest" options (Piraten, 
Green and AfD). Fourthly, labour and anti-crisis protests were quickly superseded by 
mobilisations on "post-materialist" themes (e.g. environmental problems). Finally, 
internal infighting around the issue of governmental participation and the retreat of 
Oskar Lafontaine from the political frontline compounded the above-mentioned 
problems. Since 2011 the party has been credited by pollsters with a mere 6-8% of the 





The present chapter will analyse in more detail this trajectory. 
In section 3.2 I will map out the contours of the German radical left over the last 25 
years. First of all, I will track the evolution of its societal weight and the imbalances 
between electoral growth, organisational decline and lack of governmental weight. 
Secondly, I will underline the remarkably low level of fragmentation of this political 
area and its capacity to initiate significant processes of regroupment, such as the shift 
from regional (PDS) to all-German (DIE LINKE) foundations. Thirdly, I will examine the 
transformation of its political nature, as the initial national specificities (e.g. the roots 
of the PDS within the milieu of former East German communist cadres and 
bureaucrats) were gradually watered down and the typical features of the 
contemporary Western European radical left came to the forefront.  
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In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the 
German case. Did the neo-liberal shift of the mainstream parties and their turn away 
from their traditional welfarist policies and values open up a political space which new 
parties could reasonably hope to fill? What potentialities and limitations did this 
situation create for the growth of the radical left? 
In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which favoured the cohesion and regroupment 
of the German radical left parties and which prevented its fragmentation in competing 
organisations. 
In section 3.5 I will try to determine if the "strategy of left-ward pull" of the German 
radical left was at all successful in influencing the dynamics of competition within the 
party system and in counterbalancing or reversing the right-ward shift of its main 
competitors (SPD and Greens). 
In section 3.6, finally, I will offer summarise the main findings and offer some 









3.2 The making of a new German radical left 
 
3.2.1 Societal weight 
 
The evolution of the societal weight of the German radical left in its various key 
dimensions is summarised below (TABLE 3.1 and FIGURE 3.2). The almost entirety of 
the totals is attributable to one subject only: the PDS up to 2005; the PDS-WASG 
alliance in 2005-2006; DIE LINKE from 2007 onwards. The weight of other far left 
organisations (mainly DKP, MLPD and PSG) always remained extremely marginal. 
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GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT    
NATIONAL  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
REGIONAL  4.28% 3.96% 4.81% 

















MEDIA OUTREACH Weak Weak Weak 
ORGANISATIONAL LINKAGES Weak Weak Weak 
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, total party members, total party incomes). 
Averages: rolling figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in 





FIGURE 3.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT 
 
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members, 
total party incomes, total population administered. 
 
The overall picture is one of a medium-small player within the national political 
system, with all but one quantifiable dimensions of oscillating around average values 
ranging between 4.3% and 6.5%. The German radical left did reasonably well and 
followed a growth path at the electoral, parliamentary and financial level; it struggled 




The electoral dimension was without doubt the most successful and followed a general 
trajectory of growth mirroring two of the three above-mentioned shocks: the post-
reunification crisis (1993-1999), when the PDS consolidated itself as an Eastern 
regional party, and the post-Hartz IV reforms period (2003-2009), when DIE LINKE 
established itself as a national force making inroads in the traditional social democratic 
constituency. From 1990 to 2013 the electoral weight of the radical left grew in 
absolute terms from 1,138,174 to 3,784,482 votes and in relative terms, from 2.45% to 
8.65% of valid votes.  
 
The parliamentary dimension roughly mirrored the previous one, with a presence 
slightly inferior but fairly proportional to the electoral results. The radical left enjoyed 
at all times a presence in the national parliament, although in the period 2002-2005 it 
was reduced to only two MPs. The presence in regional parliaments was geographically 
highly differentiated. The PDS has a strong anchoring in the East but always failed to 
gain a foothold in the West. DIE LINKE did better and since 2009 has had an 
intermittent presence in many of the Western parliaments, being represented at its 
peak (2011) in seven of the ten regions.  
  
The governmental dimension points to a very weak presence of the German radical left 
in governmental majorities and executives, in a very interesting deviation from the 
pattern of its Italian and French counterparts.  
Neither the PDS nor DIE LINKE was ever involved in parliamentary coalitions at the 
national level, despite some willingness on the part of their leadership to open 
discussions for an external support to a red-red-green majority. The refusal of SPD and 
Greens has so far been adamant and whenever the left support was vital to form a 
"red-red-green" majority (2005) the social democratic party preferred to it a "grand 
coalition" with the CDU/CSU. 
At the regional level the picture was somewhat different. While still limited to few and 
little populous regions (in average just 4.3% of the German population), experiments 
of external support (Tolerierung) and direct governmental participation have indeed 
taken place in the Eastern regions. Three cases belong to the first group: the majority 
SPD cabinet in Brandenburg (1994-1999), the minority SPD-Greens then SPD cabinets 
in Sachsen-Anhalt (1994-2002) and the transitional minority SPD-Greens cabinet in 
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Berlin (2001). Three cases fall under the second group: the SPD-PDS/DIE LINKE cabinets 
in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998-2006), Berlin (2002-2011) and Brandenburg 
(2009-present).  
The progressive electoral rise of the PDS and of DIE LINKE has however made the 
problem of crafting viable parliamentary centre-left coalitions more and more acute. In 
the East the party tends to be vital in the majority of cases; the SPD has here 
progressively evolved toward a fairly open attitude, but continues to consider as its 
preferred option a grand coalition with the CDU. In the West the issue has emerged 
only after 2007 and the response of centre-left parties has been so far quite 
reluctant.64  
 
The organisational dimension, finally, did not match the electoral successes and 
tended to follow a stagnating or declining path. 
Membership levels, which can be tracked with precision, followed a rapidly declining 
trajectory - with the exception of the period 2005-2009. The transition from SED to 
PDS (1988-1990) meant a loss of almost 90% of members, from 2.3 million to 280,882. 
This was followed by another three years (1990-1993) of heavy losses, which halved 
the membership to 131,406. In the subsequent eleven years (1993-2004) the PDS 
continued on a path of slower but sustained decline, halving again to a historical low 
point of 61,385. The establishment of the WASG and then of DIE LINKE led to a period 
of expansion, as the further losses in the East were more than compensated by an 
impetuous growth in the West; by 2009 the party had reached a peak of 78,046 
members. The revival was however short-lived and by 2011 the membership had fallen 
back to 69,458 members. The decline was less accentuated in terms of shares of all 
party members (11.7% in 1990, 6.6% in 1993, 4.0% in 2004, 5.6% in 2009 and 5.2% in 
2011) but meant a shift from a membership-heavy to a membership-light party, with 
the index of encapsulation (M/V) falling from the incredibly high levels of 1990 (24.7%) 
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 In the five cases when the support of DIE LINKE was needed, its potential partners chose to "get 
creative" three times (CDU-Greens, CDU-FDP-Greens and CDU-SPD coalitions) and the remaining two 
times built short-lived minority SPD-Green coalitions: the one in Hessen failed to obtain the required 
majority, due to SPD dissidents, and never entered into office; the one in Nordrhein-Westfalen (2010-
2012) refused to reach a programmatic agreement with DIE LINKE and was seated thanks to its 
unrequited abstention, later looking for variable majorities on a case-by-case basis. DIE LINKE abstained 
on the 2010 and 2011 budgets and voted against on the 2012 one, thereby triggering early elections.   
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to medium-low (6.0% in 1994, 3.7% in 1998 and 2002) and very low (1.8% in 2005, 
1.5% in 2009) levels. 
From a financial point of view, the initial period of crisis linked to the seizure of SED 
assets (1990-1993)65 was followed by a very stable situation, with real annual incomes 
oscillating around 24 million euro, around 5.3% of the total income of parliamentary 
parties. 
The two remaining sub-dimensions cannot be quantified with precision. 
As far as the media outreach was concerned, party-controlled forms of communication 
(e.g. membership-based campaigning, party-owned media, broadcasting of 
parliamentary debates, paid advertising) had a significant impact in the Eastern regions 
but remained sporadic in the West. The mass media, on the other hand, tended to 
provide a hostile and weak (Hansen et al., 2010; Jandura, 2011) coverage of the PDS 
and DIE LINKE, which tended to be treated as irrelevant forces or as a danger for 
democracy. 
As far as organisational linkages were concerned, the parties of the German radical left 
pained at translating their growing electoral appeal into more stable forms of indirect 
influence. Altogether, the influence was confined to the organisations representing the 
interests of the former bureaucracy (e.g. the Ostdeutsches Kuratorium von Verbänden, 
OKV), the far left scene (e.g. squatter, anti-fascist, communist, Turkish and Kurdish 
groups), the pacifist movement and the alter-globalist milieu (e.g. ATTAC, Sozialforum 
in Deutschland). The presence among the cadres and leaders of the dense German civil 
society (trade unions, associations, churches, charities), with the exception of sections 
of the East German associationism, remained on the other hand quite small: the 
relationship warmed up, moments of collaboration took place, but the political 
allegiance of mass organisations remained firmly, if critically, aligned with their 
traditional subcultural representatives (SPD, CDU and, to a lesser extent, Greens). 
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 Nominal incomes collapsed from 816.5 million DM (first half 1990) to 72.9 million DM (second half 
1990) and 22.5 million DM (1992), before rising to 34.3 million DM in 1994. The net assets inherited 
from the SED and not voluntarily given up amounted in 1990 to 1,277 million DM but were administered 
by a state commission (UKPV); in the end they were almost entirely seized, leaving in 1994 a net wealth 
of just 20 million DM. For a discussion of the legal, practical and ethical issues surrounding the fate of 
the SED assets inherited by the PDS see the opposite views of Behrend (2006) and Bräutigam (2010).  
92 
 
3.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation 
 
Unlike its French and Italian counterparts, the German radical left presents a 
remarkably small degree of organisational fragmentation (see TABLE 3.3).  
TABLE 3.3 FRAGMENTATION 
Votes 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 AVER. 
PDS 99.2% 99.4% 99.5% 99.9% - - 66.4% 
L.PDS/DIE LINKE - - - - 98.5% 99.3% 33.0% 
Others 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 1.5% 0.7% 0.7% 
Members 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 AVER. 
PDS/L.PDS 96.1% 92.5% 90.4% 90.2% 74.9% - 74.0% 
WASG - - - - 15.6% - 2.6% 
DIE LINKE - - - - - 91.8% 15.3% 
Others 3.9% 7.5% 9.6% 9.8% 9.5% 8.2% 8.1% 
MPs 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 AVER. 
PDS/L.PDS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% - 79.6% 
WASG - - - - 22.2% - 3.7% 
DIE LINKE - - - - - 100.0% 16.7% 
Fragmentation 
index 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 AVER. 
Votes 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01 
Members 1.08 1.16 1.21 1.21 1.68 1.18 1.25 
MPs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.53 1.00 1.09 
 
The moment of potential crisis actually abounded: in 1989-1990 the SED seemed 
briefly oriented toward dissolving itself and paving the way for the establishment of 
several left-wing parties (Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Bortfeldt, 1992; Segert, 2008); in 2002-
2003 the clash between left-wing and right-wing tendencies of the PDS menaced to 
split it along ideological lines (Behrend, 2006); in 2004-2005 the emergence of the 
WASG seemed to announce a period of destructive competition and the subsequent 
process of alliance and full-blown merger (2005-2007) was repeatedly threatened by 
local incidents66 (Heunemann, 2006; Spier et al., 2007; Hough et al, 2007); in 2010-
2012 the clash between Western radicals around Oskar Lafontaine and Eastern 
pragmatists around Dietmar Bartsch again prompted many to claim that the merger 
had not worked and that each side should go its separate way. 
In the end, however, the party not only never split, but also managed to co-opt or 
marginalise potential external challenges and to become the centre of successive 
waves of radical left regroupment. In 1990 the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-
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 In particular, the local WASG branches in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern decided to run against 
the PDS in the 2006 regional elections. 
93 
 
Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) was an electoral 
failure but succeeded in co-opting significant sections of the existing far left groups in 
the East (VL, Die Nelken) and West (DKP, KB, VSP). In 2004-2007, then, the alliance 
with the WASG enabled it to finally set a solid foothold in the western side of the 
country. 
 
The far left groups which refused to join the PDS and DIE LINKE (e.g. DKP, MLPD, KPD-
Ost, PSG and RSB) remained tiny and little influential. Their total membership has been 
oscillating since 1993 between 7,000 and 10,000 members; their total electorate 
reached, at its peak in 2005, just 60,843 votes (0.10%).67 
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 Kailitz (2004), BdI (1991-2012). 
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3.2.3 Political nature 
 
The political nature of German radical left parties was characterised, as in the rest of 
Western Europe, by the transition from the legacies of the 20th century communist 
movement to the dilemmas and possibilities of the contemporary radical left 
landscape. In the case of Germany, the origins of the PDS in a former ruling party of 
the Soviet bloc provided for marked specificities vis-à-vis its French and Italian 
counterparts.   
 
Ideologically, the German radical left was quick in ditching the legacy of the 
bureaucratic socialism represented by the GDR in favour of an eclectic "radical left" 
programmatic.  
Within the SED, socialism was conceived as a state-led process of accumulation and 
redistribution through the means of state ownership, economic planning and party 
dictatorship (Roesler, 1992; Dale, 2004; Steiner, 2010). When this model unravelled in 
1989-1990 under the impact of an economic, political and geo-political crisis, it was 
not clear which left-wing vision might replace it. Both the civic movements 
(Bürgerbewegungen) and the PDS initially advanced the idea of a reformed socialist 
GDR (Kamenitsa, 1998; Riegel, 2002; Segert, 2009), but the extent and type of reforms 
to be undertaken remained vague and controversial. After the victory of right-wing 
pro-unification forces in the March 1990 Volkskammer election, these debates were 
swept away and East Germany swiftly proceeded toward a quick and thorough 
adaptation to the institutional realities of the FRG (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann, 1996). 
The response of the PDS was an original theorisation of "modern socialism" or 
"democratic socialism" (Land & Possekel, 1995; Klein & Brie, 2007; Segert, 2008; Land, 
2010). This was conceived as a "third way" between market capitalism and state 
socialism characterised by: (a) a wide-ranging democratisation of both state and the 
economy; (b) a mixed economy with a multiplicity of property forms (private, state, 
cooperative). The vision was appealing but rather indeterminate, as the relative weight 
of the three theoretical poles of state intervention, market competition and (workers' 
and users') self-management was not spelled out in detail. It could lend itself to a 
variety of interpretations, as the internal debates of the PDS would soon amply 
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demonstrate (Land, 1995b; Brie, 2000; Chrapa, 2000; Sturm, 2000; Behrend, 2006; 
Prinz, 2010). 
De facto, the programmatic of the PDS focused on two key areas: on the one hand, a 
broad anti-neoliberal catalogue of progressive measures mixing welfarist, left-
Keynesian and post-materialist themes; on the other hand, a particular attention to 
the defence of cross-class Eastern interests against the perceived economic, political 
and cultural marginalisation of the area in the new German republic (PDS, 1990b, 1993 
and 2003). 
The WASG avoided any commitment to a post-capitalist future but its short-term 
socio-economic programme overlapped with that of the PDS and even had a more 
radical edge (WASG, 2005). The party sought to work toward a "new alternative social 
bloc of labour and knowledge" (Krämer, 2005) against the intellectual hegemony of 
neo-liberalism and came up with a coherent programme of welfarist and left-
Keynesian reforms. 
DIE LINKE, finally, worked toward a synthesis of the main concerns of the two 
constituent parties: working and living conditions, the expansion of the welfare state, 
democratisation, socio-ecological restructuring, pacifism, Eastern interests and the 
long-term aim of democratic socialism (PDS, 2007 and 2011). 
 
Sociologically, the German radical left has until recently significantly diverged from the 
Western European norm (see TABLE 3.4 and TABLE 3.5). Most contemporary radical 
left parties tend to have a quite heterogeneous social composition, encompassing in 
various proportions employed wage workers, pensioners and other inactives, students, 
unemployed and professionals. Moreover, the organic links with the organised 
workers' movement tend to follow a declining parable. Nevertheless, employed blue-
collar and white-collar tend to remain largely over-represented among their ranks and 
the main target of their organising efforts.  
The PDS, on the contrary, had from the start a different core constituency: the highly-
educated but downward-mobile sections of the former GDR elite. The party never 
managed to gain a stable foothold in the Western regions, which made up at most less 
than 5% of its members and less than 22% of its voters. As a consequence of its nature 
of successor party of the SED, it also elicited a strong initial hostility from blue-collar 
workers, which had been among the key protagonists of the 1989-90 revolution 
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(Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006). This gap was partially mended through the role 
of the party in the 1992-1993 wave of industrial struggle but never entirely 
disappeared. Altogether, PDS members remained overwhelmingly over-60 pensioners 
with a bureaucratic or intellectual background, while PDS voters represented a fairly 
balanced cross-section of the Eastern population (except for blue-collar workers) with 
the addition of a small Western appendix (skewed toward wage workers and 
unemployed).  
The post-2005 shift has significantly changed this situation, partially re-aligning the 
sociology of DIE LINKE with the broader radical left standards. The Western regions, 
although still much weaker than the Eastern ones, have seen their weight rise to 37.9% 
of the members and 55.5% of the voters (2009). The new Western members were 
predominantly employed wage workers or unemployed and thus rejuvenated the 
overall profile of the party. Blue-collar workers became more likely to vote for DIE 
LINKE than the rest of the population. These developments, however, were mostly 
determined by the dynamism in the West; indeed, the party remains a largely dual 
entity. In the West it represents a development of the WASG: a dynamic point of 
attraction for broad left forces (former SPD, PDS, Greens and far left supporters), 
dominated by men of the central age cohorts, with an over-representation of lower-
class backgrounds. In the East it remains a renamed PDS, with a declining membership 
dominated by gender-balanced and aging former SED members and a composite 





TABLE 3.4 SOCIOLOGY OF MEMBERS 
 PDS 1991 PDS 1998 PDS 2000 DIE LINKE 2009 
N. 172,579 94,627 83,478 78,046 
GENDER adm adm adm adm 
Male 56.1% 54.0% 54.4% 62.8% 
Female 43.9% 46.0% 45.6% 37.2% 
AREA adm adm adm adm 
East 99.7% 96.7% 95.1% 62.0% 
West 0.3% 3.1% 4.7% 37.9% 
Other 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 
AGE poll poll adm poll 
18-30 10.6%  1.8%  
31-60 49.7%  31.2%  
61+ 39.7%  67.0%  
18-34  2%  7% 
35-49  13%  17% 
50-64  25%  30% 
65-79  52%  31% 
80+  8%  16% 
EDUCATION poll poll poll poll 
Below 10 years 32.2% 40% 30.3% 37% 
Secondary 5.1% 5% 4.2% 17% 
University 62.7% 54% 65.3% 46% 
PROFESSION poll poll poll poll 
Active population   24.5%  
Employed wage worker 19.3% 21.2%  28.9% 
Blue-collar 4.4% 3.9%  6.5% 
White-collar 14.5% 6.9%  10.9% 
Civil servant 0.4% 10.4%  11.6% 
Unemployed and 
assimilated 
26.9% 5.0% 6.5% 8.0% 
Independent 7.2% 1.9%  5.5% 
Employer and  
self-employed 
3.4% 1.4%  4.1% 
Professional 3.8% 0.5%  1.4% 
Inactive 46.6% 73.0% 68.9% 58.0% 
Pensioner 41.3% 70.0% 63.8% 53.0% 
Student - 1.0% 2.8% 4.0% 
Other 5.3% 2.0% 2.3% 1.0% 
RELIGION  poll  poll 
Catholic  1%  7% 
Protestant  2%  11% 
Other  1%  3% 
None  97%  79% 
ACTIVISM (subjective)  poll  poll 
Very active  4%  8% 
Fairly active  28%  28% 
Little active  52%  48% 
Not active  16%  16% 
Sources: my elaboration from ISDA (1991), Chrapa and Wittich (2001), Spier et al. (2011) and Niedermayer (2012). 







TABLE 3.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION) 












N. 1,129,578 2,066,176 2,515,454 1,916,702 4,118,194 5,155,933 
GENDER poll poll poll rw rw rw 
Male 56.1% 49.9% 50.0% 51.6% 54.5% 54.2% 
Female 43.9% 50.1% 50.0% 46.4% 45.5% 45.8% 
AREA adm adm adm adm adm adm 
East  90.3% 83.7% 83.0% 78.5% 56.4% 44.5% 
West  9.7% 12.3% 17.0% 21.5% 43.6% 55.5% 
AGE poll poll poll rw rw rw 
18-24 16.7%      
25-29 12.9%      
30-39 21.6%      
40-49 17.0%      
50-59 12.4%      
60+ 19.4%      
18-24  12.0% 11.0% 7.5% 7.3% 7.0% 
25-34  22.8% 18.0% 11.2% 10.5% 10.3% 
35-44  19.7% 24.0% 20.0% 20.4% 16.0% 
45-59  24.7% 26.0% 28.8% 33.3% 36.5% 
60+  20.8% 21.0% 32.5% 28.6% 30.2% 
EDUCATION    poll poll poll 
Below 10 years    58.3% 66.7% 64.9% 
Secondary    16.7% 15.6% 19.1% 
University    25.0% 17.7% 16.0% 
PROFESSION   poll poll poll poll 
Active population       
Employed wage 
worker 
  49.9% 48.4% 52.6% 50.9% 
Blue-collar   17.9% 19.3% 23.5% 22.5% 
White-collar   29.4% 25.7% 26.6% 25.7% 
Civil servant   2.6% 3.5% 2.5% 2.6% 
Unemployed   12.0% 11.6% 16.1% 8.0% 
Independent   5.1% 5.3% 3.7% 5.1% 
Inactive   33.0% 34.7% 27.6% 36.0% 
Pensioner   21.0% 26.3%  20.0% 
Other   12.0% 8.4%  16.0% 
RELIGION poll   poll poll poll 
Catholic 6.6%   7.3% 13.7% 18.7% 
Protestant 14.4%   20.8% 26.3% 30.8% 
None 79.0%   71.9% 60.0% 50.5% 
Sources: my elaboration from BWL (2002, 2005, 2009) and FGW (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009).  










Organisationally, the PDS and DIE LINKE are exemplary models of the shifts undertaken 
by most European radical left parties: a complete overhaul of internal democracy and 
pluralism; the winding-up of workplace-based forms of organisation; the loss of 
members and membership density; the move from a hegemonic toward a 
collaborative attitude toward social movements and civil society organisations; the 
consolidation of the influence of the party in public office vis-à-vis that in central 
office. 
The key features of the SED organisation (Herbst et al., 1997) were quickly dismantled 
in the immediate post-1989 years, leaving behind a largely transformed party (Gerner, 
1994; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996). The PDS was re-organised along the principles of 
delegate democracy, with regular competitive selections of congress delegates (every 
two years) and electoral candidates by the members, plus elements of direct (binding 
referenda) and network (thematic groups, non-members participation) democracy. It 
also adopted a "broad left" model aimed at integrating the widest possible spectrum 
of traditions and sensibilities, chose to privilege pluralism and tolerance over political 
coherence and institutionalised wide-ranging rights of individual members and of 
political or thematic tendencies. It dissolved paramilitary and workplace cells and 
replaced them with neighbourhood-based territorial cells.  
These changes, both a spontaneous reaction to the oppressive nature of Stalinist 
bureaucratic centralism and a necessary adaptation to the West German laws and 
practices, largely failed to make the party attractive as a place of activist engagement: 
most young and middle-aged members left in the 1990-1993 crisis; the remaining 
membership was dominated old cadres – now mostly pensioners – organised in close-
knit cells which proved remarkably unsuitable for new recruits. For the same reason, 
the party was largely cut off from any meaningful avenue of trade union and 
workplace intervention. At the same time, the discipline, commitment and local 
embeddedness of its remaining activists made them a fundamental resource for the 
electoral, institutional and societal representation of the diffuse interests of the East 
German population. 
The establishment of DIE LINKE represented in this sense a qualitative shift: the party 
finally managed to gain the (thin) coverage of the Western regions which had eluded 
its predecessor; its Western structures, based not on local cells but on district 
branches, were less active and effective but more welcoming to new recruits; the links 
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with trade unions and social movements were strengthened. This notwithstanding, the 
balance between electoral and social rootedness became more and more skewed 
toward the former, as membership growth remained small and did not keep up the 
huge gains in votes.  
 
Strategically, the politics of the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE were all predicated on the 
idea of contributing to the establishment of a large anti-neoliberal counter-hegemonic 
coalition which, through a combination of electoral, parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary pressures, would in the mid-term pull the mainstream centre-left 
parties (SPD and Greens) to the left and create the conditions for a new progressive 
centre-left alliance and a "change of direction" (Richtungswechsel) in socio-economic 
and foreign policy (Brie, 2000, 2003 and 2007; Krämer, 2004). This strategy was 
confronted with the familiar dilemma of the contemporary European radical left. On 
the one hand, the strengthening of the radical left was primarily dependent on a direct 
competition with the (right-ward moving) moderate left over its traditional left-wing 
supporters: i.e. on "filling the vacuum" left by its adaptation to neo-liberalism, first by 
gaining the confidence of the East German population and then by encroaching on the 
Western working-class and post-materialist constituencies. On the other hand, this 
risked either to benefit the "greater evil" of the right (if no centre-left alliance could be 
established) or to dent the anti-neoliberal credentials of the radical left (if the latter 
agreed to support centre-left governments which did not move toward a more 
progressive path).  
In the case of Germany, the parties of the radical left have largely been shielded from 
the need to make the kind of hard tactical and strategic choices which have so 
damaged their Italian and French counterparts. Up to 1998 the PDS mainly presented 
itself as a lone opposition against the Western-dominated, neo-liberal and militaristic 
policies embraced by the mainstream parties. At the same time, it was careful to 
minimise the pressure of an anti-right tactical voting by claiming that a growth of the 
party was the best way to ensure a "pressure from the left" on the political system 
(PDS, 1994 and 1998) and by hinting that, if the situation would require it, it would not 
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stand in the way of a minority SPD-Green governmental alternative.68 From 1998 to 
2009 PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE had a relatively easy game in pointing out the 
"betrayals" of the SPD leadership and exploiting the dissatisfaction against its most 
unpopular decisions. Only after 2009 the terrain became more delicate, as the tension 
between hostility toward the SPD and the aspiration toward a common front of the 
centre-left became more acute.  
The dual image of a party of coherent yet non sectarian anti-neoliberal opposition, 
providing a useful left-ward pull on the mainstream left, was preserved by two lucky 
factors. First, the national SPD always remained adamant in its refusal to seat to the 
bargaining table with the PDS and DIE LINKE for the purpose of the establishment of a 
red-red-green governmental majority. Second, the radical left never actually proved 
determinant to form a centre-left governmental majority, with one exception. 
Although they rarely won a majority of the valid votes (with the exception of 1990), 
both the centre-right bloc (1994 and 2009) and the centre-left one (1998 and 2002) 
generally managed to win an independent parliamentary majority, thanks to a 
combination of the effects of the 5% electoral threshold and of the possibility of 
obtaining overhang seats (Überhangmandate) through the constituency vote.69 The 
only situation when the support of the radical left was mathematically needed to form 
a centre-left majority obtained in 2005: this possibility, however, was quickly ruled out 
by the SPD which went on to form a grand coalition with its conservative rival CDU-
CSU. Thus, PDS and DIE LINKE were prevented from ever being sucked into actual 
experiences of governmental participation at the national level, which proved so 
destructive for its French (1981-1984 and 1997-2002) and Italian (1997-2001 and 2006-
2008) counterparts, while at the same time being able to shift the blame for the failed 
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 The often employed formula was that a change will "not fail because of us" (an uns nicht scheitern), 
signalling a readiness to provide an initial external support; for one of the earliest instances see Spiegel 
(28.03.1994). 
69
 The latter mechanism was declared inconstitutional and removed before the 2013 election. 
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3.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of the 
radical left mobilisation 
 
 
The hopes of the German radical left, as elsewhere in Europe, were pinned on the so-
called "vacuum thesis" (Abromeit, 1992 and 1993; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998, 1999, 
2002; Brie, 2000 and 2007; Patton, 2006; Nachtwey & Spier, 2007; Nachtwey, 2009). 
The general political, social and intellectual climate had been unfavourable to the left 
since the late-1970s and the aftershocks of the crisis and collapse of the Soviet bloc 
had accentuated this condition, affecting to various degrees both the established 
communist parties and the non-Stalinist far left. The roots of this long-term decline are 
to be found in the defeat and recuperation of the post-1968 wave of labour militancy 
and in the inability of the left to respond effectively to the concomitant restructuring 
of the productive system.  
This notwithstanding, the mid-1990s seemed to pave the way for a recovery based on 
the brutality of neo-liberal reforms, growing discontent and resistance against them 
and a quick right-ward shift of the established centre-left parties, which allegedly left a 
political vacuum of political representation of traditional left-wing themes and 
constituencies. In the German context several themes seemed to lend themselves to a 
mobilisation on the part of the radical left, as the discrepancy between significant 
popular interest and disregard by the mainstream political system presented potential 
"representation gaps" (Vertretungslücken) to be exploited.  
The first one was the issue of East German interests. As Heidrun Abromeit (1992 and 
1993) has convincingly shown, the mechanics of the 1990 unification led to a structural 
disregard for the peculiar problems and concerns of the population of those regions, 
which could hardly find a voice through the ("Bonn") mainstream parties. A regional 
left-wing party such as the PDS could provide a logical corrective to this situation 
(Neller & Thaidigsmann, 2002). 
The second one was social justice. This was the traditional core issue of the SPD, 
encompassing both working-class interests and broader welfare state provisions. As 
the party sharply turned to the right after the first year in office (1999) and again after 
103 
 
the 2002 electoral victory, this could provide the opportunity for the establishment of 
a significant radical left force in the Western regions.  
Finally, the issue of pacifism was deeply felt on both sides of the country and the post-
1990 turn toward an activist military politics (in particular the 1999 Kosovo war and 
the 2001-present Afghanistan war) represented another promising area to win over 
disaffected ecologist and social democratic supporters. 
How did the German radical left fare in this respect? Did the vacuum theory make 
sense? To what extent and why were the parties able to fill the relevant 
representation gaps? What were the limits of this strategy?  
The present section will explore these questions by discussing the empirical contours 
of the alleged vacuum on the left (paragraph 3.3.1) and the results of the electoral 
(paragraph 3.3.2) and organisational (paragraph 3.3.3) mobilisation of the parties of 





3.3.1 Contours of the vacuum 
 
There is no doubt on the fact that the German political system, as its main European 
counterparts, has been evolving since the 1980s in a clear right-ward direction. 
Firstly, state-owned corporations – always comparatively weaker than in Italy or 
France – were gradually dismantled and/or aligned with shareholder models of 
corporate governance (Rösler, 1994; Mayer, 2006; Beyer & Höpner, 2003) while the 
number of state employees was significantly reduced. 
The process of privatisation of state-owned companies was started in the mid-1980s 
by the centre-right (VEBA, Volkswagen and Lufthansa). The 1990 unification led to its 
sudden acceleration. In the East, the Treuhandanstalt oversaw in four years the 
restructuring and privatisation of the near-totality of the local industrial sector; its 
follow-up organisms (BvS, TLG and BVVG), carried on with the gradual sale of Eastern 
real estate and agricultural land. In the West, centre-right and centre-left governments 
went on to partially or entirely privatise most of the remaining state-owned 
enterprises, including the key service providers Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom. 
Since the late 2000s only one large enterprise remains under full state ownership 
(Deutsche Bahn)70; minority participations exist in other important companies (KfW, 
Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom). The role of regional and local governments, 
however, remains strong in the banking sector, with Landesbanken and Sparkassen 
retaining about a third of the market share. 
More generally, since unification the public sector employment has also been 
drastically reduced. This number reached its peak in 1990, when the two German 
states employed more than 7 million people, but was cut to 5.4 million in 1995 and 4.6 
million in 2005, stabilising afterwards (DESTATIS, 2013).    
 Secondly, welfare state reform followed a path of "managed austerity" (Vail, 2010) 
involving both a preservation of overall state provisions and their selective 
rationalisation and neo-liberal recalibration. Key measures were the pension reforms 
of 1992, 2000 and 2006 and the labour market reforms of 2003-2005 (Agenda 2010). It 
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 The 1994 railway reform transferred most of the personnel of the sector from public to private 
employment contracts, but the new company (Deutsche Bahn AG) remained 100% controlled by the 
state. The planned privatisation was shelved in 2008 due to the adverse financial climate. 
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is notable that all but the first were drafted by social democratic ministers, either in 
centre-left or in grand coalition cabinets (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013).  
Thirdly, the traditional restraint of the country in military foreign policy was reversed 
in the early 1990s by a more assertive stance (Meiers, 2010), which led to the 
participation to a series of minor NATO operations and to two full-fledged armed 
conflicts (Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan from 2001 onwards). Both the SPD in 1992 
and the Greens in 1998 abandoned their previous opposition to out-of-area military 
missions – in the second case by breaching one of their founding values, pacifism.   
Fourthly, and most importantly, existing political parties have been less and less able 
to rely on the main promise of the German market economy, i.e. the fact that an 
embedded liberal capitalism could be harnessed to distribute the benefits of the 
economic growth to all sectors of the population.  
The issue of mass unemployment, which skyrocketed for the first time with the 1982 
crisis, was never satisfactorily tackled. The unemployment rate rose to 7-8% of the 
active population in the 1980s and to 9-12% in the following fifteen years. Only after 
2006 it started to significantly improve.71 
GDP growth continued to slow down from the very high levels of the 1960s and 1970s 
to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7% in the business cycle 1982-1993, 
1.5% in 1993-2003 and 0.7% in 2003-2009. Wages did worse, moving from slow growth 
in the first two periods (CAGR 1.1% and 0.7%) to stagnation/decline after 2003 (-0.2%).  
Overall, the unbalances of the reunification, high unemployment and deregulating 
labour market reforms led to a sharp decline of the share of wages on the GDP, a 
tendential stagnation of average labour incomes, a growth of real and perceived 
inequalities (Glatzer, 2009) and a dualisation of the labour market, with an enormous 
expansion of low-wage and precarious employment (Eichhorst & Marx, 2009).     
Core left-wing themes – social justice, state regulation, pacifism – were increasingly 
neglected, rejected or redefined in the propaganda of the SPD and Greens (Walter, 
2007; Klein & Falter, 2003; Nachtwey, 2013); the traditional social democratic 
constituencies – industrial workers, lower-middle social strata – did not seem to gain 
much from their term in office; the East bore the brunt of mass unemployment and 
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labour market reforms. This seemed indeed to be a fertile terrain for the emergence of 
new left-wing challengers.  
 
A shift of the political system, however, does not necessarily create a representation 
gap. On the one hand, the change might simply reflect or accompany a similar shift in 
public opinion – in our case, the strengthening of a new neo-liberal hegemony. On the 
other hand, it might result in a passive acquiescence of the population, which either 
sees the developments as inevitable or cannot envisage meaningful ways to counter it. 
Existing electoral and opinion poll data seem to indicate that, in fact, the disconnection 
between sectors of the German population and the party system did grow and was at 
least in part due to a growing dissatisfaction "on the left". 
 
Firstly, the support for "establishment" parties (CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP) has been 
constantly eroding since the early 1980s, with particularly steep declines in the periods 
1983-1993 and 2005-2009 (TABLE 3.6). Their share of the total electorate fell from 
86.0% in 1980 to 49.8% in 2009, to the benefit of abstentions and of new parties, while 
their capacity to develop a feeling of identification (GESIS poll data) followed the same 
trend, from 78.8% in 1980 to 47.5% in 2011.  
FIGURE 3.6 SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES 
 
Sources: my elaboration from Bundeswahlleiter and GESIS. 
Notes: share of total electorate. 
Secondly, the weight of traditional left-wing beliefs, far from decreasing, was rather on 
the rise (TABLE 3.7 and 3.8).  
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FIGURE 3.7 LEFT-WING OPINION, SIZE 
 Sources: my elaboration from GESIS. 
 
FIGURE 3.8 LEFT-WING OPINION, NET BALANCE 
Sources: my elaboration from GESIS. 
Notes: positive minus negative responses. 
 
The difference between people identifying as left-of-the-centre and their opponents 
shifted from negative values in the 1980s (1983: -8.0%) to positive values afterwards 
(2006: +12.4%). Germans became more and more likely to consider existing social 
differences as unfair rather than fair (1984: +3.2%; 2008: +45.2%) and socialism as "a 
good idea badly implemented" rather than a bad idea (1992: -11%; 2007: +22%). 
Crucially, the difference between those supporting an expansion of the welfare state 
and those wishing its cut-back tended to be largely positive (1990-2007 average: 
+13.4%), with the only exception in the period 2000-2004. Other questions of the 
108 
 
ALLBUS72 survey point out to a post-1989 trend toward growing perceptions of social 
injustice and conflicts of interests, criticism of capitalism and support for welfarist and 
redistributive measures (Petersen 2007; Glatzer, 2009; Köcher, 2012). 
Both developments reached an extremely pronounced extent in the former-GDR area, 
as social grievances overlapped with regional ones.  
 
Thus, a growing area of dissatisfaction around socio-economic grievances could be 
identified among the middle-lower strata of German society. It was up to the radical 
left to offer them a credible perspective, winning them over from either a traditional 
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 Questions V150, V155, V156, V160, V163, V175, V176, V177, V178, V179, V180, V181, V211. 
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3.3.2 Electoral mobilisation 
  
Should the attempt of the German radical left to fill the electoral dimension of the 




Over the whole period 1990-2009 the main parties of the radical left (PDS, WASG and 
DIE LINKE) followed a path of sustained growth, soaring from 1,129,578 votes (2.4% of 
valid votes; 1.9% of the total electorate) to 5,155,933 votes (11.9% and 8.3%). It is easy 
to show that this happened precisely because they managed to partially fill 
"representation gaps" which had opened between the established parliamentary 
parties and specific sectors of the population: the East/West conflict and the issue of 
social justice (Brie, 2000 and 2007).  
Schematically, this development followed two distinct phases. In the 1990s the PDS 
recovered a mass support in the East, benefitting from the adverse consequences of 
the CDU-led reunification process. In the 2000s, on the other hand, the PDS-WASG 
alliance and then DIE LINKE managed to win a mid-sized support in the West, 
exploiting the rift of Schröder's SPD with its traditional working-class constituency 
(FIGURE 3.9).  
 
In the first phase (1990-1998) the gains of the PDS were concentrated on the former 
GDR territory, where the party doubled its December 1990 votes and became a well-
rooted political force; in the West its influence remained very small (Meuche-Mäker, 
2005). 
At the first free Volkskammer elections on 18 March 1990 the party obtained 16.4% of 
valid votes. While facing a marked hostility from most social categories – especially 
from the industrial working class, which had been at the forefront of the anti-SED 
revolution (Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006) – it could still muster the support of 
large sections of the former bureaucracy and of former SED members, which had 
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benefitted from the old regime and viewed its downfall as a threat of severe 
downward social mobility (Jung, 1990; Solga, 1995; Goedicke, 2003).  
 
FIGURE 3.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS, EAST/WEST  
Sources: Bundeswahlleiter. 
Notes: shares of valid votes and absolute number of votes. V1990: votes obtained in the March 1990 Volkskammer election (GDR). 
 
The after-shocks of the local revolutionary process and the prospect of unification 
seemed to doom the party to a quick disappearance. In the following months its share 
of votes slid to 14.6% on 9 May (local elections), 12.7% in October-December (regional 
elections) and 11.1% on 2 December (Bundestag election). Since 1992, however, the 
fortunes of the party revived. It recovered its support among the former bureaucracy 
(now active in white-collar professions, early-retired or unemployed), which was 
indeed being significantly discriminated against in the new republic. It also managed to 
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reach out to broader layers of the Eastern population, which started to feel deceived 
by the contrast between the early promises of a rapid socio-economic improvement 
and the realities of a permanently under-developed area. In particular, the 
involvement of the PDS in the massive 1992-1993 wave of workplace and public outcry 
against the policies of the Treuhand (Garms, 1994; Gehrke, 1997) markedly improved 
its image, partially mending its antagonistic relationship with the local working class. 
By 1998 the party reached its temporary high point (2,054,773 votes, 21.6%), 
recovering the early losses to the SPD and scoring significant gains from CDU-CSU and 
new voters.  
 
In the second phase (1998-2009), on the other hand, the gains of the radical left were 
concentrated in the West, among traditional SPD voters. 
Despite promising conditions, the PDS initially failed to profit from the right-ward shift 
of the seating centre-left cabinet and actually suffered a heavy set-back in the 2002 
elections. The subsequent events, however, changed this situation. The labour market 
reforms of the second Schröder cabinet provoked a rift between the SPD leadership 
and its traditional working-class constituency, which found its expression in vigorous 
public criticism, a cycle of mass street mobilisation and the establishment of a new 
left-wing splinter party, the WASG. The PDS-WASG electoral alliance, led by Oskar 
Lafontaine, massively profited from this climate and soared to 4,118,194 votes (8.7%) 
in the 2005 elections. This upward trend continued during the following legislature, 
when the merger of the two groups into a new party (DIE LINKE) could boast its role as 
the only "social" opposition against the policies of the CDU-SPD grand coalition and 
further rose to 5,155,933 votes (11.9%). 
This represented a qualitative shift for the German radical left. Firstly, the East/West 
imbalance persisted but was largely attenuated and DIE LINKE became a small but real 
political alternative to the SPD in the Western regions. Secondly, the atypical social 
profile of the PDS was replaced by a more typical radical left one, with strong results 







FIGURE 3.10 ELECTORAL RESULTS, SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS  
 
Sources: my elaboration from FGW (1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009). 
 
Thirdly, the main electoral competitor switched from the CDU to the SPD, again 
aligning with a more typical European pattern of intra-left competition. In the period 
2002-2009, for instance, the net electoral exchange between PDS/DIE LINKE and SPD 
marked a shift of almost 2.1 million voters toward the former (TABLE 3.11). 
 
In 2013, however, DIE LINKE fell back roughly to the levels of 2005 with 3,755,699 























Votes 1,892,329 1,129,578 2,066,176 2,515,454 1,916,702 4,118,194 5,155,933 +4,026,355 
GERMANY         
SPD  -241,000 236,000 80,000 -290,000 970,000 1,100,000 2,096,000 
Greens  6,000 110,000 40,000 0 240,000 140,000 530,000 
CDU-CSU  -46,000 183,000 90,000 -50,000 280,000 40,000 543,000 
FDP  -66,000 109,000 10,000 -20,000 100,000 -20,000 179,000 
Other  6,000 77,000 -50,000 20,000 90,000 0 137,000 
VOTERS  -341,000 715,000 170,000 -340,000 1,680,000 1,260,000 3,485,000 
Abstention  -440,000 153,000 190,000 -260,000 430,000 -300,000 213,000 
Replacement  46,000 69,000 60,000 -40,000 80,000 30,000 199,000 
Migration  -28,000 2,000 10,000 -10,000 10,000 30,000 42,000 
NON VOTERS  -422,000 224,000 260,000 -310,000 520,000 -240,000 454,000 
TOTAL  -763,000 939,000 430,000 -650,000 2,200,000 1,020,000 3,939,000 
EAST         
SPD  -253,000 178,000 50,000 -310,000 380,000 320,000  618 000  
Greens  -61,000 76,000 30,000 -10,000 30,000 30,000  156 000  
CDU-CSU  -47,000 163,000 130,000 -40,000 100,000 -30,000  323 000  
FDP  -69,000 94,000 10,000 -20,000 30,000 -10,000  104 000  
Other  12,000 41,000 -40,000 10,000 10,000 10,000  31 000  
VOTERS  -418,000 552,000 180,000 -370,000 550,000 320,000 1 232 000  
Abstention  -446,000 112,000 160,000 -160,000 200,000 -330,000 - 18 000  
Replacement  15,000 49,000 20,000 -50,000 20,000 -30,000  9 000  
Migration  -30,000 -2,000 -20,000 -30,000 0 10,000 - 42 000  
NON VOTERS  -461,000 159,000 160,000 -240,000 220,000 -350,000 - 51 000  
TOTAL  -879,000 711,000 340,000 -610,000 770,000 -30,000 1 181 000  
WEST         
SPD  12,000 58,000 30,000 20,000 590,000 780,000 1 478 000  
Greens  67,000 34,000 10,000 10,000 210,000 110,000  374 000  
CDU-CSU  1,000 20,000 -40,000 -10,000 180,000 70,000  220 000  
FDP  3,000 15,000 0 0 70,000 -10,000  75 000  
Other  -6,000 36,000 -10,000 10,000 80,000 -10,000  106 000  
VOTERS  77,000 163,000 -10,000 30,000 1,130,000 940,000 2 253 000  
Abstention  6,000 41,000 30,000 -100,000 230,000 30,000  231 000  
Replacement  31,000 20,000 40,000 10,000 60,000 60,000  190 000  
Migration  2,000 4,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 20,000  84 000  
NON VOTERS  39,000 65,000 100,000 -70,000 300,000 110,000  505 000  
TOTAL  116,000 228,000 90,000 -40,000 1,430,000 1,050,000 2 758 000  
Source: My elaboration from INFAS (1990, 1994), INFRATEST DIMAP (2002, 2005, 2009). 
114 
 
... and limitations 
 
Despite these undeniable successes, the radical left managed to tap only a small 
portion of the theoretical vacuum opened-up by the right-ward shift of the SPD. Three 
sets of data hint to this. 
 
The first option is to compare of the total results of DIE LINKE to a variety of indicators 
for left-wing opinion. In 2009 the party obtained 5.2 million of votes, 8.3% of the total 
electorate (including abstentions and invalid votes). This share remained slightly lower 
than that of people identifying as far left or left-wing (10.6%) and less than a third of 
that of people supporting an expansion of the welfare state (26.5%).  
The second clue is provided by an analysis of the net electoral fluxes of the SPD in the 
period 1998-2009 (TABLE 3.11). During that decade the SPD lost 10.2 million votes, 
more than half of its initial total. Only 17.6% of the losses accrued to DIE LINKE; the 
large majority went instead to the parties of the right (35.5%), to abstentions (24.2%), 
to the Greens (14.8%) and to other kinds of change (7.8%).  
The third possibility is to look at the sociological composition of the radical left 
electorate (FIGURE 3.10). Despite the gains of the period the "natural" target 
constituency of the left, i.e. employed wage workers, became only marginally more 
likely than the rest of the population to support the radical left; the success among 
blue-collar workers, in particular, was not matched by the results among white-collar 
workers (which remained slightly below-average) and civil servants (which became 
more and more hostile). 
 
All indicators suggest that the potential electoral constituency of the party remained 
much larger than its actual voters, particularly among people oscillating between a 









The interpretation of the electoral evolution of the German radical left is fairly 
straightforward. The PDS first and DIE LINKE at a later stage succeeded in exploiting 
two representation gaps which the establishment parties were less and less able to 
cover: first, regionalised social cleavage in the East around the issues of socio-
economic marginalisation of the former bureaucracy and of large sectors of the 
employed and welfare-dependent population (1990-1998); later, a nationalised social 
cleavage across the country around the issues of social justice and defence of the 
welfare state (1998-2009). Despite its limitations, it managed to expand its electoral 
influence and grow from a small-sized regional force to a medium-sized national 
challenger of the SPD. 
 
The pre-conditions of this growth were largely not of its own making.  
The gaps depended on a series of external factors over which radical left parties had 
no influence: German unification, general trends in political economy and the "neo-
liberal" turn of the SPD after 1998. The growing socio-economic grievances of both 
East Germans and the Western working class were largely the result of the slow rates 
of economic growth of the period, a hasty unification process, deliberate state policies 
geared at containing wages and turning away from full-employment and redistributive 
aims and an overall weakness of the workers' response. The party which was best 
placed to benefit from these developments was the SPD, the traditional party of the 
working-class and of socio-economic redistribution. And, indeed, it initially did so, 
gaining over the period 1990-1998 4.6 million votes (7.5 percentage points) – with 
particularly hefty gains in the former GDR territory –and coming to power in 1998. It 
was only through its long period in office (1998-2009) that the party gradually 
squandered its left-wing credentials and alienated large sections of its lower- and 
middle- class support, thereby creating a significant space for the rise of other left-
wing competitors. 
Given their fundamental socio-economic choices, there was little that either the CDU-
CSU or the SPD could do to relieve the plight of the social groups which were deserting 
them. Nevertheless, the extent of their losses could have been reduced by more skilful 
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policies. The SPD, in particular, repeatedly missed the chance of neutralising the rising 
competition on its left. In 1990 large sections of the SED/PDS were ready to join hands 
with the Eastern social democrats (SDP/SPD), but the refusal of the latter to accept 
former SED members prevented the further disarticulation of the newly-born PDS and 
provided the basis for its subsequent consolidation. In 2003-2005 the party proved 
excessively intransigent in its defence of the Agenda 2010 in face of a growing public 
opposition, thus giving the WASG an ample breathing space to emerge and 
consolidate. The key mistake, however, was made in 2005: instead of reviving its left-
wing credential through a spell in the opposition it went on to form a grand coalition 
with the CDU, which resulted four years later in its lowest score ever (23.0%).   
 
The fact that the radical left did manage to exploit, at least in part, these openings was 
the outcome of the interplay of both external and internal factors. Part of it depended 
on the behaviour of the SPD: in particular, the dogged refusal of the latter to envisage 
any collaboration with it at the national level helped to preserve the social and 
oppositional credentials of the party while minimising the blame for the failed 
cooperation. Part of it was the result of the 29 September 1990 sentence of the 
Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 82, 322) which, by introducing a temporary exception to 
the 5% electoral threshold (to be calculated separately for the East and for the West), 
enabled the PDS to acquire the crucial advantage of a representation in the national 
parliament. On the other hand, the core leadership group of the PDS (in particular 
Gregor Gysi, Lothar Bisky and the Brie brothers) can claim a significant amount of 
credit for this success, as it proved capable to ensure the survival of the party during 
the 1989-90 transition, endow it with an attractive broad left programme, preserve its 
unity (1990-91, 2003, 2010-2012), develop constructive relationship with the social 
movements (1992-1993, 2003-2005) and invest its resources in broader projects of left 
regroupment (1990, 2005-2007).   
 
What prevented the German radical left from exploiting more fully the disillusionment 
with the traditional mass parties and, in particular, from replacing the SPD as the main 
left-wing party?  
A first factor was the nature of the PDS as the legal successor of the SED, which 
inevitably connected it with the historical legacy of that discredited authoritarian 
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regime.73 While the efforts of the party to critically assess the GDR experience and to 
distance itself from its negative aspects were sustained and broadly sincere, its 
opponents had an easy task in pointing out to the continuities in the biographies of 
party leaders and members (notably, the issue of past contacts with the Stasi) and to 
its tight relations with the milieu of the former bureaucracy. Although attempts to 
mobilise anti-communist biases against the PDS fell flat in the East they remained quite 
effective in the West, contributing to its highly negative image among the population 
(see FIGURE 3.12).74  
 
A second factor was the lack of roots of the PDS in the West (Neu, 2000; Meuche-
Mäker, 2005). This proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for the party which, by 
failing to attract any significant number of Western members and activists, always 
remained "spiritually, politically and socially a foreign body" in the region (Brie, 2000: 
12), reaching at its peak in 1998 just 442,136 votes (1.2%). This was by no means a 
small achievement, as it went well beyond anything that the West German far left had 
done since the mid-1960s; it represented however an upper ceiling which proved 
impossible to break and which left little hope of benefitting from the emergence of 
disaffected SPD or Green voters. The creation of the WASG (2004) and the merger in 
DIE LINKE (2007) for the first time enabled the radical left to appear as a small but 
credible political force in the Western regions, and this shift led to growing electoral 
successes in the period 2005-2009: in general elections the party soared to almost 3 
million votes (8.3%) while in regional elections it managed to cross the 5%-threshold in 
six of the ten Western regional parliaments. The roots of the new party, however, 
remained tenuous, exposing it to rapid changes in the behaviour of its little-attached 
recent supporters. 
 
                                                     
73
 This dimension is eviscerated at length in a highly hostile strand of scholarly (Moreau et al., 1994; 
Moreau, 1998; Lang, 2003; Neu, 2004; Jesse & Lang, 2008) and popular (Knabe, 2008) literature.  
74
 In the East, negative opinions of the party rapidly fell from 61.3% in 1991 to 43.6% in 1994, stabilising 
afterwards; in the West, they never fell under 62% (2008). Similarly, positive opinions of the party 
reached around 40% in the East (since 1994) but in the West never exceeded 11% for the PDS (2001) 
and 19.8% for DIE LINKE (2008). The high levels of extremely negative opinions point to the fact that the 
much of this rejection was not so much programmatic but rather of a more fundamental and emotive 
nature.   
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FIGURE 3.12 PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PDS, EAST/WEST 
 
Source: my elaboration from GESIS. 




The key element, however, was probably what I would "weight of tradition". Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) were the first to point out to the tendential "freezing" of European 
party systems around the cleavage structure of the 1920s; subsequent research (Rose 
& Urwin, 1970; Mair, 1993; Drummond, 2006) has discussed the hypothesis of a "de-
freezing" since the 1980s, while confirming that "old" parties are generally fairly 
successful in adapting to new circumstances and that radical change does not occur 
but in exceptional moments of social and political crisis (e.g. the 1992-1994 crisis in 
Italy). In the German case, we should point out to three factors counterweighing the 
tendency toward the decline of the traditional parties.  
First, a natural wariness of people to give up long-lasting political allegiances forged in 
the formative period and consolidated by the subsequent experience of an effective 
ideal and material representation. While undeniably little effective in securing 
economic growth and social welfare in the neo-liberal era, traditional parties can 
nevertheless still draw much delayed benefit, especially among the older age cohorts75, 
from their past policies and their long-term effects.  
Second, the dense networks of subcultural organisations and clienteles which the 
major parties created over decades are without doubt rapidly losing their political 
coherence, size and influence but nevertheless remain a brake against change. In the 
case of the SPD, the fact that almost the entirety of the leadership of the traditional 
workers' movement (the trade union DGB, the mass organisations AWO, VdK, SoVD, 
KOS and DMB, part of the cooperative umbrella DGRV) stood by the party during its 
recent crisis – albeit in an often critical manner – is of a great immediate and 
perspective political importance, as it provides a good foundation for a future 
recovery. 
Third, by virtue of their position and resources the two main parties (CDU-CSU and 
SPD) are still partially able to "polarise" the competition as a choice between only two 
realistic programmes and candidates for chancellor, thereby rallying around them a 
large number of wavering potential supporters which just want to bar the way to the 
larger evil. Moreover, while the scope for consolidating their support while in office 
                                                     
75
 The share of valid votes of CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP fell by 27.7 percentage points between 1972 and 
2009 (99.1% to 71.4%). The decline is however stronger among the younger generations and weaker 
among the older ones: -39.5 points among voters aged 18-25 (99.1% to 59.6%), -31.6 points among 
voters aged 45-60 (98.8% to 67.2%), -17.0 points among over-60 voters (98.9% to 81.9%).  
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with redistributive policies is decreasing, the parties are still able to regain part of the 
lost votes through a shift to the opposition. True, the emergence of stable (FDP, 
Greens) or potential (PDS/DIE LINKE) allies has gradually reduced their room for 
manoeuvre in this sense, as disaffected voters may now opt for a smaller alternative 
without the risk of favouring the rival camp. However, a veritable collapse of their 
electorates obtained only in 2005-2009, when they de-emphasised the left-right divide 
by entering a grand coalition. The subsequent restoration of the traditional pattern of 
competition is likely to at least in part make up for the lost ground.  
 
So long as it remains a minor player with shallow civil society roots, therefore, the 
German radical left will be exposed to the danger of swift oscillations of its support 
toward the SPD (tactical voting) or toward abstentionism (disengagement). The 
improvement of 1990-1998 among these two categories, for instance, was almost 
entirely wiped out in 2002; the gains of the period 2002-2009, similarly, were partially 




3.3.3 Organisational mobilisation 
 
While the German radical left was fairly successful in expanding in the electoral 
dimension of the vacuum which opened up among the deceived traditional 
constituencies the SPD and, in the Eastern regions of the country, of the CDU (Eastern 
blue collar workers), the same cannot be said for the organisational dimension of the 
vacuum. The dense societal linkages of the German mass parties (Volksparteien) have 
been eroding more rapidly than their own electorate; this notwithstanding, the 
German radical left has failed to provide a solid alternative. The present paragraph is 
devoted to the discussion of the two key facets of this issue, party membership and 





Like their counterparts in Western Europe, the German mass parties have suffered a 
strong long-term decline in their membership levels which set in during the 1980s, 
continued in the 1990s (with the brief exception of 1990, due to the massive influx of 
new Eastern members) and accelerated after 1999 (FIGURE 3.13). Over the period 
1990-2011, for instance, the CDU-CSU lost 34.4% of its members and the SPD 48.1%.  
Unlike the Greens, the PDS/DIE LINKE did not benefit from this situation and did even 
worse than its rivals, falling in absolute terms by 75.3% (from 280,882 members in 
1990 to 69,458 in 2011). In terms of penetration ratios (members over voters, M/V), 
they thus shifted from a membership-dense (1990: 24.9%) to an intermediate (2002: 
3.7%) and thin (2009: 1.5%) kind of party formation. Other radical left organisations, 
such as the orthodox DKP, followed the same trend.76  
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 According to intelligence data (Kailitz, 2004; BdI, 1991-2012), the fairly large DKP membership of the 
late 1980s (42,000 in 1986, 34,000 in 1989) melted away after during fall of the Soviet bloc, leaving 
behind only 8,000 members in 1992. After that year the decline continued at a slower but relentless 




FIGURE 3.13 MEMBERSHIP LEVELS 
 
Source: Niedermayer (2012). 
 
The root of these problems lay in the origins of the PDS in the mass communist party 
par excellence, the SED, which in 1988 encompassed 2.3 million members, around 
18.5% of the GDR population. The initial choice to renew the party instead of 
dissolving it enabled the PDS to preserve a core of dedicated activists, but was 
followed only by a small fraction of its predecessor's members (280,882 in 1990; 
131,406 in 1993). As it was, the remaining members were overwhelmingly over-50 
pensioners or inactives coming from the former mid-ranking intelligentsia or 
bureaucracy; ordinary members deserted the party and never came back. Since 1993, 
thus, the main factor of the decline has been the natural process of aging and death of 
its initial membership. Simultaneously, their replacement with new members has been 
hindered by a series of factors: on the one hand, the general reluctance of the new 
generations of the Western European population to join political parties, which are 
seen as an outmoded form of political engagement and do not confer anymore the 
ideational (sense of purpose and community) and material (policies, patronage) 
benefits of the past; on the other hand, the distinctive organisational (tightly-knit small 
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"cells"), sociological (aged former bureaucrats) and geographical (overwhelmingly 
Eastern) set-up of the party, which are little welcoming and interesting for newcomers.  
A very important additional factor in decline has been the existence of widespread 
institutionalised and informal practices of discrimination, whereby retaining or 
acquiring the membership of an "extreme" party such as the PDS could be highly 
detrimental for one's private life and career prospects. In the West, far left members 
were thoroughly purged from civil service by the Radikalenerlass of 1972 (Braunthal, 
1990) and political vetting of new applicants and existing civil servants, albeit gradually 
loosened after 1995, remains in place in many public institutions. In the East, after the 
reunification the 2.1 million state employees were similarly vetted for the role they 
played in the fallen regime (Keller & Henneberger, 1992; McAdams, 2001; Crossley-
Frolick, 2007). Although the number of people explicitly fired on political grounds, 
because of past collaborations with the Stasi, appears to be small – only 42,062 cases 
according to McAdams (2001) –, card-carrying PDS civil servants were singled-out in 
the waves of lay-offs, outsourcings and early retirements which rapidly downsized the 
Eastern public sector workforce to 1,592,546 (1991), 861,155 (2001) and 722,602 
(2008) employees.77 More generally, the party continued to be categorised as 
borderline "extremist" by the state authorities and therefore subjected to a constant 
surveillance by the federal and regional political intelligence agencies 
(Verfassungsschutz).    
 
Despite serious efforts, these drawbacks proved to be insurmountable. 
Even at times when PDS sympathisers and voters grew rapidly (1993-2001, 2003-
2007), its Eastern members continued to follow an inexorable decline. 
The Western branches of the radical left parties were less burdened by the legacy of 
the SED and did experience a general trend of modest membership growth,78 peaking 
at 4,708 members (2002) in the PDS, 11,250 members (2005) in the WASG and 29,551 
members (2009) in DIE LINKE. The former mostly recruited among a small and 
scattered far left milieu; the latter for the first time managed to create a thin layer of 
structures covering almost all Western administrative districts and to become 
attractive for significant numbers of far leftists, social movement activists and 
                                                     
77
 DESTATIS (2011), excluding people employed in Berlin.   
78
 With the exception of the periods 2003-2004 and 2010-2012. 
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disaffected social democratic and green voters. The "successes", however, were of an 
altogether limited magnitude. First, while being more dynamic both in size and in 
socio-demographic composition, Western branches organised a much lower ratio of 
voters (PDS 1998: 0.68%; DIE LINKE 2009: 1.00%) than their Eastern counterparts. 
Second, their growth was generally not strong enough to compensate the decline of 
the rest of the party. As a consequence, total party membership increased only in 
2004-2009 (from 61,385 of the PDS to 78,046 of DIE LINKE) and decline set in again 




Societal linkages  
 
The crisis of the traditional mass parties was not restricted to their membership 
decline, but also entailed a deep crisis of their traditional subcultural networks of 
collateral and friendly organisations (von Winter, 2007).  
This process had three dimensions: (i) a loss of members and supporters of the party-
near mass organisations; (ii) their progressive autonomisation vis-à-vis their traditional 
political references, leading to a less partisan and politicised public discourse; (iii) a 
loosening of their ties with their own memberships, reflected in their decreased 
capacity to command identification and to orient behaviour.  
A good example is provided by the SPD-near trade union confederation. On the first 
account the DGB, after a momentary revival in 1991 when millions of Eastern workers 
swelled its ranks, suffered a dramatic membership decline, falling from 11.8 million 
(1991) to 6.1 million (2010) members in absolute terms and from 35.5% to 18.3% of 
the employed workforce in relative terms.79 On the second account, in 2002 the 
confederation discontinued the traditional practice of offering an explicit voting advice 
for the SPD and at times (e.g. in 2003-2004) assumed fairly critical attitudes toward the 
latter. On the third account, the capacity of union leaders to mobilise their followers 
also seems to be declining. On the industrial front, in 2003 the metalworkers' union 
                                                     
79
 Visser (2013). As 15-20% of union members are not employed wage-workers (e.g. unemployed, 
pensioners and students), the actual share should be even lower. 
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suffered the first defeat in a strike in fifty years (Schmidt, 2003). On the political front, 
while the vast majority of union leaders and cadres are still card-carrying SPD 
members the same cannot be said of union members, which since 1998 have left the 
social democratic electorate at a faster pace than the rest of the population (from 56% 
in 1998 to 33.5% in 2009). 
The same dynamics have been at play in the array of SPD-near charities (AWO), 
specialised associations (VdK, SoVD, DMB, KOS), companies (part of the DGRV 
cooperative movement, the party press) and other friendly networks and organisations 
– which encompass several hundred thousands of professional and semi-professional 
collaborators and several million members.   
 
The German radical left, despite its electoral surge, was not able to expand its 
positions within civil society and social movement organisations and to become a 
serious competitor of the SPD in this domain. The network of organisational linkages of 
the PDS was largely destroyed in 1989-1991; subsequent efforts at strengthening the 
ties with existing or new civil society organisations had real but limited positive results. 
The gigantic network of mass organisations controlled by the SED largely dissolved 
itself or merged with their Western counterparts, completely escaping to the influence 
of the PDS and aligning with the new dominant parties CDU and SPD. In particular, the 
influence of the party among the organised labour movement was shattered by the 
consequences of revolution and of unification (Wilke & Müller, 1991; Loeding & 
Rosenthal, 2001). The only notable exception was the charity Volkssolidarität (Winkler, 
2010), which adopted a cross-party stance but remained politically quite close to the 
PDS. Although rapidly declining (853,000 members in 1991; 538,000 in 1994; 276,000 
in 2009), the organisation remained a social and economic powerhouse and gradually 
came to dominate the German confederation of non-confessional charities (Der 
Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband, DPW).  
The PDS did manage to forge close links with a series of new organisations created to 
represent the interests and ideals of the former socialist bureaucracy (e.g. the ISOR), 
which were strategically important for their dense legal and cultural work but never 
gathered more than 40,000 members. Outside this milieu, the efforts of the party 
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tended to fall flat. Friendly Eastern civil society organisations80 remained fairly small 
and little influential. Networks set up by the party to spearhead specific mobilisations 
also tended to be little successful and failed to institutionalise themselves into 
significant social movement organisations. In 1992 the party created together with a 
group of political and social notables the Komitees für Gerechtigkeit to protest against 
the socio-economic plight of the former GDR, but the organisation was wound up 
before the end of the year (Fieber & Reichmann, 1995). In 1997 personalities from 
various strands of the German left (SPD, Greens, PDS, DKP and independents) came 
together to sign the Erfurter Erklärung, calling for a united front of all left-wing parties, 
a common left-Keynesian programme and a strong extra-parliamentary movement 
(Dahn, 1997). The declaration gathered 45,000 signatures and led to the establishment 
of a DGB-linked coordination (Aufstehen für eine andere Politik) and to the 
organisation of a mid-sized demonstration in Berlin (60,000 participants); the 
momentum, however, did not survive the 1998 election and the coming to power of 
the centre-left. Finally, the influence of the party within the old West German (now all-
German) civil society organisations remained very low. In particular, the sharp rise of 
the sympathy of Eastern unionised workers toward the party after 1992 did not 
translate into significant gains within the union apparatus, which remained solidly 
controlled by the SPD. Only in Thüringen was the PDS able to win the confidence of 
some high-level union cadres81. 
The emergence of the WASG represented a gain of a significant number of trade union, 
social movement and political activists. However, their influence was largely limited to 
the smallish alter-globalisation galaxy.82 The WASG played a key role in the various 
coordinating bodies of the 2003-2004 protests against the Agenda 2010, but these 
failed to coalesce into permanent social movement organisations. Within the trade 
union movement, supporters of the new party remained fairly isolated and limited to 
low- or mid- ranking positions. Within other SPD-near organisations, which in the 
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 Such as the city gardening association VKSG, the unemployed association ALV and the handicapped 
association ABID. 
81
 Such as the DGB chairman Frank Spieth (1992-2006) and the HBV chairman Bodo Ramelow (1992-
1999). 
82
 ATTAC Deutschland, for instance, had only 14,001 members in March 2004. While refusing to formally 
align itself with the new party, the organisation maintained a strong informal proximity to the WASG 
(ATTAC, 2005; Speth, 2006: 96). Other alter-globalist organisations which became quite close to the 
WASG or the PDS (the pacifist DFG-VK, the academic BdWI, the far left Turkish/Kurdish GDF and DIDF) 
had altogether less than that number of members.   
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period 2003-2009 showed heavy signs of dissatisfaction toward the party (SoVD, VdK, 
DMB), the WASG made practically no inroads.  
DIE LINKE inherited the organisational linkages of its predecessors and experienced a 
certain growth of its civil society roots. However, its influence among the leaders and 
cadres of mass organisations still remains feeble, much weaker than its electoral 
influence and much smaller than that of the SPD, which continued to command the 
(more or less critical) allegiance of large majority of left-leaning civil society 
organisations. The example of the trade union movement is indicative. While 17.1% of 
trade union members voted for DIE LINKE in 2009 (32.1% in the East, ahead of the CDU 
and SPD), the 1,805 union cadres who signed the appeal "Wir wählen links!" almost 
exclusively consisted of low-ranking officials83 and the doors of top union organs 
remained closed to card-carrying LINKE supporters84. As far as social movement 
networks were concerned, the party played a central role in the 2007 G8 counter-
summit at Heiligendamm and in the post-2009 anti-crisis protests (Wir zahlen nicht für 
eure Krise! in 2009-2010 and Blockupy in 2012-2013) but, as for previous experiments, 
no notable organisational legacy was left once the movement ebbed.    
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 The only high-ranking figures were Renate Licht (secretary of the DGB sub-district of Thüringen) and 
two retired unionists: Horst Schmitthenner, for two decades member of the IG-Metall executive (1989-
2009), and Sybille Stamm, secretary of the Ver.di district of Baden-Württenberg (2001-2007). 
84
 The 5-person DBG executive, for instance, was composed by three SPD, one CDU and one Green 
member. The larger executives of individual trade unions did not include any single LINKE member 





The German radical left was fairly successful in filling the electoral vacuum left by the 
neo-liberal shift of traditional mass parties (SPD and CDU-CSU).  
In the 1990s the PDS consolidated its support among the downward-mobile former 
Eastern bureaucracy, markedly improved its image and results among other Eastern 
social strata (workers, inactives, employees) and saturated the small Western far left 
opinion. A key obstacle preventing it from becoming a credible contender to the SPD, 
i.e. the lack of any organisational root in the West, was removed in the period 2003-
2007. The unpopularity of Schröder's labour market reforms and the massive wave of 
protest which followed them provoked the emergence of a small but significant new 
radical left group (the WASG) and the defection of important social democratic figures 
(Oskar Lafontaine). The alliance (2005) and subsequent merger (2007) of the two 
parties in DIE LINKE created the best possible conditions for filling the representation 
gap between mainstream parties and their traditional working-class and welfarist 
constituencies, and the results met or even exceeded the expectations. 
Altogether, in the period 1990-2009 the German radical left gained more than four 
million votes, soaring from 1.9% to 8.3% of the total electorate and from 2.4% to 
11.9% of valid votes. Although this rise did not fully compensate for the post-1998 
collapse of the SPD and was somewhat fragile, as the 2002 and 2013 setbacks clearly 
proved, the electoral balance-sheet was nothing short of extraordinary.  
 
However, the gains obtained at the levels of generic sympathy and voting behaviour 
did not spill over to the level of organised social strength (FIGURE 3.14). 
The overall membership of the PDS/DIE LINKE collapsed up to 2004 and barely grew 
afterwards, as the gains in the West were largely wiped out by the continued decline in 
the East. The radical left thus remained dwarfed by the SPD which, while in crisis, still 




FIGURE 3.14 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE 
 Notes: share of the total electorate. Sympathisers: people declaring a proximity with the party (GESIS polls). 
 
The influence among civil society organisations and social movements experienced a 
moderate growth since the historical trough of 1990-1991, when the PDS was faced 
with an overwhelming hostility outside the milieu of the former GDR bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, the sympathy won among left-wing activists in the 1990s and above all 
in the 2000s remained limited to small radical circles (e.g. the pacifist and alter-
globalist movement) and little influential currents (e.g. strands of the union left), while 
the bulk of civil society and social movement cadres tended to confirm an (albeit 





3.4 Explaining radical left regroupment 
 
As already remarked, one of the peculiarity of the development of the German radical 
left was its organisational unity. Instead of suffering from a destructive competition 
between different organisations (as in France) or from successive debilitating splits (as 
in Italy), the PDS managed to preserve its hegemonic status on the radical left 
spectrum and even to initiate significant waves of radical left regroupment, absorbing 
important far left and left-social democratic currents. How was this possible? 
 
This achievement can be explained by the interplay of a series of socio-political, 
institutional, relational and subjective factors.  
The pre-conditions for the processes of regroupment of the German radical left were 
provided by a series of socio-political factors: (i) the post-1989 crisis of the radical left, 
which reduced the salience of many of the old dividing lines, favoured processes of 
opening and renewal and encouraged the pooling together of strengths and resources; 
(ii) the neo-liberal transformation of the SPD, which left increasing sectors of its 
traditional intellectual, working-class and welfarist constituencies in search of 
alternatives; (iii) the dynamics of left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisation which, 
unlike in most European countries, reached their peak in a protracted wave of protest 
on social issues and against a seating centre-left government (2003-2005).  
Further incentives to radical left regroupment and safeguards against party splits were 
provided by institutional and relational factors: (iv) the electoral system, which 
discouraged splits and new party formations and encouraged the collaboration of 
disparate currents to overcome the 5% electoral threshold; (v) the attitude of potential 
allies; by excluding the PDS from the participation to national cabinets and limiting its 
involvement at the regional level, the SPD defused the conflict between conciliatory 
and intransigent tendencies and helped to preserve the anti-neoliberal credential of 
the PDS in the eyes of its core electorate.  
A final subjective factor was nevertheless crucial: (vi) the non-sectarian and farsighted 
attitude of the major player, the PDS, which proved capable to create a working 





The first two factors are common to the all Western European countries and constitute 
the main drivers of the general tendency to craft, from the ruins of the 20th century 
orthodox, euro-communist and far left organisations, new "broad left" formations85 
able to appeal to the traditional communist constituency, to the disaffected social 
democratic supporters and to newly-politicised layers of the population. In this matter 
the German case has no claim to exceptionality.  
 
The third factor, on the other hand, played a vital role in provoking the break-away to 
the radical left of a small number of former social democratic cadres86 and the 
emergence of the WASG. Although the contemporary radical left has assiduously 
courted left-wing social democratic tendencies, results have tended to be little 
forthcoming. The case of the WASG remains to this day one of the few examples, and 
arguably the most successful one, of left-ward splits of the European social democratic 
party family.87 The explanation of this outcome lies precisely in the fact that discontent 
toward the neo-liberal turn of the SPD was magnified and accompanied by a long cycle 
of public protest and mass mobilisation against its policies in government, while in 
other countries anti-neoliberal protests have tended to flare up against right-wing 
cabinets and abate when the left is in office.  
  
The lack of any significant split from the radical left, both to its left and to its right, and 
the non-emergence of notable competitors had on the other hand much to do with 
the effect of institutional factors.  
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 The most important examples of this pattern are the Spanish Izquierda Unida (1986), the Greek 
Synaspismos, the Dutch GroenLinks, the Danish Enhedslisten and the German Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus (1989), the Swedish Vänsterpartiet and the Finnish Vasemmistoliitto 
(1990), the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista and Partito Democratico della Sinistra (1991), 
the Dutch Socialistische Partij (1990s), the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda (1999), the Greek SYRIZA 
(2004), the German DIE LINKE (2007) and the French Front de Gauche (2009). A few of them (Dutch GL 
and Italian PDS) later abandoned the radical left party family.  
86
 Oskar Lafontaine and some second- and third- rank politicians and unionists (Ulrich Maurer, Frank 
Spieth, Klaus Ernst, Thomas Händel). 
87
 Other examples are the French MDC/MRC (1993), the Greek DIKKI (1995), the French PG (2009), the 
shift of former PASOK politicians to SYRIZA (2012) and the shift of former PDS politicians to the PRC (all 
along); in the latter case, however, all forces involved (Lucio Magri, Pietro Ingrao, Aldo Tortorella, Piero 
Folena, Cesare Salvi) had a communist background.    
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The political isolation to which the SPD subjected the PDS first and DIE LINKE later 
helped to cement its cohesion and hegemony on the radical left. Right-leaning 
tendencies could hardly hope to find a welcoming environment within the traditional 
centre-left parties, where justified hostility toward the SED, more questionable anti-
communist instincts and competitive rivalries ran deep.88 Left-leaning tendencies, on 
the other hand, for the same reason lacked serious political reasons to leave. As the 
PDS and DIE LINKE appeared to support a radical and coherent anti-neoliberal 
programmatic and their involvement in experiences of governmental participation was 
limited to a few regions, the establishment of a more radical competitor would 
necessarily appear as incomprehensible to both voters and activists, as electoral 
results repeatedly proved.89 Moreover, the fact that the party was never posed in front 
of the hard choice of supporting a minority centre-left government at the national 
level (in 2005 the SPD ruled out this option and in all other elections its votes were 
never needed) further helped to minimise the possibility of defections and splits.  
The effects of the electoral system, similarly, provided a large incentive to pool 
together the strength of each organisation and sensibility with the aim of overcoming 
the 5%-threshold and obtaining parliamentary representation. In fact, through the 
alliance with the PDS even tiny radical left groups could hope to obtain national, 
regional and local elected representatives90; conversely, by going alone the chances 
were near to nil. This represented the most important factor in explaining the 
magnetic pull of the PDS on other radical left forces, the success of the alliance and 
merger with the WASG and the absence of any significant party split.  
 
Finally, the central leadership of the PDS proved remarkably flexible and skilful in 
encouraging the coexistence of different tendencies within a unified framework and 
enticing potential partners to join.  
                                                     
88
 The initial refusal of the Eastern SDP (the initial name of the social democratic party of the GDR) to 
accept former SED members, and notably the important PDS faction of Wolfgang Berghofer, marked the 
tone of the relationship. While a few high-profile PDS politicians later switched to the SPD (Angela 
Marquardt in 2008, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann in 2009), they did it individually and with meagre personal 
and political rewards.  
89
 Both orthodox and movementist challenges to the party had desultory electoral outcomes. The 
situation could be different at the local level, when radical challenges to unpopular SPD-PDS regional 
governments had more space to emerge. The dissident Berlin branch of the WASG, for instance, 
obtained a decent 2.9% of valid votes in 2006. 
90
 This applied both to Western leftists (e.g. Ulla Jelpke, Winfried Wolf and Eva Bulling-Schröter) in the 
period 1990-2002 and to former WASG members in the post-2005 period.  
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First of all, the ideological and organisational renewal of the party was organised from 
the start on open, pluralistic and tolerant "broad left" bases which were conducive to 
the coexistence and integration of the widest possible spectrum of different political 
traditions and sensibilities. Organised factions91 and thematic groups92 were allowed 
official recognition and granted political and financial resources; formal and informal 
tendencies93 were involved inclusively in the decision-making process and in the 
allocation of internal and public offices; individual and group dissent94 was amply 
tolerated. As the party provided a favourable living and working environment to a wide 
range of positions, it reduced the incentives to split and formed a powerful pole of 
attraction toward smaller (mainly far left) organisations and (former far left, SPD or 
Green members) individuals. Secondly, each internal crisis (in 1989-91, around the 
dissolution of the SED; in 2002-2003 and in 2010-12 around the relationship with the 
SPD; in 2006, around governmental participation in Berlin and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) or problem (the drawn-out conflict with the neo-Stalinist KPF in 1993-
2003) was ultimately settled with compromise solutions which discouraged the 
departure of the defeated wing. Thirdly, the party was prepared to make enormous 
concessions to prospective partners. Although the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-
Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) in 1990 was an 
abysmal failure, the Western leftists who subsequently joined the PDS were raised to 
positions absolutely disproportionate to their weight on the ground. In 2005-2007, the 
alliance and merger with the WASG (Heunemann, 2006; Spier et al., 2007; Olsen, 2007; 
                                                     
91
 In the PDS, formalised factions (Plattformen) tended to emerge only during periods of heated internal 
battle and disband or lose significance afterwards: Plattform 3. Weg, Plattform WF, Plattform 
Demokratischer Sozialismus, Sozialdemokratische Plattform and Kommunistische Plattform in the period 
1989-1991; Geraer Dialog (GD), Forum Zweite Erneuerung (F2E) and Netzwerk ReformLinke (NRL) in the 
period 2002-2003. In DIE LINKE, on the other hand, old and new factions – Kommunistische Plattform 
(KPF), Sozialistische Linke (SL), Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus (FDS) – assumed a permanent 
character and a more central place.     
92
 Thematic groups (Zusammenschlüsse, also called Arbeitsgemeinschaften, AG) reached the maximum 
number of 31 in the PDS (2004) and 20 in DIE LINKE (2012).  
93
 Beyond the above-mentioned formal factions, many looser sensibilities existed. Within the PDS, Brie 
(1995, 2000) identified four main groupings (reformist socialists; reformist pragmatics; orthodox 
socialists and radical democrats) while Behrend (2006) focused on the conflict between a leadership-
based "right-wing", a membership-based "centre" and a fragmented "left" (KPF, Marxistisches Forum, 
Western leftists). Within DIE LINKE, internal debate was structured around formal and semi-formal – 
Antikapitalistische Linke (AKL), Netzwerk ReformLinke (NRL) and Emanzipatorische Linke (Ema.Li.) – 
factions and other informal groupings (e.g. former PDS vs. former WASG, Western radicals vs. Eastern 
moderates).    
94
 From 1999 to 2012, for instance, only three expulsions of members were ever confirmed by the 
internal arbitration court. Similarly, the presence of outspoken oppositional groups (e.g. the orthodox 
KPF or Trotskyist entryist organisations) was sometimes attacked but ultimately always accepted.   
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Hough et al., 2007; Lees et al., 2010; Ernst et al., 2012; Patton, 2013) was similarly 
eased by an array of safeguards which boosted the influence of the smaller partner 
and gave it a long-term equal say in the life of the future party. 
  
In conclusion, so long as DIE LINKE will remain in the comfortable position of being a 
parliamentary party excluded from national government, no significant change in the 
level of radical left fragmentation is to be expected. On the other hand, a change in the 
attitude of the SPD would inevitably expose it to the key dilemma of the contemporary 
radical left and fuel the kind of relational-based fragmentation between conciliatory 
and intransigent currents which is typical of other European countries (most evidently 















3.5 The strategy of left-ward pull 
 
 
In the previous section I have dissected in detail some key elements of the evolution of 
the contemporary German radical left: the development of the different dimensions of 
its societal weight; the success of a strategy of growth based on the exploitation of the 
representation gaps opening between traditional parties and growing sections of their 
social constituencies; the preservation of its cohesion and the results of successive 
waves of regroupment. The final missing element of the analysis is an assessment of 
the strategy connecting immediate activity, mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term 
anti-capitalist goals.  
 
The German radical left chose to follow, particularly since the mid-1990s, a variant of 
what I define as a strategy of mixed left-ward pull, which can be schematically 
summarised in three steps.95 In the short term, party activity was geared to a double 
aim: sustaining the growth of their overall societal weight and affecting the broader 
social and ideological balance of forces. In the mid-term, this combination of friendly 
and hostile, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures was supposed to affect 
the course of the moderate left parties (SPD and Greens) and force them to undertake 
a left turn. This would create the conditions for the establishment of a progressive 
centre-left alliance, its electoral victory and a policy shift away from neo-liberalism 
(Politikwechsel). In the long-term, the successful incremental implementation of 
progressive reforms would lead the way toward a deeper kind of social transformation 
toward a democratic socialist society.  
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 For clear formulations see the late programmes of the parties (PDS, 2003; DIE LINKE, 2005, 2007 and 




3.5.1 Party efforts 
 
Several kinds of pressure can be analytically distinguished in the activity of the parties 
of the German radical left. 
 
The first element was the pressure on the political system exerted by the electoral 
growth of the party and its possible influence on the "direction of competition" 
(Sartori, 1976). As I have already shown in section 3.3, the German radical left did 
follow an overall path of electoral growth. Until 2004, however, the threat was limited 
by the medium-small size of the PDS, by its inability to expand in the Western areas of 
the country and by the composition of its gains (which damaged the centre-right 
parties equally or more than the centre-left ones). It was only after that date that DIE 
LINKE came to represent a direct and serious competitor for the SPD. 
 
The second element was the pressure on prospective allies exerted by means of 
electoral, parliamentary and governmental alliances. The overview in section 3.2 has 
clarified that this tool, while often being a distinct eventuality in the run-up of general 
elections (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013), became relevant only once, during the 
2005-2009 legislature. Since 2005, however, the electoral growth of DIE LINKE 
drastically reduced the chances of the traditional centre-left parties (SPD and Greens) 
to ever obtain an autonomous parliamentary majority, increasing the urgency of a 
rethinking of their coalition policy (Switek, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010). Moreover, 
while insisting on its primarily oppositional outlook, the German radical left 
consistently signalled its openness to bargain its support in exchange for policy 
concessions, thus further impelling its potential allies to change.  
  
The third element was the broader pressure exerted by public debate, alliance-building 
and extra-parliamentary activities on the ideological and social balance of forces. 
While the radical left was fairly isolated within the party system, it could find several 
allies on specific issues and social mobilisations, notably East German interests, 
pacifism and the defence of the welfare state. 
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A direct dialogue with the internal left-wing tendencies of the SPD and of the Greens 
was repeatedly undertaken, concretising in intellectual collaborations such as the first 
Crossover project (1993-1999), the Erfurter Erklärung and its follow-ups (1997-2000), 
the second Crossover debate (2007-2009) and the Institut Solidarische Moderne (2010-
present).96 This kind of activity had however little political repercussions. 
The experiences of local governmental collaboration also helped to improve the 
acceptance of the party and the quality of the left-left dialogue, but proved to be a 
double-edged sword. Given the relative strength of radical and moderate left and the 
institutional and budgetary constraints of regions and communes, more often than not 
this kind of cooperation tended to de-radicalise the former rather than to radicalise 
the latter. In particular, the red-red coalitions in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in 
Berlin significantly damaged the credibility of the PDS as a coherent anti-neoliberal 
force, as they forced it to accept significant cuts of the local welfare and to enable the 
approval of significant counter-reforms in the Bundesrat.97  
The involvement within social mobilisations, on the other hand, was more significant. 
Although neither the PDS and the WASG nor DIE LINKE had the capabilities to initiate 
or sustain large-scale protests and campaigns, as they lacked both a mass membership 
and the proximity of mass civil society and social movement organisations (see section 
3.3.3), they did play an important role in three of the five major cycles of contentious 
politics which have emerged in the country over the period 1989-2012 (1992-1993; 
1997-1998; 2002-2005), in other important contentious events (e.g. the 2007 G8 
counter-summit at Heiligendamm) and in a multiplicity of less prominent struggles and 
campaigns.  
 
The latter element is worth a more detailed discussion. 
The first and most important wave was the 1989-1990 peaceful revolution in the 
German Democratic Republic (Lohmann, 1994; Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006). 
The mobilisation of millions of citizens in gigantic demonstrations, direct actions and 
labour conflicts dealt a death blow to the ruling Communist regime, forcing it to 
sweeping reforms and ultimately forcing its removal from office. The PDS played here 
                                                     
96
 See http://www.sf-rheinland.de/crossover and http://www.solidarische-moderne.de/.  
97
 Behrend (2006: 96-118), Hildebrandt and Brie (2006).  
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an ambiguous role, being both the main target of the protesters and an actor of 
renewal, which self-reformed and accompanied the process of democratic transition 
(Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Segert, 2008 and 2009). Altogether, these efforts were mainly 
perceived as insincere and the outcome of the revolution left the party in tatters, 
enfeebled and politically isolated. 
The second wave was the 1992-1993 movement against the negative repercussions of 
the unification process (Abromeit, 1992; Roesler, 1994; Garms, 1994; Fieber & 
Reichmann, 1995; Gehrke, 1997). Mass unemployment and the de-industrialisation 
policy of the Treuhandanstalt came particularly under fire, resulting in a proliferation 
of local strikes, occupations, demonstrations and hunger strikes. Some attempts to 
coordinate the protests were made (the Komitees für Gerechtigkeit and the 
Ostdeutsche Initiative der Betriebs- und Personalräte) but the movement failed to gain 
the support of mainstream parties and trade unions and slowly died out in a swarm of 
localised defeats or settlements. While little successful in industrial terms, the 
movement had a significant impact on the political climate, contributing to a long-
lasting shift of the East German electorate away from the CDU and toward the PDS and 
SPD.  
The third (and smaller) wave was represented by the disparate anti-Kohl mobilisations 
of unemployed, students, leftists and trade unionists in 1997-1998 (Dahn, 1997; 
Brandt, 1998; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Himpele, 2009). Often explicitly conceived 
as or bent to the needs of the upcoming electoral campaign, the protests were 
smallish and little effective but offered an important contribution to the subsequent 
victory of the centre-left coalition and to the acceptance of the PDS as a peculiar but 
viable left-wing corrective.  
The fourth wave covered the years 2002-2005 and was characterised by a generalised 
revival of social movements. The most important struggle was the one against the 
AGENDA 2010/HARTZ IV labour market reform of the Schröder government, which 
brought to the streets hundreds of thousands of people for a whole summer of 
decentralised "Monday demonstrations", several central marches and a host of smaller 
protest actions (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Rink & Phillips, 
2007; De Grazia et al., 2007; Burger, 2008). But labour (Schmidt, 2003), pacifist 
(Walgrave & Rucht, 2010) and alter-globalist (Rucht & Roth, 2008) struggles were 
prominent as well. Despite their sometimes impressive proportions all mobilisations 
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ended without tangible results but had a large political resonance, providing the 
foundations for the rapid electoral growth of the radical left (Nachtwey & Spier, 2007) 
and for a significant shift to the left of the public opinion.  
The fifth and final wave covered on the period 2009-2011 and was opened by anti-
crisis and student protests (Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010; Kolisang, 2013) and continued 
with massive environmental mobilisations (Rose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Brettschneider 
& Schuster, 2013). Unlike most of their predecessors, these were partially successful, 
leading for instance to the abolition of university tuition fees in all but one region and 
to a confirmation of the phasing out of nuclear energy by 2022. While DIE LINKE 
benefitted from the early phase of the cycle, its late phase favoured on the other hand 
Greens and SPD. 
To sum up, most of the period of this analysis (1992-2009) was characterised by 
medium-sized social mobilisations developing on favourite radical left issues. This fact 
helped the PDS, the WASG and DIE LINKE to enhance their public profile and electoral 
influence of the radical left, thereby raising the pressure on the moderate left parties 
to modify its policy outlook.  
 
It is therefore clear from the above-mentioned discussion that the various kinds of 
pressure exerted by the radical left on the German political system were significant but 
limited, becoming truly worrying only after 2004. It was only in this latter period that 
the radical left managed to break through the boundaries of the former German 
Democratic Republic, to acquire a mid-sized electoral and extra-parliamentary weight, 
to turn into an attractive alternative for the centre-left electorate and to become a key 
player for the success of a left parliamentary alternation.  
 
3.5.2 Systemic effects 
 
Did the pressures of the radical left succeed in exerting a left-ward pull on German 
politics and society? Three kinds of effects must be distinguished: (i) effects on non-
governmental actors; (ii) effects on official governmental policies; (iii) effects on the 
programmatic outlook of political parties, in particular the moderate left ones (SPD 




On the first account, the activity of the radical left had practically no effect. Within the 
workplaces, for instance, radical left activists were few, devoid of a coherent strategy 
of intervention and little influential. Thus, the growth of the sympathy toward the 
radical left failed to produce positive effects on the terrain of unmediated class 
struggle: labour militancy remained very low, union density continued to fall and 
working conditions (wages, contracts, unemployment and precarious jobs) significantly 
worsened.  
 
On the second account, the pressures of the radical left had little direct effect but may 
have had some indirect one. What is certain is that its mobilisation failed to prevent 
implementation of the key counter-reforms of the period (e.g. the privatisations of the 
early 1990s and the AGENDA 2010 labour market reform), did not produce any explicit 
policy concession and did not stop or reverse the overall trend toward neo-
liberalisation. On the other hand, it may have contributed to prevent heavier setbacks 
and produce more covert forms of compensation. 
 
On the third account, finally, the growth of the radical left had some repercussion on 
the broader political debate, raising the profile of its core issues, but has so failed to 
produce a clear turn to the left of the party system. The SPD, in particular, continues to 
cling to the legacy of the Schröder government and to reject the idea of a broad 
centre-left coalition with the Greens and DIE LINKE. While the electoral defeat of 2005 
did not bring about any change of course, the much larger defeat of 2009 did however 
produce some rethinking and repositioning, strengthening the weight of the internal 
left and leading to the adoption of some minimal but clear left-wing proposals (such as 
a € 8,50 minimum wage).  
 
Altogether, the idea of a wide-ranging turn of the moderate left from neo-liberal to 
neo-Keynesian policies appears as a far-fetched and uncertain prospect. There are two 
possible explanations for this outcome.  
The first one is grounded on the insufficient level of the radical left pressures. At its 
peak in 1998, the PDS represented only about 5% of the valid votes and a mere 
hypothetical threat to the governmental prospects of the SPD, which could reasonably 
141 
 
hope to see it miss the electoral threshold (as it indeed happened in 2002) or to offset 
the losses by winning new centrist votes. Since 2005, when DIE LINKE turned into a 
much more insidious competitor, tangible results remained scarce but some doubts 
and cracks in the outlook of the mainstream parties began to appear. It is therefore 
certainly possible that the failure was due to a lack of electoral and extra-
parliamentary weight and that, though a further growth, the outcome would be 
different. 
The evidence, however, also points to an extreme reluctance of the SPD and more in 
general of the Western European "new" social democracy to effectively renege on 
their current policy outlook. The roots of their neo-liberal shift seem to run much 
deeper than mere electoral expediency, having become constitutive to the nature of 
those parties and very resistant to any prospect of "re-socialdemocratisation". The 
testing of such a hypothesis lies beyond the scope of the present research; the case of 
Greece however lends it a significant prima facie credibility, as even the combination 
of a huge electoral shift to the left (with the radical left soaring 31.9% of valid votes 
and the PASOK collapsing to 12.2%) and unprecedented social mobilisations has so far 




Despite a successful intensification of its pressure on the German political system, the 
radical left has so far failed to move closer to the intermediate step of its strategy – 
breaking the hegemony of neo-liberalism and paving the way for a political change of 
direction. Its activity remains predominantly propagandistic and incapable to 
overcome the threshold of effectiveness, winning tangible concessions for its own core 










The post-1989 evolution of the German radical left represents a fairly successful 
example within the Western European panorama. Its careful analysis, however, reveal 
a more nuanced picture of lights and shades. 
 
On the positive side, this political area followed a trajectory of almost uninterrupted 
electoral growth which pushed it from 1.1 million (1990) to 5.2 million (2009) valid 
votes. It preserved its organisational cohesion and successfully aggregated around the 
PDS successive layers of far left activists, new and non-voters and disgruntled centre-
left supporters. And it enriched the terms of the public debate, providing a visible 
political representation to themes (the specificity of the Eastern regions, social justice, 
pacifism, critique of capitalism) and interests (the former GDR bureaucracy, 
unemployed and employed wage workers, the strata benefitting most from the 
welfare state) which had tended to become increasingly neglected by the mainstream 
parties. 
On the negative side, however, it proved unable to translate this growth into tighter 
and more effective forms of allegiance and mobilisation. Its activists and members 
continued to shrink, its influence within civil society and social movement 
organisations remained low and its capacity to launch or steer significant extra-
parliamentary campaigns was limited. Moreover, its attempts to exert a left-ward pull 
on the political system yielded little tangible results. Finally, its electoral gains did 
make up only a small section of the losses of the moderate left parties and remained 
vulnerable to the dangers of de-mobilisation and tactical voting, as the deceiving 
results of the 2002 and 2013 general elections clearly proved. 
 
In a nutshell, both the growth potential and the capacity of influence of the radical left 
seem to ultimately run up against insurmountable ceilings, linked to internal 
(organisational, strategic and political) shortcomings and external (material and 
ideological) constraints. Neoliberal policies are increasingly questioned and contested, 
but no credible perspective of an alternative is on the agenda. The "new" SPD is 
weakened, but its electoral, institutional and extra-parliamentary hegemony on the 
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left remains solid. The radical left is an effective thermometer of these trends, but is 




CHAPTER FOUR. THE ITALIAN 




4.1 The national context 
 
The contemporary Italian radical left can boast exceptionally strong historical roots 
and its post-1989 development made it a far from marginal force within Italian and 
European politics. On the one hand its electoral and parliamentary weight, although 
fluctuating around mid-range levels well below the successes of other Western 
European counterparts (e.g. Greece, Portugal and France), was big enough to make it a 
vital element for the formation of centre-left majorities and entrusted it with a 
disproportionate amount of governmental weight at both regional and national levels. 
On the other hand its major party, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC), has 
played a key role for the reorientation of the European radical left, both as a role 
model and as a liaison agent.98 
Despite its promising beginnings, however, the Italian radical left has failed to 
consolidate its positions and has progressively fallen prey to strategic helplessness, 
damaging splits, growing fragmentation and a recent (post-2008) severe drop in 
support and overall influence.  
In the present chapter I will chart the evolution of the parties of the Italian radical left 
and explain the reasons of their weaknesses and of ultimate failure.   
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 For instance, in the establishment of the transnational Party of the European Left (2004) and in the 
coordination of the alter-globalist movement (1999-2004). In particular, the PRC was the only political 
party in the world to be allowed to sign the final declaration of the first World Social Forum in 2001 and 
was instrumental in organising its largest European mobilisations (the Genoa counter-summit in 2001 





The societal context of the period 1989-2012 was marked by a series of wide-ranging 
shifts and turbulences, to which the Italian radical left struggled to respond 
adequately. A detailed analysis of the socio-economic, institutional and political 
transformations of the last 25 years will be carried out in SECTION 4.3. The four main 
developments were the progressive degradation of the productive/macroeconomic 
conditions of Italian capitalism, the neo-liberalisation of the state and of public 
policies, the crisis and reconfiguration of the political system and the shift of the 
majority of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from Eurocommunism toward a peculiar 
variation of the "new" or "market" social democracy. 
 
Economically, the country suffered and proved unable to measure up to the challenges 
of global competition, European integration and the progressive weakening of its 
traditional competitive advantages and support mechanisms (low wages, state 
ownership and subsidies, deficit-spending, currency devaluations). Real gross domestic 
product growth declined from the high levels of the 1960s and 1970s to paltry ones in 
the 1990s and 2000s and collapsed after 2008. Most large companies, with the partial 
exception of the banking system and of the "pocket multinationals" (Colli, 2002), 
struggled to withstand international competition and were often forced to downsize or 
to sell to foreign groups. Who suffered most was the Italian working class: in the 
period 1993-2009 unemployment remained high (9.1%); real wages stagnated (yearly 
+0.2%); large swathes of the young and not-so-young potential workforce had to 
resort to the precarious conditions of informal employment and of the new atypical 
contracts introduced by labour market reforms; welfare provisions for the unemployed 
and for the poor remained patchy and mostly delegated to the support of the enlarged 
family.  
 
At the level of the political system, the early Nineties swept away the established 
actors, rules and patterns of competition of the so-called "First Republic" (1945-1992) 
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and gave way to the unstable set-up of the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2011).99 
The traditional mass political parties were superseded by new ones with shallower 
social roots; the existing non-selective proportional representation was replaced by an 
electoral system with strong elements of disproportionality and incentives to the 
establishment of pre-electoral governmental coalitions; the regime of blocked 
competition (a permanent centrist majority of the DC and its allies) gave way to a 
prevailing pattern of bi-polar alternation between broad centre-left and right-wing 
alliances (with frequent interludes of transitional technocratic cabinets)100. In the early 
2010s, however, the system teetered again on the brink of collapse, perhaps 
anticipating the transition to a new "Third Republic".  
 
This political transition was accompanied by a deeper transformation of the role of the 
state from dirigisme to neo-liberalism. As in other Western European countries, this 
adjustment did not mean a significant reduction of the economic centrality of the state 
within capitalist reproduction101 but rather the retreat from a direct productive role 
and a change of the means and goals of its intervention. This shift, however, 
represented a veritable earthquake which largely dismantled the large state-owned 
sector (privatisations and liberalisations), revolutionised the labour market, public 
services and welfare provisions (especially pensions) and entrenched important 
elements of free-market competition, budgetary restraint, financialisation and 
commodification.  
 
The Italian Communist Party, finally, set on a course of wide-ranging modernisation 
and progressive drift to the right. In the early 1990s it renamed itself Party of the 
Democratic Left (PDS), joined the Socialist International, aggressively supported the 
majoritarian reform of the electoral law and unsuccessfully sought to come to power 
at the head of a broad left-wing alliance. After 1995 it cut a deal with large sections of 
the old establishment, joined a broad centre-left alliance and became the main actor 
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 See Gundle and Parker (1996) and Grilli di Cortona (2007). Unlike in France, the definition does not 
indicate a wide-ranging constitutional change. The shift of 1992-1994 interested the electoral 
legislation, the units of the political system (parties) and the dynamics of competition but the formal 
constitutional framework, the form of state and the form of government did not change.   
100
 Amato I (1992-1993), Ciampi (1993-1994), Dini (1995-1996), Monti (2011-2012). 
101
 In the period 1993-2009 state revenues (45.2% of GDP), expenditures (49.1% of GDP) and gross debt 
(110.8% of GDP) remained at historical peak levels. 
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and supporter of the pro-European neo-liberal modernisation of the country; it also 
merged with smaller left-wing forces in the Left Democrats (DS). In the mid-2000s, 
finally, it merged with its Christian democratic and centrist allies into generic centre-
left vessels: the Olive Tree Federation (FED) in 2004 and the Democratic Party (PD) in 
2007 (Bordandini et al., 2008). 
 
Radical left responses 
 
All these developments represented dramatic setbacks for the traditional interests, 
values and projects of the left-wing constituency. At the same time, the swift right-
ward drift of the political system could reasonably be expected to create a sizeable 
political vacuum on the left, offering interesting opportunities of recovery and 
expansion to renewed radical left partisan organisations. As I will show in section 4.3, 
these hopes were not entirely unfounded but at the same time proved to be overly 
optimistic. The attempts of the radical left to fill the gap of political representation of 
working-class/welfarist interests had to face a long series of structural and subjective 
obstacles and ultimately failed, plunging this party family in a state of organisational 
fragmentation, political disarray and unprecedented societal weakness (2008-present).  
 
Unlike the parties of other communist strongholds (France, Portugal and Finland), the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI)102 had withstood the Eighties with relative grace. While 
in decline from its historical climax in 1976 (12,616,650 votes - 34.4% of valid votes - 
and 1,814,154 members), by 1987 it could still boast an impressive number of voters 
(10,250,644 votes, 26.6%) and members (1,508,140), local governmental presence and 
friendly mass organisations (the trade-union CGIL, the Legacoop cooperative 
movement, the ARCI recreational network). Its crisis, rather than a material one, was 
one of identity. As the Berlin Wall fell, the party went through a process of wide-
ranging renewal which led it to abandon the communist party family for the social-
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 Partito Comunista Italiano. 
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democratic one, changing its name to Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)103 and 
becoming a modern, moderate and coalitionable left-of-the-centre party (Ignazi, 1992; 
Bellucci, Maraffi & Segatti, 2000; Liguori, 2009; Magri, 2009).  
The Italian far left had also the strongest in Europe. Despite the decline of the number 
and impact of its activists, a large number of local groups remained active on the 
ground and its electoral expression, Proletarian Democracy (DP)104, maintained a non-
negligible electoral support (1987: 1.7%) and above all an independent parliamentary 
representation (Billi et al., 1996; Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Gambetta, 2010; 
Pucciarelli, 2011).  
Against this background, in 1991 a large variety of sensibilities on the left and to the 
left of the old PCI which opposed its change of name and nature decided to give birth 
to a new neo-communist force, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC). This 
experiment, which promised to offer an original solution to the crisis of 20th century 
communism, was unique in Western Europe105 as it was the only successful radical left 
party to emerge through a split from a former Communist party.  
The new party proved to be a significant political player. It was however immediately 
faced with a key dilemma which would determine its entire subsequent evolution: 
what attitude was it supposed to take toward the emerging centre-left pole of the new 
bi-polar competition of the so-called "second republic"? Should it accept or reject its 
integration within the centre-left camp, including the need to support externally or 
directly participate to centre-left governments? The PRC has proved incapable to cope 
with this problem, as the choice of the latter option has regularly produced large 
defections of its elected representatives and damaging right-wing splits (1995, 1998 
and 2009) while the choice of the former one has invariably shattered its anti-
neoliberal credibility and demobilised its voters and members. Thus, the party failed to 
consolidate its hegemony over the Italian radical left and progressively fragmented in a 
variety of competing organisations (see FIGURE 4.1). 
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 Partito Democratico della Sinistra. In 1998 it fused with smaller progressive groups in the Left 
Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra) and in 2007 it merged with most remaining centre-left forces 
(notably the Christian-Democrats of DL) to form the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico).  
104
 Democrazia Proletaria. In 1991 it dissolved and contributed to the birth of the PRC.  
105
 Some parallels exist only in Eastern Europe. 
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FIGURE 4.1 ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES  
 
The Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC)106 is relatively well studied and has been 
the object of a number of historiographical and politological monographs (Dormagen, 
1996; Valentini, 2000; Dalmasso, 2002; Bertolino, 2004; Cannavò, 2009; Favilli, 2011).  
Two other radical left parties have since survived and played a significant role in the 
national political system. The Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)107 was established in 
1998 as a break-away PRC faction which refused to withdraw its support to the Prodi I 
government. The party still lacks a complete history, but interesting analyses are 
provided by Cossu (2004) and Bordandini and Di Virgilio (2005 and 2007). Left Ecology 
Freedom (SEL)108, on the other hand, was created in 2009 by the merger of various 
left-wing splinter groups determined to reconcile different cultures (neo-communism, 
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left socialism, environmentalism) in a common organisation freed from the communist 
label and firmly positioned within a broader centre-left alliance. Its recent history has 
been well analysed by Romano (2009), Damiani (2011) and Bordandini (2013).    
All other right-wing (CU) and left-wing (COBAS, CCA, PdAC, PCL and SC) splits of the 
PRC have been short-lived and devoid of a veritable societal weight. 
 
In short, the initial emergence and consolidation of the "new" Italian radical left (1992-
1996) has gradually given way to a long period of roller-coaster oscillations (1996-
2008) followed by an unprecedented phase of crisis and helplessness (2008-present). 
How and why did this happen? 
 
A tentative answer to these interrogatives will be provided in the rest of the chapter, 
following the narrative and analytical structure already employed in the previous one. 
In section 3.2 I will illustrate the trajectory of the Italian radical left along its three key 
dimensions (societal weight, fragmentation and regroupment and political nature) 
over the period 1992-2012.  
In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the 
Italian case. Why did the PRC and its successor parties ultimately fail to profit from the 
ideological de-radicalisation, political neo-liberalisation, centrist alliances and electoral 
failures of the PDS/DS/PD?  
In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which determined the progressive 
fragmentation of this party family and the failure of the counter-processes of 
regroupment.  
In section 3.5, finally, I will draw a balance sheet of the efforts of the radical left in 
influencing the course of Italian politics and society; in particular, the failure of its 





4.2 The making of a new Italian radical left  
 
 
4.2.1 Societal weight 
 
The following tables (TABLE 4.2 and FIGURE 4.3) provide a good overview of the 
different dimensions of the overall societal weight of the parties of the Italian radical 
left over the period 1991-2013. Three parties account for the vast majority of the 
totals: the PRC (1991-present), the PdCI (1999-present) and SEL (2010-present). Pre-
1989 data for their communist and far left predecessors (PCI and DP) are also included 
for reference. 
 










































    


















    
NATIONAL  34.8% 0.0% 47.1% 0.0% 
REGIONAL  29.8% 14.6% 26.7% 38.7% 
ORGANISATIONAL 
WEIGHT 











YEARLY INCOMES  
(1997-2011) 
€ 14,536,222 - € 15,393,065 € 12,179,902 
MEDIA OUTREACH Weak Strong Weak Weak 
ORGANISATIONAL 
LINKAGES 
Weak Strong Weak Weak 
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling 
figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in government 
(participation or external support); at least one radical left party. National: Camera dei Deputati. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro; 
central level only. REF: national 1987; regional 1990; European 1989; membership 1988.  
* = indicative figures (unreliable data) ** = the radical left ran lists together with non radical organisations (Verdi, IdV, PSI); the 




FIGURE 4.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT  
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members, 
total population administered. 
 
The Italian radical left initially inherited only a small fraction of the strength of its main 
predecessor, the Italian Communist Party: one tenth of its membership, one fourth of 
its voters, one fifth of its parliamentary weight, and very little of its institutionalised 
influence within mass civil society organisations. From 1992 to 2008 it nevertheless 
managed to develop into a mid-sized political area, with most quantifiable variables 
averaging between 5% and 7% and a key role for the purposes of government 
formation. The devastating electoral defeat of 2008, however, for the first time 
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excluded it from parliament and determined a sharp drop in all indicators, threatening 
its long-term significance and perspectives. The most recent period, despite some 
timid countertrends, remains marked by a state of crisis and disarray.109 I will briefly 
review each dimension below. 
 
The electoral weight of the radical left was mid-sized: in average 2,541,164 votes (6.6% 
of valid votes) in parliamentary elections and of a similar magnitude in other kinds of 
elections.  
The peaks were reached in 1996 (8.6%) and 2007 (8.2%), the troughs in 1992 (5.6%), 
2001 (6.7%), 2008 (4.5%) and 2013 (5.7%). In the latter two cases the real weight of 
the radical left was even lower, as the parties ran within electoral list including non-
radical partners.110  
The share of the PRC steadily declined from 100.0% (1996) to 71.6% (2006) to less than 
a third of the total (2013)111, to the benefit of its own successive right-wing and left-
wing splits. Geographically the results were fairly well distributed across the national 
territory, with strongholds in Toscana, Umbria, Marche and eastern Liguria (but not 
Emilia Romagna) and an extreme weakness in the North-East and in Sicilia112.  
 
The aforementioned level of electoral support translated into a still mid-sized but 
significantly lower share of seats within the first chamber of parliament (4.1%) and 
regional assemblies (5.3%).  
This squeeze was due to the highly negative working of the electoral legislation (4% 
electoral threshold; first-past-the post constituency seats; majority premiums) on 
smaller and non-aligned forces; it was however mitigated by a general policy of centre-
left alliances which avoided a much worse outcome. The values peaked in 2006-2007 
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 The 2009 European elections marked a vigorous electoral recovery but no representation, as both 
main lists failed to overcome the 4%-threshold. In 2013, on the contrary, the radical left managed to re-
gain a sizeable representation in the national parliament (37 seats), thanks SEL's choice of centre-left 
alliance, but its electoral results barely improved compared to 2008 (from 4.5% to 5.7%).  
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 The Greens in 2008, the Greens and Di Pietro's crumbling IdV in 2013. 
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 In 2008 the PRC ceased to run for office independently and chose instead to participate in short-lived 
broad left electoral fronts: the Rainbow Left (SA) in 2008; the Federation of the Left (FdS) in 2009-2012; 
Civil Revolution (RC) in 2013. It is therefore not possible to ascertain its precise electoral weight as a 
party; the weight of the fronts has fallen from 69.3% in 2008 to just 39.2% in 2013. 
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(national 9.0%; regional 7.3%) and had their troughs in 2001-2002 (national 3.3%; 
regional 6.0%) and 2010-2012 (national 0.0%; regional 4.1%).  
Radical left elected representatives tended to be more moderate than the party 
memberships and quite undisciplined, repeatedly providing the backbone of large 
right-wing splits (1995, 1998, 2009).   
A major event was the defeat of 2008, when the SA electoral list failed to overcome 
the 4%-threshold and therefore the entry into parliament. This trauma had wide-
ranging effects, as it drastically reduced the visibility and financial resources of the 
member-parties and rippled over on all other indicators.  
 
The electoral and parliamentary weight of the radical left assumed a disproportionate 
importance in the context of the tight bipolar competition, providing an indispensable 
contribution to the formation of centre-left governmental majorities at the national 
and regional level. While large sections of the radical left were sceptical toward an 
organic alliance with the centre-left, considered to be subservient to neo-liberal 
ideologies, centrist parties and the socio-economic establishment, its evolution 
followed a path of growing governmental involvement.  
At the national level, the radical left contributed to the survival of six cabinets (about 
the third of the total time): Dini in 1995-1996 (CU); Prodi I in 1996-1998 (PRC); D'Alema 
I, D'Alema II and Amato II in 1998-2001 (PdCI); Prodi II in 2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI, SD, 
SC). The degree of involvement also steadily increased over time, beginning with an 
external support of PRC dissidents in 1995 and ending with a full governmental 
participation of all major parties in 2006-2008.  
At the regional level, the evolution was even more impressive: the radical left 
supported (directly or externally) regional cabinets administering 29.8% of the national 
population, with an incredible peak of 65.4% in 2005-2007 which included the 
presidency of one region (Puglia with Nichi Vendola, PRC). 
  
The organisational dimension, finally, is more difficult to quantify but oscillated 
between medium and low values. 
The membership of radical left parties was in average 116,262 members or around 
6.3% of total party membership, with peaks in 1997 (130,509) and 2006 (136,323) and 
troughs in 1991 (112,835), 2002 (115,824) and 2012 (77,448). The figure was broadly 
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proportional to and synchronised with the electoral weight and remained remarkably 
stable until 2006, as the general contemporary tendency of European parties to 
decline and age was counterbalanced by a continuous influx of new and young 
members; the subsequent events (governmental participation, fragmentation, 
electoral losses), however, initiated a stark decline which continues to this day.  
Finances experienced a much larger oscillation. The central accounts of the parties had 
in average a real yearly income of €14,536,222, with a peak of €28,896,969 in 2007 
and a trough of just €3,640,874 in 2011.113 The financial "bubble" of the mid 2000s, 
fuelled by perfectly proportional and increasing amounts of state financing, had 
important political side-effects, as it tended to create a dependency and encourage an 
atrophy of the fund-raising and militant capabilities of the party membership. The 
dramatic fall after 2008, on the other hand, was mainly the result of an introduction of 
high thresholds for the public financing of general and European elections which the 
parties failed to overcome. 
Media outreach tended to be weak. The PRC daily newspaper Liberazione (1995-2011), 
for instance, sold in average only around 10,000 copies, represented a heavy financial 
burden for the party and was finally closed down in 2012. Other forms of direct party 
propaganda were significant but tended to be progressively disorganised by the 
continuous splits and defections of popular leaders and cadres. The main channel of 
political communication of the parties gradually became the mass media, where 
charismatic leaders (Fausto Bertinotti, Nichi Vendola) often enjoyed a large coverage 
but were also exposed to the hidden agendas of the media owners.  
Paradoxically, the presence within civil society and social movement organisations was 
one of the weakest points of the radical left parties. True, the PRC was a key 
protagonist of the coalitions behind the alter-globalist mobilisations of 1999-2004, the 
anti-war movement in the same period and of several other popular campaigns (e.g. 
the 1995, 2003 and 2011 referendums). However, the party and its successive splits 
failed to consolidate their influence within the activists and apparatuses of mass civil 
society organisations and to transform a generic sympathy into a close collaboration. 
Mass civil society organisations (e.g. the CGIL trade union) remained solidly, albeit 
somewhat critically, aligned with the PDS/DS/PD; their left-wing tendencies stagnated; 
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and smaller and more radical organisations (e.g. the independent trade union 
confederations or the centri sociali) remained weak and restive.  
 
In conclusion, the dynamics of radical left societal weight can be usefully divided in 
three distinct sequences.  
A fist ascending period (1991-1997) covered the emergence of the PRC under the "first 
republic" and its consolidation under the "second republic". The party cultivated an 
image of externality and antagonism toward the rest of the political system while duly 
participating to broad left (1994) and centre-left (1996) electoral alliances geared at 
defeating the right. The victory of the latter and the creation of the first organic 
centre-left cabinet of the second republic (Prodi I, 1996-2001), which the PRC 
supported externally, rapidly highlighted the ambiguity of the party's positioning and 
increased the centrifugal pressures on it, leading to the crisis of 1998 and opening a 
new phase.  
The second period (1998-2007) was characterised by a significant organisational 
fragmentation, a pro-cyclical oscillation at high levels and a growing integration of the 
parties within the centre-left. The radical left space was now occupied by two main 
organisations (PRC and PdCI), which lost weight while in office and almost entirely 
recovered while in opposition to centre-right governments. The PdCI was from the 
start a loyal partner of the centre-left. The PRC, despite the apparent radical turn of 
1998-2003, did not resist the political and material incentives provided by a tactics of 
centre-left alliances and was also increasingly involved in local and national 
governmental participations. Attempts of radical left regroupment all failed on 
strategic or organisational issues.  
The third period (2008-present), finally, was characterised by an overall lack of 
influence and existential uncertainty. The inevitable consequences of the 
governmental experience (an unprecedented level of disillusionment and of strategic 
and organisational division) traumatised the radical left, leading to heavy electoral 
losses and to the exclusion from parliament (2008). The further loss of resources, 
visibility, members and presence on the national territory made a recovery very 
difficult. Two rival projects of regroupment emerged: on the one hand SEL, on the 
other hand the Left Federation (FdS). Both, however, remained weak and essentially 
dependent on alliances with the PD for their survival. SEL progressively drifted toward 
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4.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation 
 
Contrary to Germany, in Italy the initial organisational regroupment of disparate 
radical left forces within a unified radical left party (the PRC) gradually left place to a 
situation of a growing fragmentation. 
As TABLE 4.4 clearly shows, the panorama of the radical left thus became increasingly 
complex as time went by: from the initial predominance of one "big church" neo-
communist organisation in 1991-1997 (PRC); to the limited competition between a 
more radical and a more moderate neo-communist force in 1998-2006 (PRC and PdCI); 
to the explosion of the PRC into several fragments after 2006 (PRC, PdCI, SEL, PCL, SC 
and other minor groups) and the failure of all subsequent attempts to regroup the 
weakened surviving forces.  
 
TABLE 4.4 FRAGMENTATION 
Votes 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 74.9% 71.6% - - 63.8% 
PdCI - - - 24.9% 28.4% - - 7.6% 
SA (cartel) - - - - - 69.3% - 9.9% 
RC (cartel) - - - - - - 39.2% 5.6% 
SEL - - - - - - 55.9% 8.0% 
FAR LEFT - - - 0.2% - 30.7% 4.9% 5.1% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Members 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2012 AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% 68.4% 69.5% 40.7% 79.5% 
PdCI - - - 22.2% 31.6% 28.6% 16.1% 14.1% 
SEL - - - - - - 42.0% 6.0% 
Far left - - - - - 2.0% 1.3% 0.5% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
MPs 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 55.0% 71.9% - - 65.4% 
PdCI - - - 45.0% 28.1% - - 14.6% 
SEL - - - - - - 100.0% 20.0% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Fragmentation 
index 
1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
Votes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.61 1.69 1.95 2.14 1.48 
Members 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.53 1.76 1.77 2.72 1.54 
MPs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.98 1.68 - 1.00 1.28 




In all cases, the increase of the fragmentation was due to splits of the PRC around the 
issue of the relationship to be had with the moderate left and, notably, of 
governmental participation at the national level. The position of the PRC within the 
radical left space thus declined from absolutely hegemonic (until 1997) to clearly 
minoritarian (since 2009). Every time that the party seemed to refuse an alliance, right-
wing minorities broke away and formed their own short-lived (CU, 1995) or long-
lasting organisations (PdCI, 1998; MpS114 and its successor SEL in 2008-2009); every 
time that the party came to support a centre-left cabinet, smaller left-wing minorities 
did the same (CCA, 1998; PCL, PdAC and SC, 2006-2007). The former were 
unquestionably more damaging, with particularly heavy losses of elected 
representatives and high-ranking cadres, while the latter tended to be non-starters or 
to wither away after a short wave of enthusiasm.   
 
Fragmentation was not necessarily damaging from the point of view of overall (e.g. 
electoral) results, but tended to limit the external influence and bargaining power of 
each individual actor.  
Thus, a series of regroupment schemes were devised over time to counter-act the 
dispersion of forces and reach over to other potential allies (left-wing currents of the 
PDS/DS; the ecologists; social movement activists). All early attempts to build a broad 
"radical left pole" failed to materialise; the belated experiment of 2008, when all 
radical left parties came together in the Rainbow Left (SA) electoral cartel, led to a 
catastrophic defeat. A very high level of fragmentation has persisted in the subsequent 
years: the more conciliatory elements have merged into a new non-communist 
organisations (SEL) and drifted toward the PD; the PRC and PdCI have oscillated 
between alternative projects of regroupment (the FdS federation in 2008-2012; the RC 
electoral front in 2013), hopes of autonomous recovery and an increasing 
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 Nichi Vendola's Movement for the Left (Movimento per la Sinistra) split after the 2008 congress and 
became one of the major partners of the SEL project.  
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4.2.3 Political nature 
 
The analysis of the political nature of the Italian radical left requires a separate 





The parties of the Italian radical left all moved in that field of similar ideological 
coordinates which characterises most of the contemporary Western European radical 
left. 
 
Firstly, the theoretical, cultural and identitarian references of the parties have tended 
to oscillate between traditionalism and innovation, the appeal to the history of 20th 
century communism and the search for a broader and more modern radical left 
identity.  
The legacy of Italian communism in its multi-faceted complexity had been at the core 
of the establishment of the PRC in 1991 (Dormagen, 1996 and 1998) and this reference 
continued to retain a strong emotional power in the following decades (Cossu, 2004; 
De Nardis, 2009). At the same time, the parties were conscious that their success 
required a creative re-interpretation and innovation of that tradition (Bertolino, 2004; 
Transform!, 2004). Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s the PRC claimed to be 
working, as its name indicated, at a refoundation of Communism leading to "a new 
mass communist party, a new workers' movement and a new alternative political 
alliance" (PRC, 2011). In fact, this task was rarely taken seriously and was soon 
degraded to a weapon for the internal factional battle, while the day-to-day practice of 
the party was dominated by issues of tactical positioning and electoral alliances. 
Moreover, it gradually became clear that this communist identity represented more an 
obstacle than a resource in the dialogue with other critical cultures (ecologism, 
feminism, third-worldism, left Catholicism, alter-globalism, pacifism, post-operaism, 
movementism) and in the attempts to forge an enlarged radical left pole with potential 
partisan and civil society allies. 
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In the end, these two opposing tendencies reached an impasse. On the one hand the 
aspirations to refound communism failed to arrive at a concrete synthesis and the PRC, 
instead of being nourished by these endeavours, progressively fragmented in a variety 
of organisations, each carrier of a different kind of communist identity: modernist and 
conciliatory in the case of the CU and SEL; traditionalist and conciliatory in the case of 
the PdCI; elusive in the late PRC; intransigent in the case of the far left splits, which 
remained nevertheless divided by very specific ideological interpretations (Trotskyist, 
movementist, orthodox and so on).  
 
Secondly, the long-term goals of the parties have until recently all maintained a clear 
reference to the overcoming of capitalism and to the attainment of a future socialist or 
communist society in their statutes and programmatic documents. For the PRC this 
involved "the transformation of capitalist society in order to achieve the liberation of 
women and men through the establishment of a communist society" (PRC, 2011); for 
the PdCI the "fight for socialism and communism" (PdCI, 2011); for the PCL the 
"achievement of communism as a superior form of civilisation" (PCL, 2011). Only the 
most recent creation, SEL, has carefully avoided any such mention and claimed to work 
toward a generic "alternative to modern capitalism" (SEL, 2010). 
However, as in most of the contemporary radical left thinking, the exact contours of 
this project and its links with day-to-day political activity remained unclear. Politically, 
the substitution of the Soviet model with references to democracy, pluralism and self-
management fell short of a model of social decision-making clearly alternative to 
liberal-democracy. Economically, the key question of the socialisation of the means of 
production and of the ways to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic planning and state 
capitalism were rarely addressed. Strategically, the assertion of the failure of both 
Stalinism and social democracy in transforming capitalism did not lead to a serious 
reflection on the features and problems of a realistic path toward a post-capitalist 
future115.  
 
Thirdly, the mid-term programmatic of all parties – what the PRC called the 
"alternative of society" (PRC, 2002) – focused on an eclectic yet coherent assemblage 
                                                     
115
 More specifically, the generic rhetoric on democratisation replaced the need to take a reasoned 
stand on the classic issues of parliamentarism, revolutionary violence and grassroots self-organisation.  
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of contemporary radical left themes depicting a break with neo-liberalism: the 
protection of the immediate interests of the salaried population (employment, 
salaries, working time, pensions, job security); the defence and expansion of the 
welfare state; a renewed economic intervention of the public hand to further industrial 
growth and redistribution, curb rents and unproductive expenses and encourage 
sustainability; the reform of the international order (peace, solidarity, a social Europe); 
the expansion of democracy (proportional representation, industrial democracy, civic 
participation) and minority rights (women, LGBT, migrants). In this field, what 
distinguished the parties was not so much real programmatic disagreement but rather 
their closeness to power: while groups which were comfortable with waging a long-
term opposition (PCL, SC, at times the PRC) could push for the whole package of radical 
reforms, including nationalisations, groups which wanted to be accepted as loyal 
partners of the centre-left (PdCI, SEL, the PRC at other times) were forced to moderate 
or fudge their demands, turning them into generic values or nebulous pleas.    
 
    
Sociology 
 
From a sociological point of view, the Italian radical left had a profile quite similar to 
most of its European counterparts and was mainly characterised by the following 
points: a strong decline of the weight of the industrial proletariat to the benefit of non-
industrial workers, the unemployed and the inactive population; a lingering over-
representation of the employed and unemployed salaried strata, in particularly the 
lowest ones; a weak penetration among employers and self-employed, over-60 and 
housewives; excellent results among the non-religious and weak ones among the 
practicing Catholics and other practicing believers; a slightly masculine profile. 
 
The analysis of the radical left electorate (TABLES 4.5 and 4.6) returns both similarities 
and differences with that of the Italian Communist Party of the late 1980s. 
The first difference is the strong decline of blue-collar workers, whose weight almost 
halved in the in the early 1990s as a result of employment trends and political 
disengagement and who represented in average less than 20% of the contemporary 
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radical left voters. The weight of all employed and unemployed wage workers 
remained on the other hand stable around 48.8%, a very low level compared with 
international standards and a reflection of the historical weakness of Italian capitalism. 
The second divergence is a loss of influence in the "red area" of central Italy to the 
benefit of the centre-south. The third dissimilarity is a strong process of rejuvenation 
and strong gains among students and young people. The fourth contrast is a reversal of 
the educational composition, with excellent results among university graduates and 
low ones among voters with little or no education. The fifth change is a doubling of the 
weight of non-believers.  
 
The analysis of the radical left membership is instead hampered by the lack of frequent 
and complete data for all parties (Chiocchetti, 2013). Altogether, the profile seems to 
be fairly similar to that of the electorate: a geographical concentration in the "red 
regions" and the centre-south, with a growing predominance of the latter since the 
late 1990s; a good presence of the under-35 (around 30%); a "popular" educational 
profile (secondary and primary certificate holders predominate) which, while 
decreasing over time, sets these parties apart from the profile of their German and 
French counterparts; a cross-class sociological composition with small deviations from 
the general population (except for the over-representation of students); a weak 
feminine presence (20-30%).  
 




















N. 10,892,545 3,213,748 2,494,762 3,113,591 1,623,072  
GENDER Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Male 58.1% 54.9% 60.6% 56.4% 66.0% 59.5% 
Female 41.9% 45.1% 39.4% 43.6% 34.0% 40.5% 
AREA Adm Adm Adm Adm Adm  
North-West 26.6% 26.8% 28.8% 26.5% 27.6% 27.4% 
North-East 8.0% 7.8% 9.0% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 
Red area 29.1% 23.1% 23.1% 22.0% 21.4% 22.4% 
Centre-South 36.3% 42.3% 39.1% 43.4% 41.2% 41.5% 
AGE Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
18-24 13.8% 20.6% 14.2% 15.8% 20.2% 17.7% 
25-64 71.9% 74.3% 73.3% 71.3% 69.1% 72.0% 
>64 14.3% 5.1% 12.5% 12.9% 10.6% 10.3% 
EDUCATION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
5 years 57.4% 22.9% 20.5% 22.8% 8.5% 18.6% 
8 years 25.9% 45.1% 37.5% 24.8% 43.6% 37.8% 
13 years 13.9% 25.1% 31.1% 40.6% 30.9% 32.0% 
University 2.8% 6.9% 10.8% 11.9% 17.0% 11.6% 
PROFESSION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Employer and self-
employed 
10.2% 6.9% 8.0% 9.0% 7.4% 7.8% 
Manager 0.9% 2.3% 2.9% 5.0% 1.1% 2.8% 
Employed wage 
worker 
44.7% 41.1% 41.1% 36.0% 40.4% 39.7% 
Blue-collar 34.0% 18.9% 23.4% 17.0% 19.1% 20.1% 
White-collar 10.7% 22.3% 17.7% 19.0% 21.3% 19.6% 
Unemployed and 
atypical 
3.7% 7.4% 7.9% 10.0% 11.7% 9.1% 
Inactive 40.5% 42.3% 40.6% 40.0% 39.4% 40.6% 
Student 1.9% 16.0% 10.9% 9.0% 17.0% 13.2% 
Pensioner 22.8% 12.0% 22.9% 21.0% 17.0% 9.1% 
Other 15.8% 14.3% 6.9% 10.0% 5.3% 18.2% 
"WORKING CLASS" 48.4% 48.6% 48.6% 46.0% 52.1% 48.8% 
RELIGION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Practicing Catholic 31.9% 30.8% 30.2% 33.3% 21.5% 29.0% 
Semi-practicing 
Catholic 
38.1% 32.5% 26.2% 29.4% 14.0% 25.5% 
Non-practicing 
Catholic 
19.5% 8.9% 20.9% 24.5% 30.1% 21.1% 
Other religion 1.0% 2.4% 7.0% 4.9% 3.2% 4.4% 
Non Believer 9.5% 25.4% 15.7% 7.8% 31.2% 20.0% 
Source: my elaboration ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008). 





























RESULT 28.2% 8.6% 6.7% 8.2% 4.5% 7.0% 
GENDER Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Male 30.6% 8.7% 8.0% 9.1% 5.6% 7.8% 
Female 25.5% 8.4% 5.4% 7.2% 3.2% 6.1% 
AREA Adm Adm Adm Adm Adm  
North-West 27.2% 8.3% 7.2% 8.0% 4.6% 7.0% 
North-East 18.9% 5.5% 5.1% 5.4% 3.6% 4.9% 
Red area 43.6% 10.7% 8.5% 9.8% 5.2% 8.5% 
Centre-South 24.7% 8.7% 6.2% 8.3% 4.3% 6.9% 
AGE Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
18-24 34.2% 12.4% 9.1% 10.9% 8.8% 10.3% 
25-64 28.0% 8.6% 7.0% 8.2% 4.6% 7.1% 
>64 25.1% 3.7% 4.5% 6.0% 2.0% 4.1% 
EDUCATION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
5 years 33.6% 6.4% 5.9% 10.7% 2.6% 6.4% 
8 years 27.0% 9.9% 7.2% 5.9% 4.4% 6.8% 
13 years 19.3% 8.1% 6.4% 8.9% 4.6% 7.0% 
University 18.2% 17.0% 8.1% 9.1% 6.2% 10.1% 
PROFESSION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Self-employed 20.1% 4.3% 4.0% 5.4% 3.2% 4.3% 
Manager 19.5% 6.6% 8.4% 16.1% 2.0% 8.3% 
Employed wage 
worker 34.4% 11.2% 9.0% 8.9% 5.8% 8.7% 
White-collar 20.0% 10.9% 7.0% 7.7% 4.7% 7.6% 
Blue-collar 44.5% 11.6% 11.3% 10.8% 7.8% 10.4% 
Unemployed and 
atypical 35.5% 8.7% 6.9% 9.6% 8.2% 8.4% 
Inactive 25.6% 8.1% 5.9% 7.7% 3.5% 6.3% 
Student 30.0% 13.6% 10.4% 11.0% 8.7% 10.9% 
Pensioner 25.7% 5.1% 6.1% 7.8% 2.7% 5.4% 
Other 24.9% 8.4% 3.3% 5.9% 1.8% 4.8% 
"WORKING CLASS" 34.5% 10.7% 8.6% 9.1% 6.2% 8.7% 
RELIGION Poll Poll Poll Poll Poll  
Practicing Catholic 15.9% 4.7% 4.0% 5.4% 1.8% 4.0% 
Semi-practicing 
Catholic 39.3% 9.9% 6.5% 8.2% 2.9% 6.9% 
Non-practicing 
Catholic 54.0% 10.9% 9.1% 15.0% 8.8% 11.0% 
Other religion 65.8% 24.5% 17.5% 13.5% 4.4% 15.0% 
Non Believer 50.6% 26.1% 27.2% 14.6% 17.3% 21.3% 
Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008). 











Created in the early 1990s by the merger of disparate neo-communist factions, the 
PRC inherited little of the organisational legacies of the Italian Communist Party and 
therefore by-passed most of the features and tendencies of the 20th century mass 
party model.  
The mixed territorial branch/workplace cell organisation was almost entirely 
superseded by a territorial model; bureaucratic centralism was replaced by a strong 
membership-based internal democracy; centralisation of resources and decision-
making within a homogeneous central apparatus gave way to a decentralised and 
stratarchical organisation, leaving large autonomy to each territorial and hierarchical 
level, to the party in public office and to organised internal factions; the leadership 
became less collegial/bureaucratic and more personalised/charismatic (Calise, 2006; 
Newell, 2010; Gerbaudo, 2011; Damiani, 2013); the parties became highly dependent 
from external actors, from the state (party financing and other perks) to professional 
consultants and the mass media. 
 
This had both positive and negative long-term consequences. 
On the positive side, the organisational models of the Italian radical left remained 
flexible, adaptable and capable of renewal, as attested by their ability to of each party 
to attract a large initial membership (PRC in 1991, PdCI in 1999 and SEL in 2009), to 
continuously renew their ranks (many young people and few pensioners) and to 
respond efficiently to favourable external conditions. In particular, they escaped the 
common tendency of former communist parties to shrink and age. 
On the negative side, the parties remained comparatively fragile, little disciplined and 
with a declining penetration of their party-constituency. The membership density 
index (M/V), a useful synthetic expression of the strength of the organisational linkage 
between party-organisation and party-constituency, points to medium-weak and 
declining values: in average 4.87% for the whole radical left, 4.58% for the PRC, 4.05% 
for the PdCI, 3.02% for SEL and 0.63% of the far left groups. While parties have been 
able to recover rapidly from the organisational crisis of 1998, the defeats of 2008-2009 
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have instead plunged them into a state of disarray from which no recovery is yet in 
sight.  
 
More detailed party-specific analyses are already available for the PRC (Bertolino, 
2004; Transform!, 2004; PRC, 2007; Calossi, 2007), the PdCI (Bordandini & Di Virgilio, 






The major divergence between the individual parties of the Italian radical left can be 
found at the level of their strategic elaboration and politics of alliances. 
All parties shared a similar analysis of the conjuncture, characterised by an 
unfavourable balance of forces between classes, the predominance of neo-liberal 
policies and a rapid right-ward shift of the Italian political system. They also observed 
that the transformation of the PDS/DS/PD offered an important opportunity for the 
radical left, which could expect to find a large audience by filling the vacuum and by 
reclaiming the traditional redistributive and welfarist themes of once expounded by its 
competitor. Finally, they all believed that the appropriate mix of parliamentary, 
electoral and extra-parliamentary pressures, alone and in alliance with other social and 
political forces, could exert a left-ward pull on the political system and pave the road 
to the successful implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal programme. 
The identification of the correct strategy required to reach their common goal, 
however, produced disagreements and differentiations. The most radical groups and 
tendencies considered the moderate left as a direct adversary and obstacle which had 
irreversibly sold out to the camp of the bourgeoisie and therefore insisted on the 
establishment of an autonomous anti-capitalist pole and a strategy of anti-capitalist 
alternative; all other groups (most of the PRC, SEL and the PdCI), while moderately or 
strongly critical of the centre-left, nevertheless believed that a strategy of left-ward 
pressure could in due time influence the latter and lead to its re-socialdemocratisation, 
thereby turning it into a useful ally. 
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Moreover, the parties differed in their readiness to accept tactical compromises in the 
short term. The far left currents had a fairly intransigent attitude, refusing most 
hypotheses of governmental participation and electoral alliance with the centre-left116; 
the right-wing ones had a conciliatory attitude, believing that an organic alliance with 
the centre-left was inevitable to defeat the right and to prevent a greater evil; the 
centrist ones oscillated between the two perspectives.  
 
The majority group of the PRC was particularly affected by the dilemma between the 
need to emphasise its autonomy and the desire not to antagonise its future potential 
allies, trying to steer a middle course of "radicality and unity" (PRC, 1996): radicality in 
the anti-neoliberal demands and image; unity with the centre-left to defeat the right. 
At the practical level this entailed convoluted tactics involving, for instance, offering an 
electoral but not a governmental alliance (1996, 2001, 2013), providing external 
support to a centre-left government but being prepared to topple it if demands were 
not met (1996-1998) or compensating an hostile relation at the national level by 
strengthening or preserving the local ones (1998-2004; 2008-2013). Only in the period 
2004-2008 the party turned toward a policy of generalised alliances with the centre-
left, justifying it with over-optimistic arguments on the strength and influence of the 
social movements (PRC, 2005). 
The position of the PRC was an attempt to respond to the deep-seated contradictory 
tendencies present within the (actual and potential) radical left constituency. It was 
however hard to sustain and soon degenerated into an incoherent succession of 
abrupt tactical shifts and internal lacerations. Every time that the moment arrived 
when a clear choice between supporting and toppling a centre-left government was 
required (1995; 1996-8; 2006-2008), the unity of the party exploded and large sections 
of its electorate scattered in the direction of abstentionism, lesser-evilism and protest. 
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 The national congresses of the PRC were dominated by these issues. The various far left motions all 
rejected organic alliances with the centre-left, but were often more pragmatic on softer forms of 
indirect assistance (such as the unilateral withdrawal in key constituencies). The Sinistra Critica 
tendency, in particular, strongly attacked the Unione alliance (2004-2008) but its few MPs did not have 
the heart to topple the Prodi II government, deploying for two years all kind of parliamentary 
strategems to mark their public dissent while ensuring the cabinet's survival. The events are well 
documented – albeit with some positive spin – by one of their protagonists (Cannavò, 2009).   
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The successive left-wing and right-wing splits of the PRC tried to cut the Gordian knot 
by choosing one or the other possible options: to wage a vocal opposition of principle 
or to become a loyal and responsible, albeit critical, left of government. Neither was 
however very successful. The organisations choosing the former option (COBAS, CCA, 
PdAC, PCL and SC) were invariably quickly marginalised. Those opting for the latter 
possibility (CU, PdCI and SEL), however, never went beyond deceiving electoral scores 
(2-3%); in the long-term, they were either absorbed by the moderate left or forced to 
re-radicalise. SEL currently finds itself precisely in this situation, torn between the 
constraints of its organic alliance with the PD (and the hypothesis of a merger) and its 
objective collocation as the largest left-wing opposition to the "grand coalition" 





4.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of 
radical left mobilisation 
 
 
As in Germany, the political and economic trends of the post-1989 decades sketched a 
worrying picture for the radical left but simultaneously offered important chances of 
revival and growth.  
The growing economic problems of the country, which hit heavily the medium-low 
salaried strata and the new generations, shook the popular confidence in the ability of 
Italian capitalism to ensure an adequate growth and a wide distribution of material 
welfare. The policy responses of the state, marked by a mix of austerity (deficit control, 
pension reforms, wage containment) and neo-liberal solutions (privatisations, 
liberalisations, labour market flexibility), were primarily shouldered by the same 
categories and failed to counteract the decline. Finally, the crisis of the party system of 
the "first republic" and the rapid right-ward shift of the majority of the former Italian 
Communist Party created the legitimate expectation that a representation gap had 
emerged and was waiting for the radical left to fill it.  
The present section will analyse more in detail the contours of the problem, the 




4.3.1 Economic stagnation and neo-liberal shift 
 
The underlying weaknesses of Italian capitalism (little concentration and centralisation 
of capital, low productivity and innovation, focus on low-intermediate segments of the 
productive ladder, inefficient state) were masked from 1970 to 1992 by a massive 
increase of deficit spending and by frequent currency devaluations. In the 1990s, as 
these policy tools were gradually neutralised by the participation of the country to the 
process of further European integration, the country was thus plunged into a 













Real GDP annual growth (CAGR) 2.2% 1.7% -0.1% 1.0% 
Real wages annual growth (CAGR) 1.1% -0.1% 0.6% 0.2% 
Wage share of GDP (average) 49.2% 45.1% 45.4% 45.2% 
Unemployment rate (average) 11.0% 10.2% 7.2% 9.1% 
Current account balance/GDP (average) -0.9% 1.1% -1.5% 0.1% 
  1993 2003 2009 
Italy's share of global GDP (average)  4.1% 4.0% 3.7% 
Gross public debt/GDP  (average)  115.0% 104.1% 116.4% 
Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), ISTAT, KLEMS.  
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate. 
 
The selected macro-economic indicators summarised in TABLE 4.7 are telling. Growth 
rates progressively deteriorated and came to a standstill after 2003. The gains of the 
feeble expansions (2004-2007, 2010) were completely wiped-out by severe recessions 
(2008-2009, 2012); public debt soared; the loss of international competitiveness and 
de-industrialisation advanced (Gallino, 2006; De Cecco, 2007). The biggest losers of 
these trends were the different sections of the Italian working class. 
Employed wage workers were severely hit by the tripartite July Agreements of 1992-
1993, which abolished the existing wage indexation mechanism and replaced it with a 
formalised corporatism (concertazione) geared toward wage restraints (Simoni, 2010). 
The effect was two decades of real wage stagnation (+0.2% yearly growth) and a 
significant fall of aggregate wages and income equality.  
The rate of unemployment, which had exploded from around 5% in the 1960s to 12.0% 
in 1989, remained high throughout the 1990s and declined in the 2000s only thanks to 
a shift toward precarious employment. At the same time, the rate of inactivity rarely 
dropped below 50% of the working-age population. As the traditionally patchy 
coverage of welfare provisions in this domain was never expanded, these categories of 
unemployed, semi-employed and discouraged workers remained largely bereft of 
public safety nets and had to rely on alternative forms of support to survive (the 
enlarged family, the informal economy, private charities). 
The most penalised, however, were the youngest generations of the workforce, which 
were disproportionally hit by unemployment, labour precarisation and the long-term 




The effects of the faltering growth were accentuated by the brutal shift of the Italian 
state from a (crony) dirigiste welfare state toward austerity and neoliberalisation 
(Barca, 1997; Amyot, 2003). Under the pressure of the fiscal and currency crisis of 
1992, the old post-war settlement was progressively dismantled in the decade 1992-
2002 and the readjustment proceeded with up and downs to this day. 
Firstly, a large process of privatisations and liberalisations led to the dismissal of much 
of the state-owned industrial and financial corporations, which had previously 
controlled a majority share of the national economy (Mediobanca, 2000; Valle, 2002; 
Mucchetti, 2003; Barucci & Pierobon, 2007). Privatisations helped to fuel the 
speculative stock exchange bubble of the 1990s but did little to improve the efficiency 
of Italian capitalism; in fact, the only successful "national champions" which emerged 
from the process were paradoxically groups where public or quasi-public subjects 
retained a controlling share (ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica, Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo), 
while many other important industrial companies failed to survive the end of state 
support and often ended up being sold to their foreign competitors. 
Secondly, the growth of public employment – both a traditional source of patronage 
and an important outlet for university graduates – stopped and inverted its course, 
leading to a loss of almost 9% of the workforce in the period 1998-2010.  
Thirdly, wide-ranging reforms and budgetary cuts curbed the upward trend of social 
security and welfare expenditures and planned drastic reductions of services for the 
long term. The main area of welfare retrenchment was that of pensions, where a series 
of reforms117 steeply increased the retirement age and decreased future contributions 
(Ferrara & Jessoula, 2007; Aben, 2011). While partially safeguarding rights of existing 
pensioners and older workers, these measures will have disturbing effect on the 
retirement age and levels of treatment of the central and youngest generations of the 
workforce. 
Fourthly, labour market reforms118 steeply increased the precariousness of 
employment and working conditions (Accornero, 2006; Gallino, 2007; Choi & Mattoni, 
2010). 
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 One was withdrawn (Maroni in 1994) and six were successfully implemented (Amato in 1992, Dini in 
1995, Prodi in 1997, Maroni in 2004, Prodi in 2007 and Fornero in 2011). 
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Finally, a policy of tight money and fiscal discipline was introduced and 
institutionalised through EU instruments (the Maastricht criteria of 1992, the 
delegation of monetary creation to the European Central Bank in 1999, the Fiscal 
Compact of 2012). While failing to address the long-term Italian debt problem119, these 
measures compounded the economic and social difficulties of the country. 
 
The neo-liberal shift produces important changes also outside the strict socio-
economic field. 
At the level of democratic institutions, the constitutional framework of the "First 
Republic" survived almost intact but was partially subverted by a hosts of 
transformations: the wide-ranging changes in the electoral legislation, which forced a 
bipolar straightjacket on the fragmented partisan landscape and strongly penalised 
smaller and non-aligned parties; the replacement of the traditional political ideologies 
(Christian democracy, communism, socialism, republicanism, liberalism) with vaguer 
post-modern identities (reformism, populism, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, 
localism/secessionism); the permanent conflict between the leader of one of the main 
governing coalitions, Silvio Berlusconi, and the judiciary; moves toward regionalisation.  
At the level of international relations, the end of the cold war order was the occasion 
for a turn toward a more activist foreign policy (Ignazi et. al., 2012). While Italy had 
been prevented to deploy troops abroad until 1970 by the Paris Treaty of 1947 and 
had started participating to peace-keeping missions only in 1982, since 1990 the 
country has intervened in a long series of foreign military interventions (Iraq in 1990; 
Somalia in 1992-1993; Albania, 1997; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2001-ongoing; Iraq, 
2003-2006; Libya, 2011). Constitutional constraints (De Fiores, 2003) and the wide-
spread pacifist sentiment among the population (Roccato & Fedi, 2007) failed to act as 
significant brakes on this new military activism.  
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 From its peak of 121.1% in 1994 the gross debt/GDP was slowly reduced to 103.9% in 2003 but then 
stagnated and rose again during the global financial crisis, reaching 120.1% in 2011.  
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4.3.2 The "Second Republic" and the potential representation gaps 
 
The neo-liberal transformation of the country was accompanied by veritable 
earthquakes at the level of political representation.  
 
Firstly, the dominant party blocks were twice discredited by corruption scandals, 
severe economic crises and unpopular policies, suffering veritable electoral and 
organisational collapses to the benefit of new anti-establishment parties and political 
disengagement (see FIGURE 4.8).  
In the first case (1992-1994) the old centrist ruling coalition (pentapartito) completely 
fell apart, fuelling the rise of a new regroupment of right-wing forces headed by Silvio 
Berlusconi (Waters, 1994; Bartolini & D'Alimonte, 1995; Nelken, 1996; Revelli, 1996; 
Gundle & Parker, 1996; Ginsborg, 2001). In the second case (2006-2013) the two 
centre-left and right-wing blocs of the existing bipolar alternation entered into a 
severe crisis and a new uncertain period of partisan reconfiguration opened up – so 
far, mainly to the benefit of the populist 5 Star Movement (M5S)120 (De Sio et al., 2013; 
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013). 
 
Secondly, even during the period of relative electoral and systemic consolidation of the 
"Second Republic" (1994-2006) the support for governmental forces remained 
somewhat shaky.  
The winning coalition of each general election always stopped short of 50% of valid 
votes and 41% of the total electorate; these values further plummeted to their lowest 
point of the 2013 elections, when the plurality obtained by the centre-left coalition 
consisted in just 29.5% of valid votes and 21.4% of the total electorate. Moreover, an 
important section of the support for both centre-left and centre-right coalitions was 
motivated merely by mutual hatred (not political identification or policy agreement) 
and evaporated as soon the enemy was defeated; thus, Italian governments always 
lost the subsequent general election and were often toppled mid-term by internal 
defections (1995, 2001, 2008 and 2011). 
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TABLE 4.8 ELECTORAL RESULTS BY POLE AND IDEOLOGY  
 
Sources: my elaborations from Ministero degli Interni.  




The shallow social roots of the new party system are revealed even more forcefully by 
the figures on party membership.121 The crisis of the old parties in the early Nineties 
was accompanied by a collapse of the number of total party members, which fell from 
4.4 million in 1990 to just 1.5 million in 1996. The data for the following years are fairly 
unreliable but indicate, at best, a small recovery to 1.7-1.8 million members.  
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 Data on total party membership are fairly reliable up to 1992, less so until 2003 and largely 
inconsistent afterwards, in particular after 2006. The figures provided in the text are my estimated 




To sum up, the traditional ruling parties of the "First Republic" lost their popular 
support and legitimacy almost overnight but the new parties of the "Second Republic" 
failed to adequately replace them and after a while, under the impact of the global 
depression, entered in turn into a deep systemic crisis. 
 
From the point of view of the radical left this situation represented, in abstracto, an 
unprecedented opportunity of electoral and social growth. 
Firstly, the collapse of the dominant centrist bloc in 1992-1994 might have been 
expected to benefit the forces emerged from the traditional main opposition (the 
Italian Communist Party): the PDS and the PRC. This was however not the case, as the 
left-wing alliance of the Progressisti was thrashed at the 1994 general election by the 
alliance of new right-wing populist forces: the neo-regionalist Northern League122, the 
post-fascist National Alliance123 and Berlusconi's Forward Italy124 (Bartolini & 
D'Alimonte, 1994). 
Secondly, the electoral rise of the right-wing bloc did not consolidate into a long-term 
dominance of the country; on the contrary, each right-wing cabinet had to face a 
revitalised left-wing constituency, large-scale protests and swiftly declining approval 
ratings. Several waves of left-leaning contentious politics came into being.125 The first 
and second Berlusconi government, in particular, were confronted by veritable mass 
movements involving oceanic demonstrations and general strikes (1994-1995, 2001-
2004); the contestation of the third Berlusconi government was more dispersed but 
nevertheless included important student and anti-governmental mobilisations (2008-
2009). The radical left was in a good position to exploit this discontent, due to its clear 
programmatic stance on the salient themes (welfare reform, economic policy, 
globalisation, peace) and its prominent involvement in the movements. 
Thirdly, the rapid right-ward shift of the moderate left also offered a promising avenue 
of growth. At a symbolical level, the choice of the majority wing of the Italian 
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 Lega Nord. 
123
 Alleanza Nazionale. 
124
 Forza Italia. 
125
 Baccaro (2003), Della Porta et al. (2003, 2006), Mirra (2005), Roccato and Fedi (2007), Ferrara and 
Jessoula (2007), Ghezzi and Guiducci (2007), Della Porta and Piazza (2008), Andruccioli (2008), Ceri 
(2009), Newell (2009), Fusaro and Hansen (2010), De Cindio and Peraboni (2010).  
176 
 
Communist Party to abandon any reference to communism (1991), ally with its former 
socialist and Christian democratic adversaries (1993-1996) and ultimately merge with 
them into generic centre-left subjects (2004-2007) was troubling for the old 
communist constituency (Bordandini et al., 2008). More importantly, the rapid 
transition of the PDS/DS/PD from Eurocommunism to a Blairite "new" social 
democracy and a US-style left-of-the-centre force reversed all the traditional policy 
positions of the party and turned it into the strongest supporter of the neo-liberal 
modernisation of the country. Ironically, the main actors of the dismantlement of the 
post-war Italian social model were not the right-wing cabinets but 
centrist/technocratic governments supported by the post-communist left (1993-1994, 
1995, 2011-2013) or proper centre-left governments (1996-2001 and 2006-2008).126 
While the wild neo-liberal rhetoric of the right often concealed political actors 
incapable or unwilling to undertake major policy reforms, the agency of the moderate 
left and its collateral trade union CGIL were vital for the implementation of most of the 
transformations of the period: wage restraint, welfare retrenchment, labour market 
flexibilisation, fiscal rigour, privatisations, electoral and constitutional reform, EU 
integration, foreign wars. The radical left, thus, could reasonably hope to benefit from 
progressively picking up those traditional left-wing themes that the Left Democrats 
were progressively discarding.    
 
Was the radical left able to fill the gap of representation of labour/welfarist interests 
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 The first group includes the cabinets Ciampi, Dini and Monti, the second group the cabinets Prodi I, 
D'Alema I and II, Amato II, Prodi II. The cabinet Amato I (1992-1993) was formally opposed by the PDS 
but with little conviction, as the left-wing trade-union confederation failed to mobilise against its 
austerity measures and lent a grudging support to Amato's economic policy and industrial relations 
reform (the July 1992 agreement). A few years later Amato was co-opted as one of the main leaders of 
the centre-left coalition.   
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4.3.3 Electoral mobilisation 
 
The assessment of radical left mobilisation at the electoral level reveals both partial 




The best way to gauge with precision the electoral success of the radical is the study of 
results in all kinds of elections (lower chamber, regional, European) over a territory 
where data are comparable (13 regions representing 80.8% of the total Italian 
electorate)127. The evolution is reported in the figure below (FIGURE 4.9). 
 
In complex, the Italian radical left enjoyed a mid-sized electoral support (average 7.1%, 
standard deviation 1.3%) with cyclical oscillations around a slightly parabolic central 
trend. The electoral development can be subdivided in three main phases. 
In the first period (1991-1994) the left-wing currents which refused the dissolution of 
the Italian Communist Party and gave birth to the PRC managed to emerge and 
consolidate as a force weighing 6.3% of the valid votes (s.d. 0.4%). This new radical left 
electorate was just about a fifth of the old communist one but the development can 
nevertheless be regarded as a first important success. 
In the second period (1995-2007) the parties of the radical left were forced to adapt to 
the socio-political landscape of the new "Second Republic" and its system of bi-polar 
competition. There is no doubt that this produced significant, albeit unstable, further 
gains. Average results rose to 7.9% (s.d. 0.9%), with frequent peaks around 8-9% of the 
valid votes (1995-1997; 2002-2006). Even in the period of relative crisis following the 
experience of the Prodi I government and the split of the PdCI (1998-2001) results 
remained higher than in the previous phase. 
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 The regions are those holding synchronised regional elections. The resulting values for the radical left 
are slightly higher than the real results. 
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FIGURE 4.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS (13 REGIONS) 
 
Sources: my elaboration from Ministero dell'Interno. 
Notes: 13 regions: Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria. 
 
In the third period (2007-present), on the contrary, the radical left collapsed to its 
historical low point. The average results (5.8%, s.d. 1.1%) were only slightly inferior to 
the initial ones but represented a significantly smaller own electorate, as the radical 
left parties regularly ran within composite electoral lists including significant partners 
with different origins and orientations (Verdi always; the PSI in 2009; the IDV in 2013). 
The 2008 general election was particularly destructive, with the total plunging to 4.5% 
and the forces involved in supporting the Prodi II government (the Rainbow Left list) 
gathering just 3.1% of valid votes; the subsequent recovery was altogether weak and 
unstable.      
 
The graph already provides several indications with regards to the reasons for the 
growth and decline of the radical left.  
Firstly, the evolution appears to be strongly linked with choices of political positioning. 
On the one hand, the radical left slowly grows while in opposition (1992-1996; 2001-
2006; 2008-2009) and is severely punished while in government (1996-1999; 2006-
2008). On the other hand, however, its best results are generally obtained when 
running as part of a centre-left coalition (1995-1996; 2005-2006) while a choice of 
isolation (PRC in 1999-2001; FDS/RC in 2009-2013) tends to produce sub-standard 
results. Altogether, the movement shows an impressive parallelism with that of the 
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centre-left as a whole, with the hopes built during periods of right-wing government 
regularly betrayed after the electoral victory.  
Secondly, the curve also appears to be related to trends in social mobilisation, with 
electoral peaks (1995-1996; 2004-2006) neatly following the aftermath of large left-
wing contentious movements.  
 
The electoral results of the radical left by social category presented above (TABLE 4.6) 
also show a certain capacity to fare well among the sectors at the receiving end of the 
stick of neo-liberal reforms: between 1996 and 2006, in average, it won the vote of 
11.2% of blue-collar workers, 11.7% of students and 10.8% of under-25 people (but 
only 8.6% of white-collar workers and 8.4% of the unemployed).  
 
A final element of interpretation is offered by the study of electoral fluxes (TABLE 4.10 
and TABLE 4.11). Unfortunately, the data are incomplete and not very reliable; they 
may suggest some tendencies but cannot provide safe conclusions.128 With these 
caveats in mind, it seems possible to confirm that the votes from and toward the 
radical left followed two main directions: on the one hand, the former Italian 
Communist party and its successors (PCI/PDS/DS/FED/PD); on the other hand, 
abstentionism. In 1992, around 86% of the votes of the PRC came from the former. In 
the period 1994-2006, the radical left gained 1.3 million votes from the PDS/DS and 
lost 0.4 million to abstentions. In 2008, finally, the electoral defeat was 
overwhelmingly due to heavy losses in both directions: 0.7 million votes toward the PD 
and 0.6 million votes toward abstentions. 
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 The source data of the ITANES post-electoral surveys mislabel the radical left in 1994 (it is not 
possible to distinguish between PRC and PDS voters) and returns a very small sample in 1992 (22 radical 
left voters). In 2008 the question makes reference exclusively to the Rainbow Left list but, as far left 
respondents did not have an alternative choice and are likely to have selected that option (the poll 
results of SA are unusually high compared to the real ones), results can be here cautiously interpreted as 
referring to the whole area. The data for 2013 have not yet been made public. The figures reported are 
my own estimates; due to statistical error, the large discrepancy between survey data and effective 
results and the need to introduce many hypotheses in the elaboration their value is only indicative.   
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TABLE 4.10 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES 
 1987 1992 1994 1996 
PARTY DP RL RL RL 
Real votes 641,901 2,201,428 2,343,946 3,213,748 
Net flux:     
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD  1,659,528  603,620 
Other parties  -218,625  147,059 
Abstention  118,902  119,123 
Total  1,599,528  869,802 
 2001 2006 2008 2013 
PARTY RL RL RL RL 
Real votes 2,494,762 3,113,591 1,623,072 1,949,768 
Net flux:     
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD 309,282 -159,067 -688,388  
Other parties -702,192 734,894 -203,766  
Abstention -331,319 43,003 -598,366  
Total -724,229 618,830 -1,490,520  
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006). 
 
TABLE 4.11 ORIGIN OF VOTES 
 1987 1992 1994 1996 
PARTY DP RL RL RL 
Real votes 641,901 2,201,428 2,343,946 3,213,748 
Origin:     
Radical left  4.5%  58.7% 
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD  86.4%  20.3% 
Other parties  0.0%  12.8% 
Abstention  9.1%  8.2% 
Total  100.0%  100.0% 
 2001 2006 2008 2013 
PARTY RL RL RL RL 
Votes 2,494,762 3,113,591 1,623,072 1,949,768 
Origin:     
Radical left 70.4% 47.4% 70.4%  
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD 20.3% 20.2% 9.9%  
Other parties 5.7% 19.9% 11.1%  
Abstention 3.5% 12.5% 8.6%  
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006). 
 
From the above-mentioned elements it is therefore possible to conclude that, in its 
best moments (1991-1993129; 1995-1996; 2004-2006), the Italian radical left did 
manage to expand its support; it also predominantly fished among the former 
communist electorate, the industrial working class and the precarised youth. These 
                                                     
129
 After its initial success at the 1992 general election (5.6%), the local elections of 1993 hinted to a 
further strong upward tendency, especially in the big cities (e.g. 14.6% in Torino, 11.4% in Milano, 8.9% 
in Napoli, 8.6% in Genova, 7.0% in Roma). The expected growth, however, did not materialise at the 
subsequent 1994 general election (6.1%).  
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dates coincide with periods of opposition to unpopular centre-right or centrist 
governments, strong left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations and a visible shift to 




This success had however very clear limits.  
 
Firstly, all post-1992 gains were cyclically wiped out by sudden negative swings (1993-
1994, 1997-1999, 2007-20008) and, after 2009, left place to a slow but continuous 
decline.  
Secondly, both in terms of absolute levels and of relative gains these results were 
comparatively weak by European standards. The electoral peak of 1996 (8.6% of valid 
votes, +2.5 percentage points) is not very impressive if compared to the best results of 
the radical left of other countries (Greece 2012: 31.9%, +19.0% points; Netherlands 
2006: 16.6%, +10.2 points; Denmark 2007: 15.2%, +5.8 points; Portugal 2002-2009: 
19.3%, +8.6 points; Germany 2002-2009: 12.0%, +8.0% points). 
Thirdly, the votes of the radical left were well below its potential. I have already shown 
(TABLE 4.10) that the net gains from disaffected PDS/DS/PD voters were significant in 
the early 1990s but practically ceased after 1998. More generally, the radical left 
conquered only a small fraction of the total left potential: 15%-30% of the old 
communist electorate131; 23%-29% of the total vote for left parties; 23%-31% of all 
people positioning themselves on the left (FIGURE 4.12). 
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 The average self-positioning of voters (1=left, 10=right), which otherwise gravitates around the 
perfect middle of the political spectrum (5.50), jerked to 4.74 in 1996 and 5.07 in 2006 (see ITANES 
surveys). 
131
 A question of the 2001 ITANES survey provides a further interesting glimpse on the patter. People 
declaring to have voted for the PCI at least once in the past (38% of the sample) had the following voting 




FIGURE 4.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION 
 
Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008) 
Notes: RADICAL LEFT = PRC, PdCI and SA. LEFT = the above plus PDS/DS. SELF-POSITIONING: 1-10 left-right scale, included no 
responses; radical left = 1; left = 1-3. COMMUNIST VOTE OF 1987: PCI + DP.  
 
The period 2001-2006 was particularly deceiving. Radical left parties played a 
prominent role in the extra-parliamentary movements of those years; their trademark 
issues (peace, alter-globalism, labour rights) acquired a large visibility; public 
participation to left-leaning mobilisations reached unheard-of levels. Just to mention a 
few examples: in 2003 almost a fifth of the electorate actively participated to anti-war 
protests132 and 10.5 million people (about 28% of a typical general election electorate) 
voted yes to the unsuccessful referendum on the extension of safeguards against 
dismissal for workers of companies below fifteen employees. In both cases, the radical 
left was the main protagonist of the mobilisation, supported by small political allies 
(Verdi, IdV, DS-left) and important sections of the left-leaning and Christian 
associationism (CGIL, ARCI, Rete Lilliput, etc.) but in opposition to the official line of the 
moderate left parties (DS and DL). The majority of pacifist and labour-near voters, 
however, chose not to vote the radical left in the subsequent 2006 general election 
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 20.4% declared to have hung out a peace flag from their balcony and 16.5% to have walked in anti-
war demonstrations (Roccato & Fedi, 2007). 
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... and explanation 
 
Where did the strategy of exploiting the symbolic (communist identity) and political 
(neo-liberal policies and centrist or conservative alliances) vacuum created by the 
right-ward drift of the moderate left go wrong? The answer is likely to depend on three 
kinds of reasons. 
 
Firstly, the population seems to a great extent to have followed or accompanied the 
political-ideological shift to the right of the political system. In terms of ideological self-
positioning, the overall trend of the Italian electorate is cyclical but clearly tends to the 
right (TABLE 4.12). The voters of the PDS/DS/PD, in particular, after some initial 
uneasiness have followed the cue of their party and moved to the right in synch with it 
(TABLE 4.13).  
 
TABLE 4.13 EVOLUTION OF POST-COMMUNIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND PERCEPTION 
 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
SELF-POSITIONING      
ALL VOTERS  4.74 5.48 5.07 5.46 
PDS VOTERS  2.53 3.10 - 3.68 
PRC VOTERS  1.80 2.12 2.05 2.37 
POSITIONING PDS      
ALL VOTERS  2.50 2.89 2.78 3.95 
PDS VOTERS  2.62 2.83 - 3.68 
PRC VOTERS  3.10 3.44 2.95 4.43 
Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008). 
Notes: 1-10 left-right scale (1=left) 
 
In terms of actual voting, the periodic dissatisfaction toward both old (pentapartito) 
and new (bi-polar coalitions) political system has indeed fed strong anti-establishment 
swings, but right-wing (Northern League, Forward Italy, National Alliance) or generic 
(Five Star Movement) populism benefitted much more than any left-wing variety of it. 
  
Secondly, as the main left-of-the-centre political force and the heir of an organisation 
with a long tradition and strong social roots, the PDS/DS/PD successfully deployed a 
variety of mechanisms to retain the allegiance of a majority of the left-wing electorate. 
Some (especially in the 1990s) remained out of traditionalism and loyalty for the 
glorious communist past. Some others were convinced by the ability of the party to 
project a "differentiated image" to each specific segment of the electorate (e.g. 
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appearing as a reasonable organisation promoting wage restraint and budgetary 
discipline to the moderates while remaining the friend of the CGIL and of the anti-
fascist partisans to the radicals). Another group stayed thanks to the pull of the 
weakened but still imposing network of ex-communist collateral organisations, which 
continued to offer an outspoken albeit critical support to the party: notably, the CGIL 
trade union confederation, the cooperative movement (Legacoop) and the ARCI 
associationism. A final group was made up of leftists fearing the victory of the right-
wing bloc and willing to vote tactically for the lesser evil challenger most likely to 
defeat it. The working of bipolarism and anti-Berlusconism favoured the moderate left 
all along the period 1994-2008 but the effect of tactical voting was particularly visible 
in the 2008 election, when 55.9% of self-identified radical left voters preferred the 
avowedly centrist Democratic Party to other more coherent options (ITANES, 2008) 
 
Thirdly, the radical left failed to fully exploit the opportunities which presented 
themselves to it. 
The big problem was here the growing enmeshing of the parties in the dynamics of 
bipolar competition and their participation to centre-left governmental coalitions. The 
general weakness of the centre-left camp meant that the help of the radical left was 
generally indispensable to win the elections and to form a governmental majority. 
Programmatically, there was little ground of agreement between the two sides. A long 
list of important reasons, however, pushed in this direction: the strongly-felt rejection 
of the right among the radical left members and voters; the fear to be squeezed by an 
anti-right tactical voting in case of the choice an excessively intransigent stance (which, 
indeed, in part explains the defeat of the SA in 2008); the pressure of radical left 
elected representatives, many of whom owed their parliamentary seats and 
governmental or other offices to a policy of alliances and who were often prepared to 
jump ship to retain them (as indeed happened in 1995, 1998 and 2009); an over-
optimistic view of the possibility to influence the centre-left landscape from the inside. 
In the end, the conciliatory line progressively gained ground. 
This had two consequences. On the one hand, the radical left greatly undermined its 
long-term credibility in campaigning against neo-liberal reforms (for the 
implementation of which it was partially responsible) and precluded itself the chance 
of growing through an aggressive campaign against both centre-left and centre-right 
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poles (which the 1992-1994 and 2008-2013 conjunctures might have offered). On the 
other hand, the gains made during periods of ferment and extra-parliamentary 
mobilisation against right-wing governments (1996; 2006) were regularly wiped out 
after its participation to centre-left majorities (1998; 2008).   
 
Could different tactical and strategic choices have yielded different results? 
The answer to this question remains uncertain. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
the unprecedented level of governmental involvement of the parties in the years 2006-
2008 (direct participation to the national cabinet and to the cabinets of 14 regions, 
ruling over 65.4% of the Italian population) was the main cause of the subsequent 
collapse in 2008. A more radical stance of anti-systemic opposition might have put the 
radical left in a better position to exploit the fallouts of the global financial crisis and 
the rise of anti-establishment revulsion against both traditional blocs. 
On the other hand, it is not sure that this course was actually viable. All attempts to 
create a more radical alternative to the left of the PRC (1996-1998; 2006-2009) were 
short-lived and of little consequence. The choice of running alone and outside of a 
centre-left alliance might lead to some mid-term gains (as the 1998-2003 course of the 
PRC suggests) but meant the immediate short-term forfeiture of the voters most 
sensible to the need to defeat the right and inevitable organisational splits. Finally, the 
squeeze due to an anti-right useful vote proved to be serious enough in 2001, 2008 
and 2013 but would have probably been much stronger after periods of unpopular 
right-wing government, threatening the ability of the parties to gain parliamentary 
representation. 
In conclusion, it seems that the Italian radical left was both the victim of an 
unfavourable political environment and an agent of its own demise. Its main weak 
point was its inability to pursue a coherent politics of alliances, which progressively 
disoriented its own constituency and led to a growing organisational fragmentation 
(Cannavò, 2009). The scope for an autonomous stance, however, was significantly 
narrowed by the post-1993 electoral laws (with its 4%-threshold, its pre-electoral 




4.3.4 Organisational mobilisation 
 
 
The results of radical left mobilisation at the organisational level were largely inferior 
to the electoral ones. Like the rest of the European radical left, the Italian parties were 
incapable to respond effectively to the crisis of the Fordist organisational models and 
to turn a vague popular sympathy toward their political programmes into more intense 
forms of attachment and activism.   
 
The results in terms of membership were lukewarm. 
As already remarked, the total number of members of Italian political parties suffered 
a veritable collapse in the early Nineties (from 4.5 million members in 1990 to 1.5 
million in 1995) but somewhat recovered afterwards (between 1.7 and 2.0 million). In 
the case of the PCI/PDS/DS/PD, the party halved from 1990 (1,273 thousand) to 1993 
(690 thousand) and continued a slower decline to this day (2012: 505 thousand), with 
the exception of an extraordinary but short-lived bout of enthusiasm provoked by the 
establishment of the Democratic Party in 2007. Despite this opportunity (see FIGURE 
4.14) the parties of the radical left gained very little until 2007 and drastically declined 
afterwards. 
  






On the positive side, the radical left membership avoided the early decline and aging 
typical of all traditional and post-communist parties (including the DS) and remained 
fairly responsive to changes in its electoral influence, growing in 1991-1993, 1996-1997 
and 2002-2006 and declining in 1994, 1998-2000 and 2007-present. 
On the negative side, it remained dwarfed by its post-communist competitor and (with 
the exception of the founding period in 1991-1992) it failed to attract significant 
numbers of its disaffected members and activists.  
 
The results in terms of organisational linkages were as well not particularly positive.  
In Italy the networks of collateral mass civil society organisations did not generally 
follow the collapse of their traditional political referents and usually managed to 
reinvent themselves as less politicised interest groups and service providers. This is 
notably the case of the trade union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL, which lost 
following and legitimacy in the workplaces but compensated for it by growing in 
absolute terms, thanks to the massive influx of pensioners, and by preserving or 
expanding their role in the system of industrial relations.133 In this context, the 
influence of the PRC started from weak initial positions and tended to stagnate or 
wane over time.  
Within the main left-wing trade union confederation CGIL, the PRC had at its moment 
of maximum influence in 1996 the support of 13.7% of union members and no 
secretariat members; conversely, the PDS could boast 44.9% of the former and 75% of 
the latter.134 The trade union left, which embraced cadres loyal to the radical left, the 
PDS-left and other extra-parliamentary groups, remained relatively weak (10-25% of 
congress votes), fragmented in rival tendencies135 and jealous of its autonomy from 
any partisan intervention (Cremaschi, 2000; Ghezzi & Guiducci, 2007; Andruccioli, 
                                                     
133
 The ICTWSS database (Visser, 2013) estimates a drop of "net" union density from a peak of 50.5% in 
1976 to 38.8% in 1990 and 33.2% in 2006, followed by a small recovery in the following period of 
economic crisis. In absolute terms, however, the three major confederations (CGIL, CISL, UIL) grew from 
8.2 million members in 1976 to 10.1 million in 1990 and 12.2 million in 2010.  
134
 The secretariat did generally include at least one member of the minority left-wing tendency, but this 
tended to be either a member of the DS left (1991-1996) or an independent (1998-2007; 2010-present). 
Dalmasso (2002: 66) also reports a figure of 470 card-carrying PRC officials of the CGIL in 1997 (2.9% of 
the total 16 thousand).  
135
 The main groups were the following: Fausto Bertinotti's Essere Sindacato (1991-1996), Gianpaolo 
Patta's Alternativa Sindacale (1996-2000) and Lavoro Società (2000-2007), Ferruccio Danini's Area dei 
Comunisti (1996-2000), Giorgio Cremaschi's Rete28Aprile (2005-present), and the left-wing majority of 
the FIOM (1997-present).  
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2008; Lacoppola, 2010). The parties, in turn, failed to define a coherent union policy 
and to launch with their union allies effective industrial or political mobilisations. 
The situation was similar in other sectors. On the one hand, the former ancillary 
organisations of the PCI, the pacifist and environmental movement, the world of 
charities and NGOs remained largely dominated by bureaucracies faithful to the 
moderate left parties (PDS/DS, DL and PD). On the other hand, the more radical galaxy 
of post-operaist grass-roots trade unions and centri sociali (Mudu, 2004 and 2012; Choi 
& Mattoni, 2010) was friendlier but numerically limited, fragmented and easily 
alienated.136 The only field where the PRC did make a breakthrough was the alter-
globalist and pacifist movement: here the party managed to play a dominant role and 
to win a large sympathy among the activist community (Della Porta et al., 2003 and 
2006)137. Even in this case, however, the success was short-lived. The party member 
Vittorio Agnoletto was indeed selected as spokesperson of the Genova Social Forum 
(2001) and of the Italian Social Forum (2002-2004), two loose consensus-based 
national coordinating bodies which encompassed most of the centre-left spectrum of 
Italian civil society. The individual member organisations however (most of whom 
dominated by the DS or DL) never relinquished much control to it and, as the 
movement ebbed in 2004-2005, the centrality of the radical left rapidly evaporated 
leaving behind little traces.  
 
In a nutshell, the radical left failed to exploit the crisis of the mass parties of the "first 
republic". Its membership levels and organisational linkages remained medium-weak 
and no match for its post-communist rival. 
As for the electoral dimension the radical left failed to offer a convincing solution to 
the wide-spread dissatisfaction of the "people of the left" which, instead of 
radicalising, turned to lesser-evilism or resignation and disengagement. The good 
relations of sympathy and collaboration developed at the peak of the alter-globalist 
and pacifist movement with mass organisations (FIOM, CGIL, ARCI, UDS/UDU), 
thematic networks (Genova Social Forum and Italian Social Forum, Tavola della Pace, 
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 Several groups were quite friendly to the PRC in the early 1990s and early 2000s but broke with it 
during its periods of governmental participation: e.g. the leadership teams of the grass-roots unions SLAI 
COBAS, RdB/USB and Conf. COBAS.  
137
 A survey conducted during the Genova counter-summit, for instance, returned a strong proximity of 
respondents with the PRC (63.5%) and a low one for the DS (10.2%).  
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Forum del Terzo Settore) and party-political groups (the left-wing tendencies of DS and 
DL) could not trump traditional post-communist and Christian-democratic allegiances 
and the call of anti-Berlusconism: at every critical juncture both apparatuses and 
members either refused to jump ship, falling back to the Left Democrats and the 
Democratic Party138, or left disillusioned.139 The radical left thus remained weakly 
rooted in the strategic sites of class struggle (notably, the workplaces and the trade 
unions), incapable of igniting mass mobilisations against the centre-left governments 
(whereas the CGIL continued to be able to undermine right-wing ones) and prisoner of 




The "Bolognina turn" of 1989-1991 (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009) marked the end of the 
history of 20th century communism in Italy, one of the countries where this tradition 
had obtained the largest societal weight and the best policy results.  
The neo-communist currents which came together in 1991 to form the PRC managed 
to carve up a medium-small political area from its ruins; in the medium-long term, 
however, they failed to revive the prospects of an anti-capitalist alternative and to 
profit from a series of negative but potentially favourable developments: the collapse 
of the traditional political parties (1991-1995); the transformation of their post-
communist cousins (1991-2007); the renewed crisis of the party system (2008-
present); a context marked by economic stagnation and neo-liberal reforms.  
 
                                                     
138
 The example of the CGIL is indicative. In 1989 four out of seven communist members of the 
secretariat were against the Bolognina turn and close to the left-wing Ingrao minority, but none joined 
the PRC in 1991. In 2006, again, four out of nine DS members of the secretariat sympathised with the 
left-wing Mussi minority, but by 2008 no member of Sinistra Democratica remained.  
139
 The two classic examples are the end of the PCI in 1989-1993 (at least 600,000 members were lost 
and did not continue to be active either in the PDS or in the PRC) and the revulsion against concertative 
line of the official trade unions in 1992-1995 (these lost hundreds of thousands of active members but 
very few switched over to the radical grass-roots unions). 
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As indicated in FIGURE 4.15, the societal weight of the radical left followed a pattern of 
very moderate growth until 2006 but suffered a serious setback afterwards140. This is 
unlikely to change in the short term.   
 
FIGURE 4.15 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE 
 
Notes: share of the total electorate 
                                                     
140
 It must be here reminded again that the electoral data for the last two elections are somewhat 








The Italian radical left followed a trajectory which brought it from an initial period of 
regroupment and hegemony of the PRC (1991-1994) to a progressively growing 
organisational fragmentation (1995-2013). How can this development be explained? 
 
Like their European counterparts, the Italian radical parties were faced by one major 
and one minor dilemma. 
The first dilemma was the relationship to be taken toward the centre-left camp. 
Should the radical left embrace a clear-cut attitude, choosing to be strategically 
independent and alternative or on the contrary to be a constituent part of it? Should it 
instead pragmatically choose on a case-by-case basis, oscillating between tactical 
alliances and temporary breaks? Politically, the gulf between the anti-neoliberal or 
anti-capitalist aspirations of the former and the modernisation project of the latter 
was huge and never ceased to grow, projecting a farcical light on the idea of a 
programmatic alliance. Radical and moderate left advanced diametrically opposite 
solutions to all major policy choices faced by the country: state economic intervention 
vs. disengagement; wage push vs. restraint; welfare expansion vs. retrenchment; 
military neutralism vs. intervention. Attempts to reach a substantial compromise and 
govern together (1995-2001; 2006-2008) were inevitably marred by continuous 
frictions and ambiguities and only survived thanks to the choice of sections of the 
radical left to give up their demands, engage in degrading efforts to mitigate or spin 
the scope and pace of neo-liberal reforms and resign themselves to support the "lesser 
evil". On the other hand, good political reasons pushed for some sort of alliance: a) the 
determination to defeat the right-wing coalition which, because of its history, 
ideological positions and social foundations, elicited a widespread and fierce rejection 
among the left-wing constituency; b) the desire not to cut one's ties with those 
important sections of the centre-left constituency which shared some or many anti-
neoliberal values; c) the hope (or wishful thinking) in one's ability to outmanoeuvre the 
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leadership of the moderate left and pressure it into significant concessions.141 This 
issue was the source of most internal conflicts between radical left tendencies and 
organisations.   
The second dilemma was represented by the tension between ideological and 
organisational self-sufficiency and radical left regroupment. Was the PRC and its 
project to "refound communism" adequate to hegemonise the political space of the 
radical left and to exploit the emerging gaps of political representation on the left of 
the centre-left bloc? Or, on the contrary, did a further expansion and regroupment of 
the radical left necessitate a broader image and a front with other political cultures 
and organisations, including the downplaying or abandonment of its communist 
identity? From the point of view of a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme the 
communist characterisation was fairly insubstantial and proved to represent an 
obstacle to the dialogue with potential allies. At the same time, it was a key and 
emotionally-charged element of symbolic identification for an organisation born in the 
fire of the battle against the change of name of the Italian Communist Party in 1989-
1991.   
 
What made these dilemmas particularly intractable was the tremendous pressure 
(unusual in other European countries) exerted by the new post-1993 political system. 
On the one hand, the new electoral laws142 which replaced the previous system of 
almost perfect proportional representation severely punished smaller non-aligned 
forces and strongly encouraged the establishment of a bi-polar competition between 
heterogeneous centre-left and centre-right alliances. Key elements of the lower 
chamber legislation were the following: a medium-sized electoral threshold (4%) for 
independent parties; the possibility to establish pre-electoral alliances; large 
majoritarian incentives to the "winning" coalition at the constituency (1994-2005) or 
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 For instance through parliamentary blackmail, an alliance with social movements and the DS-left or, 
more recently, the tool of open primary elections.   
142
 For general elections see L. 276.1993 and L. 277/1993 (Mattarellum) and L. 270/2005 (Porcellum). 
The reformed laws on regional (L. 43/1995) and local (L. 81/1993) elections also introduced majoritarian 
and pro-coalition mechanisms.   
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national (2006-present) level143; strong incentives to small parties to join one of these 
coalitions144; a strong moral pressure on the same not to play the part of the "spoiler".  
On the other hand the weakness of the left, in primis the post-communist DS, made 
the contribution of both centrist forces (DL, RI, UDEUR) and of the radical left vital for 
the electoral victory and parliamentary survival of centre-left governing coalitions. The 
radical left, therefore, could not afford itself the luxury of abstaining from the main bi-
polar competition and carry on a frontal opposition to both centre-right and centre-left 
cabinets: this choice was possible, but it would have automatically implied a long-term 
political hegemony of Berlusconi's right-wing coalition. 
 
The PRC sought to respond to this situation by devising complex tactics which could 
make the victory of the centre-left possible while maintaining a degree of political 
independence and alternative profile. One option was to reach merely technical pre-
electoral alliances, such as mutual (desistenza, 1996) or unilateral (non-belligeranza, 
2001) standing-down agreements in the constituency seats; this possibility was 
scrapped by the electoral reform of 2005 and, anyway, in case of an electoral victory of 
the centre-left a subsequent parliamentary support was still likely to be required to 
build a viable governmental majority. Another option was not to join the centre-left 
cabinets directly but to support them externally on a case-by-case basis (CU in 1995, 
PRC in 1996-1998, PRC rebels in 2006-2008); this fiction, however, had sooner or later 
to give way to the hard choice between voting unpalatable policies, thus demoralising 
its own constituency (e.g. the PRC in 1996-1998 and 2006-2008), or toppling the 
government, thus exposing itself to a public outcry and the charge of letting the right-
wing back in power (e.g. the PRC in 1998 or SC in 2007-2008). 
 
In the end, the centrifugal pressures originating within the radical left constituency and 
in the broader political environment produced their inevitable outcome: painful right-
                                                     
143
 The Mattarellum attributed 75% of the seats to first-past-the-post single-member constituencies; the 
Porcellum had instead a more proportional framework with a variable coalition premium at the national 
(Camera) or regional (Senato) level. Depending on the electoral results, this could oscillate from low to 
very high levels: it amounted to 5.3% of first chamber seats in 2006, 8.3% in 2008 and 29.7% in 2013.   
144
 The Mattarellum offered the opportunity to bargain with the potential partners and be granted 
"safe" constituency seats. The Porcellum, on the other hand, offered to parties within a coalition lower 
and more accessible electoral thresholds (2% of valid votes; in addition, the "best loser" of each 
coalition was granted representation regardless of its results) and the proportional sharing-out of the 
majority premium.  
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wing or left-wing organisational splits at every crucial turn (1995, 1996, 1998, 2006 and 
2008) and a progressive separation of the different sensibilities, which in other 
countries managed to pull off a more or less civil coexistence (e.g. Germany with DIE 
LINKE or more recently France with the Front de Gauche), in rival parties and 
grouplets.  
 
The unfortunate fate of the various projects of regroupment was also largely tributary 
of the above-mentioned centrifugal pressures. Time and time again attempts were 
made to unite the PRC and other radical left tendencies (its own dissidences, the DS 
left, the Greens and various civil society and social movement actors) under a common 
organisational framework. The most important were the following: (i) the Costituente 
per l'Alternativa (1993) promoted by the recent PDS defectors Pietro Ingrao and 
Fausto Bertinotti together with il Manifesto newspaper; (ii) the 1999 talks between il 
Manifesto, the PRC and other recent DS runaways (Lucio Magri, the ARS of Aldo 
Tortorella and Giuseppe Chiarante), which led to the establishment of the journal of 
debate Rivista del Manifesto (1999-2004); (iii) the half-hearted attempts (2001-2004) 
of Vittorio Agnoletto, Luca Casarini and Fausto Bertinotti to transform the alter-
globalisation movement into a full-fledged political subject; (iv) the attempt of the 
Lavoro e Libertà association (2003), promoted by Tortorella (ARS), Gian Paolo Patta 
(CGIL left), Gianni Rinaldini (FIOM) and Cesare Salvi (DS left), to give a political outlet to 
the labour mobilisations of the period; (v) the Forum Programmatico per una 
Alternativa di Governo (2003-2004), promoted by Gian Paolo Patta (CGIL left), which 
sought to federate PRC, PdCI, Verdi and DS-left; (vi) the Camera di Consultazione della 
Sinistra (2004-2005), promoted by the ex-DS professor Alberto Asor Rosa, which had 
the same goal; (vii) the Sezione italiana della Sinistra Europea (2004-2007), promoted 
by Fausto Bertinotti (PRC), which sought to combine PRC, the group of Pietro Folena 
(DS left) and social movement activists; (viii) the Costituente della Sinistra (2007-2008), 
promoted by the girotondino professor Paul Ginsborg, which again aimed at 
regrouping all radical left parties in a joint electoral cartel; (ix) the Sinistra Arcobaleno 
(2008), which for the first time succeeded in regrouping all above-mentioned subjects 
under a common electoral cartel but resoundingly crashed at the general election and 




While the programmatic commonalities between these groups were large, an agreed-
upon strategic line proved to be elusive. The main stumbling block to unity was, of 
course, the question of its collocation vis-à-vis the centre-left coalition. 
In the period 1998-2003 few groups were tempted by an alliance with the PRC, locked 
in an attitude of hostility toward the national centre-left. It was only after its decision 
to re-join the alliance (2004-2008) that the projects of cooperation could become 
more credible and concrete, ultimately leading to the (short-lived) experience of the 
Rainbow Left electoral coalition. After 2008, finally, the division between more 
"conciliatory" and more "intransigent" wings resurfaced with force both between and 
within each party, contributing to the general organisational crisis of the area. 
Cannavò (2009) correctly underlines the responsibility of the leadership of the PRC in 
sabotaging all attempts of the second period and in agreeing to the alliance too late 
and at the worst possible moment, when a favourable external mood had already 
given way to a the climate of disillusionment toward the Prodi II government (2006-
2008). A united radical left coalition between 2004 and 2006 might indeed have 
experienced a stronger growth of electoral weight and influence; the collapse at the 








4.5 The strategy of left-ward pull 
 
The final topic I wish to analyse is the success of the radical left in exerting an actual 
influence of Italian politics and society. Were the party successful in creating the 
conditions for an implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term anti-
capitalist goals?  
 
As elsewhere in Europe most of the parties (PRC, PdCI, SEL) followed a strategy of left-
ward pull, attempting to use a growth of their support and a broadening of their 
alliances to influence the political line of the moderate left and gradually push it to 
revert to its traditional post-war social constituency, values and policy planks. Only the 
small far left grouplets tended to envisage a strategy of anti-capitalist alternative 
where working-class self-organisation and mobilisation would by-pass the centre-left 
and lead to the conquest of power and a rupture with capitalism.  
As I already showed in section 4.2.3, each party adopted a distinctive vision of the 
kinds of pressures and devices most likely to lead to the wished-for aim. Under the 
leadership of Fausto Bertinotti, the PRC followed a path of dynamic left-ward pull 
which foresaw sharp tactical turns, moments of alliance followed by moments of 
contraposition and a strong reliance on extra-parliamentary mobilisations (Cannavò, 
2009). It was also fairly optimistic on the possibility of reversing the right-ward shift 
and alliances of the DS, bringing about a "new reform course" (PRC, 1996) and the first 
elements of an "alternative of society" (PRC, 2005) and paving the way for the 
subsequent stage of the "transformation of capitalist society" (PRC, 2005). The PdCI, 
on the contrary, followed a rather pessimistic strategy of conciliatory left-ward 
pressure, convinced of the inescapable necessity of a long-term support to the centre-
left as a "trench" (PdCI, 2008) against the greater evil and as the most advanced 
political landscape for the pursuit of realistic compromises. SEL, finally, shared a similar 
strategic view but for most of its existence gambled on a friendly leveraged buy-out of 
the centre-left through the participation of its popular leader Nichi Vendola and other 
party-near personalities to the mechanism of open primary elections (Venturino, 2007; 




Unfortunately, none of the parties managed to turn its mobilisation into tangible 
political influence. The post-communist "cousins" of the PDS, far from being pulled to 
the left by their more radical allies and competitors, have continued on a steady right-
ward trajectory which has included not only the support of neo-liberal governments 
(1993, 1995, 1996-2001, 2006-2008) and an alliance with centrist and technocratic 
forces but sometimes went as far as embracing the model of "grand coalition" with the 
opposing right-wing camp (the Bicamerale commission of 1997-1998, the Monti and 
Letta cabinets of 2011-2013). The activity of the radical left parties within the 
successive governing coalition has failed to achieve any significant policy turn and has 
on the contrary eroded the credibility and support of their proponents; at the same 
time, the choice of a more radical stance of opposition to centre-left cabinets (COBAS 
and CCA in 1996-1998; PRC in 1998-2001; PCL and PdAC in 2006-2008) has not yielded 
better results in the short-term, as the exertion of effective extra-parliamentary 
pressures was paralysed by the fear of the trade union apparatuses and even of many 
radical activists to weaken "their" governments. The hypothesis of the conquest of the 
centre-left through the mechanism of the open primaries, finally, has failed to produce 
significant results at the national level.145  
 
What was the reason of this generalised failure?  
 
Clearly, the most important explanatory factor is the insufficient amount of electoral, 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure that the radical left parties were able 
to deploy.  
With an average of 6.6% and a peak of 8.6% of valid votes (general elections), their 
electoral results were unpleasant for the centre-left but never threatened its position. 
The PDS/DS in particular realised that, first, the weight of its radical allies always 
remained inferior to that of its centrist ones and, second, the losses to its left could be 
fairly easily compensated by gains on its right. Unlike some of its European 
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 In 2005 Fausto Bertinotti (PRC) stopped at 631,592 votes (14.7%); in 2012 Nichi Vendola (SEL) 
stopped at 485,689 votes (15.6%). At the local level, where stakes, participation and controls were 
lower, radical left and other "outsider" personalities did better: Nichi Vendola (PRC then SEL) won twice 
the primary for the presidency of the Puglia region in 2005 and 2010 and the primaries for big cities 




counterparts, the Italian radical left never managed to feed on the corpse of a 
discredited centre-left (e.g. forcefully opposing unpopular left-leaning governments) 
but rather tended to rise and fall together with it. 
The use of electoral and parliamentary tactics seemed a more promising avenue, as 
the radical left effectively played the role of one of the kingmakers of the centre-left 
coalition and its support was indispensable for the victory and survival of centre-left 
governments. This card, however, was partially undermined by the extreme reluctance 
in its ranks to push the bargaining up to a point of rupture. Whenever the PRC 
leadership chose to topple a centre-left cabinet (Dini in 1995 and Prodi in 1998), 
dissidents within its parliamentary group broke ranks, ensured its survival and formed 
a break-away organisation. Moreover, the fear to be perceived as the "spoiler" and be 
squeezed by tactical voting (up to the loss of parliamentary representation) was 
exaggerated but not without grounds.   
Extra-parliamentary pressures, finally, proved to be effective in influencing the political 
agenda only when they managed to involve the trade unions in large-scale 
mobilisations against seating right-wing governments. Two cases of this kind stand out: 
1994, when the three confederations forced the Berlusconi I cabinet to backtrack on a 
proposed pension reform and ultimately led to its downfall few months later (Ferrera 
& Jessoula, 2007), and 2002-2003, when the CGIL effectively stopped a reform of the 
safeguards against unfair dismissal.146 When the unions were not on board, however, 
the movements tended to be absent or ineffective. And this was precisely the biggest 
problem for the radical left as the CGIL, tightly controlled by a DS-near leadership, 
always refused to mobilise against seating centre-left/centrist governments and gave 
its consent to all their landmark neo-liberal policies: in particular, the highly damaging 
and unpopular July Agreements of 1992-1993, pension reforms of 1995, 2007 and 
2011 and labour market reforms of 1997 and 2012. While the radical parties loudly 
complained against these developments, they did not have the means to transform 
the widespread unease on the ground into organised resistance.147  
                                                     
146
 The article 18 of the Workers' Statute (L. 300/1970). An experimental 3-years reform was agreed in 
principle by the government with the rival trade union confederations (Patto per l'Italia, 5 July 2002) but 
never implemented in practice.  
147
 The contestation against the official trade union policies peaked in the period 1992-1995, when 
union leaders were regularly hit by missiles during public rallies and union referenda returned a minority 




More specifically, the Italian radical left has been incapable to contribute to the 
renewal and revival of class struggle at the point of production, retreating toward the 
easier but less effective terrains of electoral, institutional, cultural and street 
mobilisation.  
Following the defeats of the late 1970s-early 1980s workplace conflict has continued 
its long-term downward trend (see FIGURE 4.16).  
 
FIGURE 4.16 LABOUR CONFLICT 
 
Source: my elaboration from ISTAT. 
Notes: index, 1976 = 100. 
 
According to ISTAT data148 the average yearly number of working hours lost for strikes 
has collapsed over the last three decades: from 162.8 million (1969-1976) and 86.9 
million (1977-1983) to 24.7 million (1984-1990) and just 6.6 million (1991-2009). While 
the traditional forms of organisation and conflict within medium-large industrial 
companies have gradually lost their strength, the diffuse and fragmented workforce of 
                                                                                                                                                           
wing dissatisfaction (the new grass-roots trade unions and the left tendencies of the CGIL) both failed to 
fully benefit from the conjuncture and ultimately remained fragmented and confined to small fringes of 
the workforce. The latter never got more than a quarter of the votes at the CGIL national congresses. 
The former encompassed in 2011-2012 in their stronghold, the public services, only 2.4% of union 
members and 3.9% of voters in professional elections (RSU works councils).  
148
 The methodology is known to exclude political conflicts and to strongly underreport the overall levels 




small companies, of the tertiary sector and with atypical employment contracts has yet 
to find effective ways to pursue its collective interests (Choi & Mattoni, 2010).Until 
these trends will be reversed, there is little hope of a significant left-ward shift of 
either the social or the political relations of force. The contribution of the radical left to 





 4.6 Conclusions 
   
 
The analysis of the contemporary Italian radical left has highlighted the large breaks 
which separate its member parties from its pre-1989 predecessors. 
The transformations of advanced capitalist economies and societies, the crisis and 
collapse of the Soviet model of state socialism, the defeats and fragmentation of the 
traditional labour movement and the shift to the right of the political-ideological 
climate have had important consequences. Following a different path in each Western 
European country, a "new" radical left has tentatively emerged from the ruins of the 
20th century left of communist, socialist and gauchiste persuasion. The discontinuities 
– ideological, sociological, organisational, strategic and systemic – have generally been 
stronger than the elements of continuity. 
 
From the point of view of their political nature, the parties of the Italian radical left can 
be characterised as predominantly anti-neoliberal parties. 
Until recently all parties have re-affirmed their communist and anti-capitalist identity 
(with the exception of SEL, whose links with this party family are gradually loosening 
and who might soon join the European Socialist Party). This choice, however, has rarely 
had much concrete bearing on their political activity, which has essentially focused on 
reconciling two kinds of appeal: the representation of the interests of broad salaried 
strata in the defence and expansion of the legacies of the post-war Fordist-welfarist 
compromise and the promotion of post-1968 left-libertarian values (feminism, 
environmentalism, minority rights and solidarity). This mid-term anti-neoliberal 
programme was broadly confirmed by the parties' socio-demographic composition, 
which attracted a broad spectrum of social groups but saw an over-proportional 
weight of the social categories which were supposed to benefit most from their 
proposals: traditional manual workers and state employees, students and the 
precarious youth and university graduates. The parties have however showed a 
marked difficulty in reaching out to the fragmented workforce of the post-Fordist small 
enterprise, to the long-term unemployed and to women.   
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From the point of view of their societal weight, the balance sheet of more than two 
decades of political activity is mixed. The Italian radical left has gravitated, with cyclical 
oscillations, around a roughly parabolic trajectory: from an initial phase of growth 
(until 1996) to one of stagnation and finally of decline (after 2006). The gains won 
during periods of parliamentary opposition and large social mobilisation against the 
right (1992-3, 1994-1996, 2001-2004) have been regularly wiped out by the 
bewilderment which followed its support to centre-left governments. The electoral 
and organisational supremacy of the other post-communist organisation (PDS/DS/PD) 
on the left camp has never been seriously threatened or dented. Their overall weight 
(electoral, parliamentary, governmental and organisational) has never gone beyond 
that of a medium-small political area.  
From the point of view of fragmentation, the initial regroupment of different 
tendencies around the PRC has gradually given way to a fragmentation in a variety of 
rival organisations separated by strategic, ideological and material disagreement and 
whose regroupment is unlikely to take place anytime soon. 
 
The efforts to fill the vacuum created by the right-ward shift of the main left-of-the-
centre party (PDS/DS/PD) and of the rest of the political system have been rewarded 
by some limited short-term success but have failed in the long term. Why? 
The analysis of section 3.3 clearly reveals that two factors have an immediate influence 
on the success of the radical left: the presence of strong (especially labour-based) left-
wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations plays a positive role while the involvement in 
centre-left governmental coalition plays a negative one. On these certain foundations 
it is possible to develop a broader, albeit more conjectural, interpretation of its 
historical trajectory.   
 
On the one hand, the weakest point of the Italian radical left has clearly been its 
increasing cooptation within the centre-left pole of the new bi-polar competition. This 
development, in particular the ever growing involvement in the external support or 
direct participation to national and local centre-left governmental coalition, has 
undermined the credibility of its cultural-political battles in favour of the defence and 
expansion of the traditional welfare state and its anti-establishment profile, leading to 
a long-term loss of political profile and popular support.  
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Although this outcome is in part the result of strategic mistakes of the leadership of 
the different parties, which have underestimated the strength of the neo-liberal drive 
and overestimated their capacity of exerting an influence on state policies, it was also 
largely over-determined by the constraints and incentives of the post-1994 political 
system.  
The experience of other European countries shows that leading a radical opposition 
against an unpopular centre-left government can – under certain conditions – help to 
consolidate the radical left and increase its electoral support. The problem in Italy was 
that a left victory might have never occurred without the contribution of the more 
radical forces and that these were exposed to stronger environmental pressures and 
had less room for manoeuvre than most of their Western European counterparts. The 
fundamental dilemma between programmatic coherence and anti-right unity could 
not be defused or fudged; the centre-left coalition always required their electoral and 
parliamentary support if it wanted to have any chance of coming to power (unlike 
France) and in general actively requested it, thus laying the blame for an eventual 
defeat squarely at their door (unlike Germany). Moreover, the majoritarian electoral 
system placed a heavy material price on an eventual isolationist choice, including the 
risk of losing its parliamentary representation. Finally the appeal of anti-Berlusconism, 
which was very strong among its actual and potential constituency, further pulled it 
toward a conciliatory strategy. 
The immediate roots of the current crisis of the Italian radical left are clearly related to 
its unprecedented level of governmental involvement in the mid-2000s, both at the 
national (Prodi II cabinet, 2006-2008) and at the regional level. In the public perception 
it thus became fully responsible for the deceiving policies of the centre-left and part of 
the political establishment, with the effect of demobilising its own constituency and 
paving the way for the emergence of new populist parties. The leadership of the PRC 
bears heavy responsibilities for this outcome; its progressive return toward a politics of 
centre-left alliances after the break of 1998-1999 (in 2000 at the local level and in 
2003-2004 at the national level) prevented a consolidation of the party on a line of 
radical opposition to both main poles. It cannot be stated for certain, however, if an 
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intransigent strategy would have been actually viable at that time, when the pressures 
toward left unity and the threat of the "useful vote" were at their strongest.149  
 
On the other hand, the radical left has not been able to channel the non-negligible 
degree of dissatisfaction against the neo-liberal transition into effective forms of 
collective resistance.  
At an electoral-parliamentary level, both conciliatory and intransigent strategies 
seemed incapable to exert any meaningful influence on the pace and direction of the 
reforms (the latter more than the former). At the level of political extra-parliamentary 
mobilisations, the trade union movement repeatedly proved to be the only social 
subject which could wage large-scale and successful campaigns (1994-1995, 2002-
2003). However, the hold of the PDS over its collateral trade union confederation CGIL 
meant that the latter showed militancy under right-wing cabinets but was glad to 
accept demoralising compromises under centre-left or centrist ones. Radical unionists 
proved entirely powerless in contrasting this moderate course (in particular, the 1992-
1993 turn toward wage moderation). At the level of immediate class conflicts, neither 
the moderate nor the radical trade unionists managed to find a way to reach out to the 
fragmented workforce of the small industry and tertiary services, focusing on 
minimising the damages for their core constituency in the big companies and in the 
public sector. The brief flares of left-wing contestation of neo-liberalism thus tended to 
rapidly turn not toward radicalisation but rather toward demoralisation, 
disengagement, diminishing expectations and, in the worst cases, the pursuit of 
populist scapegoats (Southerners, migrants, politicians). 
Again, it is probable that a different outcome was out of the reach of the small forces 
of the radical left, depending as it does on structural features of advanced capitalist 
development and the long-term effects of the labour defeats of the late 1970s. Could a 
stronger emphasis on workplace politics and a clearer trade union strategy have 
helped the parties to act as a break to some negative tendencies? Their progressive 
shift of focus away from labour activism and the fragmentation and indiscipline of their 
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 The movements of 2001-2004 had induced a widespread rejection of the seating right-wing 
government but had generally failed to obtain concrete results and to provoke its downfall; all 
expectations were therefore pinned on an electoral alternation. The new electoral law of 2005 




trade unionists certainly did not help. A unique window of opportunity was probably 
represented by the years 1992-1995, when the large grass-roots opposition to wage 
and pension reforms might have led to important organisational developments. In this 
occasion the union left proved to be indecisive and divided150 and the dissent was 
quickly controlled and neutralised (Baccaro, 2006; Leonardi, 2013). 
 
In conclusion, the efforts of the Italian radical left to survive, to thrive and to exert a 
left-ward pull on the political and social relations of force proved self-defeating. 
Despite some limited and short-lived successes, this political area failed to become a 
serious competitor of the moderate left and ultimately followed it on its course of 
societal weakening, identity crisis and political moderation. In 2008, after almost two 
decades of existence, it ceased to be a medium-small but relevant national political 
player and drifted toward fragmentation and marginality. It does not seem in a 
condition to recover its role anytime soon.  
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CHAPTER FIVE. THE FRENCH 
RADICAL LEFT: SUCCESS OR 
FAILURE?  
 
5.1 The national context  
  
 
The French radical left is simultaneously the strongest and the most fragmented of the 
three case studies. 
 
Orthodox communism and its heterodox variants have left a deep mark on the 
electoral, social and intellectual history of the country (Cahiers Leon Trotsky, 79/2002; 
Becker & Candar, 2005; Martelli, 2009 and 2010). While the golden age of 1936-1979, 
with its mass influence and defining moments (the Popular Front, the Resistance, May 
1968), gave way to a steep crisis and decline during the 1980s, the post-1989 
developments nevertheless remain the object of much interest and of an immense 
bibliography.151 This attention is not entirely unwarranted, as the radical left has 
repeatedly proven to retain an important weight in electoral and institutional politics, 
in the intellectual debate and in extra-parliamentary mobilisations. 
 
Despite the absence of a clear organisational break in the period 1989-1991, the face 
of the contemporary French radical left has steadily changed over time.  
The hold of the French Communist Party (PCF)152 over this political area has 
progressively waned to the benefit of far left and other alternative organisations 
(Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Lavabre & Platone, 2003; Andolfatto, 2005; Pudal, 2007; 
Martelli 2010 and 2012).  
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 See Souillard and Carreau (2011) for the PCF and Lanuque et al. (2011) for the Trotskyist far left. 
152
 Parti communiste français.  
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The party has mainly suffered from the growing competition by a series of Trotskyist 
groups: Workers' Struggle (LO)153 (Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003; Choffat, 1991 and 2012); 
the Communist Revolutionary League (LCR) and later the New Anticapitalist Party 
(NPA)154 (Turpin, 1997; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Krivine, 2006; Filoche, 2007; 
Bonnemaison, 2012); to a less extent, the organisations of Lambertist tendency155 
(Landais, 2004).  
Less important electorally but more influential within representative institutions is a 
second group of heterogeneous radical left organisations: an "eco-socialist" milieu 
mainly composed of former PSU and PCF activists156; the communist, ex-communist 
and left-independentist parties of the overseas territories157; and left-wing socialist 
dissidences, in particular Jean-Pierre Chevènement's now moribund Citizens' 
Movement (MDC)158 (Verrier, 2003) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's more recent Left Party 
(PG)159 (Alemagna & Alliès, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012).   
  
The evolution of this complicated landscape is made more interesting by it external 
socio-political context, which was characterised by an unparalleled resistance to neo-
liberalism (Wolfreys, 2003, 2006 and 2008; Kouvelakis, 2007). On the one hand public 
sector workers, students and to a less extent private sector workers and marginalised 
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 Lutte ouvrière. 
154
 Ligue communiste rèvolutionnaire (until 2009) and Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (since 2009).  
155
 The current repeatedly changed its name: from OCI (Organisation communiste internationaliste) in 
1965 to PCI (Parti communiste internationaliste) in 1981, MPPT (Mouvement pour un parti des 
travailleurs) in 1985, PT (Parti des travailleurs) in 1991 and POI (Parti ouvrier indépendant) in 2008. 
Despite its electoral weakness (never more than 0.5% of valid votes), it has sometimes had a significant 
influence within mass organisations such as the student union UNEF-US/UNEF-ID and the trade union 
FO. 
156
 The Parti socialiste unifié formally dissolved in 1990. Among the most important organisations of this 
area, all very small from the point of view of membership and voters, the following must be mentioned: 
Pierre Juquin's Nouvelle gauche (NG) in 1988-1989; the Alternative rouge et verte (AREV) in 1989-1998 
then Les alternatifs (1998-present); the Convention pour une alternative progressiste (CAP) in 1994-
2012; the Fédération pour une alternative sociale et écologique (FASE) since 2008.  
157
 Notably, the Parti communiste réunionnais (PCR), Parti communiste guadeloupéen (PCG), Parti 
progressiste démocratique guadeloupéen (PPDG), Mouvement indépendantiste martiniquais (MIM), 
Parti communiste martiniquais (PCM) and Mouvement de décolonisation et émancipation sociale 
(MDES). Once close allies of the PCF, the "colonial" communist parties have drifted away during the 
1980s in an intermediate position between PCF and Socialist Party. Despite their often very relevant 
local presence (PCR and MIM are at times the biggest parties of their respective islands), these parties 
remain very little studied, with the exception of Gauvin (2000).  
158
 Mouvement des citoyens (1993-2002). Born as a left-wing dissidence of the socialist party, it later 
oscillated between PS, radical left and "neither left nor right" nationalism and fragmented in a variety of 
smaller groups.  
159
 Parti de gauche (2008-present).  
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strata (the unemployed, the poor, migrants, post-colonial citizens) were at the 
forefront of large-scale extra-parliamentary mobilisations which contested proposed 
reforms or advanced alternative demands (1986-1988, 1993-1995, 2002-2003, 2005-
2006, 2009-2010). On the other hand the critique of neo-liberalism had a strong 
influence on the political climate, leading to the "no" victory in the 2005 European 
Constitution referendum (Crespy, 2008; Dufour, 2010) and a significant shift in 
mainstream discourses, if not policies (Wolfreys, 2008; Crespy, 2010; Desbos & Royall, 
2011).  
 
The present chapter will therefore offer the opportunity to chart the development of 
the French radical left parties within a very interesting environment. Section 5.2 will 
provide an overview of the evolution of their key dimensions: societal weight, 
regroupment and fragmentation and political nature. Section 5.3 will place them in the 
context of the shift from the post-war social settlement to the era of neo-liberal 
transformation and assess the successes and limitations of their electoral and 
organisational mobilisation. Section 5.4 will analyse the reasons behind the trend 
toward increasing fragmentation during the 1990s and 2000s and the partial 
regroupment in the early 2010s within the Left Front (FdG) alliance160. Section 5.5, 
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5.2 The making of a new French radical left  
 
 
France was one of the few Western European countries where the landscape of the 
partisan radical left was not radically transformed by the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 
1989-1991. Only one player of the previous historical period disbanded (the left-
socialist PSU). The parties of the French radical left active in the 1990s and 2000s had 
thus all a long history and tradition behind themselves: the French Communist Party 
(PCF) had been established in 1920 as the French section of the Communist 
International (Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Martelli, 2012); Workers' Struggle (LO) traced its 
roots to the Trotskyist group founded in 1939 by Barta and had an uninterrupted 
organisational existence since 1956 (Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003); the Communist 
Revolutionary League (LCR) assumed its current name in 1974 but its predecessors 
went back in time to at least 1944 (Filoche, 1996; Salles, 2005; Krivine, 2006).  
Despite this formal continuity, the 1980s and early 1990s brought about wide-ranging 
discontinuities at all levels: societal weight, fragmentation, ideology, sociology, 
organisation, strategy... The "new" radical left of the contemporary neo-liberal period 
was thus quite different from the "old" communist and far left of the 1970s, although 
elements of continuity lingered. This chapter will provide an overview of the most 




5.2.1 Societal weight 
 
The different dimensions of societal weight of the French radical left for the period 
1990-2012 are summarised in the following tables (TABLE 5.1 and FIGURE 5.2). They 
define a political area with a medium-sized electoral weight (10%-12% of valid votes), a 
rather strong organisation and governmental involvement and a weaker parliamentary 
presence.  
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NATIONAL  0.0% 0.0% 21.7% 21.7% 0.0% 
REGIONAL - 8.2% 48.1% 46.8% 0.0% 
ORGANISATIONAL 
WEIGHT 
     
MEMBERSHIP 569,942 378,387 182,015 172,056 ca. 8,000  
YEARLY INCOMES 
(2003-2010) 






MEDIA OUTREACH strong strong medium medium weak 
ORGANISATIONAL 
LINKAGES 
strong strong medium medium weak 
Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling 
figures calculated on all years. Regional results are weighted by regional population. Electoral results refer to the whole national 
territory (including overseas regions). Governmental involvement: time in government (participation or external support); at least 
one radical left party. Membership: PCF, LO, LCR, PG. National: Assemblée Nationale. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro. REF 1978: 
European 1979. REF: 1988: European 1989. FdG: legislative and European votes attributed to the PCF, presidential votes not. * = 







FIGURE 5.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT 
Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values (electoral: legislative and presidential). Shares of total valid votes, total 
seats (weighted), total party incomes, total population administered. 
 
From the analysis of these data a few striking elements immediately emerge. 
First, the timing of the decline of the old communist left was relatively precocious. The 
French radical left suffered an early electoral collapse in the period 1979-1986 but 
stabilised afterwards. Indeed, the shock of 1989 did have little impact in this respect, 
with the contemporary values being roughly equivalent to those of the late 1980s.  
Second, the results in each category are quite uneven. The positive legacies of the past 
determined extraordinary levels of membership and income; in those categories the 
PCF played in the same league as the major mainstream parties of the left (PS) and the 
right (RPR/UMP). Governmental involvement at the regional level was also extremely 
high. Parliamentary weight, on the contrary, was weak. The divergence between 
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national and sub-national levels is particularly interesting. If the radical left was fairly 
marginal in the national government (only one spell in 1997-2002), the presence of the 
PCF within sub-national executive organs (regional and local governments, mayors) 
was quite significant.  
Third, the role of the PCF was also very unbalanced: an overwhelming predominance in 
most categories was contrasted by difficulties at the electoral level. Here the party 
progressively lost the capacity to represent the radical left milieu to the benefit of 
other candidates (Arlette Laguiller, Olivier Besançenot, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and 
others) and organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In presidential elections, the most 
extreme case, it dropped from a healthy 8.6% of valid votes in 1995 (Robert Hue) to 
3.4% in 2002 (Robert Hue) and 1.9% in 2007 (Marie-George Buffet). This rapid and 
irreversible electoral weakening was the foundation for the 2008 turn and the creation 
of a loose coalition with other political forces, the Left Front (FdG). Conversely, far left 
(LO, LCR/NPA) and other radical left (PG) organisations were often successful from an 
electoral point of view but remained weak or negligible in all other respects.  
A more detailed analysis of each dimension provides further elements for the 
assessment of the overall evolution of the French radical left.  
 
From an electoral point of view the French radical left has hovered at fairly high levels 
(in average, around 10.7% of valid votes), experiencing cyclical oscillations around a 
slight downward trend (see FIGURE 5.3).161 
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 The results of the MdC and the overseas communist or post-communist parties are included only 
when explicitly allied with the PCF. Their overall impact is generally minimal, with the exceptions of the 
MdC in the 1994 European election (2.54%) and 2002 Presidential election (5.33%); both results have 
not been included.   
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The radical left obtained its single best result in the 1995 presidential election 
(4,248,012 votes, 13.9% of valid votes) and its worst one in the 2002 legislative 
election (1,974,711 votes, 7.6%). In general, presidential scores (average: 12.2%) were 
clearly better than those in other kinds of electoral competition.162 The very weak 
results in regional elections were largely due to the tactical choices of the PCF, which 
often forwent the presentation of autonomous lists and chose instead to participate to 
left unity lists with the socialists, greens and radicals, thereby maximising the chance 
to increase its parliamentary weight and governmental influence.163 
 
The periodization and interpretation of this trajectory is pretty straightforward: a 
negative underlying long-term tendency (the weakening of the communist subculture) 
and temporary adverse factors (governmental participations, the squeeze of anti-right 
tactical voting) were periodically balanced-out by favourable factors (the opposition to 
unpopular centre-right cabinets and large left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations). 
The first period of stability at high levels (1986-1988) was probably the product of a lull 
in the crisis of the PCF provided by the unpopularity of the seating centre-right cabinet 
of Jacques Chirac and the successful social mobilisations against it. The second period 
of decline (1988-1992) reflected the shock of the fall of the Soviet bloc but was 
remarkably small and short. The third period of surge (1992-1995) was produced by 
the growing opposition to the centre-right cabinet of Balladour and a radicalisation of 
the public opinion, which would anticipate and prepare the great strike wave of 
autumn 1995. The stability at high levels of the fourth period (1995-2002) hid an 
enormous internal shift from the PCF, whose governmental participation was 
destructive, to the far left, which benefitted from challenging it.  
The shock of 21 April 2002 (Perrineau & Ysmal, 2003) marked the beginning of the fifth 
period (2002-2007). The elimination of the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin from the 
second round of the 2002 presidential election, which turned into a duel between the 
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 The first round of presidential elections offers an extraordinary campaigning platform to 
organisations with strong ideas and personalities but weak national roots, and the small far left groups 
have managed to exploit this opportunity to the full. 
163
 This happened in all 22 metropolitan regions in 1998, in 14 regions in 2004 (61.2% of the potential 




right-wing incumbent Jacques Chirac and the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, was 
partially due to an unprecedented dispersion of the total left vote on a variety of far 
left, radical left and moderate left candidates. The unintended consequences of their 
voting behaviour pushed a significant number of radical left voters to adopt a new 
attitude and tactically converge from the first round on the socialist candidate. The 
radical left thus suffered a tight squeeze which almost halved its scores, prevented it to 
benefit from the significant extra-parliamentary campaigns of the period and produced 
a long stagnation at unusually low levels.  
In the sixth and final period (2009-present), at last, the dynamism generated by mass 
mobilisations and two competing projects of radical left regroupment – Besancenot's 
NPA and Mélenchon's FdG – finally paved the way for an electoral recovery, but the 
results of the 2012 legislative elections indicate that the memory of 2002 have not yet 
been completely effaced.    
Looking at the results of individual parties, the PCF more or less held its own until 1997 
but collapsed during the period of participation to the Jospin government (1997-2002) 
and proved incapable to recover afterwards. The far left organisations, on the 
contrary, started out from a small capital of support (1-2%) carried over from their 
golden age in the 1970s but experienced an unparalleled period of growth between 
1993 and 2009; the main beneficiary was LO up to 2002 and the LCR/NPA after 2002. 
Other forces have generally remained fairly marginal - with the recent exception of 
Mélenchon's PG, whose independent electoral weight was never properly tested but 
can be estimated at least at 2% (Chiocchetti, 2010). Since 2009, finally, the Left Front 
has gradually but steadily hegemonised the radical left landscape, incorporating the 
vast majority of the players of the previous period and marginalising the rest (LO and 
the intransigent wings of the NPA). 
 
If the electoral results of the French radical left have been the best of all three 
countries, their translation into parliamentary weight has been quite complicated. 
Shares of total seats have remained much lower than the shares of valid votes: 4.2% in 
legislative, 9.0% in regional and 7.9% in European assemblies.   
The effects of the electoral legislation were here determinant. In legislative and 
departmental elections, the two-round majoritarian system tended to strongly depress 
the representation of the radical left to the benefit of the socialist party; only the 
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presence of localised historical strongholds where the PCF remained the strongest left 
party (mostly in Ile-de-France, Nord, PACA, Picardie, Auvergne, Haute-Normandie and 
Centre) prevented a complete wipe-out and preserved a reduced contingent of 
communist MPs. In European, regional and municipal elections, on the other hand, the 
very high electoral thresholds (5% to 10%) tended to waste the almost totality of far 
left votes and part of the communist ones; these losses were however partially 
compensated, especially in regional election, by parallel gains of the PCF.  
Altogether, far left organisations have been virtually denied any kind of parliamentary 
representation164 while the PCF has had to counter the negative effects of the electoral 
legislation through a variety of electoral tactics: in sub-national elections, frequent 
common lists with the PS from the first round; in legislative elections, some limited 
experiments of constituency-sharing with other left parties and the reliance on the 
local rootedness and personal popularity of "red notables" (generally mayors).  
 
Despite its parliamentary weakness, the governmental involvement of the French 
radical left was far from marginal.  
The far left, as already remarked, was generally absent from legislative assemblies and, 
when present, generally chose to remain in the opposition and defy both centre-right 
and centre-left governments.165  
The situation of the PCF, on the contrary, was very different. The once famous 
"municipal communism" (Martelli, 2010) was weakened but not destroyed; across the 
period the party continued to lead in average 878 communes (4.2 million people, 7.2% 
of the French population) and two or three departments (4.0%).166 Moreover, its policy 
of centre-left governmental alliances led to a growing presence in coalition 
governments at a regional level: from 2 regions in 1992 (8.2% of the French 
population) to 18 in 2004 (86.9%). At the national level, finally, it fully participated to 
the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) while it maintained an intermediate attitude of case-
                                                     
164
 The only exceptions are a handful of regional deputies in 1998 (LO 20, LCR 2) and 2010 (NPA, 2), 
European deputies in 1999 (LO 3, LCR 2) and municipal councillors throughout the period (peaking at 79 
LO councillors in 2008). 
165
 Rare exceptions can be found at the municipal level, where some far left councillors did contribute to 
centre-left majorities (e.g. LO in 2008-2013). 
166
 Val-de-Marne (always), Seine-Saint-Denis (until 2008) and Allier (1998-2001 and 2008-present) 
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by-case support toward the minority socialist cabinets of Rocard, Cresson and 
Beregovoy (1988-1993) and the majority cabinet of Ayrault (2012-present).167 
 
The organisational level offered the most contradictory developments. 
The average figure of 182,015 radical left members represents a very large share of the 
total party membership, which in France has always been quite low.168 The evolution in 
absolute terms was however strongly negative. The PCF continued its steep and 
inexorable decline from 355,139 members in 1990 to 86,184 in 2012. Other radical left 
parties, on the other hand, grew but not enough to compensate the communist 
decline. 
Coherent financial data are available only after 2003. Surprisingly, this appears to be 
the strongest dimension of the radical left, with yearly incomes averaging 41,479,693 
real 2010 euro (19.40% of all party incomes). This feat was the result of large albeit 
selective influxes of state financing169 and, above all, a strong capacity of self-financing 
through membership fees, contributions of elected representatives, public fundraising 
and commercial activities (e.g. literature sales or organisation of festivals).   
The evolution of the parties' media outreach was also uneven. The reach of the 
communist press steeply declined over time: the PCF daily newspaper l'Humanité, for 
instance, had in the 2000s a distribution of around 49,000 copies (against 107,000 in 
1986) while its network of local and specialised press was largely wound down in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The decline of membership levels also reduced the potential 
for daily face-to-face propaganda. On the other hand, the parties continued to be able 
to directly reach significant sections of the population in a more intermittent form: for 
instance through the PCF's yearly festival (Fête de l'Humanité) and LO's network of bi-
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 In the two periods the party escaped a neat classification into majority or opposition  
168
 French membership figures are notoriously unreliable. An excellent series for the PCF can be 
reconstructed on the basis of the contribution of Martelli (2009) and, after 2000, figures on due-paying 
members (the number of declared members was artificially kept stable). A good series on the LCR is also 
available (Videt, 2011). All other parties – including LO – provide only selective and largely inflated 
numbers. Depending on the estimates, the PCF alone might encompass between a quarter and a third of 
the total. 
169
 The matter is mainly regulated by the Loi 88-227; for good overviews see Clift and Fischer (2004) and 
Lehingue (2008). The thresholds of access are quite low: for general party financing, at least 1% of votes 
in at least 50 legislative constituencies; for the full reimbursement of campaign costs, 3% of votes in 
European elections and 5% in other kinds of elections. The distribution of funds is however significantly 
non-proportional, as 50% of the general financing is reserved for parliamentary parties only and 
allocated proportionally to their number of MPs.  
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weekly workplace leaflets (bulletins d'entreprise), both of which have a declared reach 
of around half a million people, and with electoral campaign activities (posters, 
leafleting, public rallies, etc.). The coverage of the mainstream press and television was 
highly skewed toward the two major governmental parties but offered from time to 
time a large audience to radical left forces, especially during presidential campaigns. 
The strength of the organisational linkages of radical left parties, finally, suffered a 
drawn-out but very profound decline.  
The PCF could once boast a massive network of collateral or friendly mass 
organisations for all major social categories and interests, which embraced several 
million communist and non-communist members.170 The electoral decline of the party 
during the 1980s was accompanied by a crisis of these organisations, which first saw 
their members leave and drift toward the socialist party or the right and then went 
ahead with a delayed adaptation to the new political realities, reducing their links with 
the PCF and depoliticising their activities. The best example of this process is provided 
by the CGT, the largest French trade union confederation. Between 1978 and 1995 the 
union suffered a veritable haemorrhage, plunging from 1.3 million to a mere 480 
thousand members (-64.6%). Simultaneously, support for communist presidential 
candidates among its members collapsed from 57% (1981) to 49% (1998), 35% (1995), 
18% (2002) and 7% (2007). As a reaction, in the decade 1993-2002 its leaders Louis 
Viannet and Bernard Thibault undertook a slow but decisive process of autonomisation 
from their former political patron (Andolfatto, 1997, 2003 and 2005). The union has 
since almost entirely ceased to act as a relay for radical left policies and identification, 
although many of its leaders and officials (including all its general secretaries) are still 
card-carrying PCF members.  
The decline of this traditional working-class subculture was not compensated by the 
development of new radical left subcultures, such as the milieu of the "new social 
movements" or of alter-globalism.171 On the one hand, the new organisations have 
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 The most important ones organised wage-workers (the trade union confederation CGT and the 
teachers' union FSU), sportspeople (FSGT), veterans (ARAC, FNACA), volunteers (SPF), pensioners 
(UNRPA), tenants (CNL), women (UFF) and the youth (MJCF). In-depth analyses are provided by 
Mouriaux (1985 and 2008), Borrel (1999), Fayolle (2005), Mischi (2010), Andolfatto and Labbé (2011), 
Brodiez (2013) and Bellanger and Mischi (2013).  
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 Good representatives of this world are the organisations focusing on migration and racism (GISTI, 
MRAP and RESF), unemployment (APEIS, MNCP, AC!), housing rights and exclusion (DAL, DD!!), HIV/AIDS 
(ACT UP), anti-fascism (RAS L'FRONT) and alter-globalism (ATTAC) or the new radical trade unions 
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generally remained weakly and informally structured, devoid of veritable mass roots 
and unable to exert much influence beyond a small stratum of highly educated and 
highly politicised citizens.172 On the other hand, the relationship between radical left 
parties and sympathetic civil society organisation has followed a different pattern: 
despite many concrete ideological and personal links, the fragmentation of interests 
and causes and organisational pride tended to prevail over an overarching sense of 









                                                                                                                                                           
(Solidaires, CP). The bibliography on the topic is extremely rich: see in particular Siméant (1993), 
Mouchard (2002, 2002b and 2009), Ancelovici (2002 and 2008), Sommier (2003), Monzat (2003), Cadiou 
(2004), Ubbiali (2004), Agrikoliansky et al. (2005), Pechu (2006), McNevin (2006), Waters (2006), Crettiez 
& Sommier (2006), Boumaza & Hamman (2007), Mathieu (2007 and 2012), Poliak (2008) and Morena 
(2013). 
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 At its peak in 2008 the alternative union Solidaires had about 80,000 members; still a dwarf 
compared to the weakened formerly communist union CGT in the same year (620,000). Figures for other 
organisations are even lower: ATTAC had at most 30,000 members (2003); the CP around 10,000; AC!, 
RAS L'FRONT and DD!! were informal networks of local collectives without a clearly defined 
membership. At another level, the poor performance of Josè Bové in the 2007 presidential elections 
(483,008 votes, 1.32%) was an eloquent reflection of the limits of the alter-globalist movement.  
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5.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation 
 
The trajectory of the French radical left was characterised by a movement from 
medium-low initial levels of organisational fragmentation to a progressive 
pulverisation in the period 1997-2007, followed by a partially successful process of 
regroupment in the subsequent years (TABLE 5.4).  
 
TABLE 5.4 FRAGMENTATION 
Votes 
(presidential) 
1988  1995  2002 2007 2012 AVER 
90-12 
N. 3,417,919  4,248,012  3,933,773 3,300,254 4,598,832 4,020,218 
PCF 60.2%  62.0%  24.4% 21.4% 0.0% 26.95% 
LO 17.7%  38.0%  41.4% 14.8% 4.4% 24.66% 
LCR/NPA 0.0%  0.0%  30.8% 45.4% 8.9% 21.28% 
FdG 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 86.7% 21.66% 
Other 22.1%  0.0%  3.4% 18.4% 0.0% 5.44% 
Votes 
(legislative) 
1988 1993  1997 2002 2007 2012 AVER 
90-12 
N. 2,854,826 2,788,058  3,156,698 1,974,711 2,091,084 2,046,578 2,411,426 
PCF 96.9% 80.8%  77.2% 62.7% 53.4% 87.6% 72.33% 
LO 0.0% 8.1%  13.4% 15.4% 10.4% 6.2% 10.70% 
LCR/NPA 0.0% 1.2%  2.3% 16.2% 25.6% 6.2% 10.29% 
FdG 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Other 3.1% 9.9%  7.2% 5.7% 10.6% 0.0% 6.69% 
Members 1988 1993 1995 1997 2002 2007 2012 AVER 
90-12 
N. 378,387 302,423 282,519 233,435 121,971 95,686 86,184 187,036 
PCF 99.2% 98.9% 97.1% 96.6% 93.0% 89.4% 74.5% 91.58% 
LO 0.4% 0.7% 2.5% 3.0% 5.7% 7.8% 8.1% 4.65% 
LCR/NPA 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.2% 2.8% 3.5% 1.45% 
FdG 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 2.32% 
MPs 1988 1993  1997 2002 2007 2012 AVER 
90-12 
N. 25 23  35 22 18 10 21.6 
PCF 100.0% 95.7%  94.3% 90.9% 83.3% 70.0% 86.84% 
LO 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
LCR/NPA 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
FdG 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Other 0.0% 4.3%  5.7% 9.1% 16.7% 30.0% 13.16% 
Fragmentation 
index 
1988 1993 1995 1997 2002 2007 2012 AVER 
90-12 
Votes 
(presidential) 2.33  1.89  3.06 3.37 1.31 2.41 
Votes 
(legislative) 1.06 1.50  1.62 2.25 2.69 1.29 1.87 
Members 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.07 1.15 1.24 1.72 1.21 
MPs 1.00 1.09 0.00 1.12 1.20 1.38 1.72 1.09 







The PCF had always held an absolutely hegemonic position within this area, although 
the party had been challenged since the 1970s by small but not negligible far left and 
alternative (PSU) organisations. The decline of the 1980s did not affect its position in 
terms of members and elected representatives but depressed its share of votes in 
presidential elections, where far left (Arlette Laguiller) and dissident (Pierre Juquin) 
candidates rose to around 40% of the total. The further decline which followed its 
governmental turn in 1997 increased the levels of radical left fragmentation to 
unheard-of peaks: by 2007 the weight of the party had plunged to 21.4% in 
presidential and to 53.4% in legislative elections. None of the competitors, however, 
managed to decisively impose itself and replace the PCF as the dominant player: on 
the one hand, they remained a plurality of competing organisations; on the other 
hand, the soaring popularity and presidential support of their figureheads, Arlette 
Laguiller (LO) and Olivier Besancenot (LCR), was not matched by parallel gains of 
members, parliamentary influence and organisational linkages.   
 
Faced with this problematic situation, calls emerged in favour of processes of broader 
radical left regroupment.  
Up to 1994 the debate remained mainly academic. The PCF was determined to ignore 
both the challenge of the far left and the successive dissidences of the communistes 
critiques, rénovateurs, reconstructeurs and réfondateurs (Dreyfus, 1990; Mermat, 
2005). LO, similarly, was adamant in its rejection of any alliance which fell short of a 
possible "pole of revolutionaries" including only explicitly Trotskyist organisations. The 
LCR was the only national organisation interested in crafting a "pole of anti-capitalist 
alternative" beyond the PS and PCF, but all attempts in this sense never concretised, 
failed or were rapidly absorbed by the moderate left parties (Greens and PS).173 
 
The results of the 1995 presidential election and the great social movement of 1995 
changed the situation on the ground. LO sought to capitalise its electoral scores and 
                                                     
173
 The following must be mentioned: (i) the debate on the "anti-capitalist alternative" in 1984-86 (with 
PSU, FGA, PAC and Verts); (ii) the participation to the Juquin committees in 1988 (with COCORECO, PSU, 
FGA, PAC); (iii) the experience of the Convention pour une Alternative Progressiste (CAP) in 1994-1997 
(with the Communist réfondateurs, ADS and others). 
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turn into a veritable mass party. The réfondateur minority of the PCF launched the idea 
of regrouping the whole radical left, other political partners (MDC, Greens) and social 
movement organisations into a "pole of radicalism" (pôle de radicalité) which could act 
as a counter-weight within the centre-left alliance on the making (gauche plurielle). 
Pierre Bourdieu and other social movement activists, finally, pushed for a regroupment 
of the social component of the radical left with uncertain political implications 
(Laguiller, 1995; Bell, 1998; Poulet, 1999; Mermat, 2005; Martelli, 2012). Again, little 
came out of these projects. The new reforming leadership of the PCF under Robert 
Hue embraced the idea of regroupment but continued to believe that this could be 
achieved as a simple enlargement of the PCF into a renewed and more open neo-
communist organisation. 
The term of the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) exacerbated the split between conciliatory 
organisations, which fully participated to it, and intransigent ones, which led an 
increasingly vocal extra-parliamentary opposition. The idea of a PCF-centred radical 
left regroupment was overshadowed by the electoral surge of anti-governmental far 
left forces (LO and LCR). These oscillated between the temptation of a "pole of 
revolutionaries" in the 1999 European elections and their own separate ways in the 
2001 municipal, 2002 presidential and legislative elections (Kouvelakis, 2007).  
The subsequent period of renewed opposition (2002-2007) contained both centripetal 
and centrifugal tendencies. On the one hand, a chastened PCF was tempted to 
repudiate its governmental mistakes and to work with more humility toward a 
veritable regroupment of the radical left. On the other hand, the various organisations 
remained strongly divided on political questions (notably, the politics of alliances with 
the PS at the national and local level) and organisational jealousies (who was to take 
the lead of a possible coalition). The project of a "pole of revolutionaries" remained 
controversial but was put to test again in the 2004 regional and European elections; it 
proved to be a failure, as the shock of 21 April 2002 and the growing anti-right mood 
provoked a massive swing in favour of the Socialist Party and its allies. This was 
followed by the project of a broader "anti-liberal regroupment" unifying the whole 
radical left around a common candidate for the 2007 presidential elections. Pushed by 
the successful campaign for a "left no" to the 2005 European referendum and by the 
pressure of intellectuals and grass-roots collectives (Fondation Copernic, Collectifs du 
29 Mai, CIUN), the process could not withstand the internal tensions and ultimately 
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broke down, leaving the PS-left and LO aside and producing not one but three 
presidential candidates: Oliver Besancenot (LCR), Marie-George Buffet (PCF) and José 
Bové (Crespy, 2008; Geay & Willemez, 2008; Kouvelakis, 2012; Martelli, 2012). 
The aftermath of this abysmal failure, where both the radical left and the PCF obtained 
their lowest presidential scores ever, paved the way for the successful period of 
regroupment (Coustal, 2009; Chiocchetti, 2010; Bonnemaison, 2012; Kouvelakis, 2012; 
Martelli, 2012; Grond, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012; Salles, 2012; Marlière, 2012b). 
The LCR launched the process of its self-dissolution into the NPA (2008-2009) but failed 
to convince potential organised partners and, after some initial encouraging signs, 
entered a spiral of decline and marginalisation. A crucial role was played instead by the 
left-wing socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon who in the same period, in a sort of replay of 
the German example of Oskar Lafontaine, belatedly split from the PS, created its own 
organisation (the Parti de Gauche), convinced the PCF to forge a balanced mid-term 
alliance under (the Front the gauche) and won its endorsement as future presidential 
candidate. The FdG progressively out-manoeuvred the NPA, won over its more unitary 
tendencies and other smaller groups174 and soared from the mediocre results of the 
2009-2010 election cycle (slightly above 6%) to the triumph of the Mélenchon's 2012 
presidential campaign (11.1%). 
The success of the FdG effectively led to a sharp drop in the electoral fragmentation of 
the French radical left, reconciling the former communist, far left and alternative 
electorates under a common roof and marginalising the far left, which plunged well 
below the levels of the 1980s. The question of its future prospects of consolidation, 
however, remains open. The member-organisations have so far failed to move toward 
a merger and even to institutionalise their decision-making processes, which remain 
dominated by the PCF. The unity of the coalition, moreover, is severely put to test 
every time that the electoral legislation and the lure of power (regional, departmental, 
municipal, to a less extent legislative elections) provide strong incentives to broad 
centre-left alliances.  
 
                                                     
174
 The LCR/NPA lost to it important sections of its historic leaders and cadres: the Gauche Unitaire 
(March 2009), Convergences & Alternatives (February 2011) and the Gauche Anticapitaliste (July 2012). 




5.2.3 Political nature 
 
 
As in the rest of Western Europe, the contemporary French radical left is characterised 
by a significant break with the characteristic features of the 20th century communist 





The PCF radically modernised its ideological outlook in the period 1994-2002, marked 
by Robert Hue's "mutation" (mutation) (Andolfatto, 2001 and 2005; Pudal, 2002; 
Mermat, 2005).  
The long-term goals remained rooted in an anti-capitalist vision centred around a 
"communism which will free mankind" (1994 and 2001 party statutes). The precise 
contours of this vision, however, became increasingly fuzzy. The party had already 
formally disassociated itself from the dogmas of one-party rule (1961), the 
insurrectional seizure of power (1964) and the dictatorship of the proletariat (1976) 
during its past aggiornamento of the 1960s-1970s, replacing them with the 
theorisation of a French road to socialism based on gradual reforms and the medium-
term acceptance of liberal-democratic institutions, political pluralism and a mixed 
economy. In the 1990s it repudiated the Soviet model in its entirety but failed to 
replace it with a clear alternative model of the desired organisation of production, of 
the state and of society. The references to Marxism, working-class agency and the 
socialisation of means of production were de-emphasised (at times disappearing) and 
were replaced by vaguer statements of humanistic and progressive values175.  
The mid-term programme conformed to the typical anti-neoliberal catalogue of the 
contemporary radical left centring on demands of redistribution, social protection, job-
                                                     
175
 In the 1994 statute "democracy", "a fairer and freer society", "the human being [...] at the centre"; in 
the 2001 statute "the emancipation of each man and woman, the social control, the pooling and sharing 
of knowledge, powers and wealth", the "full autonomy and the full enjoyment of each woman and men" 
and the overcoming of "every social form of exploitation, domination and alienation". 
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creation, defence of the welfare state and of the mixed economy and democratic and 
left-libertarian issues.  
The links between the two, finally, were left indefinite.  
  
The modernisation of the LCR was more superficial (Ubbiali, 2008; Bonnemaison, 2012; 
Johsua, 2013).  
The organisation progressively downplayed its references to revolutionary 
communism, Trotskyism and the Fourth International (which were formally dropped 
with the 2009 transition to the NPA) and renewed its style and discourse. On the other 
hand, its traditional long-term goals and strategy remained clearly recognisable behind 
the various stylistic innovations. The LCR continued to call for a revolutionary rupture 
with capitalism, the establishment of a future socialist society (albeit with explicit 
"21th century", "democratic", "ecological" and "feminist" qualifiers), the socialisation 
of the means of production and workers' power and self-management. 
Its mid-term demands, similarly, were much less radical than in the past but with a 
continued insistence on their transitional value: not so much feasible packages of anti-
neoliberal reforms but rather objectives encouraging the extra-parliamentary 
mobilisations and paving the way for a large-scale clash with the capitalist system.  
This evolution was coherent with the defining trait of the organisation dating at least 
back to 1983: a continuous effort to open up toward different political traditions 
(other socialist variants, ecologism, pure movementism, alter-globalism) 
counterbalanced by a strong attachment to the fundamentals of revolutionary 
Marxism (Turpin, 1997; Rizet, 2007). This attitude enabled it to remain vital and 
responsive to its external environment. At the same time, it created strong internal 
tensions: the enthusiastic participation to united fronts and projects of radical left 
regroupment regularly ended with a withdrawal and the loss of large numbers of its 
activists.  
 
LO, on the contrary, changed little of its political culture and ideology. While its public 
profile was predominantly characterised by a radical workerist and populist discourse, 




Its long-term goals and language did not deviate from the traditional Marxist-Leninist 
footprint: proletarian revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, transition toward a 
communist society through democratic planning, workers' control, the abolishment of 
wage-labour and the withering away of the state (LO, 2003). 
Its mid-term goals, in the same vein, were framed around transitional demands 
centred on employment, pay, working time and conditions, welfare provisions and 
control on company accounts and decisions. What differentiated these demands from 
typical radical left programmes and even from those of other far left organisations was 
the absolute priority of material and working-class issues over left-libertarian ones.  
  
The Front de Gauche, finally, marked the logical outcome of this long transition (FdG, 
2012). Firstly, language and ideological references were refashioned to broaden the 
electoral appeal of the coalition: communism, socialism, Marxism and the critique of 
capitalism were replaced by humanistic themes ("Human first!), the opposition to 
"neo-liberalism" and "financial capital", democratisation ("civic revolution") and left-
wing republicanism ("the Sixth Republic"). Secondly, the focus shifted entirely from 
long-term to short-term goals, i.e. a coherent and detailed programme of anti-
neoliberal democratic, social, economic and ecological reforms. Thirdly, as in the case 
of DIE LINKE in Germany, the oppositional collocation and the belligerent tones and 


















The main change in the sociology of the contemporary French radical left compared to 
its predecessor of the 1970s is a significant loss in specificity and in particular an over-
proportional decline among its traditional core constituency: manual workers, the 
broader working class and the youth (TABLE 5.5, TABLE 5.6 and TABLE 5.7). 
 
TABLE 5.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (composition) 
















SOURCE CDSP SOFRES CDSP CDSP CDSP CSA  
N. 6,712,265 3,417,919 4,248,012 3,933,773 3,300,254 4,598,832 3,827,346 
GENDER        
Male 52.8%  54.2% 42.9% 50.6%  49.2% 
Female 47.2%  45.8% 57.1% 49.4%  50.8% 
AGE        
18-24 35.8%  29.9% 20.4% 21.3%  23.9% 
25-64 50.3%  63.5% 66.3% 61.2%  63.7% 
>64 13.9%  6.6% 13.3% 17.5%  12.5% 
EDUCATION        
5 years   14.0% 4.9% 30.8%  16.6% 
8 years   55.3% 52.4% 41.9%  49.9% 
13 years   12.3% 17.4% 12.9%  14.2% 
15 years   7.7% 12.9% 8.0%  9.5% 
15+   10.6% 12.3% 6.4%  9.8% 




2.1% 0.8% 1.5% 
 1.5% 




44.9% 56.9% 50.2% 
 50.7% 
Intermediate prof. 11.7%  12.7% 17.2% 11.6%  13.8% 
White-collar 13.4%  15.7% 20.9% 20.1%  18.9% 
Blue-collar 24.9%  16.5% 18.8% 18.5%  17.9% 
Unemployed 7.3%  8.9% 6.5% 7.5%  7.6% 
Inactive 35.2%  37.3% 29.4% 36.1%  34.3% 
Student 3.3%  6.4% 7.4% 8.5%  7.4% 
Pensioner 12.6%  22.0% 14.1% 20.1%  18.7% 
Other 19.3%  8.9% 7.8% 7.5%  8.1% 
"WORKING CLASS" 57.3%  53.8% 63.4% 57.7%  58.3% 
RELIGION        









46.6% 36.9% 42.1% 
 - 
Other religion 2.0%  2.1% 4.3% 5.4%  3.9% 
Non-believer 32.3%  41.5% 43.0% 48.8%  44.5% 
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012) 







TABLE 5.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (penetration) 
















SOURCE CDSP SOFRES CDSP CDSP CDSP PSA  
N. 23.9% 11.2% 13.9% 13.8% 9.0% 11.1% 12.0% 
GENDER        
Male 25.8%  15.4% 12.7% 9.5% 12.1% 12.4% 
Female 22.0%  12.6% 14.8% 8.5% 10.1% 11.5% 
AGE        
18-24 39.4% 13.6% 12.5% 16.8% 15.0% 16.1% 15.1% 
25-34 29.0% 11.7% 16.3% 15.8% 7.0% 10.1% 12.3% 
35-44 23.6% 13.6% 16.3% 14.8% 10.0% 12.1% 13.3% 
45-64 20.9% 8.8% 10.5% 13.8% 12.0% 12.1% 12.1% 
65+ 12.5% 8.8% 9.6% 11.8% 6.0% 8.1% 8.9% 
EDUCATION        
5 years   14.7% 11.9% 9.2% 10.1% 11.5% 
8 years   14.0% 15.5% 10.0% 11.1% 12.6% 
13 years   16.1% 14.5% 8.6% 13.1% 13.1% 
15 years   11.0% 12.9% 8.1% 10.1% 10.5% 
15+   13.3% 9.9% 5.7% 9.1% 9.5% 




4.7% 4.2% 3.5% 
- 4.1% 




19.2% 19.1% 10.9% 
- 16.4% 
Intermediate prof. 27.8% 15.6% 17.3% 16.0% 8.6% 14.1% 14.0% 
White-collar 26.0% 13.6% 18.0% 19.4% 10.7% 12.1% 16.0% 
Blue-collar 43.2% 16.6% 22.6% 22.7% 13.3% 14.1% 19.5% 
Unemployed 38.2% - 18.0% 17.2% 16.0% - 17.1% 
Inactive 19.4% - 10.5% 9.4% 7.3% - 9.1% 
Student 32.2% - 13.9% 15.4% 9.2% - 12.8% 
Pensioner 16.2% - 9.3% 6.9% 6.9% - 7.7% 
Other 20.8% - 11.0% 13.5% 6.7% - 10.4% 
"WORKING CLASS" 33.6% - 19.0% 18.9% 11.3% - 16.4% 
RELIGION        









14.5% 13.2% 6.8% 
 - 
Other religion 13.5%  9.7% 10.3% 7.9%  9.3% 
Non-believer 47.0%  26.9% 22.5% 14.7%  21.3% 
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012) 
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed. 
 
If we compare the legislative vote of 1978 with the average presidential scores of the 
last two decades, the results are eloquent The radical vote across the French 
population halved from 23.9% to 12.0% (-11.9 points, -50.0%). The decline was 
however significantly stronger among blue-collar workers (from 43.2% to 19.5%; -23.6 
points; -54.7%), the entirety of the active working-class176 (from 33.6% to 16..4%; -17.2 
points; -51.2%), students (from 32.2% to 12.8%; -19.4 points; -60.2%), people aged 18-
                                                     
176
 Here defined as blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, intermediate professions and the 
unemployed, excluding upper professions. 
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24 (from 39.4% to 15.1%; -24.3 points; -61.7%) and people aged 25-34 (from 29.0% to 
12.3%; -16.7 points; -57.6%). Indeed, the radical left cut its losses only among the 
categories where it had historically been weak (people over 65 year old, professionals, 
self-employed) and among white-collar workers (from 26.0% to 16.0%; -9.9 points; -
38.3%)177. 
Most of this transformation was already achieved by 1988, before the beginning of the 
period of my study: this clearly derived from the incapacity of the PCF to offer a 
coherent perspective to its traditional electorate and prevent its dispersion in all 
directions (the rising socialist party, political disengagement and the far right).178 The 
period 1995-2002 pushed against the tide and led to a partial "re-proletarisation". 
After 2002 however, scores among the employed wage workers have dropped again 
below the levels of 1988: in 2012 Mélenchon fared 14.1% among intermediate 
professions, 12.1% of white-collar workers and only 14.1% among blue-collar workers 
– barely above his average results. 
 
The trend was even more evident at the levels of radical left members and elected 
representatives (TABLE 5.7).  
The 1979 and 1997 surveys of the PCF membership (Platone, 1985; Platone & Ranger, 
2000) enable a fairly reliable comparison. If the total members of the party more than 
halved in the period, from 540,565 to 225,394 (-58.3%), blue-collar workers suffered a 
veritable collapse (-78.8%) and their weight declined from 32.1% to 16.3% of the total 
membership. The social categories which had reduced losses were those farthest from 
the historic working-class identity of the party: professionals (-27.6%), pensioners (-
34.1%) and other inactives (-36.4%). The subsequent period, when the due-paying 
membership (cotisants) of the party liquefied reaching an all time low of 64,184 in 
2012 (-71.5%), is likely to have deepened on this tendency. 
                                                     
177
 The latter exception was entirely determined by the 1995 and 2002 elections, a reflection of the 
ability of the Trotskyist candidates to capture the sympathies of the "highly feminised [...] lower end of 
the service sector", both public and private (Sperber, 2010). All other elections (1988, 2007 and 2012) 
presented much lower scores.  
178
 A question of the 1988 French electoral panel (CDSP, 1998) is extremely interesting in this regard. Of 
the 20.8% of French voters who declared to have voted for the PCF in the past now 42.5% chose 
Mitterrand, 9% the abstention, 5.8% the centre-right and 5.7% the far right. Shifts toward abstentions 
and the FN are however likely to be strongly underestimated by the methodology of the survey.  
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TABLE 5.7 SOCIOLOGY OF THE PARTY-ORGANISATION, PCF (composition) 






N. 28,098,115 540,565 86 
GENDER    
Male 48.8% 65.0% 86.0% 
Female 51.2% 35.0% 14.0% 
AGE    
18-30 23.9% 24.5% 0.0% 
30-59 52.9% 59.9% 79.1% 
60+ 23.2% 15.6% 20.9% 
Average age 44.8 years 42.6 years 51.4 years 
PROFESSION    
Employer and self-employed 11.0% 5.9% 2.3% 
Upper profession 5.0% 3.4% 12.8% 
Employed wage worker 36.2% 59.8% 63.9% 
Intermediate prof. 10.1% 10.2% 23.3% 
White-collar 12.3% 17.6% 8.1% 
Blue-collar 13.8% 32.1% 32.6% 
Inactive and unemployed 47.8% 30.9% 21.0% 
Retired 18.6% 15.5% 19.8% 
Other 29.2% 15.4% 1.2% 






N. 30,462,633 225,394 34 
GENDER    
Male 47.6% 60.0% 88.2% 
Female 52.4% 40.0% 11.8% 
AGE    
18-30 22.8% 10.5% 0.0% 
30-59 49.9% 65.1% 76.5% 
60+ 27.3% 24.4% 23.5% 
Average age 45.9 years 48.7 years 55.4 years 
PROFESSION    
Employer and self-employed 7.3% 2.5% 0.0% 
Upper profession 5.8% 5.9% 14.7% 
Employed wage worker 33.7% 43.6% 70.6% 
Intermediate prof. 10.4% 10.3% 47.1% 
White-collar 12.9% 17.1% 8.8% 
Blue-collar 10.4% 16.3% 14.7% 
Inactive and unemployed 53.2% 48.0% 14.7% 
Retired 26.4% 24.5% 14.7% 
Other 26.8% 23.5% 0.0% 
Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995), Platone (1985), Platone & Ranger (2000), www.assemblee-nationale.fr 
 
The membership of the other radical left organisations always remained numerically 
quite limited and thus exerts little impact on the overall picture; statistical details are 
also scarce and imprecise. Excellent studies are nevertheless available for LO (Choffat, 
1990 and 2012) and the LCR/NPA (Johsua, 2004 and 2013). A common feature of both 
organisations was the very low level of inactives and the converse preponderance of 
employed wage workers; the precise composition of the latter, however, differed. LO 
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made constant efforts to entrench itself not in the student and intellectual milieus 
typical of post-1968 gauchisme but among the core sectors of the working-class. The 
resulting membership composition has been largely dominated by blue- and white-
collar workers up to the early 1990s; during the last two decades the weight of these 
categories has remained comparatively high but, due to quantitative and qualitative 
difficulties, seems to have lost some ground to teachers and pensioners.179 The social 
profile of the LCR, on the other hand, remained similar to an inverted pyramid, with an 
overwhelming concentration of members belonging to the intermediate and upper 
strata of the work-force, of intellectuals, of students and of professionals.180  
 
A similar evolution interested the social composition of the top layers of the party-
organisations. The example of the PCF deputies at the National Assembly, for instance, 
confirms the rapid disappearance of elected representative with a background as 
industrial or agricultural workers (32.6% in 1979, 14.7% in 1997, 0.0% in 2012) to the 
benefit of intermediate and upper professions (36.1% in 1979, 71.8% in 1997, 71.4% in 
2010) and pensioners, and a marked aging of the parliamentary group (in average 51.4 
years old in 1979, 55.4 in 1997 and 61.7 in 2012).   
 
To sum up, the roots of the radical left in the workers' movement gradually tended to 
loosen their grip. The middle-lower strata of the working class181 continued to 
represent a stable majority of the radical left electorate (58.3%) but not of their 
declining membership (43.6%), where they lost ground to pensioners, the 
economically inactive and professionals. They remained more present within the 
radical left than among the general population (with an index of 133.0% for their 
electorate and 129.4% for their membership), but to a much lower extent than in the 
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 The estimates of Choffat (2012) indicate for the late 1980s an almost complete predominance of 
blue-collar workers (44%) and white-collar employees (45%), mostly of the lower-central age cohorts 
and with a not weak share of women (38%); by 2009 the proportions would have changed to 26% blue-
collar workers, 38% employees, 24% teachers and 9% pensioners, increasingly belonging to upper-
central age cohorts. 
180
 The figures of Johsua (2004) indicate in 2002 very few manual workers (7.1%), more white-collar 
employees (15.3%) and many intermediate professions (19.9%), teachers/professors (23.0%), students 
(11.8%) and professionals (11.6%).  
181
 Electoral figures encompass the categories of blue-collar, white-collar, intermediate professions and 
the unemployed (excluding a section of upper-level managerial or intellectual wage-workers). 




past. Their internal barycentre shifted upwards from manual workers to white-collar 
and intermediate professions (32.7% of the electorate and 27.4% of the membership). 
Finally, the radical left support among the industrial working-class and wage-workers 





The transition from mass working-class parties (a large and disciplined membership, a 
tight network of collateral extra-parliamentary organisations, deep roots in a well-
defined social subculture, a significant workplace organisation and intervention) to 
light electoralist organisations was slower and less pronounced in France than in 
Germany and Italy but had nevertheless important consequences. 
 
Between 1994 and 2002 the PCF discarded the Stalinist element which had 
characterised most of its history (bureaucratic centralism, monolithism, strict 
discipline) and embraced internal pluralism and democracy; at the same time, it 
wittingly or unwittingly lost most of the traditional silver linings of that type of 
organisation. Workplace cells were progressively abandoned; collateral organisations 
asserted their autonomy and slowly de-politicised their activities; internal power 
groups (e.g. the elected representatives), tendencies and individual members lost their 
discipline and stopped following uniform central directives; the voluntarist policy of 
schooling and promotion of members with a humble social background to positions of 
responsibility and leadership, perhaps the single most defining characteristic of French 
communism, ceased to function altogether (Pudal, 2002 and 2009; Ethuin, 2003 and 
2006; Mischi, 2003, 2003b, 2007 and 2010). 
These reforms completely failed to delineate a viable alternative to the old model and 
to stop the organisational decline of the party, probably ending up accelerating its 
decay. Throughout the last two decades the PCF maintained a remarkably high M/V 
ratio, a sign of the persistence of the old legacies and of a close-knit subculture: 10.1% 
of communist voters in legislative elections (and 12.0% in presidential elections) were 
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also due-paying members of the party.182 It was however an inexorably shrinking 
constituency, which evaporated at a roughly similar speed in all dimensions (members, 
voters, organisational linkages).   
  
The two far left organisations came from a different story: on the one hand, parties of 
activists (Lenin's "cadre party") rather than of passive members; on the other hand, 
unlike their Bolshevik model, largely isolated from the masses due to the stronghold of 
the traditional workers' parties and distinctive defects of the Trotskyist movement. The 
conspiratorial and hyper-activist modus operandi required by the LCR (pseudonyms, 
probation membership, ideological formation and discussion, round-the-clock 
commitment, supervision of changes of residence and work) was strongly relaxed in 
1998 and 2009 (Salles, 2003; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Rizet, 2007). LO continued to 
cling to all the above-mentioned trappings, including a long process of training and 
probation to move from sympathiser to full member with voting rights and a semi-
clandestine leadership and operation (Ubbiali, 2002).  
This kind of avant-garde organisation had traditionally proven quite effective in 
ensuring the survival and reproduction of the groups, in conducting extra-
parliamentary and electoral campaigns and in intervening within fronts and external 
bodies. It was however incapable to pass the test of the period 1993-2009, failing to 
exploit the unprecedented levels of sympathy and electoral support as a springboard 
for the crucial transition from small group to solid national force. The forays into mass 
organisations did not turn into institutionalised linkages. The electoral upsurges were 
accompanied by bouts of membership growth but their magnitude remained 
altogether limited – at best 2,640 members for the LCR (2007), around 7-8,000 for 
LO183, 9,123 for the NPA (2009). M/V ratios became very low: 0.4% (LCR) and 0.6% (LO) 
in presidential and 1.2% (LCR) and 2.2% (LO) in legislative elections. And electoral 
results themselves remained unstable and highly dependent on the personal appeal of 
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 As a reference, the respective figures for the PS are just 2.3% (legislative) and 1.9% (presidential). 
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As in Italy, the organisational fragmentation of the French radical left was largely 
driven by strategic differences.  
 
The PCF pained to adapt to the supremacy conquered during the 1980s by 
Mitterrand's PS and by the moderate drift of the latter since 1982-1983. It thus 
oscillated from periods of rapprochement (1981-1984), hostility (1977-1981, 1984-
1988) and uncertainty (1988-1993). In the mid-1990s, however, Robert Hue's renewal 
was accompanied by a decisive turn toward a policy of organic centre-left alliances: 
the party became an organic component of the gauche plurielle and a governmental 
force at the national level (Jospin cabinet, 1997-2002) and in most regional and local 
administrations. Here it led a conciliatory strategy of left-ward pressure, hoping to 
influence the coalition from the inside with dialogue and bargaining. The participation 
was a political and organisational failure; the PCF failed to obtain many policy results 
and was paid dearly its choice with a collapse of both its electoral support and its 
membership (Bell, 1998; Boyd et al., 2003; Bergounioux & Grunberg, 2005; Becker, 
2005). 
LO coherently defended a strategy of anti-capitalist alternative coupled with an 
extremely intransigent attitude toward the moderate left, refusing any support to the 
"bourgeois" PS and presenting itself as the only representative of wage-workers 
against the two poles of the bourgeois alternation. Uniquely for the French far left, 
since the mid-1970s it also generally refused to appeal to a left vote in the second 
round of elections.184 
The line of the LCR/NPA was similar but more flexible. The organisation's main goal 
was the creation of an anti-capitalist pole breaking with the "social-liberalism" of the 
PS but its boundaries were left fluid (depending on the moment they could refer to an 
enlarged far left, the far left and dissident tendencies of the PCF or the whole radical 
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 The only exception since 1981 was the period 2007-2008, when the party called for a support for 




left) and tactical alliances to defeat the right were not entirely ruled out. On the 
contrary, the organisation generally called to vote for the left in the second round.185  
 
The aftermath of 2002 remained marked by the legacy of the Jospin government. The 
PCF sought to regain credibility by radicalising its discourse and electoral tactics but 
never fully questioned the need of establishing a new "union populaire" of all centre-
left forces (Buffet, 2006) and its strategy of widespread governmental involvement at 
the sub-national level. LO remained firm on its principles, but the intransigent strategy 
which had worked so well in the previous period suddenly lost all appeal when faced 
with a realisation of its possible short-term consequence, i.e. the success of the right 
and of the far right over a divided left. The LCR/NPA oscillated between the desire of a 
broad anti-neoliberal regroupment and the critique to the PCF. 
 
A temporary solution to these dilemmas was finally offered after 2009 by the rise of 
the Left Front. This alliance did not resolve the inherent contradictions of the 
contemporary radical left: anti-neoliberal coherence vs. centre-left unity against the 
right; concrete anti-neoliberal programmatic vs. vague anti-capitalist aspirations. It 
managed however to paper them over with a powerful radical discourse and an 
intelligent strategy of mixed left-ward pull, which marked its distance from the PS and 
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 The limited exceptions were mainly due to the pressure of LO. 
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5.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of 
radical left mobilisation 
 
5.3.1 The (obstructed?) neo-liberal transition 
 
The "neo-liberal" transition which developed across Europe during the 1980s and 
1990s affected France as well, but in a much less pronounced way than most of its 
counterparts.  
The shift away from the traditional dirigiste state, for example, was gradual and 
incomplete (Smith, 1990; MacLean, 1997; Berne & Pogorel, 2005). When the neo-
liberal counter-revolution of Thatcher and Reagan was in full swing, the French 
socialist government actually embarked on a programme of large-scale 
nationalisations (1981-1982) which consolidated the French state-owned sector as one 
of the largest in Europe. With the socialist electoral defeat of 1986 the tide changed 
and in the following decades a wide-spread process of total and partial privatisations 
reversed the situation.186 The bulk of it was conducted by centre-right cabinets; centre-
left ones initially positioned themselves on a defence of the status quo (1988-1993) 
but later enthusiastically adapted to the trend (1997-2002).187 This notwithstanding, 
the French state-owned sector remained proportionally quite large and bigger than in 
most other advanced industrial countries.188  
Similarly, restructuring and retrenchment of the welfare state was much less effective 
than in Italy or Germany and sometimes counter-balanced by an actual expansion of 
welfare provisions (Cole, 1999; Michel, 2008; Vail, 2010). Aggressive projects of 
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 Singling out the most important privatisations, the state progressively sold all or a majority of its 
shares in most of its banking and financial (Paribas, Crédit commercial de France, Société générale, BNP, 
AGF, CIC, CNP, Crédit Lyonnais), industrial (Saint Gobain, CGE, Suez, ELF, TOTAL, Pechiney, Renault, Bull, 
Thomson, EADS) and commercial (Air France, France Télécom, the highway network) companies. 
Minority shares of the energy companies GDF and EDF were sold in 2005-2007. 
187
 The Jospin cabinet, in fact, privatised proportionally more than any other government before or 
afterwards. 
188
 See Christiansen (2011) and Kowalsky et al. (2013). According to the former in 2009 majority-owned 
public companies still employed 838,574 workers (against 1,856,000 in 1985); minority-owned 
companied had another 924,625 employees. According to the latter the sales of the top five French 
public companies in 2011 were equivalent to 7.9% of the French GDP.   
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counter-reform by right-wing cabinets were regularly confronted by massive 
workplace and street mobilisations (1994, 1995, 2003, 2006, 2010), which often led to 
their partial or total withdrawal and in general slowed down the pace of change. The 
socialist cabinets, in turn, generally avoided a direct clash with their traditional 
constituency and failed to introduce any notable neo-liberal counter-reform; instead, 
they sought to accompany and compensate the negative development emerging from 
the economic structure (unemployment, de-industrialisation, rise of job precarity and 
poverty) with an expansion of the social safety net (e.g. the 1988 introduction of a 
guaranteed minimum revenue) and some progressive counter-measures (e.g. 1998-
2000 reduction of the working week to 35 hours)189. 
Total governmental expenditure rose, hovering for the whole period 1994-2009 
around the very high level of 53.4% of GDP. Declines in 1985-1989 (from 51.9% to 
48.9%) and 1996-2000 (from 54.5% to 51.7%) were promptly reversed afterwards and 
were due not so much to political choice but rather to mere economic fluctuations.  
Employment within the civil service, finally, remained one of the highest in Europe and 
continuously expanded in absolute term from 4,257,700 (1990) to 5,364,300 (2007), 
when the centre-right government proceeded for the first time to a small and gradual 
reduction (5,358,800 in 2011). In relative terms, this expressed a rise from 18.3% 
(1990) to 20.3% (2007) of total employment, followed by a decrease to 19.9% (2011).  
 
The macro-economic situation of the country was also somewhat better than that of 
Italy and Germany (see TABLE 5.8). The French share of the global GDP declined but 
real GDP growth, although much slower than during the golden age and the 1970s, 
remained at acceptable levels (+1.7%). Large French corporations were altogether 
fairly successful within the global competition and maintained or improved their 
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 On the former (RMI) see Cytermann and Dindar (2008); on the latter see Économie et Statistique, 
376-377. The 35-hour reform helped to increase free time, reduce unemployment and raise hourly 













Real GDP annual growth (CAGR) 2.0% 2.2% 1.0% 1.7% 
Real wages annual growth (CAGR) 0.7% 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 
Wage share of GDP (average) 59.1% 58.0% 57.9% 58.0% 
Unemployment rate (average) 8.6% 9.5% 8.5% 9.1% 
Poverty rate (average) - 7.3% 7.1% 7.2% 
Atypical contracts rate (average) 6.6% 10.4% 11.6% 10.8% 
Current account balance/GDP 
(average) 
-0.2% 1.6% -0.8% 0.7% 
  1993 2003 2009 
France's share of global GDP  5.2% 4.8% 4.5% 
Gross public debt/GDP  46.3% 63.2% 79.0% 
Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), INSEE, KLEMS.  
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate. 
 
From the point of view of the working-class the situation was less favourable but not 
clearly negative. The growth of real net annual wages was very slow (+0.6%) but 
positive and expressed a lower number of working hours; the wage share of GDP and 
income inequality remained broadly stable; legal minimum revenue (RMI) and 
minimum wage (SMIC) regulations kept poverty at bay.190 
The key problem of the period was mass unemployment. Rapidly growing since 1981, 
the rate of unemployment peaked at 10.7% in 1997 and remained fairly high 
throughout the period (1994-2009: 9.1%). Another negative development was the 
growth of atypical work contracts: despite the lack of legislative innovations on this 
front, their weight on total employment roughly doubled (1994-2009: 11.5%).191 
 
In this context, the position of the radical left was difficult. The public image of the 
socialist party was heavily marked by its "tournant de la rigueur" of 1983 and its 
failures to seriously tackle mass unemployment (Vail, 2010). The party also slowly but 
consistently drifted to the right on socio-economic themes, moving from a discourse of 
"rupture with capitalism" in 1981 to a moderate course of adaptation to the changed 
international climate afterwards (Cole, 1999). However there is no doubt that the most 
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 Official poverty rate (50% of median income) between 1996 and 2009 was 7.2%, quite low by 
international standards and with a tendency to decrease. 
191
 Attempts of the centre-right governments to introduce new precarious contracts for the youth (the 
CIP in 1993, the CNE in 2005, the CPE in 2006) were all withdrawn or shelved after a few years under the 




consistent attacks to the Keynesian-welfarist post-war settlement came from the 
centre-right. Since 1986 the latter gradually re-asserted its domination over the 
executive power (1986-1988, 1993-1997, 2002-2012) and deployed an aggressive, 
although not always successful, programme of neo-liberal reforms. Moreover, the 
communist party was largely jointly liable for the faults of the socialist-led cabinets of 
Mauroy (1981-1984) and Fabius (1984-1986), participating to the former and 
supporting externally the latter. 
The "vacuum" of political representation of working-class and welfarist interests thus 
appears at first sight less pronounced in France than in most other Western European 
countries, and the radical left seems less well positioned to profit from it. The rest of 




5.3.2 Contours of the vacuum 
 
In fact, as FIGURE 5.9 clearly shows, the consent and legitimacy of the main 
"establishment" parties RPR/UMP, UDF and PS192 was problematic. These three parties 
have been dominating the political system since the late 1970s, occupying in average 
86.2% of the lower chamber of parliament (due to the effects of the two-round 
majoritarian electoral system) and all offices of president and prime minister. Their 
level of electoral support, however, has fallen dramatically in the period 1986-2002 – 
not accidentally, the time frame of the harshest implementation and contestation of 
neo-liberal reforms.  
In presidential elections their results fell from 72.2% of valid votes (57.6% of the total 
electorate) in 1981 to 48.0% (33.2%) in 2002. In legislative elections they declined from 
76.1% of valid votes (52.8% of the total electorate) in 1981 to 53.4% (34.5%) in 1997. 
The main beneficiaries were abstentionism and the right-wing anti-establishment 
National Front (FN)193. The anti-establishment far left (LO, LCR, PT) also grew but was 
significant in presidential elections only. Other parties (e.g. communists, ecologists, 
radicals, independent centre-right) had ups and downs, decreasing until 1988 and 
growing afterwards.  
Establishment parties recovered part of their electoral lost ground after the shock of 
the 2002 presidential elections. The political trauma provoked by the accession of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen to the second round led to a massive rise of political interest and 
participation194, a centralisation of voting behaviour from minor parties to the two 
main ones (PS and UMP) and a fall of the extremes (far left and far right). The previous 
tendencies, however, slowly reasserted themselves after 2007.  
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 Rassemblement pour la République, gaullist right; in 2002 it enlarged and renamed Union pour un 
mouvement populaire. Union pour la démocratie française, centre-right; in 1998-2008 it progressively 
recentred, lost pieces to the UMP and in 2007 morphed in the centrist party Mouvement démocrate 
(MoDem). Due to its marginalisation from power, the MoDem results of 2007-2012 are accounted for in 
the "other parties" category. Parti socialiste, left. 
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 Front national. 
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 Valid votes in presidential elections increased from 69.2% in 2002 to 82.6% in 2007 (the highest level 
since 1974) and remained high at 77.9% in 2012. In absolute terms this was even more impressive (from 
28.5 million to 36.7 million valid votes, +28.8%). The movement of re-politicisation interested not only 
abstentionists but also citizens who for some reason were not registered in the electoral lists: the total 
number of registered citizens grew by 8% (whereas the "natural" increase due to the coming of age of 





FIGURE 5.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF FRENCH PARTIES BY TYPE 
 
 
Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur. 
Notes: Above presidential, below legislative elections. Share of total electorate. Main establishment parties: RPR/UMP, PS, UDF 
(without MoDem). Anti-establishment parties: far right and far left.  
 
The data at the level of broad political blocs show a similar picture. Since 1981 every 
single French government, with one exception, was voted out of office at the 
subsequent legislative election after heavy electoral losses. The big exception is 
represented by 2007, when the seating centre-right coalition managed to compensate 
the losses on its left (toward the centrist MoDem, which had in the meantime moved 




Finally, the efforts of the centre-right governments to push forward a neo-liberal 
agenda of reforms, far from demoralising the left-wing opinion, have invariably 
revitalised it and given rise to mass movements of resistance (Wolfreys, 2006; 
Kouvelakis, 2007; Ancelovici, 2012). Altogether, the level of left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilisation was of a magnitude and persistence unmatched in any 
other European country, with the possible exception of Greece. 
 
The labour movement demonstrated an unexpected militancy. Despite the misleading 
indications of official statistics, overall strike activity has remained vibrant since 1986, 
with peaks in 1989, 1995, 2003 and 2010 equal or superior to the levels of the 1970s 
(FIGURE 5.10).195 Strikes have declined dramatically in the private sector but have 
exploded in the civil service and the rest of the public sector.  
Between 1986 and 1989 a series of generally successful sectorial movements were 
launched by transport and industrial workers, nurses, teachers and employees of the 
Ministry of Finances, with a prominent role played by grassroots coordinations 
(Narritsens, 1991; Kergoat et al., 1992; Denis, 1996; Leschi, 1996 and 1997; 
Chevandier, 2007). In 1995 an enormous mobilisation of public sector workers led to 
the withdrawal of the pension reform of the Juppé government (Trat, 1997; Béroud & 
Mouriaux, 1998). Other massive but unsuccessful mobilisations of the public sector 
against further pension reforms were launched in 2003 (Khalfa, 2003) and 2010 
(Andolfatto, 2011; Ancelovici, 2011; Béroud & Yon, 2012). In 2009, finally, large 
movements around the themes of purchasing power and employment developed in 
the French Antilles (Monza, 2009; Desse, 2010, Rey, 2010) and on mainland France 
(Béroud & Yon, 2012): the first successful, the second unsuccessful. 
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 The often-cited series of the DARES excludes political strikes, the whole public sector and, since 1995, 
the transport sector [in the figure: "official"]. Following the lead of Kouvelakis (2007), I integrate it with 
administrative data from other official sources (DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP and DGOS) [in the figure: 
"all sectors"]. While administrative data are fairly reliable for the public sector, Carlier (2008) has 
convincingly shown that they systematically and increasingly underestimate the level of industrial 
conflict in the private sector and has estimated their coverage at 48% in 1992 and at 23% in 2004. After 
2005 it is possible to reconstruct a series which largely compensates this gap by combining the usual 
administrative data for the public sector and the new survey data of ACEMO for the private sector [in 
the figure: "all sectors (b)"]; the two series are of course not comparable. Some sectors still escape 
completely (agriculture, local government, companies below 10 employees) or intermittently (some 
transport and nationalised companies, the health sector, political conflicts in the private sector between 
1996 and 2004) from the computation. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.10 LABOUR CONFLICT 
 
Source: my elaboration from DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP, DGOS. 




All movements combined industrial action, mainly by public sector workers, with very 
large and protracted cycles of demonstrations (Filleule & Tartakowsky, 2008); 
regardless of their eventual success, they also seemed to enjoy a the sympathy and 
support of the majority of the population.  
The youth was the other main protagonist of the period. The student movement 
repeatedly initiated large and successful cycles of demonstrations and occupations: in 
particular, the 1986 movement against the Devaquet university reform (Dray, 1987), 
the 1994 movement against the CIP job contract (Borredon, 1996) and the 2006 
movement against the CPE job contract (Obono, 2008). High school students were the 
dominant actors behind the rise of the anti-fascist movement, which flared from a 
relative marginality to several hundred thousand demonstrators in April-May 2002 
(Monzat, 2003; Gemie, 2003). Second generation immigrant youth, finally, headed 
several important moments of contentious politics, from the Marches for Equality in 
1983-1984 to the urban riots of 2005 (Hargreaves, 1991; Le Goaziou & Mucchielli, 
2006; Béaud & Masclet, 2008).  
Beside public sector workers and the youth, other social actors created a backdrop of 
continuous effervescence with activities which were quantitatively weaker but 
qualitatively interesting and very prominent in the public debate (Waters, 2006; 
Ancelovici, 2008; Mathieu, 2012). Three relatively coherent cycles stand out: the 
mobilisations of the "sans" – undocumented migrants, homeless, unemployed – of the 
period 1991-1998 (Siméant, 1993; Royall, 1997 and 2004; Mouchard, 2002 and 2009; 
Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; McNevin, 2006; Garcia, 2013); the alter-globalist 
movement of the period 1999-2004 (Agrikoliansky et. al., 2005; Agrikoliansky, 2007); 
and the 2004-2005 grass-roots campaign for a "left no" to the EU constitution 
referendum (Crespy, 2006).  
 
This context of disaffection toward the traditional parties of government, wide-spread 
rejection of neo-liberal policies and very large extra-parliamentary mobilisations on 
traditional "old left" and "new left" themes fuelled expectations of vibrant growth for 







5.3.3 Electoral mobilisation 
 
As already remarked in section 5.2.1, the electoral mobilisation of the French radical 
left had mixed results.  
 
At an aggregate level, the radical left failed to recover the losses of the period 1978-
1986 and, notably, the long-term shift of the French electorate toward the socialist 
party. Since 1986 its results have been oscillating around an average of 10.8% of valid 
votes, less than half of the pre-crisis values of 1978 (23.9%). The post-1986 trend was 
neither downward nor upward. This overall long-term stability was the product of an 
alternation of middling or strong showings (1986-1988, 1995-2002, 2009-2012) with 
weak ones (1989-1994, 2002-2007). While some sizeable electoral victories (13.9% in 
1995; 12.6% in 2009) seemed at first to contain the promise of a bright future of 
growth, retrospectively they represented maximum ceilings which were followed by 
periods of stagnation and drops to unprecedentedly weak troughs (the legislative 
elections of 2002, 7.6%, and 2012, 7.9%). 
At the level of individual parties, the landscape was very dynamic. The overall growth 
of the far left was unstable but remarkable: from 1.3% in 1992 to 6.1% in 2009, with an 
incredible peak of 10.4% in the 2002 presidential elections. LO dominated this space 
up to 2002, the LCR/NPA afterwards. The communist party suffered periodical drops 
(1981-1986, 1989, 1997-2002) followed by periods of stagnation or hollow recovery. In 
legislative elections, the most stable indicator of its weight, it fell from 11.3% in 1988 
to 9.6% in 1997, 4.8% in 2002 and 4.3% in 2007. The Left Front, finally, came to entirely 
hegemonise this scene after 2009; its results, however, wildly oscillated between 
11.1% (2012 presidential) and 6.9% (2012 legislative), depending on its campaigning 
profile and the specific stakes and characteristics of the election. 
 
The underlying reasons of this behaviour can be illuminated by looking at the broader 
trends of the left-of-the-centre electorate (FIGURE 5.11). 
 
 
FIGURE 5.11 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF RADICAL AND MODERATE LEFT  
 
Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur. 




The figure shows very clearly that the total left vote rose during periods of seating 
centre-right governments and large extra-parliamentary mobilisations against neo-
liberalism (1986-1988; 1993-1997; 2002-2007; 2007-2012) and collapsed while the left 
was in power (1988-1993; 1997-2002). The only exception was the period 2004-2007, 
when the left vote fell despite the effervescence of the preceding years. The reason for 
this deviation is likely to lie partly in the lack of credibility of the Socialist Party, which 
had been deeply lacerated by the controversy over the 2005 European constitution 
referendum, and partly by a law and order reflex provoked by the riots in the 
banlieues.   
 
The radical left had thus to navigate a very narrow path.  
During periods of left-ward swing of the public opinion, the way to go was to present 
itself as a unitary force which would contribute to the defeat of the right-wing while 
exerting a radicalising pressure on the socialist party. The parties who failed to do this, 
adopting a more intransigent attitude, could have brief spikes in support but were 
ultimately severely punished and marginalised (LO after 2002; the NPA in 2010-2012). 
Indeed, after April 2002 the whole radical left paid dearly the consequences of the 
botched presidential election, with its overall results plunging at an all-time low. 
During periods of centre-left cabinets, on the other hand, the association of the radical 
left with the seating governments was clearly poisonous and had to be avoided at all 
costs. Most of the electoral collapse of the PCF stemmed precisely from its periods of 
governmental participation (1981-1984; 1997-2002). A more uncertain collocation, 
such as the one adopted toward the socialist cabinets of 1984-1986, 1988-1993 and 
2012-present196, was less damaging but hardly positive. 
The attempts to exploit the changing political mood with a flexible and appropriate 
strategy, however, were by no means always guaranteed a successful outcome. A 
powerful push to the left of public opinion benefitted significantly the PCF in 1993-
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 The lines between support and opposition were here blurred. In the first and third period the 
socialist cabinets did not need the communist support to have a parliamentary majority; concretely, the 
PCF voted yes (1984) or abstained (2012) at the initial confidence vote and then decided on a case-by-
case basis. In the second case, the socialist cabinets did not have an autonomous parliamentary majority 
and relied sometimes on the PCF but mostly on centrist dissidents, often with the help of the peculiar 
procedure of the article 49.3 of the Constitution (Ferretti, 2003). Posed in front of no-confidence 
motions, the party voted them twice (1990 and 1992) but enabled the survival of the cabinet the 
remaining times.  
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1997 and the FdG in 2010-2012 but only marginally or uncertainly the PCF in 1986-
1988 and the whole radical left in 2002-2004. Conversely, a clear oppositional stance 
against socialist governments by the far left led to extraordinary results in 1997-2002 
but had been of little benefit beforehand (1981-1986, 1988-1993), when the fruits of 
the disillusionment toward the left in power were rather reaped by abstentions and 
the far right.  
 
To sum up, the French radical left was often among the beneficiaries – together with 
the moderate left – of left-ward swings of the public opinion but ultimately failed to 
profit from periods of weakening of the socialist party and came nowhere near to 
challenge its central position within the left-of-the-centre camp. 
The CDSP survey data on political proximity offer a further confirmation of the limits of 
this success (see FIGURE 5.11). Between 1988 and 2007 people identifying with the PS 
dropped from 41.9% to 24.9%. People identifying with PCF, LO and LCR/NPA did 
increase from 6.0% to 9.7%. This improvement, however, represented a very small 
portion of the socialist losses (which were mainly lost to the right) and did not 
necessarily translate in an electoral growth. 
 
FIGURE 5.11 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION 
 
Source: my elaboration from CDSP (1978, 1988, 1995, 2007). 
Notes: share of valid votes. Vote: real results. Proximity: poll data, people declaring their proximity to a party. Self-positioning: poll 




5.3.4 Organisational mobilisation 
 
 
If the electoral mobilisation of the French radical left was at least able to ensure an 
overall stability around comparatively high levels, its organisational mobilisation failed 
to stop a ruinous decline. Unlike in Germany and Italy, the issue here was not the 
capture of disillusioned social-democrats or post-communists: the French socialist 
party has historically had comparatively social roots and a minority position within the 
left spectrum. The problem was the re-capture of the traditional communist 
subculture which had been dissolving since the late 1970s. Ultimately, neither the PCF 
nor other radical left forces managed to make progresses on this task. 
  
The collapse of the radical left membership continued relentlessly all along our time-
frame (see FIGURE 5.12). 
 
FIGURE 5.12 RADICAL LEFT MEMBERSHIP 
 






The PCF had already fallen from its all-time high of 566,492 in 1978 to 368,609 in 1986, 
stabilising until 1988 (375,187). The end of the Soviet bloc, the effects or failures of 
internal reforms, internal dissidences, the 1997-2002 period of governmental 
participation and demographic replacement led to a new precipitous haemorrhage 
which reduced due-paying members to 92,772 (2003) and again 64,184 (2012).197  
The large majority of former communist members, especially those with a middle-
lower class background, abandoned any direct political engagement and often even 
failed to retain a link of electoral loyalty toward the party, shifting to a socialist or far 
left vote. 
The remaining radical left organisations missed the opportunity to profit from the 
communist decline. Lutte Ouvrière indeed strengthened its network of activists and 
sympathisers in the period 1980-2002198 but remained numerically insignificant 
compared both to the PCF and to its own electoral influence. The same assessment 
applies to other far left traditions in the 2000s: the LCR rose from 1,041 members in 
1997 to 2,640 in 2007, in a period when its electorate soared from practically nil to one 
and a half million votes;199 the NPA had a brief initial spike (9,123 members in early 
2009) but soon plunged back to the levels of its predecessor. Even Mélenchon's own 
PG, despite the very successful presidential campaign of its leader, saw its (declared) 
members double in 2009-2012 (to 12,000) but came nowhere near the membership of 
the PCF. 
 
The dense network of collateral organisations which enveloped the PCF up to the 
1980s suffered the same fate. As already remarked, the leadership of party-near mass 
organisations often retained a personal proximity with and even the membership of 
the PCF; however, they ceased to act as relays of party ideas and influence and 
adapted to a context dominated by de-politicisation and a shift toward the socialist 
party and the right. The more openly political organisations which emerged from the 
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 Formal members (an institute introduced in 2002 to mask the decline) stabilised at 130,063 in 2003 
and 133,476 in 2009. 
198
 Estimates are not very precise. Activists might have risen from 650 to 2,000 and formal members 
from less than 1,000 to 7,000-8,000.  
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struggles of the 1990s and 2000s, in turn, chose not to affiliate explicitly with any of 
the existing radical left parties. 
 
Finally, the radical left lost much of its traditional presence within workplaces. The 
official number of workplace cells of the PCF declined from 9,494 (1978) to 5,499 
(1988) and 2,800 (2000); they were de facto scrapped as a central organisational form 
at the 2000 congress and now survive almost exclusively within PCF-controlled local 
administrations and big state-owned companies (postal office, transports, EDF). 
Despite their efforts, other radical left organisations (especially LO and parts of the 








The detailed analysis of this section has sought to address the key question of whether 
the French radical left has been able, and to what extent, to fill the vacuum of political 
representation produced by the right-ward drift of the political system in the neo-
liberal age.  
The answer is that it generally has not. The mobilisation of the radical left in the period 
1988-2012 produced at best slightly increasing, in general declining outcomes (see 
FIGURE 5.13). 
 
FIGURE 5.13 INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE  
 
 




Expressed in absolute terms, the membership collapsed from 371,809 to 86,184 
members (-76.8%), legislative votes decreased from 2,845,826 to 2,046,578 (-28.3%) 
and presidential votes grew (+34.5%). Expressed in terms of percentages of the total 
electorate, membership density (M/E) has continuously declined from 0.99% to 0.19% 
of the electorate. The share of votes in legislative elections has also collapsed from 
7.52% to 4.44%, almost entirely as a result of the 2002 drop. The share of votes in 
presidential elections went through a small but significant increase from 8.96% to 
9.99%: results have oscillated widely but are in average superior to those of the late 
1980s. Expressed in terms of percentages of valid votes, results were similar: an 
unstable but rather growing presidential vote, a strongly declining legislative one. 
 
The electoral level (particularly presidential elections) proved to be the most 
favourable terrain for the radical left, but even here successes were limited, uncertain 
and unstable. Large left-ward shifts of the electorate, sparked by unpopular right-wing 
governments and mass extra-parliamentary mobilisations (1986-1988; 1993-1997; 
2002-2004; 2007-2012), generally benefitted the radical left; however, rather less than 
other left parties (e.g. the PS and the Greens). Periods of direct participation or 
external support of the PCF to socialist governments (1981-1986; 1997-2002) almost 
annihilated its electoral support. Vocal opposition to socialist governments by the far 
left (1981-1986; 1988-1993; 1997-2002; 2012-present) gave fruits only in the third 
case; in all other instances disaffected left voters dispersed toward abstention and in 
other political directions, while the indirect but ultimate beneficiary was the far right 
(Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). 
The level of extra-parliamentary organisation, on the contrary, represented a heavy 
failure. Membership levels, networks of collateral organisations, influence within civil 
society and social movement organisations: all sub-dimensions were dragged down by 
the decay of the PCF to the levels of the 1920s, before the 1935 surge. The other 
radical left organisations completely failed to intercept these disaffected ex-
communists and to provide them a new political home. More crucially, even when 
some party did manage to expand its electorate (the PCF in 1994-1997, LO in 1993-
2002, the LCR/NPA in 2002-2009, the FdG in 2008-2012), its organisational growth 
lagged well behind the electoral surge: that is, it only marginally translated its 
improved popular sympathy into tighter forms of organisational linkages. This worrying 
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development means that the French radical left has been willingly or unwillingly 
conforming to the general long-term shift of political parties from organisations solidly 
anchored within civil society to mere receptors of a fleeting electoral consent (Mair, 
1994). 
 
How can we explain this failure to exploit the high level of dissatisfaction and 
resistance against neo-liberalism as a springboard for a durable organisational and 
electoral strengthening? 
 
Various interesting explanatory factors have been advanced in the French literature. 
The first factor refers to organisational shortcomings of the PCF. Mischi (2003b), for 
instance, has pointed out that "the actual rupture occurs when the party loses its 
primacy within the communist universe". The loss of the sense of a historic mission, of 
clear identitarian references and of internal discipline leads to a crisis of the 
communist institution, the progressive autonomisation of its components and an 
avalanche effect on its organisational strength. This process, however, seems rather 
more a consequence of unavoidable external pressures – the defeat of the Western 
labour movement since the late 1970s, the general shift toward what Jacques Ion 
(1997) has defined as "distanced activism", the crisis and fall of the Soviet bloc – than 
the fruit of precise subjective responsibilities. The party leadership put up much 
resistance against these trends up to the 1990s and progressively embraced them only 
when it felt that there was no alternative to them. If the reforms of Robert Hue are 
likely to have accelerated the loss of members and cohesion, they initially succeeded in 
stalling the loss of electoral and institutional influence.  
The second factor has been identified in the fragmentation of the radical left. The 
failure of the various parties to agree on a common candidate in the 2007 presidential 
election has been particularly criticised (Khalfa, 2007; Artous & Kouvelakis, 2007; 
Kouvelakis, 2007). The hypothesis is suggestive and has been lent some confirmation 
by the outcome of the 2012 presidential election, when unity produced a dynamic 
campaign and good results. The context of 2007 however, marked as it was by a 
powerful centripetal realignment of the left electorate toward the moderate candidate 
most likely to defeat the right (the socialist Ségolène Royal or even the centrist 
François Bayrou), was unlikely to reward a joint radical left candidature more than it 
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did several smaller ones. More generally, across the period 1990-2012 organisational 
fragmentation has of course reduced the societal weight of each individual party but 
has instead rather tended to increase their total weight, catering for partially different 
constituencies and complementing their strengths and weaknesses. The existence of 
an anti-systemic far left in the period 1993-2002, for instance, compensated for the 
decline of the PCF which would have otherwise dragged down the voting results of the 
whole area. On the contrary, a regroupment of the radical left on intransigent bases 
would have largely wiped out its local and perhaps national parliamentary 
representation, which was instead safeguarded by the politics of alliances of the 
PCF.200  
The third factor refers to the incapacity of the parties to rapidly and adequately adapt 
to the changes in the political conjuncture. Kouvelakis (2007: 229-252), for instance, 
correctly reproaches the far left for its rigidity, arguing that its relative decline in 2002-
2007 (compared with 1998-2000) was partially due to its failure to adapt to the shift 
from an "anti-political" to a "political" sequence and its insistence on a rather sectarian 
posture which ignored the wide-spread desire to defeat the right. At another level, the 
continuous zigzags of the PCF from conciliatory to intransigent attitudes toward the 
socialist party proved to be too flexible: the choice of direct governmental 
participation (1981-1984, 1997-2002) left it exposed to the full brunt of the 
disillusionment of its electorate while the constant shifts played an important role in 
the above-mentioned crisis of the communist identity, sowing a deep confusion among 
its ranks; the party thus ended up losing support both on its right and on its left.  
 
My analysis has put forward a partially different explanation.  
On the one hand, the loss of cohesion, organisational fragmentation and tactical 
troubles appear as intrinsic and largely unavoidable consequences of the objectively 
contradictory position of the radical left in the neo-liberal era. Radical leaders, 
activists, voters and potential supporters all grapple with the tensions produced by a 
dilemma of difficult resolution: that between anti-neoliberal coherence and desire for 
                                                     
200
 The regional elections are a good example of this. Since 2003 non-aligned lists can pass to the second 
round and obtain parliamentary representation only if they overcome a 10%-threshold: this was a 
realistic possibility for the radical left in less than half of the metropolitan regions. On the contrary, in 
2004 the alliance with the PS guaranteed to the PCF an over-proportional number of seas (10.7%).  
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left unity. Aggressive right-wing governments tend to revitalise and mobilise the left-
wing opinion but at the same time reactivate strong pressures toward an alliance; 
subsequent periods of left-wing alternation prove politically deceiving and thoroughly 
discredit the radical left forces which enabled them. Striking a rewarding balance 
between the two sides of the dilemma is extremely difficult, especially in contexts 
when the radical left support becomes crucial for the formation of a centre-left 
electoral or parliamentary majority. In these cases, a very likely outcome is thus 
cyclical electoral oscillations and a fragmentation in rival sensibilities and 
organisations.  
On the other hand, the disarray caused by the exhaustion of the models of the 20th 
century workers' movement has not yet been superseded by viable new ones. Soviet-
style state socialism was thoroughly discredited; the traditional state-based reformism 
of Western social-democratic and communist parties gradually morphed into a 
counter-reformism fully at ease with free-market financialised capitalism; the kind of 
workplace radicalism typical of the 1960s and 1970s was less and less capable to win 
material improvements and to counteract the fragmentation, precarisation and 
disorganisation of the workforce. In this context, the parties of the radical left were to 
some extent successful in repositioning themselves as champions of the welfare state 
but failed to develop a convincing long-term political vision and effective modalities of 
extra-parliamentary intervention. 
France did not deviate significantly from the Western European norm. Anti-neoliberal 
dissatisfaction and extra-parliamentary mobilisation did at times fuel significant 
electoral surges (1992-1995, 2007-2009), but these proved to be short-lived; electoral 




5.4 Explaining fragmentation and regroupment 
 
 
The progressive organisational fragmentation described in section 5.2.2 can be traced 
back to the interplay of three main factors: (i) a strategic differentiation along 
intransigent or conciliatory lines; (ii) the institutional impact of the political system; (iii) 
a question of political and organisational identities. 
 
The first point relates to the key dilemma of the contemporary French radical left: the 
difficult relation with the Socialist Party, electorally weak but absolutely predominant 
within the left spectrum (second rounds of elections, parliamentary weight and 
governmental weight). 
From the 1970s to the early 1990s the whole radical left lost very large sections of its 
constituency to the PS which, despite its increasingly moderate course, continued to 
exert an incredible pull on the former.201 Overall fragmentation did not increase much 
as a result, as the successive splits of dissident communist tendencies were short-lived 
and generally ended up merging with the PS or other moderate left parties (Greens, 
MDC). 
From 1997 to 2002, on the contrary, the experience of the Jospin government (1997-
2002) led to a collapse of its reputation among radical left circles and progressively 
hardened the differentiation between intransigent and conciliatory tendencies. The 
ensuing collapse of the PCF did not benefit the far left in terms of membership but 
fuelled its unexpected and powerful electoral surge and was the main reason behind 
the sinking of Hue's project of an enlarged "new communist party" (1999-2002). 
After 2002, finally, the appeal of the socialist party on the left remained low; not so the 
pressure toward some form of collaboration, either simply to defeat the right or in the 
hope of exerting a more long-term pull on its policy course. As a consequence, the 
differences between the various radical left forces (PCF, LO, LCR) remained 
                                                     
201
 Among the many prominent leaders and cadres who left for the PS the following must be mentioned: 
from the PCF Henri Fiszbin (1986) and Charles Fiterman (1998); from the LCR Julien Dray (1981), Henri 
Weber (1986) and Gérard Filoche (1994); from the OCI Lionel Jospin (1970s), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (1976) 
and Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (1986).   
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irreconcilable and led to the failure of both the LO-LCR alliance (2003-2004) and the 
debates on a common presidential candidature in 2006-2007. 
 
The second point relates to the role of the (electoral, financial, etc.) rules and 
regulations of the political system in providing positive and negative incentives to 
fragmentation or in artificially neutralising it. The effects have not been uniform. 
The permissive 1993 reform of party financing has helped the proliferation of 
organisations alternative to the PCF, providing them with a reasonably accessible influx 
of resources.202 
The working of electoral legislation has on the contrary made very difficult to the same 
organisations the access to parliamentary representation.203 
Finally, the impact of electoral legislation on candidatures and electoral results varied 
according to the specific rules of each kind of election. The extraordinary tribune 
offered by the presidential election has encouraged a proliferation of competing 
radical left candidates, despite the high formal barriers.204 The medium-level electoral 
thresholds of European and regional elections have on the contrary tended to promote 
the establishment of alliances.205 Finally, the two-round majoritarian system of both 
presidential and legislative elections has generally not discouraged electoral 
fragmentation, as it enabled the electoral shift of socialist voters toward the radical 
left and of communist voters toward the far left in the first round (e.g. Tiberj, 2004). 
This was an effective means to nudge their parties to change their policies ("vote 
d'influence") without running the risk of compromising the overall result of the second 
                                                     
202
 Between 1993 and 2008 four groups have managed to regularly access state financing: LO, LCR/NPA, 
PT and SEGA (a technical regroupment of the eco-socialist milieu). 
203
 Access to national parliament has been virtually precluded to any minor radical left organisation, with 
the exception of dissident MPs seeking to retain their seat. Successful examples of the latter are 
provided by the former communists Jean-Pierre Brard (CAP), Maxime Gremetz (orthodox), François 
Asensi (FASE) and Jacqueline Fraysse (FASE), by the former socialist Marc Dolez (PG) and by the former 
MDC Jacques Desallangre (ind. then PG). Access to sub-national and supra-national assemblies was rare 
but not impossible (e.g. LO and LCR between 1998 and 2004).  
204
 Candidates need to gather signatures of support (parrainages) by existing elected representatives: 50 
(1958), 100 (1965), 500 (1981). The bar seems to be a high one for extra-parliamentary organisations 
(the total number of possible signatories is about 42,000) but has been de facto lowered by the 
willingness of local politicians to offer their signature to parties they do not belong to out of democratic 
or strategic reasons. The number of radical left presidential candidates has thus oscillated from a 
minimum of 2-3 (1981, 1995, 2012) to four (1988 and 2002) and five (2007). 
205
 E.g. between LO and LCR (1999, 2004) or the FdG lists (2009, 2010). 
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round; as soon as it produced the unintended consequence of the April 2002 
presidential election, however, this pattern swiftly and permanently reversed.  
 
The third point, finally, relates to the attainment of a common identity or at least a 
mutually acceptable compromise between the various political cultures and organised 
tendencies of the radical left. 
Although the project of a regroupment of the radical left on pluralist and anti-
neoliberal bases was implemented with some success only after 2009, many of its 
preconditions were present since the mid-1990s. In particular, the turn of Robert Hue's 
PCF away from monolithism and hegemonic predilections and toward a practice of 
external collaborations offered a promised path for a recomposition of the radical left. 
A series of obstacles, however, persistently prevented its realisation. Firstly, as I have 
shown above, the fundamental disagreements on the relationship with the moderate 
left could not be easily wished away in a period when the PCF resolutely turned toward 
a strategy of generalised electoral and governmental alliances with the socialist party. 
Secondly, the long-standing contrasts between different political cultures (Trotksyism, 
anti-capitalism, communism, socialism, ecologism) could in principle coexist under a 
common roof, as the experiences of other countries and of the Left Front prove, but 
were a source of friction. Thirdly, organisational jealousies on the sharing of power and 
resources remained difficult to assuage. In particular, the question of who was to 
embody the radical left in presidential elections was the single most important factor 
behind the failure of the 2005-2007 talks, and the regroupment operated by the Left 
Front in 2009-2012 became possible only when an enfeebled PCF became ready to 
hand over the position of presidential candidate to a non-communist.  
 
The post-2009 regroupment process had its objective bases in the obvious overlapping 
of the anti-neoliberal programmatic of the different parties and in the unprecedented 
weakness of PCF and of the French radical left in its entirety during the period 2003-
2007. Its partial success lies in the ability of the FdG to make the best out of the three 
above-mentioned factors.  
On the first level, the Mélenchon presidential candidature was effective in neutralising 
centrifugal pressures on strategic issues by simultaneously insisting on a clear political 
differentiation vis-à-vis the socialists and on left unity against the right. On the second 
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level, the rival project of the New Anticapitalist Party was out-manoeuvred in 2009-
2010 at the crucial level of the achievement of parliamentary representation.206 On the 
third level, the form of a pluralist front headed by a non-communist and giving equal 
footing to all member-organisations quickly downplayed the concerns of ideological 
and organisational identity and emphasised the benefits of cooperation. 
Both the strategic and the identitarian dilemmas are however merely assuaged and 
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 The NPA narrowly missed access to the European Parliament in 2009 (4.88%). The 2010 regional 
elections further confirmed that far left currents could hope to gain representation only through 
alliances with the PCF. These led to 7 GU and 2 NPA councillors; independent NPA and LO lists, on the 
contrary, obtained no representation. 
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5.5 The strategy of left-ward pull 
 
 
The analysis of section 5.3 has shown how the French radical left failed to significantly 
expand on the back of widespread dissatisfaction and resistance against neo-
liberalism. However, its extra-parliamentary and electoral support (legislative elections 
excepted) remained significant and in a high range for Western European standards. 
What were the results of its efforts to exert a left-ward pull on the political system? 
 
The record was altogether poor. 
The policy course of the Socialist Party seems to have been only marginally affected by 
the pressure coming from its left. The PS progressively adopted a neo-liberal economic 
policy centred on privatisations and liberalisations, an open economy and EU (trade, 
fiscal, legal) constraints but sought to accompany it with a preservation or expansion 
of public employment, state expenditures, basic welfare provisions and safety nets 
(e.g. minimum wage, minimum income, 35-hour working week); until recently, it also 
refrained from major pension and employment reforms. Lionel Jospin (1999) famously 
synthesised this approach as an embrace of the "market economy" but a rejection of 
the "market society" – a distinction more rhetorical than practical (Bergounioux & 
Grunberg, 2007; Grunberg, 2011) but not entirely devoid of empirical validity. The 
radical left can certainly claim no credit for obstructing the conversion of the socialist 
party toward the free market: its turn to privatisations happened precisely in the years 
when the communist party was its allied in power (1997-2002). The "progressive" 
measures of socialist governments, on the other hand, seem to have been 
autonomously conceived to lubricate and accompany the neo-liberal transition (Vail, 
2010) rather than as a response of any left-wing mobilisation.  
The effects on governmental policies were clearer to see. The contribution of the 
radical left to the successive waves of mass extra-parliamentary struggles which rocked 
the country since 1986 was generally minoritarian but nevertheless important. These 
mobilisations were often successful in forcing right-wing governments to retreat 
unpopular policies (the general movements of 1994, 1996 and 2006) or in obtaining 
specific material concessions for specific professional or social categories (civil 
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servants, students, the unemployed, the population of the French Antilles). They had 
however very precise limitations. Firstly, left-wing contentious politics flared up in 
periods of centre-right domination but tended to evaporate when the left was in 
power. Secondly, the failures became more and more frequent, despite the very large 
size of supporting strikes and demonstrations (2003, 2009 and 2010). Thirdly, they 
retained a generally defensive character, largely bypassed private sector workers and 
had little impact on organisational consolidation (i.e. the institutionalisation of social 
movement networks or membership growth of trade unions and other organisations).  
The radical left also played an important role in the outcome of referendums on EU 
matters: the no option lost by a hair's breadth on the 1992 referendum on the 
Maastricht treaty (49.0%) and actually won on the 2005 referendum on the proposed 
European constitution (54.7%). These manifestations of dissent, however, did not 
affect the overall process of European integration in any noticeable way. 
The effects on non-governmental actors, finally, were also rather modest. The balance 
of power within private sector workplaces, in particular, solidly in the hands of owners 
and managers and organising and mobilising efforts failed to put a brake to ongoing 
negative tendencies (wage stagnation, precarisation, industrial dismissals and union 
density).   
 
This failure to exert a left-ward pull on French politics and society was common to all 
parties (PCF and the far left) and strategies (conciliatory and intransigent). Three 
explanations are possible. 
Firstly, the outcome may simply derive from an insufficient level of electoral, 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures. As I have shown in section 5.2.1, the 
societal weight of the French radical left was fairly high by Western European 
standards but always remained of a middling size. Despite short-lived spikes, it 
followed a long-term constant or declining trend and it never came close to threaten 
the dominant position of the socialist party within the left-of-the-centre political 
spectrum. Moreover, it was increasingly divided between competing organisations 
which not always reached some form of unity in action.  
Secondly, the problem may instead lie in the wrong kind of tactics. At the electoral 
level, support to socialist candidates in the second round has rarely been explicitly 
linked to clear policy conditionalities. Since the disaster of the 1958 legislative 
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elections left parties, including the far left, have generally stuck to the deeply-
ingrained precepts of "republican discipline" (discipline républicaine), providing for 
stand-down agreements (désistements) and the convergence of all votes on the best-
placed left candidate; in some cases, especially at the sub-national level, this basic 
form of cooperation has been upgraded to more solid agreements on common left 
candidates from the first round. Only Lutte Ouvrière (after 1981) has normally turned 
away from this custom and refused to call for a left vote in the second round. Both 
tactics, however, left the socialist candidates free from the need to commit to policy 
concessions to their left.207 At the parliamentary level, the PCF was wary to push its 
bargaining with seating socialist governments to the point of threatening to topple 
them. The communists were decisive for the survival of the centre-left on two 
occasions: 1988-1993 and 1997-2002; the party threatened to support a no-confidence 
motion twice, in 1990 and 1992, but failed both to win significant concessions and to 
force a cabinet reshuffle or new elections. The key problem in adopting this set of 
more aggressive tactics was the fact that they risked to prove double-edged swords, 
running against the wide-spread desire of left unity against the right and leading to a 
punishment in the ballot box. 
Thirdly, the incapacity of the radical left to assume a leading role within workplaces 
and civil society organisations and to devise effective methods of mobilisation may 
also be one of the culprits. The radical left enjoyed more credit among sympathisers of 
the left-leaning trade unions than that among the general population, at times higher 
than that of the PS;208 this notwithstanding, it was generally isolated within the unions' 
top decision-making instances and unable to carry on the fight against their will (2003 
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 Conditional agreements were on the other hand sometimes offered by the far left to the PCF, for 
instance, by LO for the 1988 and 1997 legislative elections (LO, 1988 and 1996c) and by the LCR in the 
framework of possible processes of radical left regroupment; they were usually ignored.  
208
 In the period 1995-2012, voting intentions for radical left candidates were 37.0% within Solidaires, 





The French national context was to a large extent not dissimilar to the German and 
Italian ones. Common features were: the downturn of the militancy, organisation and 
effectiveness of the labour movement begun in the late 1970s and its consequences in 
terms of the socio-economic and political-ideological balance of forces; the moves 
toward a neo-liberal restructuring of state and society such as the privatisation of the 
state-owned sector and reforms of welfare provisions and labour protection; the 
progressive right-ward shift of social democratic parties; the crisis and final collapse of 
the Eastern bloc and the need to redefine a credible and appealing vision of a post-
capitalist future.  
Some key differences were however evident. Firstly, in France left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilisation has remained since the late 1980s at fairly high levels, with 
a constant background of localised movements by wage-workers, the youth and other 
social subjects and cyclical eruptions of mass conflicts (1994-1995, 2003, 2005-2006, 
2009-2010). Secondly, a strong popular suspicion and resistance to neo-liberalism has 
determined a much slower and incomplete pace of the process of neo-liberalisation: if 
the state-owned sector has been largely (but not completely) dismantled, pension and 
labour reforms have been less incisive than elsewhere and welfare provisions, state 
expenditure and state employment have remained stable or even expanded. Thirdly, a 
comparatively successful record in macro- and micro-economic terms has favoured a 
feeble but not negligible growth of real wages (contrary to the wage stagnation in Italy 
and Germany), although unemployment rates have remained high.  
 
Although the shock of the years 1989-1992 did not represent the sudden 
organisational break experienced in other countries, it accelerated a process of 
progressive change of the radical left away from the 20th century models to new 
features and characteristics. The main trend directions, consistent with the general 
Western European trends, can be schematised as follows. 
Ideologically, the parties moved from traditional communist references to a vaguer 
"left" identity and from long-term anti-capitalist goals to a more concrete anti-
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neoliberal programmatic. Sociologically, the barycentre of their constituency shifted 
from the lower-middle strata of the salaried population (e.g. industrial and agricultural 
workers) to a more composite mix of ordinary wage-workers, highly educated strata 
and inactives. Organisationally, the mass party (PCF) and avant-garde party (LO, LCR) 
models morphed into light organisation with a predominantly electoral focus. 
Strategically, the dilemma of the relationship with the moderate left became the 
centre of the inter- and intra-party debate and led to periodic oscillations, lacerations 
and an overall growth of fragmentation. 
The transition remains to this day incomplete and open-ended: stark discontinuities 
are counterbalanced by the legacies of the past; the old ways are increasingly sidelined 
but their replacements are unstable and incoherent.  
 
This turbulence was largely the symptom and attempted response to two key 
challenges: (i) arresting or compensating for the collapse of the communist subculture; 
(ii) exploiting the political vacuum created by the accommodation of mainstream 
parties to neo-liberalism as a springboard for a recovery of societal weight and political 
influence. 
The balance sheet of more than two decades of activity is mixed. On the one hand, the 
radical left managed to remain a vital and medium-sized political area and preserved 
an important role at all levels of French politics and society. On the other hand, it failed 
to embark on a stable path of electoral and organisational growth and to dent the 
supremacy of the socialist party within the left-of-the-centre spectrum. Instead, the 
bouts of expansion ignited by mass dissatisfaction and resistance against the proposed 
neo-liberal reforms of the right (1993-1997 and 2009-2012) remained of limited 
magnitude and were followed by periods of stagnation (1997-2002) or relative 
weakness (2002-2008). As it was, the vacuum to the left of the socialist party proved 
much more difficult to fill than expected. 
 
The inability to overcome certain maximum ceilings (13.8% of valid votes; the 
interruption of membership decline; a consolidation of the presence within civil 
society and social movement organisations) may be attributed to subjective mistakes: 
the overly conciliatory course of the PCF during the term of the Jospin government 
(1997-2002); the overly sectarian attitude of the far left organisations at the peak of 
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their electoral influence (LO-LCR in 2002-2004; NPA in 2009-2012); the failure to carry 
out an early process of regroupment (2005-2007). From my perspective, however, 
these problems are largely a reflection of objective constraints.  
Firstly, the radical left space occupies a structurally contradictory position, torn as it is 
between the necessities of anti-neoliberal coherence and those of anti-right unity. The 
former undermines any conciliatory strategy of long-term left alliances while the latter 
frustrated the formation of a fully autonomous pole.209 This is the material foundation 
of most predicaments of the contemporary radical left, from its cyclical electoral 
development to its growing organisational fragmentation.  
Secondly, the socialist party shows a continued ability to neutralise the threat on its 
left through a variety of political and technical mechanisms: a periodic renewal 
through opposition; the exploitation of its pivotal position within the left camp and of 
the two-round electoral system; the cooptation of junior partners of moderate left or 
radical left origin and of extra-parliamentary social movements; the attraction of non-
attached voters on grounds of enabling the success and stability of movements of 
political alternation. 
    
Like its German and Italian counterparts, the French radical left has so far failed to find 
a way out of these conundrums. It has thus become a thermometer of the 







                                                     
209
 Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003) are thus correct in describing the French political system as 
fundamentally tripartite: left, centre-right and far right. 
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CHAPTER SIX. CROSS-COUNTRY 
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION: 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS. 
 
 
This concluding chapter will draw together the findings and implications of my analysis.  
In section 6.1 I will show how this thesis contributes to illuminate the questions on the 
meaning of the Western European radical left emerging from the existing scholarly 
literature. In section 6.2 I will expand on the political nature of the contemporary 
radical left. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 will be devoted to charting the evolution of the 
various dimensions of societal weight (electoral, institutional and organisational) of this 
political area and to a discussion of their reasons and consequences. In section 6.6 I 
will explain the contradictory tendencies toward regroupment and fragmentation. In 
section 6.7 I will assess the failure of the radical left to exert a significant influence on 
Western European politics and society. In section 6.8, finally, I will provide some 




6.1 The meaning of the contemporary radical left. 
Incoherent adaptation, revival of left reformism or a 
socialism for the 21st century? 
 
 
In the initial literature review and throughout the three national chapters I have shown 
that no consensus has so far emerged within the scholarly community on the 
fundamental nature of the contemporary radical left. Three main questions have 
proven particularly divisive. 
 
The first question refers to the coherence or lack thereof of the contemporary radical 
left and the possibility to understand it as a party family. 
On the one hand, many early analyses have tended to emphasise the predominance of 
an incoherent process of disintegration of the Western European communist party 
family, as each party transformed at a different pace and in a different direction. Bell 
(1992) and Bull (1994 and 1995) proclaimed the end of the 20th century communist 
movement: after 1989 the parties followed divergent paths of adaptation 
(traditionalism, reform or rupture with the communist tradition) and what was left was 
too inhomogeneous to be encompassed by a single analytical category. Botella and 
Ramiro (2003b) and Marantzidis (2003) substantially concurred with this analysis and 
insisted on the fragmentation of the radical left landscape and on the partial or total 
reconversion of former communist parties to other political traditions. The former 
pointed to four outcomes: a more or less orthodox preservation of a communist 
identity; the transformation into social democratic, green or non-communist leftist 
parties. The latter identified four slightly different groupings: Marxists-Leninists, 
"disillusioned social-democrats", social-democratised and post-materialists.  
On the other hand, most recent surveys have insisted that the contemporary radical 
left, once the dust of abandonments (e.g. the Italian PCI and the Dutch CPN) or 
extinctions (e.g. the British CPGB) settled down, has retained a minimal level of 
coherence: the rejection of capitalism and neo-liberalism; an effort to offer a political 
representation to the working-class and the workers' movement; an anti-neoliberal 
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programmatic merging the defence of the welfare state with left-libertarian themes. 
Nevertheless, the tendency toward convergence was seen as uneven and not 
preventing the existence of a great diversity and fragmentation. March and Mudde 
(2005) identified four sub-groupings: communist, green and new politics, democratic 
socialist and social-populist parties. March (2011) further refined the distinction in ten 
sub-categories: conservative communists, reform communists, democratic socialists, 
populist socialists and social populist parties, each of them split into "radical left" and 
"extreme left" parties. De Waele and Vieira (2012) and Ducange et al. (2013) focused 
on the differences between communist, red-green and left social democratic parties. 
Hildebrandt (2010), finally, singled out two main currents: democratic socialists and 
communists.     
My analysis has demonstrated that, contrary to the first group of authors, the 
contemporary radical left can indeed be understood as a unitary party family. All 
parties, whatever their historical tradition and present sensibilities, share largely 
similar fundamental features: some form of critique of capitalism; an anti-neoliberal 
mid-term programme; the fusion of "old left" and "new left" themes and social 
constituencies; an ideal and concrete link with the workers' movement and other left-
libertarian social movements; an unresolved relationship with the moderate left; an 
electoral behaviour intimately connected with disaffection toward social democracy 
and the political system. Contrary to the second group of authors, however, I have 
shown that the attempts to devise stable ideological sub-groupings are misguided. 
Common tendencies affect all parties while the main lines of differentiation operate 
not between but across parties. Under favourable conditions all radical left sensibilities 
can coexist under a common organisational framework, be it a unitary party (e.g. the 
Italian PRC or the German PDS/DIE LINKE) or a looser alliance (e.g. the French FdG). 
Under unfavourable conditions, instead, the radical left tends to explode into rival 
fragments. Neither broad left parties nor competing organisations, however, can ever 
fully escape the overall tendencies and tensions of the radical left space, thus 
continuously oscillating between anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism and between 





The second question refers to the deeper meaning of the radical left project. At least 
three basic positions can be identified here.  
The first possibility is to understand the post-1989 evolution of the radical left as a 
transition from anti-capitalism to social democracy ("social democratisation") based on 
a fundamental discontinuity with the past. Most scholars recognise an element of 
truth in this argument, although they rarely push it to its extreme consequences. The 
concept has been applied with reference to both the overall Western European 
context (Marantzidis, 2004; March, 2008)210 and to specific national parties (Arter, 
2002; Fülberth, 2008)211.  
The second option is to identify the radical left as "left reformist" while insisting that it 
was already so in the past (Callinicos, 1999, 2008 and 2012; Rees, 2001; Blackledge, 
2013). "Reformist consciousness" always had more and less radical variants and 
incarnated in a variety of parties: the crisis of Stalinism and the disaffection toward 
social democracy led in part to the growth of revolutionary forces but predominantly 
to a revival of new kinds of reformism, sometimes within traditional working-class 
parties but increasingly outside of them.  
The third choice is to claim that the radical left has retained a fundamental continuity 
in its "anti-capitalist" goals, although the contours of the socialist project and the 
conditions of its action were rethought and adapted to a changed external 
environment. For some authors we deal here with a case of a wolf in sheep's clothing 
(Backes & Moreau, 2008). Others insist on the fact that the long-term vision, albeit 
generally vague, remains one of an alternative to capitalism (Hudson, 2000 and 2012; 
March & Mudde, 2005; Seiler, 2012; Marlière, 2013). Finally, Kouvelakis (2007: 289-
294) has argued that while tensions between anti-neoliberalism and anti-capitalism do 
exist, the general adoption of the former by radical left parties does not necessarily 
involve a reformist outcome: in the present conjuncture, any coherent anti-neoliberal 
                                                     
210
 Marantzidis (2004:172) states that "despite the appearance of a grand variety of choices at the end 
of the 1980s, the communist and post-communist parties seem to orient themselves toward social 
democracy". March (2008: 1) claims that "the far left is becoming the principal challenge to mainstream 
social democratic parties, in large part because its main parties are no longer extreme, but present 
themselves as defending the values and policies that social democrats have allegedly abandoned".  
211
 Arter (2002:233) suggests that "the first decade [after 1989] has witnessed an attempted social-
democratisation of the post-communist parties in Finland and Sweden [...] the potential in this appeal lay 
in the fact [...] of a neo-liberalisation of the ruling Social Democrats [...]". Fülberth (2008: 162) argues 
that "[DIE LINKE] is the second (neo-)socialdemocratic party of a capitalist German society".  
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approach inevitably leads to large-scale class confrontations and to the actuality of a 
break with capitalism.  
My analysis shows that the use of the term "social democratisation" is doubly 
misleading. On the one hand, the assimilation of the programmatic vision of the radical 
left to a mere take-over of social democratic themes ignores the fact that its socio-
economic demands are often the legacy of a specifically communist form of reformism 
and that its non-economic demands rather derive from the "new left" and 
movementist thinking of the post-1968 period. On the other hand, the ideological 
rapprochement of the radical left with traditional social democratic policies was not 
matched by a recreation of the key organisational features of the "narrow" definition 
of social democracy (Moschonas, 2002: 15-22): in particular, an interpenetration of 
parties with the workers' movement and with a mass working-class sub-culture. The 
gains of the contemporary radical left, when they occurred, were exclusively electoral 
in nature and never managed to revert the tendency to a steep decline of the 
(communist or social democratic) mass party model.  
The controversy between reformist and anti-capitalist characterisations, on the 
contrary, remains somewhat open and conditioned by the specific interplay of 
historical traditions, environmental constraints and subjective developments in each 
country and period. Firstly, while a growing number of radical left forces indeed lack 
any reference to Marxism and to a post-capitalist future, in many cases this was 
actually the outcome of a radicalisation of traditional social democratic tendencies 
(e.g. the German WASG, the French PG) or of newly-politicised layers (e.g. the youth of 
the alter-globalist and anti-crisis movements); the demands and attitudes of these 
currents were generally to the left of those of traditional communist parties and an 
actual implementation of their vision might have led to a kind of dynamic similar to the 
one suggested above by Kouvelakis. Secondly, forces which explicitly call for an 
overcoming of capitalism remain strong both outside and within the pragmatic radical 
left parties (e.g. DIE LINKE, PRC and PCF) and moves to completely abandon any anti-
capitalist perspective are rare and tend to lead to a quick exit from the party family 
(e.g. the experience of the Dutch GL or the Italian PDS and more recently SEL). Thirdly, 
however, the fact that none of the contemporary radical left parties has so far 
developed a credible vision of a post-capitalist society and of the path toward it does 
not bode well for their future development. Renewed (non-Stalinist) Leninist 
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blueprints (Bensaïd, 2007; Post, 2013) remain marginal and controversial even among 
the most radical currents. "Movementist" strategies based on the linear growth of 
extra-parliamentary mobilisations and counter-powers (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 
Holloway, 2003) have failed to devise effective new methods to consolidate the 
movements and win significant reforms, let alone to point to a transcendence of 
capitalism: all major mobilisation cycles of the period (the workers' struggles of 1992-
1995, the alter-globalist movement of 1999-2004 and the anti-crisis protests of 2009-
2012) were of an eminently defensive character, failed to institutionalise themselves in 
permanent counter-hegemonic organisations and ultimately reverted to electoral 
politics and centre-left alliances as a "lesser-evil" trench helping to weather the storm. 
The partisan radical left, finally, has attempted to play the role of a left-wing counter-
weight and correction to the mainstream moderate left – depending on the 
circumstances, institutional or movementist and conciliatory or intransigent – but has 
not succeeded in designing a successful way to either political power or policy 
attainment. 
Altogether, the case for the contemporary radical left as a vehicle of the "socialism for 
the 21st century" (Hudson, 2012) seems at present not supported by the German, 
Italian and French experiences. On the contrary, this political area certainly appears to 
be an electoral thermometer of the dissatisfaction toward neo-liberalism and of the 
crisis of the 20th century workers' movement in its social democratic, communist and 
far left variants; it has however not (yet?) found a solution either to the renewal of 
working-class politics or to the emergence of new forms of democratic radicalism.   
 
The third question refers to the entity of the electoral success of the contemporary 
radical left. Initial accounts (Bell, 1993; Bull & Heywood, 1994) certified a swift decline 
of Western European communism and tended to forecast its inevitable extinction. 
Subsequent analyses (Moreau et al., 1998; Botella & Ramiro, 2003b; March & Mudde, 
2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008) underlined contradictory tendencies toward both 
decline and recovery and remained cautious on the overall direction of change. The 
most recent contributions (March, 2008 and 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Marlière, 
2013), on the contrary, stressed an uneven but significant recovery since the low point 
of the early 1990s. 
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The analysis I carried out in chapter two demonstrates that from 1993 to 1999 a strong 
recovery of the radical has indeed taken place across Western Europe; after that date, 
however, little progress has been made on the whole. Average results have steered a 
stagnating course between sudden surges and falls; national trajectories have become 
asynchronous; a stable or slightly growing electoral weight has often translated into a 
lower political influence (due to the growth of organisational fragmentation).  
The following figure (FIGURE 6.1) summarises the evolution of radical left parties in 
national legislative and European parliament elections in fifteen Western European 
countries. 
 
FIGURE 6.1 ELECTORAL EVOLUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT  
 
Source: my elaborations from official electoral data. 
Notes: 15 countries (EU15), rolling averages. Total shares of valid votes, unweighted national averages. National: legislative 
elections. EP: European Parliament elections. 
 
Three further important elements emerge from the analysis of the curves.  
Firstly, the extent of the recovery of the contemporary radical left tends to be over-
estimated by the tendency to look at simple averages (red lines and columns) instead 
of at total results (blue lines and columns). The growing gap between the two sets of 
results is due to the fact that the radical left has rather improved in medium-small 
countries (e.g. Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Portugal) and, with the 




Secondly, the strong link between the contemporary radical left and the alter-
globalisation movement asserted by many scholars (e.g. Callinicos, 2008 and 2012) 
appears largely imaginary from a global electoral perspective; on the contrary, the 
international mobilisations of the period 1999-2003 come across as ininfluent or 
negative diversions from the task of building solid national parties. 
Thirdly, the swings seem instead to be strongly correlated with social and political 
events at the national level. In particular, large-scale labour and anti-governmental 
mobilisations almost always result in gains while governmental participation unfailingly 
produces heavy losses. 
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6.2 Political nature: anti-neoliberal parties and 
troubled relationship with the moderate left 
 
The German, French and Italian case studies point to three key features that all the 
radical left parties share at least in part: a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme mixing 
working-class, welfarist and left-libertarian themes; a composite social constituency; a 
strategy of left-ward pull on the political system and more specifically on the moderate 
left parties. 
 
The first feature provided a common ideological framework to overcome the shock of 
the failures of the 20th century communist movement, to by-pass old debates, to 
regroup different organisations and sensibilities and to appeal to the discontents of 
the neo-liberal transition and of the right-ward shift of moderate left parties. 
The mid-term programmatic of the radical left tended to cover three types of issues: 
socio-economic demands (working and living conditions of the majority of wage-
workers, employment, welfare provisions and public services, inequality and 
redistribution between classes and geographical regions); a questioning of the existing 
model of economic development (formal ownership and effective control of the means 
of production, quantity and quality of economic growth, and its overall purpose and 
direction) and so-called left-libertarian issues (solidarity, peace, civil and democratic 
rights, minority rights, secularism and environmental protection).  
The area where the radical left was more effective was the defence of the social 
advances of the 1960s and 1970s which were being progressively abandoned by their 
original authors (social democratic, Christian democratic and left-liberal parties). 
Activity on the other two fronts was less rewarding, as the terrain of left-libertarian 
issues was already selectively covered by green and other mainstream parties while 
the appeal of a deeper critique of capitalism was dampened by a lack of clarity on the 
proposed alternatives. 212 
                                                     
212
 Both at a strictly political and at a broader intellectual level, the radical left was vocal in criticising the 
consequences of unbridled capitalism but remained more cautious and vague on the specific features of 
its proposed alternative: the role of nationalisations, the mechanisms of democratic and workers' 
control, participation to the Eurozone and to the European Union, growth vs. de-growth, the promotion 
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Important differences in the outlook of each radical left group lingered but their 
saliency steadily decreased over time. The fractures caused by diverging international 
allegiances lost much of their relevance with the collapse or adaptation of the regimes 
of really-existing state socialism. The obstacles provoked by authoritarian modes of 
organisations were removed by the adoption by of a democratic, pluralist and "broad 
party" approach by all communist parties. The tension between the pursuit of reforms 
within the boundaries of capitalism and the advocacy of an anti-capitalist rupture 
appeared largely academic at a time where class struggles had an entirely defensive 
character and the daily activity of all tendencies was focused on the mere defence of 
the existing regimes of social protection. Finally, the debates on the precise features of 
a post-capitalist transformation suffered the same fate, as the feasibility of such a 
transition seemed to be put off to a very distant and uncertain future. All these 
reasons concurred to favour the collaboration and mixing of forces of different origin 
(orthodox and dissident communists, left-wing socialists, social movement activists, 
newly-politicised strata, Marxists and non-Marxists) in a new kind of anti-neoliberal 
radical left. 
A symptom of this shift was the progressive downplaying of traditional identitarian 
references and the adoption of broader and inclusive ones213. 
 
The evolution of the class composition of the German, French and Italian radical left is 
summarised in the following table (TABLE 6.2).  
Their electorate retained a significant working-class class bias. Employed and 
unemployed wage workers – in particular blue-collar workers and the unemployed – 
were somewhat over-represented (with an index of 133 in France, 126 in Italy and 113 
in Germany); employers and self-employers strongly under-represented. The total 
share of the working class (Germany, 62.4%; France, 57.3%; Italy, 48.4%) remained 
virtually unchanged compared to the pre-1989 figures; what changed was the relative 
                                                                                                                                                           
of large vs. small enterprises, the identification of strategic sectors and products, the repudiation of 
public debt, and so on. This ambiguity ensured that in the early 1990s, despite their veto power as vital 
partners of centre-left governmental majorities, both the Italian PRC/PdCI and the French PCF actually 
enabled the adoption of the common European currency and the dismantlement of the state-owned 
sector in exchange for small redistributive concessions. 
213
 For instance, through the rebranding with a non-communist and generic "left" label: Left Party (2005) 
and The Left (2007) in Germany; Left Front (2008) in France; Rainbow Left (2008), Left Ecology Freedom 
(2008) and Federation of the Left (2009) in Italy.  
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weight of each component, with a decline of blue-collar workers and a growth of 
white-collar and unemployed ones. 
Their membership, on the contrary, testifies to a significant loosening of the historic 
links of the parties with the history of the socialist workers' movement. The German 
SED, the French PCF and the Italian PCI, despite profound differences, had 
unquestionable working-class roots: wage-workers and specifically (industrial and 
agricultural) blue-collar workers made up a majority of their membership; part of their 
organisation was structured along the workplace principle (workplace cells); cadres 
with a working-class background were schooled and promoted to significant leadership 
positions. Within their contemporary heirs, instead, active workers have become a 
sometimes small minority while the weight of groups with an ambiguous class position 
(pensioners, professionals, students and other inactives) has soared. 
  
TABLE 6.2 CLASS COMPOSITION 
 GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 










Average on...  4 elections  3 elections  4 elections 
WORKING-CLASS - 62.4% (113) 57.3% (140) 58.3% (133) 48.4% (122) 48.8% (126) 
EMPLOYED  - 50.4% (101) 49.9% (138) 50.7% (132) 44.7% (122) 39.7% (126) 
White-collar  - 29.6% (93) 25.1% (112) 32.8% (121) 10.7% (71) 20.1% (108) 
Blue-collar - 20.8% (116) 24.9% (180) 17.9% (158) 34.0% (158) 19.6% (153) 













Average on...  2 surveys    3 surveys 
WORKING-CLASS - 31.6% - - - 48.2% 
EMPLOYED  78.5% 25.1% 59.9% 43.7% 52.4% 40.3% 
White-collar  - 19.9% 27.8% 27.4% 11.1% 20.0% 
Blue-collar - 5.2% 32.1% 16.3% 41.3% 20.3% 
UNEMPLOYED - 6.5% - - - 7.8% 
Source: my elaboration from FGW, CDSP and ITANES survey data. 
Notes: share of each category over radical left totals; in brackets: index of over-representation compared to valid votes. 
 
Altogether, the social constituency of the radical left appears composite and little 
homogeneous. The lingering over-representation of the working-class thus seems to 
have changed its deeper meaning: not the heart of the parties' identity but one of the 
many components of a broader left-wing coalition based on a variety of political 
appeals (class, welfarism, secularism, left-libertarianism, regional political cultures).  
 
Finally, with the exception of the most extreme currents which expounded a strategy 
of anti-capitalist alternative, all major parties broadly agreed on a strategy of left-ward 
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pull aimed at gradually influencing the course of the moderate left through a 
combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, friendly and hostile pressures.  
The traditional differentiations of radical left parties over ideology, long-term goals, 
means, class composition and political culture were overshadowed by a different kind 
of problem, which became the veritable bone of contention of the period: the degree 
of intransigence to be adopted vis-à-vis the moderate left. Conciliatory voices declared 
the unavoidability of strategies of organic centre-left alliances, hoping to prevent even 
worse outcomes (a right-wing government) and to influence policies from the inside. 
Intransigent voices, on the contrary, tended to reject electoral and above all 
governmental coalitions on grounds of anti-neoliberal coherence. Most of the parties 










6.3. Electoral mobilisation: discordant trends, 
underlying reasons and the "vacuum thesis" 
 
6.3.1 Overall support 
 
The evolution of electoral weight of the German, French and Italian radical left is 
summarised below (TABLE 6.3 and FIGURE 6.4). 
 
Average levels were medium-small in Germany (6.32% of valid votes) and Italy (6.55%), 
medium in France (9.62% in legislative and 12.47% in presidential elections). 
 













PERIOD 1990-2013 1992-2013 1993-2012 1995-2012 1990-2013 1990-2013 
VOTES (n.)             
Average  2,916,005 2,451,164 2,465,564 3,916,947 1,851,846 1,064,159 
First 1,138,174 2,201,428 2,788,058 4,248,012 1,026,739 111,435 
Last 3,784,482 1,949,768 2,046,578 4,598,832 1,877,897 1,906,585 
Change 2,646,308 -251,660 -741,480 350,820 851,158 1,795,150 
Change % 232.50% -11.43% -26.59% 8.26% 82.90% 1610.94% 
% on valid votes       
Average  6.32 6.55 9.62 12.47 19.04 2.95 
First 2.45 5.61 10.96 13.94 9.95 0.31 
Last 8.65 5.73 7.89 12.82 21.37 5.46 
Change 6.20 0.12 -3.07 -1.12 11.42 5.15 
Change % 253.06% 2.14% -28.01% -8.03% 114.77% 1661.29% 
% on electorate       
Average  4.74 5.09 6.06 9.40 13.65 2.20 
First 1.88 4.64 7.15 10.62 7.40 0.24 
Last 6.11 4.16 4.44 9.99 14.34 3.90 
Change 4.23 -0.48 -2.71 -0.63 6.94 3.66 
Change % 225.00% -10.34% -37.90% -5.93% 93.78% 1525.00% 
Source: my elaborations from official national data. 
Notes: rolling averages; Italian data are slightly inflated by the 2008 and 2013 results. Germany east includes Berlin. 
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FIGURE 6.4 ELECTORAL WEIGHT 
 
Source: my elaborations from official national data. 
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes. 
 
The trends broadly conform to the general development of the West European radical 
left: collapse in the early Nineties, recovery in the mid-Nineties, nation-specific 
trajectories afterwards. Interestingly, values show a certain convergence toward 
central levels up to 2005-2007 but diverge again hereafter. The development is 
unquestionably positive only in Germany; in France and Italy is rather declining.   
In all three countries the radical left suffered a heavy initial blow from the dissolution 
of the international communist movement in 1989-1991. In Italy the Partito Comunista 
Italiano, which in 1987 still gathered 26.58% of valid votes, in 1991 decided to 
transform itself into a moderate social democratic organisation and defected from the 
party family, leaving behind a medium neo-communist party (PRC) formed by 
disparate communist dissidents and other leftists. In France the Parti communiste 
français experienced an early decline, plunging from 20.62% in 1978 to 9.50% in 1986. 
By that time further communist losses were generally compensated by the gains of 
other (far left and alternative) organisations. In Germany the landscape was marked by 
the 1990 re-unification: in the West the radical left had been and remained virtually 
non-existent, while in the East the collapse of the authoritarian socialist regime 
shattered the influence of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands but 




The period 1992-1998, on the contrary, led to a strong recovery in all three countries. 
The radical left was among the beneficiaries of the growing dissatisfaction and 
resistance toward neo-liberalism encapsulated by large strikes by public and private 
sector workers and massive anti-governmental demonstrations (1992-1993 and 1996-
1997 in Germany; 1995 in France; 1994 in Italy). 
Since 1998, finally, the evolution of the radical left was characterised by oscillating and 
highly nation-specific paths. In Germany it followed an altogether upward trajectory 
punctuated by temporary setbacks (2002 and 2013); its results grew from 5.12% 
(1998) to 8.65% (2013) and, crucially, included the unprecedented achievement of 
establishing a mid-sized electoral foothold in the Western regions of the country (from 
1.13% to 5.41%). In France, it declined strongly in legislative elections (average: 7.85%) 
and slightly in presidential ones (average: 11.87%). In Italy, a cyclical fluctuation until 
2006 was followed by a serious collapse afterwards. In all three cases the crucial 
obstacle which broke the previous upward movement was that of the relationship with 
the moderate left, with radical left parties paying dearly for both their governmental 
participation (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008) and the 
pressure of tactical anti-right voting (Italy in 1999-2001 and 2008; France since 2002; 
Germany in 2002 and 2013).     
 
 
6.3.2 Radical left voters 
 
Who were the voters of the radical left? The following table (TABLE 6.5) summarises 
the socio-demographic characteristics influencing positively or negatively a vote for 





TABLE 6.5 SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL FEATURES OF VOTERS 
 GERMANY 
1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
(legislative) 
ITALY 
1996, 2001, 2006 
 (legislative) 
FRANCE  
1995, 2002, 2007  
(presidential) 
GEOGRAPHY    
Positive Eastern regions  
Valid 20.8% - RL 65.6% - index 314  
Red area  
Valid 18.4% - RL 22.7% - index 123  
- 
Negative Western regions  
Valid 79.2% - RL 34.4% - index 43  
North-East  
Valid 12.1% - RL 8.3% - index 69  
- 
GENDER    
Positive - - - 
Negative - - - 
AGE    
Positive - <25 years old  
Valid 12.2% - RL 16.9% - index 138  
-  
Negative -  >64 years old  
Valid 16.1% - RL 10.2% - index 63  
>59 years old  
Valid 27.2% - RL 15.6% - index 57  
RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICE 
   
Positive Non religious 
Valid 27.0% - RL 61.2% - index 228  
Non-believers  
Valid 5.5% - RL 16.3% - index 295  
Non-practicing Catholics  
Valid 11.9% - RL 18.1% - index 152  
Non-believers  
Valid 24.9% - RL 42.4% - index 170  
Negative Catholics  
Valid 34.7% – RL 13.0% - index 37  
Protestants  
Valid 38.3% - RL 25.8% - index 68  
Practicing Catholics  
Valid 52.1% - RL 31.4% - index 60  
Practicing Catholics  
 Valid 10.9% - RL 4.2% - index 38 
Other religion  
Valid 5.4% - RL 4.2% - index 78 
Semi/non-practicing Catholics 
Valid 58.8% - RL 49.2% - index 83  
EDUCATION    
Positive -  University degree  
Valid 7.7% - RL 9.8% - index 128  
- 
Negative - - University degree 
Valid 24.4% - RL 20.0% - index 82  
PROFESSION    
Positive Unemployed  
Valid 4.7% - RL 11.9% - index 258  
Students  
Valid 7.9% - RL 12.0% - index 151  
Blue-collar workers  
Valid 13.6% - RL 19.8% - index 146 
  
Blue-collar workers  
Valid 11.4% - RL 18.1% - index 158  
Unemployed  
Valid 5.9% - RL 8.2% - index 140  
White-collar workers  
Valid 14.9% - RL 19.2% - index 129 
Negative Civil servant 
Valid 4.5% - RL 2.8% - index 61 
Self-employed  
Valid 7.2% - RL 4.8% - index 68 
Self-employed  
Valid 13.5% - RL 8.0% - index 59  
Self-employed  
Valid 4.6% - RL 1.6% - index 35  
Retired  
Valid 26.9% - RL 17.3% - index 64  
SELF-
POSITIONING 
   
Positive n.a. Left (1+2) 
Valid 20.3% - RL 73.7% - index 364  
Far left  
Valid 4.3% - RL 18.5% - index 426  
Left  
Valid 33.9% - RL 52.4% - index 155  
Negative n.a. Centre (5+6) 
Valid 17.8% - RL 4.6% - index 26  
Centre-right (7+8)  
Valid 23.2% - RL 1.6% - index 7  
Right (9+10) 
Valid 12.4% - RL 0.6% - index 5  
Centre  
Valid 22.0% - RL 13.8% - index 63  
Right  
Valid 29.9% - RL 4.9% - index 16  
Far right  
Valid 3.2% - RL 0.2% - index 7  
Source: my elaborations from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006), CDSP (1995, 2002, 2007) and FGW (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009). 
Notes: Valid: average weight of the category among valid votes. RL: average weight of the category among radical left voters. 
Index: average ratio of overrepresentation of the radical left in the said category. Only categories showing at least +/- 9% variation 




Only two factors had a strong and unambiguous effect in all three countries: ideology 
and religious affiliation/practice. Little surprisingly, the spatial self-positioning of voters 
on the left-right axis was the most important factor favouring a vote for the radical 
left: parties drew the overwhelming majority of their support among voters on the "far 
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left" or "left" end of the spectrum and rapidly lost support among those on the centre, 
right and far right.214 The religious factor also showed a very strong effect, with non-
believers being much more likely and practicing Christians (especially Catholics) much 
less likely to support the radical left than the average voter. 
 
Other key sociological factors, on the other hand, had a more selective and uneven 
effect. 
Deep-seated geographical subcultures were very relevant but their persistence seems 
to be slowly eroding. The support for the PDS was largely concentrated in the small 
territory of the former German Democratic Republic (more than 75% of its votes) but 
this share dropped to around 50% with the creation of the Left Party and DIE LINKE; 
over-representation of Eastern voters thus steadily declined from 406.5% (1990) to 
235.1% (2013). The support for the Italian radical left was geographically better 
distributed. The PRC and its various splinter groups generally enjoyed strong results in 
the "red" central regions (former PCI strongholds) and weak ones in the "white" North-
East (former DC and current right-wing strongholds), but the over-representation of 
the red area almost completely disappeared over time (from 149.8% in 1992 to 106.2% 
in 2013). In France, finally, traditional communist strongholds were spatially very 
fragmented: roughly speaking, one area in the North, one in the Centre and one on the 
Mediterranean coast. Here as well the differences seem to have gradually decreased 
over time (Martelli, 2009; Brechon, 2009).  
The radical left electorate was in average slightly masculine, but counter-examples 
abounded. A substantial gender balance was achieved in Italy in 1996 and in Eastern 
Germany throughout the period. In France the 2002 elections even saw a small over-
representation of female voters.215  
As far as age is concerned, over-60 tended to be strongly reluctant toward the radical 
left in Italy, France and Western Germany but not in Eastern Germany. Supportive 
groups also varied from country to country and from election to election. The youth 
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 The data on Italy and France thus support the German findings of Doerschler and Banaszak (2007), 
who found that "the most consistent and powerful explanation of PDS support across time is ideology [;] 
unlike other explanations [...] whose relative import is either negligible or waxes and wanes over time, 
ideological beliefs appear consistently significant through the first 14 years after unification".  
215
 Sperber (2010) has emphasised the strong showing of the far left among the female electorate in this 
election, due to its success among the highly feminised "service proletariat". The outcome was however 




(under-24) was consistently favourable in Italy, generally favourable in France (except 
in 1995) but generally hostile in Germany. The working-age population (25-59), finally, 
gave inconclusive results, although there seems to be a tendency toward a weakening 
of the younger age brackets and a strengthening of the older ones. 
As far as educational levels were concerned, holders of a university degree were more 
likely than the average voter to support the radical left in Italy and less likely in France; 
in Germany, the strongly favourable attitude of graduates toward the PDS was 
reversed with DIE LINKE.  
Finally, the influence of class on the radical left vote was moderately strong and 
somewhat consistent, but not completely uniform. In all three countries employers 
and self-employed were very unlikely to vote for the radical left. The success among 
the different sectors of employed wage workers, however, varied: largely limited to 
blue-collar workers in Italy; broader (blue-collar and white-collar) in France; evolving in 
Germany, where the hostility of blue-collar workers toward the PDS turned to a strong 
attraction toward DIE LINKE. The unemployed were strongly favourable in Germany 
and France but not in Italy. Students were very supportive in Italy but inconsistent in 
the other two countries. Finally, the remaining sections of the economically inactive 
population (e.g. pensioners, housewives, discouraged unemployed) tended to be quite 
hostile in France and Italy but not necessarily so in Germany. 
 
To sum up, the political profile of the radical left in the three countries found a 
uniformly strong support among the ideologically left-wing and non-religious sectors of 
the population but had a fluctuating success among other socio-demographic groups 
and categories. The French radical left was the most characterised from the point of 
view of class, obtaining good results among the lower and middle strata of the 
(employed and unemployed) salaried population and bad ones among the self-
employed, the economically non-active population and the professionals. The Italian 
and German radical left, on the other hand, were only partially successful among their 
"natural" target constituency. In the first case the sociological profile was incoherent, 
with consistently good results only among manual workers and students. In the second 
case the PDS started out as the mouthpiece for very peculiar social stratum (the 
downwardly-mobile former bureaucracy of the GDR) and progressively expanded its 
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constituency to other social strata: success was immediate and extraordinary among 
the unemployed but had to wait until 2005 among blue-collar workers.  
  
 
6.3.3 The vacuum on the left and its limitations 
 
The social and political environment of post-cold war Western Europe provided for a 
contradictory mix of opportunities and obstacles to the electoral recovery of the 
radical left. 
 
The nation-specific chapters of this thesis (chapter three, four and five) have analysed 
at length the contours of an emerging vacuum on the left of the political spectrum. 
Three main elements are crucial to the understanding of this issue. 
Firstly, the declining and overall poor macro-economic performance of the "neo-liberal 
era" compared to the "golden age" of welfare capitalism (Gordon et al., 1987; Harvey, 
2005; Harman, 2009; Duménil & Lévy, 2011) provided the material basis for a 
widespread dissatisfaction toward the social and political system. There is no obvious 
reason why these trends should benefit the left. On the contrary, the obvious 
consequence of declining growth rates, high unemployment and stagnating living 
standards was to sap the organisational capabilities and the confidence of the working-
class and to create an adverse political climate which translated in political 
disengagement and passivity (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2006), diminishing expectations and 
the drift toward narrow forms of protest and social protection (e.g. xenophobia, 
ethno-regionalism, law and order conservatism). It is perhaps not accidental that the 
two main periods of growth of the Western European radical left (1993-1999 and 
2004-2007) coincided with upswings of the international economic climate, when the 
contradiction between increased social wealth and a limited distribution of its benefits 
appeared more visible and cogent. What this economic predicament did do, however, 
was to undermine the popular support of mainstream (conservative, Christian 
democratic and social democratic) parties, which went on to govern with less and less 
consent (electorate, membership, party identification, policy support). For left-wing 
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anti-establishment parties this represented a conjuncture hard to exploit but with a 
very large potential, as the recent success of Syriza in Greece seems to suggest. 
Secondly, the progressive adaptation of mainstream political parties to an agenda of 
privatisations, wage and welfare containment and labour market flexibility further 
eroded their historical legitimacy, which had been largely built on past policies of 
regulation, redistribution, de-commodification, public employment and social 
protection. The right-ward shift of moderate left parties such as the German SPD, the 
French PS and the Italian PDS/DS/PD from "traditional" welfarist social democracy 
toward the model of a "new", "third-way" or "market" social democracy (Gamble and 
Wright, 1999; Pierson, 2001; Moschonas, 2002; Bailey, 2009; Callaghan et al., 2009; 
Nachtwey, 2013), in particular, seemed to create important opportunities for the 
radical left. Scholars have variously defined the problem as a "representation gap" 
(Abromeit, 1993), as a "vacuum on the left" (Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998), as a "crisis of 
[working-]class representation" (Nachtwey, 2009) or as a "space" which opened up on 
the left and only waited to be filled (March & Mudde, 2005; Callinicos, 2008; Marlière, 
2013). Certainly, the attempt to win over the traditional core social constituencies 
(employed wage workers) and themes (welfare state, mixed economy, redistribution, 
Keynesianism) of "people's" parties has been at the centre of the mobilising efforts of 
the contemporary radical left.  
Thirdly, the direct attempts by right-wing and left-wing governments to implement 
programmes of neo-liberal counter-reforms (state-owned sector, public services, 
labour law, pensions, welfare provisions, wage-indexation mechanisms, state budgets) 
were less liable to be accepted as mere reflections of impersonal market forces and 
more likely to revitalise left-wing dissent and resistance.216 Strike activity in the private 
sector collapsed to a historically low plateau (Franzosi, 1995; Salucci, 2008) but anti-
governmental general strikes actually rose (Kelly & Hamann, 2010). Welfare and labour 
reforms often became the focal point of wide-ranging extra-parliamentary 
mobilisations combining strikes, huge demonstrations and other forms of contentious 
politics (France in 1993-1995, 2003, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010; Germany in 1992-1993 
                                                     
216
 Conversely, as Harmann (2007) has correctly stressed, one fundamental goal of privatisations was to 
shift the blame for restructuring away from the state. Experience proves that this strategy was effective: 
while resistance during privatisations did emerge (e.g. in Germany in 1992-1993), post-privatised 
companies have been fairly pacified and calls for re-nationalisations feeble.   
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and 2003-2004; Italy in 1994 and 2002). Finally, this resistance had mixed material 
results but generally succeeded in shifting the political climate and leading to the 
defeat of the seating government in the subsequent electoral cycle. 
 
The cases of Germany, France and Italy tend to support the empirical existence of a 
political vacuum predicated on the above-mentioned historical developments.  
They also tend to confirm that, under certain conditions, the radical left could succeed 
in growing electorally on the back of the popular rejection of neo-liberalism and the 
defection of social democratic voters. The case of the German radical left is exemplary: 
between 2002 and 2009 DIE LINKE made a net gain of 3.2 million votes, 64.3% of which 
were former SPD supporters. On a smaller scale the same was true for the Italian 
radical left: between 1994 and 1996 the PRC gained 0.9 million votes, 69.4% of which 
were former PDS supporters. French data on electoral fluxes are imprecise, but here as 
well it seems that a good section of the growth of the periods 1993-1992 and 2007-
2012 derived from the influx of former PS voters.  
Such successes, however, were always of a limited magnitude and short lived. Only in 
Germany we can talk of a consistent upward movement (with two interruptions); in 
Italy and France the radical left rather tended to stagnate or decline. In a nutshell, the 
vacuum proved to be much more difficult to fill than expected. Why was it so? 
 
The study of the pre-conditions of radical left electoral success points to three major 
possible avenues of growth. 
The first avenue is represented by an overall shift of the political mood to the left, with 
both moderate and radical left parties benefitting from the swing. More precisely, this 
could mean either an actual growth of the share of voters identifying themselves on 
the left of the political spectrum or their over-mobilisation vis-à-vis right-wing voters (a 
differential abstentionism). Such a conjuncture was generally the result of the attempt 
of seating right-wing governments to implement neo-liberal reforms and of the 
consequent development of large extra-parliamentary movements of resistance: good 
examples are the years 1995-1997 and 2009-2012 in France, the years 1993-1998 in 
Germany and the years 1994-1996 and 2002-2005 in Italy. 
The second avenue is represented by a shift of moderate left voters toward the radical 
left, with the aim either of punishing more mainstream parties for their governmental 
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policies or of nudging them to move further to the left. The French politological 
literature has distinguished these two effects in a "vote sanction" and a "vote 
d'influence" (Tiberj, 2004). A favourable environment for this kind of strategy was 
provided by grand coalition governments suspending the left-right divide, where the 
moderate left got discredited while the pressure toward anti-right unity lost its 
saliency, fuelling the rise of anti-establishment parties of all hues. A good example is 
Germany (2005-2009), to a less extent Italy (1994-1996) and, outside the three 
countries, Greece (2009-2012). The Italian radical left wasted an extraordinary 
opportunity to exploit a similar situation which occurred after 2011. Its opposition to 
the Monti and Letta cabinets was little credible, in view of its past and present links 
with the centre-left coalition and its unprecedented organisational and parliamentary 
weakness; the chance was instead seized by Grillo's populist Five Star Movement. 
Another favourable environment was the one described under the previous point: a 
critical or potential alliance with the centre-left in a context of unpopular right-wing 
governments could attract voters wishing to use the radical left as a "corrective" to its 
moderate partners (Italy in 1994-1996 and 2004-2006; France in 1994-1997 and 2012; 
Germany in 1994-1999). This tactics, however, was self-defeating in the long term, as it 
implicated the radical left in the disillusionment elicited by the governmental coalitions 
they ended up supporting (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008). A 
path of head-on confrontation against a seating centre-left government, finally, could 
also bear fruit (Germany 2002-2005; the French far left in 1997-2002); in absence of a 
minimum level of confidence among the radical left constituency, however, it could 
lead instead to demobilisation or adaptation to a "lesser evil" perspective (Italy in 
1999-2001 and 2008; Germany in 2002).  
The third avenue is represented by a growth of the radical left beyond the confines of 
the secular and progressive left-wing voters. As already remarked, the strategies 
employed and the success met varied for each party. The French far left candidates 
(Laguiller, Besancenot) were the most successful in appealing to class and attracting a 
core constituency of economically active wage workers.217 The German PDS, on the 
other hand, saw the predominance of a regional (East German interests) over a class 
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 It was this appeal which enabled LO and LCR to obtain much better results than the PCF among non-




appeal, with strong but socially undifferentiated results among the Eastern voters and 
a nation-wide over-representation only among the unemployed. The Italian radical 
left, finally, showed a decreasing capability to attract specific social constituencies 
(except for the youth, among whom it was very successful) and remained 
predominately characterised by its left-wing ideological positioning.  
  
As it is clear from the above-mentioned discussion, much of the strategies of the 
radical left were thus self-moderating: they could give good results in the short term 
but inevitably led to a counter-swing in the mid-term.  
The key problem was that the very electoral success of the radical left parties tended 
to make them determinant, in the ballot box and in parliament, for the formation of a 
centre-left governing coalition – the more so, the more successful they were on 
contending the typical electorate of mainstream left parties. The choice to exploit this 
situation as a powerful lever to influence the policies of a victorious centre-left 
coalition invariably turned out to be a poisoned chalice. Both external support (Italy in 
1996-1998) and direct governmental participation (France in 1997-2002, Italy in 1998-
2001 and 2006-2008) yielded little visible material results, destroyed the credibility of 
the parties in the eyes of their electorate and led them to electoral disasters at the 
subsequent election. The opposite choice of intransigence, on the other hand, risked 
to expose the parties to accusations of playing into the hands of the enemy and to the 
consequent squeeze due to anti-right tactical voting. The French radical left 
experienced this brutal pressure after the 2002 presidential election: the shock of the 
elimination of Lionel Jospin from the second round led to an immediate loss of almost 
half of its electorate, mainly in the direction of the socialist party, and its effects 
appear to be long-lasting. 218 The Italian radical left also suffered heavily from this 
mechanism in 2008, when it lost at least 0.7 million votes to the Democratic Party;219 
more frequently, the choice of intransigence meant painful splits (the CU in 1995; the 
PdCI in 1998; SEL in 2008-2009) of the tendencies which were determined to maintain 
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 From 2002 to 2008 its scores in all kinds of elections oscillated between 7.6% and 9.2% of valid votes 
(against an excellent 13.8% of the 2002 presidential first round). Even the subsequent upswing in 2009-
2012 did not completely defuse this danger, as the sharp drop in the 2012 legislative election (7.9%) 
proved. 
219
 The figure refers to the net losses of PRC and PdCI only; the other partners of the Rainbow Left cartel 
were completely cannibalised by the PD.  
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a close alliance with the centre-left. The threat was somewhat minimised only in the 
German case, as it was the SPD which consistently refused a governmental alliance 
with the radical left.220  
 
Crucially, the oppositional stance which might work well at times of centre-left 
governments became less practical and rewarding at times of strong rejection and 
mobilisation against right-wing ones; conversely, the unitary posture which yielded 
fruits against the right became catastrophic as soon as it involved any form of 
governmental participation.  
An additional problem was provided by the fact that the sudden surges of enthusiasm 
obtained through a convincing electoral or extra-parliamentary campaign, a popular 
leader or a new partisan project were difficult to sustain for a longer period. As neither 
conciliatory nor intransigent organisations managed to win immediate, concrete and 
visible policy concessions for their constituency, the hopes raised by an initial bout of 
electoral growth tended to wear off quickly, while the newly-won supporters went 
back to abstentionism or more mainstream political options.  
A further obstacle was the response of mainstream centre-left forces to the 
competition on their left. Veritable shifts to the left were minimal, even at a rhetorical 
level. However, the mere return to opposition after an electoral defeat generally 
enabled them to win back a section of their former disaffected supporters (Italy in 
2001-2006; France in 1993-1997 and 2002-2012; Germany in 2009-2013), although it 
was rarely sufficient to entirely recover the past losses. Moreover, the fact that the 
parties retained declining but strong linkages with the workers' movement (trade 
unions, cooperatives, associations) and other civil society and social movement 
organisations enabled them to preserve the loyalty of critical strata which might have 
otherwise gone over to their more radical competitors. The general point made by 
Callinicos (2012) and Davidson (2013) on the actual ideological but incomplete 
organisational break of the "new" social democracy with its traditional constituency is 
fully supported by the Italian and German cases. 
Finally, it seems that the right-ward shift of mainstream political parties was 
accompanied by a parallel right-ward shift of their constituencies. The proactive role of 
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 Pro-SPD swings were modest (0.3 million votes in 2002, 0.4 million in 2013) and roughly equivalent to 
those toward abstention. 
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moderate left leaderships in driving the neo-liberal adaptation of their parties (e.g. the 
role of Achille Occhetto and Walter Veltroni in Italy and Gerhard Schröder in Germany) 
tended to run against an often intense initial resistance by their activists, members and 
voters. However, although these shifts in identity and policies proved to be 
controversial, over time most of the critics came around to the new course and 
accepted or resigned to the changes. In other words, political neo-liberalisation did 
create a short-term window of opportunity but that opening tended to significantly 





The balance sheet of the electoral mobilisation of the radical left in Germany, Italy and 
France is mixed. Only in the first country was the story one of unquestionable success; 
in the other two countries the radical left followed an altogether stagnating or 
declining path. 
The environment of the post-cold war period offered important opportunities for its 
renewal and growth: the lukewarm macro-economic climate, the right-ward shift of 
mainstream parties on socio-economic issues, the roll-out of neo-liberal reforms and 
the intense dissatisfaction and resistance against them designed the contours of a 
vacuum in the political representation of working-class and welfarist constituencies 
which the radical left could legitimately aspire to fill. 
This potential, however, proved difficult to concretise. The choice of an appropriate 
strategy was hampered by the structurally contradictory nature of this political area, 
torn between anti-neoliberal intransigence and the pressures of anti-right unity. 
Electoral upsurges, similarly, were usually dampened and wiped out by structural 






6.4 Institutional weight: a double-edged sword 
  
The previous section has shown that in the three countries the radical left enjoyed a 
mid-sized electoral support: in average 6.32% of valid votes in Germany, 6.55% in Italy 
and 9.62% (legislative) and 12.47% (presidential) in France. The translation of these 
electoral results in forms of institutional weight – such as the presence in 
representative assemblies and executive bodies, both at the national and regional level 
–, however, gave rise to strong disproportionalities (see TABLE 6.6). 
 
TABLE 6.6 PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT AND GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
 PERIOD AVERAGE BEGINNING END Change 
(% points)  
1a) NATIONAL PARLIAMENT      
GERMANY 1990-2013 6.04% 2.57% 10.14% +7.57 
ITALY 1991-2013 4.09% 5.56% 5.87% +3.81 
FRANCE 1990-2013 4.06% 4.33% 1.73% -2.60 
1b) REGIONAL 
PARLIAMENTS 
     
GERMANY 1990-2013 5.18% 2.80% 5.84% +3.04 
ITALY 1991-2013 5.27% 1.33% 3.69% +2.35 
FRANCE 1990-2013 8.92% 8.74% 7.21% -1.54 
1c) PARLIAMENTS 
(COMBINED) 
     
GERMANY 1990-2013 5.61% 2.68% 7.99% +5.31 
ITALY 1991-2013 4.68% 1.70% 4.78% +3.08 
FRANCE 1990-2013 6.49% 6.54% 4.47% -2.07 
2a) NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 
     
GERMANY 1990-2013 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 
ITALY 1991-2013 34.78% 0.00% 0.00% - 
FRANCE 1990-2013 20.83% 0.00% 0.00% - 
2b) REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
     
GERMANY 1990-2013 4.28% 0.00% 3.42% +3.42 
ITALY 1991-2013 29.84% 0.00% 37.77% +37.77 
FRANCE 1990-2013 49.65% 8.21% 85.28% +77.07 
2c) GOVERNMENTS 
(COMBINED) 
     
GERMANY 1990-2013 2.16% 0.00% 1.71% +1.71 
ITALY 1991-2013 32.31% 0.00% 18.88% +18.88 
FRANCE 1990-2013 35.24% 4.11% 42.64% +38.53 
Source: my elaborations from official national data (Bundestag, Camera dei Deputati, Assemblée Nationale). 
Notes: rolling average. 1a) share of MPs (first chamber); 1b) share of regional deputies, weighted by regional population; 1c) 
average of 1a and 1b; 2a) time in national government; 2b) time in regional government, weighted by regional population; 2c) 
average of 2a and 2b. The radical left is counted as in government when at least one of its parliamentary parties externally 




The radical left was significantly under-represented in the respective national 
parliaments, commanding in average 4.06% of seats in France, 4.09% in Italy and 
6.04% in Germany. This was mainly due to the working of electoral legislation221 and, in 
Italy, to organisational fragmentation. The risk of a loss of the parliamentary status was 
always present: it happened in Italy in the 2008-2012 legislature and was not far from 
materialising in Germany in the 2002-2005 legislature (2 MPs) and in France in the 
2012-2017 legislature (10 MPs). The internal balance was heavily distorted to the 
detriment of the smaller and more intransigent organisations. 
The presence in regional parliaments222 was altogether more favourable: 5.18% of the 
seats in Germany, 5.27% in Italy; 8.92% in France. Radical left parties were consistently 
represented in the vast majority of the French and Italian regions, more sporadically in 
Germany223. While the German radical left paid its general inability to overcome the 
electoral thresholds in the populous Western regions of the country, the 
representation of the Italian and French radical left was broadly proportional to their 
actual electoral strengths. However, this was often due more to the choice of the main 
parties to integrate the framework of centre-left alliances than to the presence of 
more democratic and accessible electoral systems. 
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 In France the two-round majority system; in Germany the 5% electoral threshold; in Italy various 
majoritarian elements (a 4% electoral threshold and first-past-the-post seats until 2005; variable 
thresholds and majority premiums afterwards). 
222
 A complete analysis of the institutional weight of political parties should proceed further and include 
representation in the elective bodies of the local (e.g. provincial/departmental/county and municipal) 
levels of state administration. This endeavour would be particularly interesting in the case of France, 
where communes and départements are often endowed with more powers and resources than the 
regions. The poor quality and ambiguous nature of the data on local assemblies, however, prevents it.   
223
 The six Eastern regions were safe strongholds. The ten Western regions, on the other hand, saw no 
radical left presence until 2006. In the period up to 2010 DIE LINKE managed to gain access to most of 
them but subsequently lost ground and is currently represented only in four (the smallest).   
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Radical left parties, despite their reduced parliamentary weight, were often 
determinant for the formation of centre-left governmental majorities (see TABLE 6.7 
and FIGURE 6.8). 
 
TABLE 6.7 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
GERMANY ITALY FRANCE 
DETERMINANT FOR A CENTRE-LEFT MAJORITY 
2005-2009 1995-1996 1988-1993 
2013-2017 1996-2001 1997-2002 
 2006-2008  
EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO A CENTRE-LEFT GOVERNMENT 
None 1995-1996 (CU) – Dini None * 
 1996-1998 (PRC) – Prodi  
DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION 
None 1998-2001 (PdCI) – D'Alema, Amato 1997-2002 (PCF) – Jospin 
 2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI) – Prodi   
Notes: * both in 1988-1993 and 2012-present the PCF remained halfway between external support and opposition. 
 
FIGURE 6.8 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT: REGIONAL AND COMBINED 
 
 
Notes: Involvement of at least one radical left party in regional and national governments. "Regional": weighted by the regional 




In the case of Italy and France this translated into a significant level of governmental 
involvement (external support or direct participation). In Italy, one or the other radical 
party has supported five national cabinets (34.08% of the total time) and a similar 
amount of regional cabinets (administering in average 31.20% of the national 
population, with a peak of 65.49% in 2005). The issue has however proved very 
controversial, producing frequent shifts of collocation, splits and defections. In France, 
the PCF has participated to only one national government (21.02% of total time) but to 
a very large amount of regional ones (in average 47.97% of the population, with a peak 
of 86.90% in 2004-2009). In Germany, on the contrary, the SPD has been adamant in 
refusing any collaboration with the PDS/DIE LINKE at the national level, preferring to it 
the option of a "grand coalition" with the CDU (2005-2009 and, possibly, after 2013). 
Even at the regional level the experiences of collaboration have been altogether rare 
(in average 4.32% of the population with a peak of 9.71% in 2001)224.  
  
These developments had important consequences for the overall evolution of the 
radical left. 
Firstly, the fact that a large number of radical left elected representatives in Italy and 
France owed their seats not so much to their own organisations but rather to the 
benefits of a choice of alliance with the centre-left encouraged them to adopt 
conciliatory attitudes and, in case of conflicts, to engage in right-wing dissidences and 
splits.  
Secondly, the increasing integration of the Italian parties (PRC, PdCI and SEL) and of 
the French PCF into regional governments – which boomed in the period 1998-2009 to 
incredibly high levels – had the same effects described above and helped to 
fundamentally transform the self-understanding and external perception of the radical 
left from an "anti-system" to an institutional and pragmatic force. 
Thirdly, the experiences of national governmental participation (1995-2001 and 2006-
2008 in Italy; 1997-2002 in France) proved disastrous for their initiators, shattering 
                                                     
224
 Three cases of direct governmental participation (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1998-2006, Berlin 
2001-2011, Brandenburg 2009-present) and two cases of external support (Sachsen-Anhalt 1994-2002, 
Berlin 2001), all in the East. Recently DIE LINKE has come close to provide an external support in two 
Western regions, Hessen (2008-09) and Nordrhein-Westfalen (2010-2012) but its contribution has not 
been accepted by the SPD.   
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their credibility and leaving a fertile ground to far left (especially in France) or populist 





6.5 Organisational mobilisation: the crisis of the 
communist mass party model continues 
 
 
While electoral scores of the radical left were oscillating and its governmental 
involvement soaring (at least in France and Italy), the results of its organisational 
mobilisation were altogether poor. Neither the internal reforms of the neo-/post-
communist parties (the German PDS, the Italian PRC and the French PCF), nor the 
electoral surge of actors from a far left or social democratic background (the German 
WASG, the Italian SD, the French LO, LCR and PG), nor the creation of new broad left 
containers (the German DIE LINKE, the Italian FdS and SEL, the French NPA and FdG) 
managed to counterbalance the collapse of the old communist mass organisations, 
networks and sub-cultures. In the present section I will summarise in more detail the 
evolution of each key sub-dimension (party membership, collateral networks and 
material resources) and derive their implications.  
  
 
6.5.1 Party membership 
 
 
The veritable collapse of radical left party membership is portrayed below (TABLE 6.9 
and FIGURE 6.10). All indicators show a dramatic and unmitigated decline, with 

















% Change  
1988-2012 
% 
RAW NUMBERS (M) 
ITALY 116,262 1,559,963 112,835 77,448 -35,387 -31.5% -1,482,515 -95.0% 
FRANCE 182,205 365,533 332,580 86,184 -246,396 -74.1% -279,349 -76.4% 
GERMANY 108,835 2,297,000 186,079 70,461 -115,618 -62.1% -2,226,539 -97.0% 
SOCIETAL PENETRATION (M/E) 
ITALY 0.24 3.41 0.24 0.17 -0.07 -30.6% -3.25 -95.2% 
FRANCE 0.45 0.96 0.81 0.20 -0.62 -75.9% -0.77 -79.7% 
GERMANY 0.20 3.98 0.51 0.11 -0.30 -78.5% -3.86 -97.1% 
SUBCULTURAL ENCAPSULATION (M/V) 
ITALY 4.85 14.32 5.13 3.97 -1.15 -22.5% -10.35 -72.3% 
FRANCE 
(leg.) 
7.27 12.80 11.36 4.41 -6.95 -61.2% -8.40 -65.6% 
GERMANY 6.79 - 26.83 1.86 -24.97 -93.1% - - 
SHARE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP (M/M') 
ITALY 6.31 37.32 3.24 3.81 +0.57 +17.7% -33.5 -89.8% 
FRANCE - - - - - - - - 
GERMANY 6.18 - 
 
8.43 5.36 -3.07 -36.4% - - 
Source: my elaborations from various sources. 
Notes: M/E = ratio of radical left members over the total electorate; M/V = ration of radical left membership over the radical left 
voters; M/M' = ratio of radical left members over total party members. All ratios refer to the membership of the previous year. 
Pre-1989 data refer to the closest available data (1986 to 1988). German data for 1988 refer to the hypothetical sum of East and 




FIGURE 6.10 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION 
 
Source: my elaborations from various sources. 
Notes: absolute values, due-paying members. 
 
 
A focus on the period 1991-2012 reveals that the German radical left lost 115,618 
members (-62.1%), the French radical left 246,396 members (-74.1%) and the Italian 
radical left, which started from much lower levels, 35,387 members (-31.5%). In terms 
of their societal penetration (M/E), the parties continued a transition from mass 
organisations well rooted within their respective national societies to electoralist 
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forces with a marginal and patchy presence on the ground. In 1991 0.81% of the 
French, 0.51% of the German and 0.24% of the Italian electorate carried a card of a 
radical left party; in 2012 this ratio had fallen to 0.20%, 0.11% and 0.17% respectively. 
Their data for sub-cultural encapsulation (M/E) show results of a similar magnitude: in 
the early 1990s 26.83% of German, 11.36% of French and 5.13% of Italian radical left 
voters were also party members; in 2012-2013 this ratio had collapsed to 1.86%, 4.41% 
and 3.97% respectively. The radical left thus shifted from the very tight kind of 
encapsulation typical of 20th century mass parties (6-15%) to the medium levels typical 
of modern cadre parties (3-5%) or to the loose levels typical of purely electoral or new 
parties (below 2%). 
 
The driving force behind this decline was the progressive evaporation of the legacies of 
the communist mass party model. This erosion followed a different tempo in each 
country. In France, the formal organisational continuity of the PCF before and after 
1989 led to a steep and continuous decline, which only after 2003 started to be 
partially compensated by the growth of other organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In 
Germany, the mix of continuity and discontinuity of the PDS with its SED past led to a 
vertical collapse in 1989-1992 followed by a slower decline, briefly reversed in 2005-
2009 by the creation of the WASG and the merger in DIE LINKE. In Italy, finally, the PRC 
was established in 1991 as an effectively new organisation, largely unencumbered by 
the legacy of the Italian Communist Party. It thus started from quite low initial levels 
but at the same time by-passed many of the negative tendencies which affected its 
main post-communist rival (PDS/DS/PDS) – a shrinking, aging and increasingly inactive 
membership – and remained up to 2006 fairly stable and vital. In all cases, however, 
the early or late arrival to a stage of relative stabilisation could not reverse the 
underlying declining trend; by 2012 the radical left of all three countries was at its level 
of greatest membership weakness since the defeat of Fascism.  
 
The experience of Germany, France and Italy suggests two implications for the future 
of the contemporary radical left. 
The first implication is that the kind of strong and dense membership-based 
organisations which were characteristic of the 20th century workers' movement – of a 
communist, social democratic and even Christian democratic type – are a thing of the 
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past and are unlikely to be reproduced in the near future. The crisis of traditional 
communist parties is still exerting its effects thirty-five years after its beginning in the 
late 1970s and almost twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall; no party has so 
far managed to completely stop, let alone invert the course. Even the French renewal 
of left-wing activism (since 1986), labour militancy (since 1995) and political 
participation (since 2002) has had virtually no bearing on this trend.  
The second implication is that successful alternative organisational models have yet to 
emerge. On the one hand, the most dynamic radical left parties from the point of view 
of electoral and membership growth (the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE in Western 
Germany, the far left in France) have remained elite organisations with tiny 
memberships and absolutely shallow levels of sub-cultural encapsulation. On the other 
hand non-partisan social movement networks (e.g. the French "movement social" of 
the early 1990s, the alter-globalist and anti-war movement of 1999-2005 or the anti-
crisis movements of 2011-2012), despite their capacity to mobilise large numbers of 
participants for well-delimited contentious events, failed to consolidate in new mass 
associations, unions, political parties or other organisations. The only counter-
examples in the world are provided by left-wing parties of the Global South having led 
significant revolutionary processes: the Venezuelan PSUV and perhaps (reliable figures 
are not available) the Nepali CPN-M and the Bolivian MAS.  
Thus, for the foreseeable future the Western European radical left will tend be 
dominated by increasingly small political organisations, often capable of significant 
electoral exploits but unable to translate this superficial sympathy into more solid and 
stable relations of adhesion and activism. 
 
Does all this matter?  
The decline of party membership in Western political systems has been widely 
attested empirically (Katz & Mair, 1992b; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 
2012) and discussed theoretically (Mair, 1994; Ignazi, 1996 and 2004). Its 
consequences are not necessarily negative for the health of political parties. Firstly, the 
importance of the membership as a resource for propaganda and financial support has 
steadily declined vis-à-vis the role played by traditional and web-based mass media, 
external PR consultants and public financing. Secondly, the decreasing encapsulation 
of the electorate by parties (of which phenomena such as the mass party and 
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pillarisation were an expression) has certainly increased the volatility of their support, 
but this situation presents both dangers and opportunities. Thirdly, the ideal of a 
membership-based democracy has always rested uneasily beside that of an election-
based democracy, as the political preferences of committed party members and 
activists are likely to diverge significantly from those of the electorate at large. It has 
thus been argued that the shift might be a welcome development for the ordinary 
citizen, who will be allowed to express her political preferences through old (elections) 
and new (opinion polls, focus groups, open primaries, internet-based voting) 
mechanisms without the distortions introduced by the primacy of the party member. 
Moreover, the deliquescence of traditional forms of large, dense and intense linkages 
goes far beyond that of the mass party model, including most allegiances (class, 
religion) and organisations (parties, trade unions, churches, cooperatives, civic 
associations), and does not seem to be reversible in the medium-term.225  
As far as the radical left parties are concerned, membership decline has been clearly 
irrelevant to their short-term electoral fortunes. However, it poses two essential long-
term problems. From a practical point of view, the dwindling numbers, cohesion and 
quality of party members have undermined the attempts of the radical left to exert a 
serious extra-parliamentary influence on the political scene. For instance, the radical 
left has generally been incapable to improve its positions within the apparatuses of 
labour unions and significantly influence their politics; as a consequence, it has been 
deprived of a powerful tool of resistance and social transformation. From a theoretical 
point of view, the whole doctrinal elaboration of the post-Berlin Wall radical left has 
stressed the essential and necessary role of democratic participation and mobilisation 
in the attainment of short-term goals (resisting neo-liberalism, winning elementary 
reforms), in a possible mid-term shift of the political climate and in the long-term 
process of building a democratic socialist or communist society. Its inability to foster 
viable outlets and institutions where grassroots democracy can live and thrive, thus, 
represents a veritable challenge to its raison d'être and entire political vision.  
 
                                                     
225
 See Robert Putnam (2000) on the USA (the "erosion of civic engagement") and Jacques Ion (1997) on 
France (an emerging model of "engagement distancié" or "à la carte"). 
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6.5.2 Sub-cultural linkages 
 
The membership crisis of the parties of the radical left parties was paralleled by a 
similar erosion of their networks of party-near sub-cultural mass organisations.  
A precise operationalisation of this variable is at present impossible. This would involve 
calculating the total number of members of ancillary, affiliated, collateral and friendly 
organisations of a party (excluding double membership) and weighing each linkage by 
its intensity. Unfortunately, political research is still far from reaching a satisfactory 
solution to these problems.226 Nevertheless, it is absolutely evident that not much 
remains of the world of strong, dense and tightly-knit subcultures and organisational 
networks which marked much of the history of 19th and 20th century Western Europe, 
of which mass political parties were both an expression and a central point of 
reference and organising agency.  
Radical left parties have been fully affected by this shift. Its consequences, however, 
have perhaps been more serious than for other party families, which were either little 
interested in the organisation of the masses in the first place (e.g. the parties of the 
social elites) or could replace it with other forms of party-society linkages (e.g. direct 
contacts through the parliamentary institutions, the state machine, the mass media 
and "top-level" bargaining with civil society organisations).   
As I have shown in the previous chapters, this process was characterised by three 
overlapping dimensions: (i) a quantitative decline of the constituency of party-near 
mass organisations; (ii) the autonomisation of civil society organisations from their 
traditional partisan referents and the de-politicisation of their reciprocal links; (iii) the 
de-ideologisation of civil society organisations themselves, which tended to drop 
strong systemic goals, values and pedagogical pretensions and emphasised instead 
their role as more prosaic providers of individual/group services. The outcome was a 
new model of looser, more punctual and constantly renegotiated relations between 
                                                     
226
 Poguntke (2008), for instance, offers a measure of the average strength of the party organisational 
linkages but does not quantify their number and social relevance. The latter task, in turn, presents 
various theoretical and empirical problems: the poor quality of data on membership of civil society 
organisations; the issue of overlapping memberships; the different qualitative nature of different kinds 
of membership; the problem of attributing the party-near status to organisations without formal ties 
with a party.    
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increasingly autonomous organisations and social spheres, couched in terms of a 
celebration of the a-partitical or a-political character of civil society activity and in the 
rhetoric of the autonomy of social movements. 
 
In the case of Italy, the PRC was deprived from the start of any influence within the 
imposing network of collateral or friendly mass organisations of the Italian Communist 
Party (CGIL, Legacoop, ARCI, UDI, SUNIA, ANPI and so on) which was entirely inherited 
by the rival post-communist party (PDS). Over the subsequent decades PRC, PdCI, SEL 
and other smaller groups had a hard time rebuilding solid relations with old or new 
civil society and social movement organisations. Relations of affinity and collaboration 
were indeed established with a variety of societal milieus: the left-wing minorities of 
the CGIL trade union; sections of the old left associationism; the galaxy of alternative 
trade unions and centri sociali; alter-globalist, pacifist and other left-libertarian social 
movement networks. The quantitative importance of these groups was however 
smallish and the qualitative nature of the linkages never went beyond a weak and 
informal connection. Key obstacles to a progress on this front were the continued 
(albeit sometimes critical) allegiance of the leaders and cadres of veritable mass 
organisations to the PDS/DS/PD and the absence of a coherent strategy of 
intervention. 
In the case of Germany, the organisational linkages of the SED were completely 
shattered in 1989-1990 by the joint effects of the East German revolution and of the 
unification of the two German states. The PDS managed to retain tight links with a 
small network of organisations representing the interests of the former bureaucracy 
(OKV) and with the largest Eastern charity (Volkssolidarität) but lost all influence 
among the organised labour movement and other societal milieus. As in Italy, in the 
following decades PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE made some progress in establishing good 
working relations with large sections of the Eastern civil society and smaller sections of 
the Western one (alternative, alter-globalist and pacifist groups; few thin layers of 
trade unionists; some small professional and minority organisations). Here as well, 
however, the bulk of mass organisations continued to retain looser versions of their 
traditional political allegiances (SPD, CDU/CSU and Greens).  
France, finally, was the only country where the old network of collateral mass 
organisations of the PCF (CGT, FSGT, SPF, UFF, FNMT, CNL, ARAC and so forth) was not 
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suddenly destroyed by the implosion of the Soviet system. Instead, it suffered a slow 
long-term erosion due to the electoral decline of the Communist Party, the rising 
appeal of the Socialist Party and generic disengagement. Thus, while these 
organisations remained until the early 1980s part of a large and compact subculture 
closely connected to the PCF, during the 1980s and 1990s the network lost coherence 
and loosened or entirely severed its links with the party. The outcome was often 
paradoxical: many leaders and cadres remained communist members or sympathisers 
but their wider membership switched to different political proclivities and the 
organisations effectively ceased to act as relays of communist influence. More than in 
the other two countries, the various radical left parties managed to preserve and 
strengthen important relations of collaboration with significant intellectual, trade 
union, associative and movementist milieus. The intensity of these links remained 
however somewhat loose and the mutual benefits limited.   
 
The general argument is well exemplified by the case of the trade union movement. 
Although the radical left parties had better voting intentions among union members 
than among the general population (in average, around 10% in Italy and Germany and 
around 20% in France), their actual presence within the top echelons of the union 





6.5.3 Material resources 
 
Finally, it is not clear if the crisis of the communist mass party model (membership and 
networks of collateral organisations) had a similar impact on the material resources 
available to contemporary radical left parties for carrying out their political activities. 
The data available are sketchy and incoherent but seem to indicate large national 
variations, with a general tendency to decline in the 1990s and to stabilisation 
afterwards.  
 
The evolution of party finances (real yearly incomes) is depicted in the following figure 
(FIGURE 6.11).  
FIGURE 6.11 FINANCES 
YEAR GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
PARTIES: PDS, L.PDS, WASG, 
DIE LINKE 
PCF, LO, LCR/NPA, PG PRC, PdCI, SEL 
(central level only) 
1990 € 683,452,336   
1991 € 44,213,489   
1992 € 15,607,860   
1993 € 18,154,349   
1994 € 22,172,487   
1995 € 25,923,268   
1996 € 22,717,181   
1997 € 22,639,143  € 11,249,662 
1998 € 23,507,303  € 8,481,060 
1999 € 24,655,574  € 11,984,138 
2000 € 23,475,788  € 13,088,379 
2001 € 23,461,848  € 11,023,873 
2002 € 24,725,204  € 11,232,111 
2003 € 24,743,284 € 42,987,689 € 11,829,939 
2004 € 23,122,915 € 46,527,470 € 15,629,235 
2005 € 25,513,726 € 41,257,639 € 19,966,689 
2006 € 25,903,149 € 40,687,450 € 25,941,671 
2007 € 23,362,157 € 44,761,594 € 28,896,959 
2008 € 25,562,946 € 38,538,933 € 20,890,468 
2009 € 27,566,111 € 38,782,152 € 12,179,536 
2010 € 27,851,633 € 38,294,617 € 12,008,729 
2011   € 3,640,874 
AVERAGE 
2003-2010  € 25,453,240 € 41,479,693 € 18,417,903 
share 5.50% 19.40% - 
Source: my elaborations from party accounts (Deutscher Bundestag, 1992-2011; CNCCFP, 2005-2011; G.U., 2000-2012). 
Notes: yearly incomes, real 2010 euro. Share: average share of the total yearly incomes of all registered (France) or parliamentary 
(Germany) political parties. Italian accounts refer to the central level only (excluding intermediate and primary articulations).  
 
Germany is the only country where coherent data for the whole period are available. 
Revenues collapsed in the period 1989-1992, when the PDS was stripped of almost all 
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the resources inherited from the SED. In the following decades the party strongly 
recovered, growing from 15.6 million euro (1992) to 27.8 million euro (2010); their 
overall amount remained however smallish when compared with the total incomes of 
German political parties (around 5.4%).  
In France, the incomes of the radical left are likely to have declined during the 1980s 
and 1990s, as a consequence of the membership and institutional decline of the PCF, 
but precise data are available only since 2003. Despite a slight erosion, their overall 
amount remains astoundingly high: in average, 41.9 million euro and 19.6% of total 
party incomes. 
In Italy, finally, resources follow a parabolic path: from extremely weak initial levels, to 
a veritable boom in 2004-2008, to a rapid collapse after the 2008 electoral defeat. 
Unlike in the other two countries, where self-financing and state financing were fairly 
balanced, in Italy the dynamic was almost entirely determined by levels of the latter. 
 
A quantification of the human resources of radical left parties is even harder to come 
by.  
In the 2000s the official staff of the parties amounted to about 100 people in Italy, 200 
in Germany227 and more than 300 in France. This figure, however, represents only a 
fraction of the total number of people directly or indirectly reporting to the parties. 
Professional staff includes politicians (paid members of representative assemblies and 
state executive bodies), their assistants, employees of party-owned companies (e.g. 
newspapers and publishing houses) and party-near foundations, hired external 
consultants and some officials of collateral organisations. Semi-professional and non-
professional staff includes much of the active party membership and, in particular, 
local elected representatives (e.g. councillors) and members holding internal party 
offices (e.g. branch secretary).  
Most components seem to have accompanied the decline of party membership, sub-
cultural networks and financial resources; however, semi-professional elected 
representatives have probably suffered a weaker retrenchment and cadres indirectly 
made available by the state have perhaps even increased.  
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The study of the electoral evolution of the parties of the contemporary radical left 
offers the image of limited and contradictory, yet real, recovery since the shock of the 
fall of the Eastern bloc. This picture, however, contrasts strongly with that provided by 
their organisational evolution, where the long-term crisis which has enveloped the 
labour movement – in both its partisan and non-partisan forms – in Western Europe 
since the late 1970s seems to be still ongoing.  
Even in a context characterised by large waves of left-leaning contentious politics 
and/or electoral growth (France in 1993-2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-2012; Italy in 
1994-1996 and 2001-2004; Germany in 1992-1997 and 2003-2009), radical left parties 
have failed to play the roles of effective outlets for a renewal of political engagement 
and activism and of catalysts for an organisational structuration of the anti-neoliberal 
discontent and resistance. On the one hand, the legacies of the communist past (a 
mass membership, a tightly-knit network of collateral mass organisations) have 
followed a trajectory of sudden collapse (1989-1991 in Germany and Italy) or slower 
but relentless erosion (France). On the other hand, the (re)politicisation and 
(re)activation of left-wing social layers has rarely moved past the point of a generic 
sympathy toward the parties of the radical left and toward more stable and intense 
forms of collaboration. The apparatuses of traditional mass civil society organisations 
have tended to confirm a loose allegiance to the mainstream social democratic or 
Christian democratic parties of government. Figureheads and activists of the so-called 
"new" social movements (e.g. alter-globalism) have either hidden behind a 
theorisation of their autonomy and distinctiveness or, when they have sought to 
bridge the gap with party politics, they have turned out to be generals without an 
army, having little or no effect on radical left membership and electoral results. 
Ordinary citizens, finally, have not overcome a difficult and intermittent relation with 
politics, where participation remained punctual (the act of voting, marching in a 
demonstration) and engagement short-lived. 
Contemporary radical left parties, thus, tend to be characterised by a small 
membership, shallow linkages with a little-homogenous constituency and little or no 
retinue of collateral or sympathising civil society and social movement organisations. 
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This state of affairs does not necessarily constitute a problem from the point of view of 
their electoral performance, as the loss of ideological voters can be compensated or 
over-compensated by the conquest of mobile ones. However, it represents a 
fundamental obstacle to their potential for extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the 



























6.6 The case for regroupment and the reasons 
behind fragmentation 
 
While the internal conflicts and debates of the radical left of all three countries have 
been broadly similar, their outcomes have produced strikingly different national 
trajectories. 
 
The following table summarises the evolution of radical left fragmentation at the level 
of votes, members and MPs in electoral years (TABLE 6.12). 
France belongs to the group of Western European countries (together with Greece, 
Portugal and Denmark) where the radical left has been firmly and stably divided in a 
plurality of significant organisations. The competition between the PCF and other far 
left (LO, LCR/NPA, PT) or radical left actors became entrenched during the 1980s and 
grew larger in the following decades. A serious effort of regroupment in 2005-2007 
failed and the landscape remained unstable until 2012, when the successful electoral 
campaign of the Front de Gauche led to a partial but significant move toward 
unification. 
Italy started out with the establishment of an uncontested broad left party (PRC) but 
went down a course of progressive fragmentation in competing parties and micro-
parties. Subsequent attempts of regroupment have all failed to yield results. 
In Germany, finally, the PDS was able to avoid the recurring danger of fragmentation 
(1989-1990 and 2002-2005) and has on the contrary become the cornerstone of a 
larger broad left party, DIE LINKE. 
How can these divergent trajectories be explained? 
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TABLE 6.12 FRAGMENTATION  
GERMANY         
Votes 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 AVER. 
PDS 99.2% 99.4% 99.5% 99.9% - - - 56.9% 
L.PDS/DIE LINKE - - - - 98.5% 99.3% 99.2% 42.5% 
Others 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 1.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 
Members 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 (2012) AVER. 
PDS/L.PDS 96.1% 92.5% 90.4% 90.2% 74.9% - - 63.5% 
WASG - - - - 15.6% - - 2.3% 
DIE LINKE - - - - - 91.8% 89.5% 26.0% 
Others 3.9% 7.5% 9.6% 9.8% 9.5% 8.2% 9.5% 8.3% 
MPs 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 AVER. 
PDS/L.PDS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% -  68.3% 
WASG - - - - 22.2% -  3.2% 
DIE LINKE - - - - - 100.0% 100.0% 28.6% 
Fragmentation index 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 AVER. 
Votes 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.01 
Members 1.08 1.16 1.21 1.21 1.68 1.18 1.21 1.25 
MPs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.53 1.00 1.00 1.08 
ITALY         
Votes 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 74.9% 71.6% - - 63.8% 
PdCI - - - 24.9% 28.4% - - 7.6% 
SA/RC - - - - - 69.3% 39.2% 15.5% 
SEL - - - - - - 55.9% 8.0% 
Others - - - 0.2% - 30.7% 4.9% 5.1% 
Members 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 (2011) AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% 68.4% 69.5% 38.8% 79.2% 
PdCI - - - 22.2% 31.6% 28.6% 21.0% 14.8% 
SEL - - - - - - 38.1% 5.4% 
Others - - - - - 2.0% 2.1% 0.6% 
MPs 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
PRC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 55.0% 71.9% - - 65.4% 
PdCI - - - 45.0% 28.1% - - 14.6% 
SEL - - - - - - 100.0% 20.0% 
Fragmentation index 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 AVER. 
Votes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.61 1.69 1.95 2.14 1.48 
Members 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.53 1.76 1.77 2.94 1.57 
MPs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.98 1.68 - 1.00 1.28 
FRANCE         
Votes (legislative) 1993 1997 2002 2007 2012   AVER. 
PCF 80.8% 77.2% 62.7% 53.4% -   54.8% 
FdG - - - - 87.6%   17.5% 
LO 8.1% 13.4% 15.4% 10.4% 6.2%   10.7% 
LCR/NPA 1.2% 2.3% 16.2% 25.6% -   9.1% 
Others 9.9% 7.2% 5.7% 10.6% 6.2%   7.9% 
Votes (presidential)  (1995) 2002 2007 2012   AVER. 
PCF  61.0% 24.4% 21.4% -   27.0% 
FdG  - - - 86.7%   21.7% 
LO  38.0% 41.4% 14.8% 4.4%   24.7% 
LCR/NPA  0.0% 30.8% 45.4% 8.9%   21.3% 
Others  0.0% 3.4% 18.4% 0.0%   5.44% 
Members 1993 1997 2002 2007 2012   AVER. 
PCF 99.0% 96.7% 92.3% 88.1% 74.5%   90.1% 
LO 0.7% 3.0% 5.7% 7.7% 8.1%   5.1% 
LCR/NPA 0.2% 0.3% 2.0% 4.1% 3.5%   2.0% 
PG - - - - 13.9%   2.8% 
MPs 1993 1997 2002 2007 2012   AVER. 
PCF 95.7% 94.3% 90.9% 83.3% 70.0%   86.8% 
Others 4.4% 5.7% 9.1% 16.7% 30.0%   13.2% 
Fragmentation index 1993 1997 2002 2007 2012   AVER. 
Votes (legislative) 1.50 1.62 2.25 2.69 1.29   1.73 
Votes (presidential)  1.89 3.06 3.37 1.31   2.41 
Members 1.02 1.02 1.07 1.27 1.72   1.21 
MPs 1.09 1.12 1.20 1.38 1.72   1.30 
Source: my elaborations various sources (see statistical appendix). 
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The case for a regroupment of forces of different origin and sensibility under a 
common organisational framework – either a broad party (e.g. the German DIE LINKE) 
or a semi-permanent front (e.g. the French FdG) should be clear from the discussion of 
section 6.2. A broad anti-neoliberal programme based on the grievances that the 
mainstream left and its sympathetic trade unions confederations were proving unable 
or unwilling to address provided the rational basis for the unity of radical left forces of 
different origin and sensibility. Although a host of political and material questions 
produced tensions and fostered vocal debates, there was no good reason why 
compromise solutions could not be found. And, indeed, contemporary radical left 
parties were often successful in initiating and carrying out modest movements of 
regroupment. 
 
The establishment and preservation of radical left unity was overwhelmingly 
dependent from three factors: (i) the ability of the main radical left party to find a 
reasonable political and material balance between the potential partners; (ii) the 
incentives provided by the political system, in particular the access to party financing 
and parliamentary representation; (iii) the climate of political competition.  
 
The behaviour of the biggest radical left party in each country (PDS, PRC and PCF) was 
of crucial importance. A willingness to modernise its ideology, open up to pluralism 
and ensure political viability and equal dignity to potential partners helped to bring 
about unity among forces of different origin and sensibility; excessive pride, 
inflexibility and poor choices fostered the crystallisation of the disagreements into 
separate organisations. 
In Italy, the open and flexible attitude of the PRC did manage for a short period (1991-
1997) to bring together orthodox and neo-communists, far left groups and sections of 
the PDS left, before fragmenting under the pressure of bipolarism. In France the PCF 
had many opportunities to become the centre of processes of larger regroupment 
(1993-1997; 2004-2007) but regularly wasted them; a belated unification occurred 
(2009-2012) when the party came around the idea of giving up its symbolic and 
material primacy within the alliance by selecting non-communists as prominent 
candidates. In Germany, finally, the PDS managed to survive two potentially lethal 
threats of fragmentation (1989-1992 and 2002-2005) and to aggregate around its core 
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Eastern constituency successive layers of external partners: at first only smallish far 
and radical left forces; later much larger sections of the Western population. To a great 
extent, this was due to the willingness of its leadership to grant generous political 
compromises and to share with largesse its considerable resources (e.g. finances, 
internal offices, public offices) with potential partners. 
 
The presence of institutional incentives was also very important in ensuring the 
cohesion (or lack thereof) of radical left forces. 
In Germany, the 5% electoral threshold discouraged potential competitors to the PDS 
and was one of the key drivers of the alliances of 1990 (with Western leftists) and 
2005-2007 (with the WASG). In Italy, the 4% electoral threshold had a similar effect of 
deterrence on far left organisations but was undermined by the selective incentives 
offered to right-wing splits of the PRC (CU in 1995, PdCI in 1998, SEL in 2009), which 
were guaranteed a significant parliamentary representation even with a very limited 
electoral support by an alliance with the centre-left. Later on, the post-2007 drive 
toward very heterogeneous electoral coalitions (SA, SeL, FdS and RC) was also 
motivated by the determination of a weakened radical left to overcome the threshold 
and to gain parliamentary representation. In France, finally, the extremely high 
barriers to representation provided no disincentive to the proliferation of competing 
candidatures, as fielding common candidates did not increase the chances of election 
but reduced the media exposure and financial prospects of each individual 
organisation. 228 
 
Finally, the saliency of the central political fault line of the radical left, the question of 
the (conciliatory or intransigent) attitude toward the moderate left, varied sharply 
according to the external political climate. The dilemma could be temporarily defused 
or fudged in periods of opposition to right-wing or grand coalition governments and, to 
a less extent, when the moderate left had the numbers to govern alone (or refused a 
dialogue). Whenever the contribution of the radical left became determinant for the 
formation or survival of a centre-left government, however, powerful centrifugal 
                                                     
228
 Indeed, the only electoral alliances between LO and LCR (1999 and 2004 European, 2004 regional 




pressures were set in motion. The hard choice between granting the survival or 
determining the fall of a centre-left parliamentary majority drastically reduced the 
scope for ambiguity and compromises and undermined the internal cohesion and 
external appeal of radical left parties, and leading to a proliferation of right-wing and 
left-wing splinter groups and electoral losses in all directions. In Germany the PDS had 
the luck of being considered as nicht koalitionsfähig (not a viable coalition partner) by 
the SPD, which involved it only in a few experiments at the regional level; this greatly 
alleviated the pressures on the cohesion of the party. In the other two countries, on 
the contrary, the choice of the PS and PDS/DS/PD to pursue a course of broad centre-
left coalitions including the radical left was the key factor in encouraging a progressive 
fragmentation in the form of right-wing splits (Italy) or the emergence of more radical 
competitors (France). 
 
On the basis of the afore-mentioned considerations, the trajectory of the three 
countries becomes easy to understand. The unity of the Italian radical left was 
progressively destroyed by the salience of the issue of governmental participation and 
by the selective incentives offered by the electoral system to right-wing splits. That of 
the German radical left was preserved by the absence of the first pressure, by the 
positive effects of the electoral system and by the willingness of the PDS to reward 
potential allies with material resources and a political role well above their effective 
contribution. In the case of France, finally, the many chances of regroupment of the 
gauche de la gauche between 1993 and 2007 were scuppered partly by the issue of 
governmental participation and partly by the incapacity of the various potential 
partners to reach a balanced compromise; the latter element, in turn, largely derived 
from disproportions in their respective societal influence.229 It was only when the bad 
memories of the Jospin period waned and when a weakened PCF was ready to agree 
to important material concessions that the partial regroupment of the Left Front could 
take place (2009-2012). 
                                                     
229
 The PCF, a giant from the point of view of membership, resources and institutional presence, could 
not envisage an equal partnership with groups which could score well electorally (in presidential and 
European elections) but were dwarves in all other respects. The far left, on the other hand, hoped to use 
the lever of its electoral popularity to split the communist constituency and pave the way for a deeper 
reconfiguration.   
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6.7 Systemic influence: much ado about nothing? 
 
Was the radical left effective in pushing forward its political programme and shaping 
Western European politics and society? 
 
At the level of extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were very 
active in their support of and participation to a broad range of struggles and social 
movements.  
This involvement was generally regarded as constructive by the participants, tended to 
win them new allies and often significantly increased their electoral audience. The link 
between electoral gains and broad left-wing social mobilisations emerges very clearly 
in all three countries. In France the two electoral peaks of the radical left (1995-2002 
and 2009-2012) are tightly correlated to massive anti-right mobilisations led by the 
labour movement (1995 and 2009-2010). In Italy the two peaks (1995-96 and 2004-
2006) neatly followed large anti-Berlusconi mobilisations by the trade unions (1994 
and 2002) and pacifist networks (2002-2004). In Germany, finally, the two largest 
increases of the vote for the PDS/DIE LINKE (1994 and 2005) were direct consequences 
of the 1992-1993 anti-Treuhand, of the 2003 pacifist and of the 2003-2004 anti-Hartz 
mobilisations.230  
The organisational and strategic benefits of such an involvement, however, remained 
limited. First of all, the parties largely failed to translate the gains of sympathy into 
more stable linkages such as new members and activists, the establishment of 
collateral and friendly organisations or the conquest of leadership positions within the 
key social movement organisations. The trade union movement, in particular, tended 
to remain closely aligned with the moderate left and the influence of radical left 
activists was stagnating (Germany, France) or even declining (Italy). Secondly, all but 
one major mobilisation were directed against seating right-wing governments; as a 
consequence, they tended to primarily benefit the main opposition party (SPD, PS, PD) 
                                                     
230
 A significant exception to this trend is provided by the important French mobilisations of the period 
2003-2006 (2003 labour and 2006 anti-CPE mobilisations), which failed to produce a positive impact on 
the radical left vote. The reason for this was probably the 2002 presidential election, which led to a mid-
term shift of many former radical left voters toward the Socialist Party.  
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and to increase the pressures on the radical left to agree on a united front policy 
including the electoral and parliamentary level. Thirdly, despite their mass character, 
many of the union-based movements were ultimately either unsuccessful (France in 
2003 and 2009-2010, Germany in 1993 and 2004) or were circumvented by 
subsequent trade union negotiations (Italy). In short, the radical left was altogether 
unable to make use of extra-parliamentary mobilisations to improve its long-term 
ability to achieve its aims; the benefits, therefore, remained generally limited to short-
term electoral gains which disappeared as the general mood turned from optimism to 
pessimism and resignation.  
  
At the level of electoral and parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were 
similarly unable to alter the "direction of competition" (Sartori, 1976; Evans, 2002) and 
to put a halt to the main trends of the neo-liberal era. In all three countries the ruling 
elite was altogether able to push forward a major reconfiguration of class power, 
reversing the post-war balance between state-led and privately-led enterprises, 
making labour cheaper, more flexible and less influential and shifting the burden of 
taxation away from capital and managerial incomes (Duménil & Lévi, 2011). The 
legacies of the post-WWII embedded liberalism are far from having been obliterated 
(Harman, 2007) but the overall direction of change remains highly unfavourable to the 
radical left project. 
 
How can this insufficient record be explained? 
On the one hand, the failures of the radical left have of course depended on the 
altogether limited levels of its social weight. As a medium-small political family 
representing between 4% and 13% of the electorate, often fragmented in competing 
organisations and lacking important resources of independent social mobilisation (e.g. 
a mass membership, collateral trade union confederations, a large-scale system of 
communication), the pressures it could exert on the social and political system were 
modest. In particular, its ability of exerting a left-ward pull on the moderate left was 
hampered by a long series of factors: the lack of vitality of social democratic internal 
left-wing tendencies; the hostility of the leadership of key civil society organisations, in 
particular the trade union movement; the general weakness (with the exception of 
France) and ineffectiveness of labour conflict; the weakened but still effective capacity 
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of the moderate left to compensate the loss of traditionalist supporters with the gain 
of more moderate ones (e.g. Mitterrand, Schröder, Prodi) or with a successful appeal 
to tactical voting against the right (e.g. the German SPD in 2002, the French PS after 
2002, Veltroni's PD in 2008); finally, the continuous strategic oscillations of radical left 
parties between conciliatory and intransigent strategies. 
On the other hand, the insensibility of the political system (and, in particular, of the 
moderate left) to the pressures toward increased protection and redistribution could 
have deeper roots. One possible explanation might derive from the entrenchment of 
neo-liberalism into complex institutional architectures (the European Union and the 
Eurozone; the WTO; the role played by global financial markets in the financing of 
public debt, corporate and private debt and pension funds) which "locks in" the 
changes and, falling short of a head-on confrontation with multiple national and 
international power centres, bars the implementation of even modestly heterodox 
economic policies. A second explanation might be found in the slow growth rates of 
advanced European economies and the increased pressure of international 
competition, both of which curtail the space for direct and indirect redistributive 
policies.  
Further research is needed on the topic. What seems clear is that in absence of drastic 
theoretical and organisational improvements the radical left seems condemned to 





6.8 Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has endeavoured to offer an original contribution to the existing scholarship 
on the partisan radical left and on political parties.  
 
From an empirical point of view, the detailed comparative analysis of the German, 
French and Italian radical lefts based on a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data 
has painted a nuanced picture of more than two decades of evolution, has revealed 
important and often surprising findings and has laid the foundations for a solid 
attempt to provide a convincing theorisation and interpretation of the overall 
trajectory of the Western European radical left. 
From a methodological point of view, the adoption of an comparative (three 
countries), aggregate (the radical left as a complex political space), multi-dimensional 
(political nature; societal weight and influence; electoral, institutional and 
organisational mobilisation; strategies and tactics) and multi-level (party-organisation, 
party-constituency, external actors and structural environment) approach has proven 
its power in avoiding the pitfalls of one-sided generalisations from circumscribed 
experiences and in advancing our general understanding of the multi-faceted relations 
between political parties and contemporary societies. 
Finally, the unusual vantage point of non-mainstream political actors has provided an 
interesting perspective into the socio-political transformations of the neo-liberal age 
and broadened conventional conceptions of politics, democracy and historical agency.   
 
The Western European radical left has emerged from the analysis as a genuine political 
actor, endowed with important resources of societal weight and capable of playing a 
not decisive but nevertheless significant role in all sectors of political and social life: 
elections; intellectual production and public debate; extra-parliamentary mobilisation; 
governmental formation; law- and decision-making. 
At the same time, the parties of the German, French and Italian radical left have not 
succeeded in making decisive progresses toward their main proclaimed goals: to fill the 
vacuum left by the neo-liberal transformation of mainstream political parties; to 
embark on a long-lasting path of recovery of their societal weight and influence; to 
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devise a credible vision of an alternative project of society, of a transition beyond neo-
liberalism and capitalism and of a renewal of working-class politics and democratic 
radicalism. In other words, they have failed to chart a way out of the long-term crisis of 
the 20th century workers' movement and its various revolutionary, Stalinist and social 
democratic variants. 
 
Their experience, both in their successes and in their shortcomings, represents a vital 
piece of contemporary political history and shines a revealing light on the key 
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Junge Welt - http://www.jungewelt.de/  
KAS (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) - http://www.kas.de/  
KPD-Sozialgeschichte - http://www.kpd-sozialgeschichte.homepage.t-
online.de/statistiken.html  
Labournet - http://www.labournet.de  
Le Monde - www.lemonde.fr   
LO (Lutte ouvrière) - http://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/ 
Lutte de classe - http://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/documents/archives/la-revue-lutte-de-classe  
Ministère de la Fonction Publique - http://www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr/  
Ministère de l'Intérieur – http://ww.interieur.gouv.fr  
Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi, de la Formation Professionelle et du Dialogue Social - 
http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/  
Ministero dell'Interno - Archivio Storico delle Elezioni - http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
MLPD (Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands) - http://www.mlpd.de  
NPA (Nouveau parti anticapitaliste) - http://www.npa2009.org/  
PCF (Parti communiste français) - http://www.pcf.fr  
PCL (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori) - http://www.pclavoratori.it/  
PdAC (Partito di Alternativa Comunista - http://www.partitodialternativacomunista.org/  
PdCI (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani) - http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/  
PG (Parti de gauche) - http://www.lepartidegauche.fr/  
POI (Parti ouvrier indépendant) - http://parti-ouvrier-independant.fr/  
PRC (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista) - http://www.rifondazione.it/  
PRC – Archivio Manifesti - http://www.rifondazione.it/galleria/  
PRC – Archivio Storico - http://web.rifondazione.it/archiviostorico/  
Reichstagsprotokolle - http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de  
Repubblica (la) – http://www.repubblica.it  
RLS (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung) - http://rosalux.de  
Rouge - http://orta.dynalias.org/archivesrouge/recherche-par-numeros.clp 
SC (Sinistra Critica) - http://sinistracritica.org/  
SEL (Sinistra Ecologia Libertà) - http://www.sinistraecologialiberta.it/  
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Sénat de la République française – http://ww.senat.fr   
Senato della Repubblica - Archivio Storico – http://www.senato.it/storico  
Spiegel (Der) - http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print  
Süddeutsche Zeitung - http://archiv.sueddeutsche.apa.at/sueddz  
Tous est à nous - http://www.npa2009.org/tout-est-a-nous 
Wahlen in Deutschland - http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/  
Wahlrecht - http://www.wahlrecht.de  
WEO (World Economic Outlok) [see IMF] - IMF (International Monetary Fund) - 
http://www.imf.org/  
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GEN1 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
YEAR GERMANY % FRANCE % ITALY % 
1989 € 1,692.5  € 1,272.4  € 1,144.2  
1990 € 1,789.3 5.7% € 1,305.8 2.6% € 1,167.7 2.1% 
1991 € 1,879.0 5.0% € 1,319.3 1.0% € 1,184.5 1.4% 
1992 € 1,907.2 1.5% € 1,338.8 1.5% € 1,194.3 0.8% 
1993 € 1,887.8 -1.0% € 1,329.9 -0.7% € 1,184.1 -0.9% 
1994 € 1,935.7 2.5% € 1,359.8 2.2% € 1,209.6 2.2% 
1995 € 1,970.0 1.8% € 1,387.6 2.0% € 1,244.5 2.9% 
1996 € 1,986.1 0.8% € 1,402.4 1.1% € 1,258.7 1.1% 
1997 € 2,021.5 1.8% € 1,433.1 2.2% € 1,282.1 1.9% 
1998 € 2,055.1 1.7% € 1,481.5 3.4% € 1,300.7 1.4% 
1999 € 2,090.9 1.7% € 1,530.2 3.3% € 1,319.6 1.5% 
2000 € 2,159.9 3.3% € 1,586.6 3.7% € 1,367.8 3.7% 
2001 € 2,195.3 1.6% € 1,615.7 1.8% € 1,393.3 1.9% 
2002 € 2,195.9 0.0% € 1,630.7 0.9% € 1,399.6 0.5% 
2003 € 2,187.4 -0.4% € 1,645.4 0.9% € 1,398.9 0.0% 
2004 € 2,202.6 0.7% € 1,687.2 2.5% € 1,423.1 1.7% 
2005 € 2,221.2 0.8% € 1,718.0 1.8% € 1,436.4 0.9% 
2006 € 2,307.6 3.9% € 1,760.4 2.5% € 1,468.0 2.2% 
2007 € 2,385.8 3.4% € 1,800.7 2.3% € 1,492.7 1.7% 
2008 € 2,404.9 0.8% € 1,799.2 -0.1% € 1,475.4 -1.2% 
2009 € 2,282.9 -5.1% € 1,742.6 -3.1% € 1,394.3 -5.5% 
2010 € 2,374.8 4.0% € 1,771.6 1.7% € 1,418.4 1.7% 
2011 € 2,448.3 3.1% € 1,801.6 1.7% € 1,423.7 0.4% 
2012 € 2,469.5 0.9% € 1,802.1 0.0% € 1,389.9 -2.4% 
Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).     
Notes: billions of 2005 chained euro at the end of the year, % change on previous year. Germany: before 1989 West 




GEN2 Unemployment rate 
YEAR GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
1990 - 7.9 11.0 
1991 - 8.1 10.9 
1992 7.7 9.0 11.5 
1993 8.9 10.0 9.7 
1994 9.6 10.6 10.7 
1995 9.4 10.0 11.2 
1996 10.4 10.6 11.2 
1997 11.4 10.7 11.2 
1998 11.1 10.3 11.3 
1999 10.5 10.0 10.9 
2000 9.6 8.5 10.0 
2001 9.4 7.7 9.0 
2002 9.8 7.9 8.5 
2003 10.5 8.5 8.4 
2004 10.5 8.9 8.0 
2005 11.7 8.9 7.7 
2006 10.8 8.8 6.8 
2007 9.0 8.0 6.1 
2008 7.8 7.4 6.7 
2009 8.1 9.1 7.8 
2010 7.7 9.3 8.4 
2011 7.1 9.2 8.4 
2012 6.8 9.8 - 
Source: statistik.arbeitsagentur.de, www.insee.fr, seriestoriche.istat.it.   




GEN3 State budget 
YEAR GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
 Rev. Exp. Debt Rev. Exp. Debt Rev. Exp. Debt 
1990    47.1 49.6 35.2 41.2 52.6 94.3 
1991 43.2 46.1 39.5 47.7 50.7 36.0 42.4 53.7 97.6 
1992 44.5 47.0 42.0 47.4 52.0 39.7 44.7 55.0 104.7 
1993 45.0 48.0 45.8 48.6 54.8 46.0 46.0 56.0 115.0 
1994 45.3 47.7 48.0 48.6 54.1 49.2 44.2 53.2 121.2 
1995 45.4 54.9 55.6 48.9 54.4 55.4 44.8 52.2 120.9 
1996 45.7 49.1 58.5 50.5 54.5 58.0 45.2 52.2 120.3 
1997 45.5 48.2 59.8 50.9 54.2 59.4 47.2 50.0 117.4 
1998 45.7 48.0 60.5 50.1 52.8 59.5 46.0 48.9 114.3 
1999 46.6 48.2 61.3 50.8 52.6 58.9 45.9 47.9 113.1 
2000 46.2 45.1 60.2 50.2 51.7 57.4 45.0 45.9 108.6 
2001 44.5 47.6 59.1 50.0 51.7 56.9 44.5 47.7 108.3 
2002 44.1 47.9 60.7 49.6 52.9 59.0 44.0 47.1 105.4 
2003 44.3 48.5 64.4 49.3 53.4 63.2 44.4 48.1 104.1 
2004 43.3 47.1 66.2 49.6 53.3 65.0 44.0 47.5 103.7 
2005 43.6 46.9 68.5 50.6 53.6 66.7 43.4 47.9 105.7 
2006 43.7 45.3 67.9 50.6 53.0 64.1 45.0 48.5 106.3 
2007 43.7 43.5 65.4 49.9 52.6 64.2 46.0 47.6 103.3 
2008 44.0 44.1 66.8 49.9 53.3 68.2 45.9 48.6 106.1 
2009 45.1 48.2 74.5 49.2 56.8 79.2 46.5 51.9 116.4 
2010 43.6 47.7 82.5 49.5 56.6 82.3 46.1 50.4 119.3 
2011 44.5 45.3 80.5 50.8 56.0 86.0 46.1 49.8 120.8 
2012 45.2 45.0 82.0    47.7 50.7 127.0 
AVER. 44.7 47.2 62.3 49.5 53.4 59.5 45.1 50.1 111.0 
Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).     
Notes: state revenues over GDP, state expenditures over GDP, gross debt over GDP.  
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GEN4 State employees 
YEAR GERMANY % FRANCE % ITALY % 
1990 7,044.6  4,257.7 18.3%   
1991 6,737.8 17.4%     
1992 6,657.2 17.4%     
1993 6,502.7 17.3%     
1994 6,094.3 16.2%     
1995 5,371.0 14.2%     
1996 5,276.5 14.0% 4,598.9 19.9%   
1997 5,163.8 13.7%     
1998 5,068.6 13.3% 4,699.6 19.7% 3,602.4 17.1% 
1999 4,969.4 12.9%   3,593.9 16.9% 
2000 4,908.9 12.5% 4,831.0 19.2% 3,504.2 16.2% 
2001 4,821.1 12.3% 4,839.2 19.1% 3,520.4 16.0% 
2002 4,809.1 12.3% 5,046.1 19.8% 3,478.4 15.6% 
2003 4,779.4 12.3% 5,157.6 20.2% 3,454.2 15.5% 
2004 4,669.9 12.0% 5,219.3 20.4% 3,456.5 15.4% 
2005 4,599.4 11.8% 5,274.0 20.4% 3,470.6 15.4% 
2006 4,576.0 11.7% 5,316.6 20.3% 3,429.3 14.9% 
2007 4,540.6 11.4% 5,364.3 20.3% 3,436.8 14.8% 
2008 4,505.1 11.2% 5,363.9 20.4% 3,376.2 14.4% 
2009 4,547.6 11.3% 5,386.0 20.6% 3,315.2 14.4% 
2010 4,586.1 11.3% 5,379.6 20.5% 3,283.0 14.4% 
2011 4,602.9 11.2% 5,358.8 19.9%   
2012 4,617.4 11.1%     
2013       
Source: my elaborations from www.destatis.de, www.insee.fr, www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr, 
www.contoannuale.tesoro.it, www.istat.it.     












GER1 Name, shorthand and symbol  
















Date Name Shorthand Logo 
3-4.07.2004 Wahlalternative Arbeit & 
soziale Gerechtigkeit e.V. 
WASG 
 





Date Name Shorthand Logo 
17.7.2005 Die Linkspartei.PDS Die Linke. 
 




















GER2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013 
WEIMARER REPUBLIK KPD USPD SPD OTHERS TOTAL 
1919 - 7.6% 37.9% 0.0% 45.5% 
      
1920 2.1% 17.9% 21.7% 0.0% 41.7% 
5.1924 12.6% - 20.5% 0.0% 33.1% 
12.1924 8.9% - 26.0% 0.0% 34.9% 
1928 10.6% - 29.8% 0.0% 40.4% 
1930 13.1% - 24.5% 0.0% 37.6% 
7.1932 14.3% - 21.6% 0.0% 35.9% 
11.1932 16.9% - 20.4% 0.0% 37.3% 
1933 12.3% - 18.3% 0.0% 30.6% 
AVERAGE 11.4% 2.2% 22.9% 0.0% 36.4% 
BRD (WEST) KPD/DKP  SPD OTHERS TOTAL 
1949 5.7%  29.2% 0.0% 35.0% 
1953 2.2%  28.8% 0.0% 31.0% 
1957 0.0%  31.7% 0.2% 31.9% 
1961 1.9%  36.2% 0.0% 38.2% 
1965 1.3%  39.3% 0.0% 40.6% 
1969 0.6%  42.7% 0.0% 43.3% 
1972 0.3%  45.8% 0.0% 46.2% 
1976 0.3%  42.6% 0.1% 43.0% 
1980 0.2%  42.9% 0.0% 43.1% 
1983 0.2%  38.2% 0.0% 38.4% 
1987 0.0%  37.0% 0.0% 37.1% 
AVERAGE 1.2%  37.7% 0.0% 38.9% 
BRD (UNIFIED) PDS/DIE 
LINKE 
 SPD OTHERS TOTAL 
1990 2.4%  33.5% 0.0% 35.9% 
1994 4.4%  36.4% 0.0% 40.8% 
1998 5.1%  40.9% 0.0% 46.1% 
2002 4.0%  38.5% 0.0% 42.5% 
2005 8.7%  34.2% 0.1% 43.1% 
2009 11.9%  23.0% 0.1% 35.0% 
2013 8.6%  25.7% 0.1% 34.4% 
AVERAGE 6.4%  33.2% 0.0% 39.7% 
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de; www.gonschior.de/weimar/index.htm; 
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.  





GER3 Radical left vote, 1946-1947 regional elections 






Baden 6.1946 1,685,371 1,161,185 116,665 10.0% 
KPD 
Hamburg 10.1946 958,454 701,951 72,925 10.4% KPD 
Bremen 10.1946 243,410 193,547 22,262 11.5% KPD 
Hessen 12.1946 2,380,109 1,609,388 171,592 10.7% KPD 
Bayern 12.1946 4,210,636 3,048,337 185,023 6.1% KPD 
Schleswig-
Holstein 4.1947 1,594,794 1,072,715 50,398 4.7% 
KPD 
Niedersachsen 4.1947 3,956,675 2,459,479 138,977 5.7% KPD 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 4.1947 7,860,608 5,028,892 702,410 14.0% 
KPD 
Rheinland-Pfalz 5.1947 1,666,547 1,161,052 100,739 8.7% KPD 
Baden 5.1947 694,953 427,824 31,703 7.4% KPD 
Hohenzollern 5.1947 615,812 378,333 27,571 7.3% KPD 
WEST 1946-1947 25,867,369 17,242,703 1,620,265 9.4% KPD 
SAARLAND 10.1947 520,855 449,565 37,936 8.4% KPS 
BERLIN 10.1946 2,307,122 2,085,338 412,582 19.8% SED (w/o SPD) 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 10.1946 1,308,727 1,113,748 551,594 49.5% 
SED (incl. SPD) 
Brandenburg 10.1946 1,655,980 1,446,819 634,787 43.9% SED (incl. SPD) 
Sachsen-Anhalt 10.1946 2,700,633 2,330,511 1,068,703 45.9% SED (incl. SPD) 
Sachsen 10.1946 3,803,416 3,290,995 1,616,068 49.1% SED (incl. SPD) 
Thüringen 10.1946 1,986,081 1,661,859 818,967 49.3% SED (incl. SPD) 
EAST 10.1946 11,454,837 9,843,932 4,690,119 47.6% SED (incl. SPD) 
GERMANY 1946-1947 40,150,183 29,621,538 6,760,902 22.8% KPD+KPS+SED 
Sources: my elaboration from www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de  
 
 
GER4 SED-PDS vote, 18.03.1990 Volkskammer election 
District Votes % MPs 
GDR (tot) 1,892,329 16.4% 66 
Berlin 267,834 30.2% 9 
Cottbus 106,733 17.9% 4 
Dresden 176,629 14.8% 6 
Erfurt 85,764 9.9% 3 
Frankfurt 106,412 22.1% 4 
Gera 65,072 12.5% 2 
Halle  170,756 13.8% 6 
Karl-Marx-Stadt 149,176 11.3% 5 
Leipzig 135,718 14.5% 5 
Magdeburg 124,391 14.2% 4 
Neubrandenburg 108,586 25.8% 4 
Potsdam 129,627 16.6% 4 
Rostock 142,929 23.2% 5 
Schwerin 72,464 17.8% 3 
Suhl 50,235 12.6% 2 
Sources: www.wahlrecht.de  







GER5 GDR opinion polls: opinion toward the reunification 
 Strongly 
agrees 
Agrees Disagrees Strongly 
disagrees 
DDR1 (20-27 Nov 1989) 16% 32% 29% 23% 
DDR2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990) 40% 39% 15% 6% 
DDR3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990) 43% 41% 13% 3% 
DDR4 (end Apr 1990) 49% 36% 12% 3% 
Sources: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990).  
 
 
GER6 GDR opinion polls: voting intentions 





Poll 1 (20-27 Nov 1989) 0% 10% 6% 31% 17% 
Poll 2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990) 0% 13% 53% 12% 6% 
Poll 3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990) 1% 22% 34% 17% 2% 
Electoral results (18 Mar 1990) 5.3% 40.9% 21.9% 16.4% 4.9% 
Source: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990). 




GER7 Parliamentary elections, 1990-2013 (Bundestag) 
PARTY YEAR GERMANY EAST WEST GDR BRD 
N. VOTES       
DIE LINKE 2013 3,755,699 1,866,669  1,889,030  1,752,785 2,002,914 
OTHERS 2013 28,783 11,228 17,555   
DIE LINKE 2009 5,155,933 2,291 555  2,864,378  2,181,132 2,974,801 
OTHERS 2009 34,112 18,229 15,883   
DIE LINKE 2005 4,118,194 2,322,277  1,795,917  2,243,797 1,874,397 
OTHERS 2005 60,843 30,711 30,132   
PDS 2002 1,916,702 1,504,940   411,762  1,474,566 442,136 
OTHERS 2002 1,624 1,624 0   
PDS 1998 2,515,454 2,087,248   428,206  2,054,773 460,681 
OTHERS 1998 10,957 3,152 7,805   
PDS 1994 2,066,176 1,728,581   337,595  1,697,224 368,952 
OTHERS 1994 11,323 3,189 8,134   
PDS/LL 1990 1,129,578 1,019,965   109,613  1,003,631 125,947 
OTHERS 1990 8,596 6,774 1,822   
% electorate       
DIE LINKE 2013 6.06% 14.26% 3.87% 15.07% 3.98% 
DIE LINKE 2009 8.29% 17.02% 5.88% 18.13% 5.93% 
DIE LINKE 2005 6.66% 17.08% 3.72% 18.44% 3.77% 
PDS 2002 3.12% 11.06% 0.86% 12.13% 0.90% 
PDS 1998 4.14% 15.34% 0.91% 16.94% 0.95% 
PDS 1994 3.42% 12.78% 0.72% 14.16% 0.76% 
PDS/LL 1990 1.87% 7.35% 0.24% 8.15% 0.26% 
% valid votes       
DIE LINKE 2013 8.59% 21.24% 5.41% 22.66% 5.56% 
OTHERS 2013 0.07% 0.13% 0.05%   
DIE LINKE 2009 11.89% 26.45% 8.25% 28.52% 8.33% 
OTHERS 2009 0.08% 0.21% 0.05%   
DIE LINKE 2005 8.71% 23.30% 4.81% 25.29% 4.88% 
OTHERS 2005 0.13% 0.31% 0.08%   
PDS 2002 3.99% 15.30% 1.08% 16.93% 1.13% 
OTHERS 2002 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%   
PDS 1998 5.10% 19.49% 1.11% 21.58% 1.16% 
OTHERS 1998 0.02% 0.03% 0.02%   
PDS 1994 4.39% 17.65% 0.90% 19.76% 0.96% 
OTHERS 1994 0.02% 0.03% 0.02%   
PDS/LL 1990 2.43% 9.88% 0.30% 11.11% 0.34% 
OTHERS 1990 0.02% 0.07% 0.01%   
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de 




GER8 European Parliament elections 
Date Votes % Seats % 
7.06.2009 1,969,239 7.5% 8 8.1% 
13.06.2004 1,579.109 6.1% 7 7.1% 
13.06.1999 1,567,745 5.8% 6 6.1% 
12.06.1994 1,670,316 4.7% 0 0.0% 
18.06.1989 - - * - 
Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de 






































Total seats 663 662 672 669 603 614 622 630 
Radical left 24 17 30 36 2 54 76 64 
Direct 
mandates 
- 1 4 4 2 3 16 4 
Seating - 9 8 17 1 13 40 51 
New - 8 22 19 1 41 36 13 
Male 13 9 17 15 0 29 36 28 
Female 11 8 13 21 2 25 40 36 
East 24 16 25 30 2 30 36 31 
West - 1 5 6 0 24 40 33 
Source: my elaboration from www.bundestag.de 
Notes: MPs elected at the beginning of the legislature. 11
th
 legislature: after reunification the old BRD Bundestag 
was enlarged to Volkskammer representatives. The categories East and West refer to the region of election; it must 
be noted that some Western-born members were put on Eastern electoral lists in order to facilitate their election. 
The 1990 numbers refer to the Volkskammer representatives sent to the Bundestag after the reunification. 
 
GER10 Radical left members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013 








1990 2045 86 4.21% 2.80% 0 
1991 2045 86 4.21% 2.79% 0 
1992 2045 86 4.21% 2.77% 0 
1993 2045 86 4.21% 2.77% 0 
1994 1975 118 5.97% 4.35% 0 
1995 1967 129 6.56% 4.35% 0 
1996 1967 129 6.56% 4.34% 0 
1997 1967 129 6.56% 4.34% 0 
1998 1984 135 6.80% 4.41% 0 
1999 1917 151 7.88% 5.31% 0 
2000 1917 151 7.88% 5.31% 0 
2001 1917 151 7.88% 5.45% 0 
2002 1916 144 7.52% 5.22% 0 
2003 1916 144 7.52% 5.18% 0 
2004 1840 159 8.64% 5.72% 0 
2005 1840 159 8.64% 5.70% 0 
2006 1841 150 8.15% 5.53% 0 
2007 1848 157 8.50% 5.59% 7 
2008 1833 182 9.93% 6.79% 32 
2009 1825 193 10.58% 6.92% 49 
2010 1875 204 10.88% 8.22% 60 
2011 1835 203 11.06% 8.12% 58 
2012 1885 184 9.76% 6.54% 39 
2013 1870 173 9.25% 5.84% 28 
AVERAGE 1921 145 7.64% 5.18% 11 
Source: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de 
Notes: regional assemblies (Landtage). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the numbers are weighted 
for the people entitled to vote (Wahlberechtigte) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from the fact 








GER11 Governments, 1949-2013 
BT YEARS CHANCELLOR COALITION SEATS 
1 1949 – 1953 Konrad Adenauer, CDU  Union + FDP + DP 208/402 
2 1953 – 1957 Konrad Adenauer, CDU  UNION + FDP + DP + GB/BHE 285/487  
3 1957 – 1961 Konrad Adenauer, CDU  UNION + DP 287/497 
4 1961 – 1963 
1963 - 1965 
Konrad Adenauer, CDU  
Ludwig Erhard, CDU 




5 1965 – 1966 
1966 - 1969 
Ludwig Erhard, CDU 
Kurt Georg Kiesinger, CDU  
UNION + FDP 
UNION + SPD 
294/496 
447/496 
6 1969 – 1972 Willy Brandt, SPD SPD + FDP 254/496 
7 1972 – 1974 
1974 - 1976 
Willy Brandt, SPD 
Helmut Schmidt, SPD 
SPD + FDP 
SPD + FDP 
271/496 
271/496 
8 1976 – 1980 Helmut Schmidt, SPD  SPD + FDP 253/496 
9 1980 – 1982 
1982 - 1983 
Helmut Schmidt, SPD 
Helmut Kohl, CDU 
SPD + FDP 
UNION + FDP 
271/497 
279/497 
10 1983 – 1987 Helmut Kohl, CDU  CDU + FDP 278/498 
11 1987 – 1990 Helmut Kohl, CDU  CDU + FDP 269/497 
12 1990 – 1992 
1992 - 1994 
Helmut Kohl, CDU 
 Helmut Kohl, CDU 
CDU + FDP 
CDU + FDP 
398/662 
398/662 
13 1994 – 1998 Helmut Kohl, CDU CDU + FDP 341/672 
14 1998 – 2002 Gerhard Schröder, SPD  SPD + Grünen 342/669 
15 2002 – 2005 Gerhard Schröder, SPD  SPD + Grünen 306/603 
16 2005 – 2007 
2007 - 2009 
Angela Merkel, CDU 
Angela Merkel, CDU  
UNION + SPD 
UNION + SPD 
448/614 
448/614 
17 2009 – 2013 Angela Merkel, CDU UNION + FDP 332/622 
Source: my elaboration from www.bundesregierung.de and www.bundestag.de  
Notes: BT = legislature number. Union = CDU and CSU. 
 
 
GER12 Governmental involvement of DIE LINKE – federal level 
Period Government Position 
11
th
 Bundestag (1990) CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl) Opposition  
12
th
 Bundestag (1990-1994) CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl) Opposition 
13
th
 Bundestag (1994-1998) CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl) Opposition 
14
th
 Bundestag (1998-2002) SPD-Grünen (Schröder) Opposition 
15
th
 Bundestag (2002-2005) SPD-Grünen (Schröder) Opposition 
16
th
 Bundestag (2005-2009) CDU-CSU-SPD (Merkel) Opposition (*) 
17
th
 Bundestag (2009-2013) CDU-CSU-FDP (Merkel) Opposition 










1990 0 0.00%  
1991 0 0.00%  
1992 0 0.00%  
1993 0 0.00%  
1994 1 3.58% SA (ext.) 
1995 1 3.58% SA (ext.) 
1996 1 3.58% SA (ext.) 
1997 1 3.58% SA (ext.) 
1998 2 5.88% SA (ext.), MV 
1999 2 5.87% SA (ext.), MV 
2000 2 5.87% SA (ext.), MV 
2001 3 9.84% SA (ext.), MV, BE (ext.) then BE 
2002 2 6.31% MV, BE 
2003 2 6.27% MV, BE 
2004 2 6.26% MV, BE 
2005 2 6.24% MV, BE 
2006 1 3.94% BE 
2007 1 3.94% BE 
2008 1 3.92% BE 
2009 2 7.36% BE, BB 
2010 2 7.36% BE, BB, * 
2011 1 3.43% BB, * 
2012 1 3.43% BB 
2013 1 3.43% BB 
Notes: Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (Wahlberechtigte). Ext. = 
external support. SA = Sachsen-Anhalt. MV = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. BB = Brandenburg. BE = Berlin. * = the 
party also partially supported a minority SPD-Grünen government in the populous Western region of Nordrhein-
Westfalen (21.4% of the population). 
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GER14 Radical left party membership, 1989-2012 
YEAR SED/PDS/ 
L.PDS 











1988 2,300,000       
1989 1,700,000       
1990 280,882   24,500 305,382 12.7% 0.2% 
1991 172,579   13,500 186,079 8.4% 0.3% 
1992 146,742   10,700 157,442 7.6% 0.4% 
1993 131,406   10,000 141,406 7.1% 0.7% 
1994 123,751   9,000 132,751 6.8% 1.5% 
1995 114,940   9,000 123,940 6.5% 1.7% 
1996 105,029   9,300 114,329 6.2% 1.8% 
1997 98,624   9,700 108,324 6.0% 2.1% 
1998 94,627   10,000 104,627 5.8% 3.1% 
1999 88,594   8,800 97,394 5.5% 4.3% 
2000 83,478   8,000 91,478 5.3% 4.7% 
2001 77,845   7,500 85,345 5.1% 5.4% 
2002 70,805   7,500 78,305 4.8% 6.6% 
2003 65,753   7,700 73,453 4.6% 6.7% 
2004 61,385   7,500 68,885 4.5% 7.0% 
2005 61,270 12,760  7,800 81,830 5.4% 9.7% 
2006 60,388 8,944  7,500 76,832 5.3% 12.0% 
2007  (8,563) 71,711 7,500 70,648 5.6% 28.8% 
2008   75,968 7,500 83,468 6.0% 35.1% 
2009   78,046 7,000 85,046 6.1% 37.9% 
2010   73,658 7,000 80,658 5.9% 37.3% 
2011   69,458 7,000 76,458 5.7% 37.5% 
2012   63,761 6,700 70,461 5.4% 36.7% 
Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013), Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 2008, 2009), Bundesministerium 
des Innern (1991-2011).  
Notes: Members at the end of the year (WASG 2007: 15.06.2007). Figures for "OTHERS" are police estimates for 




GER15 Finances of political parties (nominal, €) 









share of state 
financing on 
income 
1990  € 454,792,682    
1991 € 383,240,067 € 31,014,823 8.1% €  493,012,146 5.7% 
1992 € 325,003,987 € 11,511,157 3.5% €  224,310,925 5.4% 
1993 € 345,738,223 € 13,976,499 4.0% €  223,826,431 21.0% 
1994 € 432,712,992 € 17,541,265 4.1% €   10,239,180 32.3% 
1995 € 353,594,488 € 20,867,991 5.9% €   15,786,929 36.2% 
1996 € 355,343,296 € 18,539,067 5.2% €   19,691,176 32.7% 
1997 € 350,182,312 € 18,831,080 5.4% €   22,478,477 33.4% 
1998 € 386,574,092 € 19,748,742 5.1% €   17,036,499 32.4% 
1999 € 392,168,403 € 20,827,352 5.3% €   15,175,793 35.7% 
2000 € 374,721,082 € 20,112,806 5.4% €   18,337,489 35.1% 
2001 € 395,636,210 € 20,491,171 5.2% €   19,280,566 35.4% 
2002 € 426,604,483 € 21,914,483 5.1% €   16,623,167 32.7% 
2003 € 443,095,189 € 22,159,189 5.0% €   20,704,390 39.4% 
2004 € 437,304,973 € 21,049,973 4.8% €   18,580,425 37.5% 
2005 € 452,445,153 € 23,580,153 5.2% €   17,749,555 36.7% 
2006 € 431,744,105 € 24,323,105 5.6% €   20,585,395 37.4% 
2007 € 423,129,716 € 22,433,716 5.3% €   23,003,682 39.3% 
2008 € 450,491,936 € 25,184,936 5.6% €   25,200,464 37.6% 
2009 € 479,082,930 € 27,260,387 5.7% €   18,700,412 39.3% 
2010 € 413,678,861 € 27,851,633 6.7% €   23,590,664 38.9% 
Source: my elaboration from Deutscher Bundestag (1992-2011)  
Notes: Major parties: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, GRÜNEN, PDS, WASG, DIE LINKE. DIE LINKE: includes PDS and WASG. 
Before 2002: figures converted into Euros at the official exchange rates (DM: 1.95583; DDR-M: 3.91166).  
  
 
GER16 Party leaders  
YEAR NAME 
PDS President (Vorsitzender) 
1989-1993 Gregor Gysi 
1993-2000 Lothar Bisky 
2000-2003 Gabriele (Gabi) Zimmer 
2003-2007 Lothar Bisky 
WASG Executive committee (Geschäftsführender 
Vorstand) 
2004-2007 Collective leadership (4 people) 
DIE LINKE. President (Vorsitzender) 
2007-2010 Lothar Bisky 
 Oskar Lafontaine 
2010-2012 Gesine Lötzsch 
 Klaus Ernst 
2012-present Katja Kipping 




GER17 Party members, DIE LINKE 
Year Men Women >30 30-59 >59 
1990 - -    
1991 56.1% 43.9%    
1992 - -    
1993 - -    
1994 54.6% 45.4%    
1995 - -    
1996 - -    
1997 53.9% 46.1%    
1998 54.0% 46.0%    
1999 54.7% 45.3% 2.3% 29.4% 68.3% 
2000 54.4% 45.6% 1.8% 31.2% 67.0% 
2001 54.3% 45.7% 2.3% 29.4% 68.3% 
2002 54.2% 45.8% 3.6% 27.7% 68.7% 
2003 54.8% 45.2% 3.3% 29.1% 67.6% 
2004 54.2% 45.8% 2.7% 27.4% 70.0% 
2005 55.1% 44.9% 3.3% 26.3% 70.4% 
2006 55.6% 44.4% 3.9% 28.0% 68.1% 
2007 60.9% 39.1% 6.1% 38.7% 55.2% 
2008 62.4% 37.6%    
2009 62.8% 37.2%    
2010 62.7% 37.3%    
2011 62.7% 37.3%    
2012 62.3% 37.7%    
Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013). 





ITA1 Name, shorthand and symbol 






   
13.04.1978 Democrazia Proletaria DP 
   
Date Name Shorthand Logo 




    





 27.7.2008 Partito della 
Rifondazione 




Date Name Shorthand Logo 
14.06.1995 Movimento dei 
Comunisti Unitari 
MCU 
   
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
11.10.1998 Partito dei Comunisti 
Italiani 
PdCI 
   
Date Name Shorthand Logo 




Date Name Shorthand Logo 
5.05.2007 Sinistra Democratica SD 
 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 




Date Name Shorthand Logo 
16.03.2009 
 








Date Name Shorthand Logo 
5.12.2009 Federazione della 
Sinistra 
FdS 
   
 
 
ITA2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013 
KINGDOM OF ITALY PCd'I PSI (+PSU) OTHERS TOTAL 
1919 - 32.3% 2.0% 34.3% 
     
1921 4.6% 24.7% 0.6% 29.9% 
1924 3.7% 10.9% 0.0% 14.7% 
AVERAGE 4.2% 17.8% 0.3% 22.3% 
"FIRST" REPUBLIC PCI PSI OTHERS TOTAL 
1946 18.9% 20.7% 0.1% 39.7% 
1948 15.5%* 15.5%* 0.1% 31.1% 
1953 22.6% 12.7% 1.5% 36.8% 
1958 22.7% 14.2% 0.6% 37.5% 
1963 25.3% 13.8% 0.0% 39.1% 
1968 26.9% 14.5% 4.5% 45.8% 
1972 27.1% 9.6% 3.3% 40.0% 
1976 34.4% 9.6% 1.5% 45.5% 
1979 30.4% 9.8% 2.2% 42.4% 
1983 29.9% 11.4% 1.5% 42.8% 
1987 26.6% 14.3% 1.7% 42.5% 
AVERAGE 25.5% 13.3% 1.5% 40.3% 
"SECOND" REPUBLIC RADICAL LEFT PDS-DS-PD   
1992 5.6% 16.1%  21.7% 
1994 6.1% 20.4%  26.4% 
1996 8.6% 21.1%  29.6% 
2001 6.7% 16.6%  23.3% 
2006 8.2% 31.3%  39.4% 
2008 4.5%** 33.2%  37.6% 
2013 5.7%** 25.4%  31.2% 
AVERAGE 6.5% 23.4%  29.9% 
Sources: my elaboration from Corbetta & Piretti (2009). 
Notes: shares of valid votes. The 1924 election were marred fascist violences and * the two parties ran common 
lists and their relative weight cannot be determined. ** the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin 









ITA3 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (Camera dei Deputati) 
Year Party Votes % Seats % 
25.02.2013 TOT 1,949,768 5.73% 37 5.9% 
 SEL 1,089,442 3.20% 37  
 RC * 765,172 2.25% 0  
 PCL 89,995 0.26% 0  
 PdAC 5,159 0.02% 0  
13.04.2008 TOT 1,623,072 4.45% 0 0.0% 
 SA 1,124,298 3.08% 0  
 PCL 208,296 0.57% 0  
 SC 168,916 0.46% 0  
 PBC 119,569 0.33% 0  
 PdAC 1,993 0.01% 0  
09.04.2006 TOT 3,113,591 8.16% 57 9.1% 
 PRC 2,229,464 5.84% 41  
 PdCI 884,127 2.32% 16  
13.05.2001 TOT 2,494,762 6.72% 21 3.3% 
 PRC 1,868,659 5.03% 11  
 PdCI 620,859 1.67% 10  
 Comunismo 5,224 0.01% 0  
21.04.1996 TOT 3,213,748 8.57% 35 5.6% 
 PRC 3,213,748 8.57% 35  
27.03.1994 TOT 2,343,946 6.05% 39 6.2% 
 PRC 2,343,946 6.05% 39  
05.04.1992 TOT 2,201,428 5.61% 35 5.6% 
 PRC 2,201,428 5.61% 35  
14.06.1987 TOT 10,892,545 28.2% 185 28.1% 
 PCI 10,250,644 26.58% 177  
 DP 641,901 1.66% 8  
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige are counted 
separately and cannot be added), list vote. * the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2008: Verdi; 




ITA4 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (Senato della Repubblica) 
Year Party Votes % Seats % 
25.02.2013 TOT 1,591,076 5.20% 7 2.2% 
 SEL 912,308 2.98% 7  
 RC * 550,007 1.80% 0  
 PCL 113,923 0.37% 0  
 PCI M-L 9,604 0.03% 0  
 PdAC 5,185 0.02% 0  
13.04.2008 TOT 1,484,270 4.53% 0 0.0% 
 SA * 1,053,228 3.21% 0  
 PCL 180,442 0.55% 0  
 SC 136,679 0.42% 0  
 PBC 105,827 0.32% 0  
 PCI M-L 8,094 0.02% 0  
09.04.2006 TOT 3,967,305 11.61% 32 10.2% 
 PRC 2,518,361 7.37% 27  
 Insieme con l'Unione 
(PdCI + Verdi) * 
1,423,003 4.17% 5  
 PCI M-L 25,941 0.08%   
13.05.2001 TOT 1,708,707 5.05% 6 1.9% 
 PRC 1,708,707 5.04% 4  
 PdCI - - 2  
 Comunismo 2,159 0.01% 0  
21.04.1996 Progressisti (PRC) 940,655 2.9% 11 3.5% 
27.03.1994 Progressisti (PRC) - - 18 5.7% 
05.04.1992 PRC 2,171,950 6.5% 20 6.4% 
14.06.1987 TOT 9,675,246 29.85% 102 32.3% 
 PCI 9,181,579 28.33% 101  
 DP 493,667 1.52% 1  
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be 




ITA5 European parliament elections 
Year Party Votes % Seats % 
07.06.2009 TOT 2,162,215 7.06% 0 0.0% 
 LCA (PRC + PdCI) 1,037,862 3.39% 0  
 SeL 857,822 3.13% 0  
 PCL 166,531 0.54% 0  
12.06.2004 TOT 2,757,389 8.48% 7 8.97% 
 PRC 1,969,776 6.06% 5  
 PdCI 787,613 2.42% 2  
13.06.1999 TOT 1,955,144 6.29% 6 6.68% 
 PRC 1,328,515 4.28% 4  
 PdCI 622,259 2.00% 2  
 COBAS 4,370 0.01% 0  
12.06.1994 PRC 2,004,716 6.09% 5 5.74% 
18.06.1989 TOT 10,048,008 28.86% 23 28.39% 
 PCI 9,598,369 27.58% 22  
 DP 449,639 1.29% 1  
Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be 






































Total seats 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 
Radical left 13 35 39 35 21 57 0 37 
Dependent - 0 28 15 9 25 0 37 
Seating 13 5 9 18 12 12 0 37 
New - 30 30 17 9 45 0 0 
Male 11 30 30 27 14 42 0 27 
Female 2 5 9 8 7 15 0 10 
Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
Notes: Beginning of the legislature. * PCI and DP members who defected to the PRC. Dependent: seats won because 
of an alliance with the centre-left (which would not have been lost, ceteris paribus, by running alone). 
 
 
ITA7 Members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013 






1991 1,067 12 1.12% 1.33% 
1992 1,067 12 1.12% 1.33% 
1993 1,065 18 1.69% 1.51% 
1994 1,065 22 2.07% 1.64% 
1995 1,090 63 5.78% 6.09% 
1996 1,090 68 6.24% 6.57% 
1997 1,090 68 6.24% 6.57% 
1998 1,090 66 6.06% 6.55% 
1999 1,090 65 5.96% 6.51% 
2000 1,071 62 5.79% 6.23% 
2001 1,071 60 5.60% 6.03% 
2002 1,071 60 5.60% 6.03% 
2003 1,071 61 5.70% 6.03% 
2004 1,076 65 6.04% 6.16% 
2005 1,120 83 7.41% 7.69% 
2006 1,120 79 7.05% 7.29% 
2007 1,120 79 7.05% 7.29% 
2008 1,117 76 6.80% 7.17% 
2009 1,112 73 6.56% 7.07% 
2010 1,106 47 4.25% 4.13% 
2011 1,106 47 4.25% 4.13% 
2012 1,106 47 4.25% 4.17% 
2013 1,066 43 4.03% 3.69% 
AVERAGE 1,089 55 5.07% 5.27% 
Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/  
Notes: all regional assemblies (ordinary and autonomous regions). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = 
the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (aventi diritto) in each region (to eliminate the distortions 














ITA8 Governments and coalitions 
Leg. YEARS PRIME MINISTER POLITICAL 
TREND 
COALITION SEATS 
10 1989-1991 Giulio Andreotti(VI), DC Old centre-left DC, PSI, PRI, minor 381/630 
 1991-1992 Giulio Andreotti(VII), DC Old centre-left DC, PSI, minor 360/630 
11 1992-1993 Giuliano Amato (I), PSI Old centre-left DC, PSI, minor 335/630 
 1993-1994 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, ind. Technocratic 
(centre+left) 
DC, PDS*, PSI, PRI, 
minor 
485/630 
12 1994-1995 Silvio Berlusconi (I), FI Right-wing FI, AN, LN, CCD, 
minor 
366/630 
 1995-1996 Lamberto Dini, ind. ** Technocratic 
(centre+right) 




13 1996-1998 Romano Prodi (I), ind. Centre-left PDS, PPI, PRC*, RI, 
minor  
337/630 
 1998-2001 Massimo D'Alema (I&II), DS 
Giuliano Amato (II), ind. 
Centre-left DS, PPI, DEM, 
UDEUR, minor  
337/630 
14 2001-2006 Silvio Berlusconi (II&III), FI Right-wing FI, AN, LN, CCD-
CDU, minor 
368/616 
15 2006-2008 Romano Prodi (II), FED Centre-left FED, PRC, IDV, 
minor 
349/630 
16 2008-2011 Silvio Berlusconi (IV), PDL Right-wing PDL, LN, minor 344/630 
 2011-2013 Mario Monti, ind. Technocratic 
(grand coalition) 
PDL*, PD*, UDC*, 
FLI*, minor* 
541/630 
17 2013-pres. Enrico Letta, PD Grand coalition PD, PDL, SC, minor 457/630 
Sources: my elaboration from http://www.governo.it/ and http://legislature.camera.it/ 
Notes: Leg = legislature number. Seats = notional seats of the governing coalition in the first chamber (real seats 
change over time as result of shifts of parties and individual deputies). Minor = parties with less than 20 seats. * = 
external support. ** Dini relied initially on the abstentions of the right-wing and later on that of the PRC and others.  
 
ITA9 Governmental involvement, national level 





10 1991-1992 Old centre-left PRC Opposition  
11 1992-1994 Old centre-left PRC Opposition  
12 1994-1995 Right-wing PRC Opposition  
 1995-1996 Technocratic PRC Opposition * 16 MPs external support (CU) 
13 1996-1998 Centre-left PRC External support 1 MP opposition (COBAS) 
 1998-2001 Centre-left PRC Opposition  
14 2001-2006 Right-wing PRC, 
PdCI 
Opposition  
15 2006-2008 Centre-left PRC, 
PdCI, SD 
Government 1 MP external support then 
opposition (SC)  
16 2008-2011 Right-wing n.p. n.p.  
 2011-2013 Grand coalition n.p. n.p.  
17 2013-pres. Grand coalition SEL Opposition  











1991 0 0.00%  
1992 0 0.00%  
1993 0 0.00%  
1994 0 0.00%  
1995 5 16.19% UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL 
1996 5 16.12% UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL 
1997 5 16.12% UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL 
1998 7 27.99% UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC, SAR 
1999 6 25.16% UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC, 
2000 8 37.54% ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, MOL, SIC 
2001 6 27.92% ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS 
2002 6 27.92% ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS 
2003 7 30.05% ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI, 
2004 8 32.95% ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI, SAR 
2005 14 65.49% PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, 
ABR, FRI, SAR 
2006 14 65.39% PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, 
ABR, FRI, SAR 
2007 14 65.39% PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, 
ABR, FRI, SAR 
2008 12 60.71% PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR 
2009 12 57.79% PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR 
2010 6 25.19% LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS 
2011 6 25.19% LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS 
2012 6 25.43% LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS 
2013 9 37.77% LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, LAZ, PUG, BAS, MOL, FRI 
Notes: Regions where at least one radical left party (PRC, PdCI, SEL) participates or provides external support to the 





ITA11 Radical left membership 
YEAR PRC PdCI SEL TOT 
1991 112,835   112,835 
1992 117,511   117,511 
1993 120,911   120,911 
1994 113,495   113,495 
1995 115,984   115,984 
1996 127,610   127,610 
1997 130,509   130,509 
1998 117,137 ?  127,479* 
1999 96,195 28,325  124,520 
2000 90,422 25,614  116,036 
2001 91,933 26,184  118,117 
2002 89,124 26,700  115,824 
2003 85,770 30,932  116,702 
2004 97,629 34,782  132,411 
2005 92,752 35,128  127,880 
2006 93,196 43,127  136,323 
2007 87,826 31,036  118,862 
2008 71,203 29,316  100,519 
2009 46,449 24,015 ? 104,388* 
2010 40,770 22,000 45,635 108,405 
2011 37,241 20,164 36,589 93,994 
2012 37,901 12,600 32,947 77,448 
Source: my elaboration from internal party data (PRC, PdCI, SEL). 
Notes: End of the year. Figures for other left-wing splits (COBAS, CCA, PCL, SC) are not available, but were never 
above 3,000 members. * hypothetical figure based on a uniform trend between previous and following year (as new 




ITA12 Finances (nominal, €) 








1997 € 8,660,248 € 8,660,248 € 7,855,204 € 7,855,204 
1998 € 6,646,599 € 6,646,599 € 9,032,542 € 9,032,542 
1999 € 9,539,992 € 5,998,861 € 11,208,815 € 9,540,401 
2000 € 10,686,136 € 7,300,129 € 11,924,687 € 11,419,738 
2001 € 9,241,238 € 6,781,742 € 12,427,736 € 12,293,001 
2002 € 9,645,437 € 7,012,238 € 14,537,352 € 13,795,539 
2003 € 10,408,181 € 7,706,394 € 15,051,979 € 13,944,911 
2004 € 14,024,798 € 10,090,247 € 15,334,696 € 14,037,760 
2005 € 18,221,107 € 13,050,458 € 16,772,441 € 15,284,771 
2006 € 24,147,511 € 18,538,220 € 18,800,123 € 17,151,785 
2007 € 27,359,363 € 21,595,251 € 19,002,986 € 17,253,852 
2008 € 20,418,794 € 15,844,506 € 16,499,375 € 16,751,472 
2009 € 11,993,635 € 9,232,292 € 15,456,562 € 15,246,023 
2010 € 12,008,729 € 7,596,707 € 18,160,384 € 17,783,818 
2011 € 3,784,047 € 1,679,021 € 14,181,707 € 14,186,405 
Source: my elaboration from Gazzetta Ufficiale (2000-2012). 




























ITA13 Organisational splits of the PRC 













L. Magri, F. Crucianelli 
Support for the Dini government 
























- - 5,244 
(2001) 
G. Bacciardi, L. Mazzei 
















A. Cossutta, O. Diliberto 
Support for the Prodi government 








- - 1,993 
(2008) 
F. Ricci 
Rejection of the Prodi government 












Rejection of the Prodi government 
Survives as a small grouplet 
Dec 
2007 









S. Cannavò, F. Turigliatto 
Rejection of the Prodi government 
Breaks up in 2013 
Jan 
2009 














L'Ernesto - ca. 
1,000 
- - F. Sorini, F. Giannini 
Re-unification with the PdCI 
In 2011 merges with the PdCI 




ITA14 Party leaders  
YEAR NAME 
PRC Secretary (Segretario) 
1991-1994 Sergio Garavini 
1994-2006 Fausto Bertinotti 
2006-2008 Franco Giordano 
2008-present Paolo Ferrero 
PdCI Secretary (Segretario) 
1999-2000 Armando Cossutta – President (Presidente) 
2000-2013 Oliviero Diliberto 
2013-present Cesare Procaccini 
SEL President (Presidente) 
2009-2010 Fabio Mussi 








ITA15 Sociology of members 
 1946 1954 1959 1966 1977 1988 1999 2006 
GENDER PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PRC PRC 
Men 80.5% 73.2% 74.0% 76.3% 75.8% 71.4% 74.5% 70.6% 
Women 19.5% 26.8% 26.0% 23.7% 24.2% 28.6% 25.5% 29.4% 
AGE         
>26    6.8% 11.2% 3.2% 11.7% 13.7% 
26-40    35.0% 32.7% 24.1%   
>40    58.2% 56.1% 72.7%   
PROFESSION         
Unemployed       9.8% 7.6% 
Blue-collar worker 64.9% 57.8% 55.2% 51.7% 46.1% 40.0% 22.8% 16.1% 
White-collar 
worker 
4.5% 2.7% 2.5% 3.1% 9.2% 10.7% 18.0% 22.4% 
Peasant 15.3% 16.1% 17.4% 13.1% 5.5% 2.8% - - 
Self-employed 
/professional 
5.2% 5.2% 5.7% 6.5% 9.1% 9.6% 8.3% 10.4% 
Inactive 10.1% 18.2% 19.2% 25.5% 30.1% 36.9% 41.0% 43.6% 
Student       9.4% 14.2% 
Retired       30.3% 25.2% 
Other       1.3% 4.2% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 












FRA1 Name, shorthand and symbol 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
30.12.1920 (SFIC)  
1921 (PC) 
1943 (PCF) 
Parti communiste français PCF 
    
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
1939 (UC)  
1956 (VO)  
1968 (LO) 
Lutte ouvrière LO 
 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
1944 (PCI) 
1966 (JCR) 
1969 (LC)  










Date Name Shorthand Logo 
1952 (PCI)  
1965 (OCI)  





1985 (MPPT)  
1991 (PT) 
Parti des travailleurs PT 
 
15.06.2008 - Parti ouvrier indépendant POI 
 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
1960  Parti socialiste unifié PSU 
 
1988 Nouvelle Gauche pour le 
Socialisme, l'Écologie et 
l'Autogestion 
NG  
1989 Alternative rouge et verte AREV 
 
1998 Les Alternatifs Alternatifs 
 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
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2008 Fédération pour une 




Date Name Shorthand Logo 
12.11.2008 (inf.)  
1.02.2009 
(official) 
Parti de gauche PG 
 
Date Name Shorthand Logo 
18.11.2008  Front de gauche FdG 
 
includes (2012): PCF, PG, FASE, les Alternatifs, GU (ex-LCR), C&A (ex-NPA), GA (ex-NPA), R&S (ex-





FRA2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013 
THIRD REPUBLIC  PC  SFIO OTHERS TOTAL 
1919  0.0%  21.2% 0.0% 21.2% 
       
1924  9.8%  20.1% 0.0% 29.9% 
1928  11.3%  18.0% 0.0% 29.3% 
1932  8.3%  20.5% 0.0% 28.8% 
1936  15.3%  19.9% 0.0% 35.1% 
AVERAGE  11.2%  19.6% 0.0% 30.8% 
FOURTH 
REPUBLIC 
FAR LEFT PCF  SFIO OTHERS TOTAL 
1945 0.0% 25.2%  22.5% 0.0% 47.7% 
6.1946 0.2% 26.0%  21.1% 0.0% 47.4% 
11.1946 0.3% 28.3%  17.9% 0.0% 46.4% 
1951 0.8% 25.7%  14.3% 0.0% 40.8% 
1956 0.4% 25.6%  15.1% 0.0% 41.1% 
AVERAGE 0.3% 26.1%  18.2% 0.0% 44.7% 
FIFTH REPUBLIC FAR LEFT PCF UFD/PSU SFIO/FGDS/PS OTHERS TOTAL 
1958 0.0% 18.9% 0.9% 15.5% 0.0% 35.2% 
1962 0.0% 21.9% 2.0% 12.5% 0.0% 36.4% 
1967 0.1% 22.5% 2.1% 18.9% 0.0% 43.6% 
1968 0.1% 20.0% 3.9% 16.5% 0.0% 40.5% 
1973 1.4% 21.4% 2.0% 19.1% 0.0% 43.8% 
1978 2.2% 20.6% 1.1% 22.8% 0.0% 46.7% 
1981 0.7% 16.1% 0.7% 36.0% 0.0% 53.5% 
1986 1.5% 9.5% - 31.0% 0.3% 42.3% 
1988 0.4% 11.3% - 34.8% 0.0% 46.4% 
AVERAGE 0.7% 18.0% 1.8% 23.0% 0.0% 43.2% 
FIFTH REPUBLIC FAR LEFT PCF/FdG  PS OTHERS TOTAL 
1993 1.8% 8.9%  17.6% 0.3% 28.6% 
1997 2.5% 9.6%  23.5% 0.3% 36.0% 
2002 2.7% 4.8%  23.8% 0.1% 31.4% 
2007 3.4% 4.3%  24.7% 0.3% 32.8% 
2012 1.0% 6.9%  29.4% 0.0% 37.2% 
AVERAGE 2.3% 6.9%  23.8% 0.2% 33.2% 
Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and cdsp.sciences-po.fr  
Notes: share of valid votes.  
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FRA3 Presidential elections, first round  
Year Candidate Party Votes % 
2012 ARTHAUD Nathalie LO 202,561 0.56% 
 POUTOU Philippe NPA 411,182 1.15% 
 MÉLENCHON Jean-Luc FdG 3,985,089 11.10% 
  TOTAL 4,598,832 12.82% 
2007 LAGUILLER Arlette LO 487,857 1.33% 
 BESANCENOT Olivier LCR 1,498,581 4.08% 
 SCHIVARDI Gérard PT 123,540 0.34% 
 BOVÉ José Indep.  483,008 1.32% 
 BUFFET Marie-George PCF 707,268 1.93% 
  TOTAL 3,300,254 8.99% 
2002 LAGUILLER Arlette LO 1,630,045 5.72% 
 BESANCENOT Olivier LCR 1,210,562 4.25% 
 GLUCKSTEIN Daniel PT 132,686 0.47% 
 HUE Robert PCF 960,480 3.37% 
  TOTAL 3,933,773 13.80% 
1995 LAGUILLER Arlette LO 1,615,552 5.30% 
 HUE Robert PCF 2,632,460 8.64% 
  TOTAL 4,248,012 13.94% 
1988 LAGUILLER Arlette LO 606,017 1.99% 
 BOUSSEL Pierre OCI 116,823 0.38% 
 JUQUIN Pierre Indep. (ex-PCF) 639,084 2.10% 
 LAJOINIE André PCF 2,055,995 6.76% 
  TOTAL 3,417,919 11.24% 
1981 LAGUILLER Arlette LO 668,057 2.30% 
 BOUCHARDEAU Huguette PSU 321,353 1.11% 
 MARCHAIS George PCF 4,456,922 15.35% 
  TOTAL 5,446,332 18.76% 
Sources: my elaboration from www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr, www.interieur.gouv.fr, and www.france-politique.fr  






FRA4 Legislative elections, first round  
Year Party Votes 
(first round) 
% Seats 
10.6.2012 LO 126,552 0.49%  
 Other far left 126,834 0.49%  
 Front de Gauche 1,793,192 6.91% 10 
 TOTAL 2,046,578 7.89% 10 
10.6.2007 LO 218,264 0.84%  
 LCR 534,666 2.05%  
 Other far left 135,320 0.52%  
 PCF 1,115,663 4.29% 18 
 Other radical left 87,171 0.33%  
 TOTAL 2,091,084 8.03% 18 
9.6.2002 LO 304,077 1.18%  
 LCR 320,623 1.24%  
 PT 42,532 0.16%  
 Other far left 39,690 0.15%  
 PCF 1,237,588 4.79% 22 
 Other radical left 30,201 0.12%  
 TOTAL 1,974,711 7.64% 22 
25.5.1997 LO 421,877 1.67%  
 LCR 71,304 0.28%  
 PT 51,696 0.20%  
 Other far left 93,992 0.37%  
 PCF 2,435,451 9.62% 36 
 Other radical left 82,378 0.33%  
 TOTAL 3,156,698 12.46% 36 
21.3.1993 LO 225,964 0.89%  
 LCR 33,167 0.13%  
 PT 47,656 0.19%  
 Other far left 145,017 0.57%  
 PCF 2,253,818 8.86% 23 
 Other radical left 82,436 0.32%  
 TOTAL 2,788,058 10.96% 23 
5.6.1988 Other far left 89,065 0.36%  
 PCF 2,765,761 11.32% 25 
 TOTAL 2,854,826 11.68% 25 
16.3.1986 LO 173,686 0.62%  
 LCR 29,719 0.11%  
 PT 181,490 0.65%  
 Other far left 45,457 0.16%  
 PCF 2,663,259 9.50% 35 
 Other radical left 76,666 0.27%  
 TOTAL 3,170,277 11.31% 35 
14.6.1981 LO 99,043 0.39%  
 Other far left 67,783 0.27%  
 PCF 4,065,962 16.14% 44 
 PSU 177,005 0.70%  
 TOTAL 4,409,793 17.51% 44 
12.3.1978 LO 474,226 1.69%  
 Other far left 133,093 0.47%  
 PCF 5,793,139 20.62% 86 
 PSU 311,807 1.11%  
 TOTAL 6,712,265 23.89% 86 
Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and www.lutte-ouvriere.org/  
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories).  
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FRA5 European Parliament elections 
Year Party Votes % Seats 
6.6.2009 LO 205,975 1.20  
 NPA 840,833 4.88  
 Communistes 3,208 0.02  
 FdG 1,041,911 6.05 4 
 AOM 73,110 0.42 1 
 TOT 2,165,037 12.57 5 
13.6.2004 LO-LCR 440,134 2.56  
 PT 131,434 0.77  
 PCF 900,447 5.25 2 
 AOM 109,529 0.64 1 
 TOT 1,581,544 9.21 3 
13.6.1999 LO-LCR 914,811 5.18 5 
 PCF 1,196,491 6.78 6 
 TOT 2,111,302 11.96 11 
12.6.1994 LO 442,723 2.27  
 PT 84,513 0.43  
 PCF 1,342,222 6.89 7 
 ROMN 37,041 0.19  
 TOT 1,906,499 9.78 7 
15.6.1989 LO 258,663 1.43  
 MPPT 109,523 0.60  
 PCF 1,401,171 7.72 7 
 Europe rénovateurs 74,327 0.41  
 TOT 1,843,684 10.16 7 
17.6.1984 LO 417,702 2.07  
 PCI 182,320 0.90  
 PCF 2,261,312 11.21 10 
 PSU-CDU 146,238 0.72  
 TOT 3,007,572 14.90 10 
10.6.1979 LO-LCR 623,663 3.08  
 PCF 4,153,710 20.52 19 
 PSU 332 0.00  
 TOT 4,154,042 23.60 19 
Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr and www.france-politique.fr 








FRA6 Complete electoral results, Lutte Ouvrière (1973-2012) 






SEATS FINANC. NOTES 
Presid.        
1974 595,247 2.33% 100.0% 2.33% -   
1981 668,057 2.30% 100.0% 2.30% -   
1988 606,017 1.99% 100.0% 1.99% -   
1995 1,615,552 5.30% 100.0% 5.30% - Yes  
2002 1,630,045 5.72% 100.0% 5.72% - Yes  
2007 487,857 1.33% 100.0% 1.33% - No  
2012 202,561 0.56% 100.0% 0.56% - No  
Legisl.        
1973 194,889 0.80% 34.9% 2.29% 0   
1978 474,378 1.69% 95.7% 1.70% 0   
1981 99,185 0.39% 32.4% 1.11% 0   
1986 173,686 0.62% 32.7% 1.21% 0   
1988 0 0.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0   
1993 227,900 0.90% 42.8% 2.15% 0 Yes  
1997 421,877 1.67% 55.6% 3.06% 0 Yes  
2002 304,077 1.18% 97.1% 1.19% 0 Yes  
2007 218,264 0.84% 97.6% 0.86% 0 Yes  
2012 126,522 0.49% 95.7% 0.51% 0 No  
European        
1979 623,663 3.08% 100.0%  3.08% 0  LO-LCR 
1984 417,702 2.07% 100.0%  2.07% 0   
1989 258,663 1.43% 100.0%  1.43% 0   
1994 442,723 2.27% 100.0%  2.27% 0 No  
1999 914,811 5.18% 100.0%  5.18% 3 (2) Yes LO-LCR 
2004 440,134 2.56% 100.0%  2.56% 0 No LO-LCR 
2009 205,975 1.20% 100.0% 1.20% 0 No  
Regional        
1986 226,126 0.81% 33.0% 1.59% 0   
1992 215,162 0.87% 30.0% 1.84% 0   
1998 788,172 3.63% 72.5% 4.52% 20 Yes  
2004 1,077,824 4.37% 88.5% 4.58% 0 No LO-LCR 
2010 213,738 1.10% 92.3% 1.09% 0 No  
Municipal        
1977 91,668 - - 3.78% 0 (?) - LO-LCR-OCT 
1983 62,237 - - 2.16% 0 (2) - LO-LCR-LOR 
1989 - - - ? 2 -  
1995 41,059 - - 2.80% 7 -  
2001 120,784 - - 4.37% 34 -  
2008 52,008 - - 1.91% 79 -  
Sources: my elaboration from www.lutte-ouvriere.org/, www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and  
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories). In brackets the number of seats 


































Total seats 577 577 577 577 577 577 577 
COMMUNIST GROUP 35 25 23 36 22 24 15 
PCF 32 24 22 34 20 15 7 
AFFILIATED  3 1 1 2 2 3 3 
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 
PCF DEPUTIES 32 24 22 34 20 15 7 
Male 29 23 20 30 16 12 6 
Female 3 1 2 4 4 3 1 
Seating 17 12 13 14 18 10 4 
New 15 12 9 20 2 5 3 
Source: my elaboration from www.assemblee-nationale.fr 
Notes: beginning of the legislature. Affiliated = apparenté (close allies). Other = other members of the group 
(usually "technical" allies).  
 
 
FRA8 Senators (Sénat) 
 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2011 
Total seats 320 322 322 322 322 322 331 343 348 
COMMUNIST GROUP 15 16 15 15 16 23 23 23 21 
PCF 14 15 14 15 15 20 20 21 20 
ALLIES 1 1 1 0 1 3 3 2 1 
PCF SENATORS 14 15 14 15 15 20 20 21 20 
Male 9 10 8 9 10 10 12 10 10 
Female 5 5 6 6 5 10 8 11 10 
Old 7 14 13 11 10 10 15 16 14 
New 7 1 1 4 5 10 5 5 6 
Source: my elaboration www.senat.fr   





FRA9 Members of regional assemblies, 1990-2012 












1990 1880 157 8.35% 8.74% 155 8.24% 8.74% 1 
1991 1880 157 8.35% 8.74% 155 8.24% 8.74% 1 
1992 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1993 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1994 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1995 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1996 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1997 1880 124 6.60% 6.82% 120 6.38% 6.82% 3 
1998 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
1999 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
2000 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
2001 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
2002 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
2003 1880 184 9.79% 10.61% 160 8.51% 9.18% 160 
2004 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2005 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2006 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2007 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2008 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2009 1880 185 9.84% 10.53% 185 9.84% 10.53% 119 
2010 1880 131 6.97% 7.21% 99 5.27% 5.47% 34 
2011 1880 131 6.97% 7.21% 99 5.27% 5.47% 34 
2012 1880 131 6.97% 7.21% 99 5.27% 5.47% 34 
AVERAGE 1880 159 8.48% 8.99% 148 7.86% 8.39% 34 
Sources: my elaboration from www.france-politique.fr, cdsp.sciences-po.fr and www.lemonde.fr  
Notes: Whole France (including extra-European territories). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the 
numbers are weighted for the registered voters (inscrits) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from 
the fact that population size and assembly size vary). Figures include: PCF, PCF allies, PCF dissidents (except MUP), 
LO, LCR, PSU/AEA, TEAG. Figures exclude: radical left movements of the extra-European territories (due to the 
uncertainty of the classification). Figures before 1998 might exclude a small number of PCF members elected on PS-





FRA10 Governments and coalitions 










1100 Michel ROCARD, PS Left (minority) * 
PS, MRG 
case-by-case: 





292 Édith CRESSON, PS Left (minority) * 
PS, MRG 
case-by-case: 




392 Pierre BÉRÉGOVOY Left (minority) * 
PS, MRG 
case-by-case: 


















1798 Lionel JOSPIN, PS Left 






























 Jean-Marc AYRAULT, 
PS 
Left  
PS, PRG, EELV 
 (227/577) 
328/577 
Notes: my elaboration from www.gouvernement.fr/ and www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ 
Notes: SEATS: governing coalition excluding external support; in parenthesis: seats of the short-lived caretaker 
cabinets seating between presidential and legislative elections. * The cabinets included "personnalités d'ouverture" 
drawn from centrist parties, but the support of the latter was generally on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
FRA11 Governmental involvement of the PCF – national level  
Period Government Crucial Position 
1981-1984 Socialist No Governmental participation 
1984-1986 Socialist No External support 
1986-1988 Gaullist No Opposition 
1988-1993 Socialist (minority) Yes Case-by-case 
1993-1997 Gaullist No Opposition 
1997-2001 Socialist Yes Governmental participation 
2001-2013 Gaullist No Opposition 
2013-present Socialist No Case-by-case 










1990 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1991 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1992 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1993 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1994 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1995 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1996 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1997 2 8.21% LIM, NPC 
1998 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
1999 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
2000 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
2001 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
2002 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
2003 7 43.91% AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA 
2004 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2005 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2006 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2007 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2008 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2009 18 86.90% AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, 
PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA 
2010 17 85.28% AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, 
MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA 
2011 17 85.28% AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, 
MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA 
2012 17 85.28% AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, 
MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA 
2013 17 85.28% AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, 
MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA 
Notes: Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (inscrits). * = participation 





FRA13 Radical left party membership 
YEAR PCF LO LCR PG TOT PT/POI 
(outside the 
total) 
1990 351,881 1,900 1,358  355,139  
1991 329,680 2,000 1,324  333,004  
1992 313,719 2,100 1,277  317,096  
1993 298,991 2,200 1,232  302,423  
1994 281,004 2,300 1,070  284,374  
1995 274,449 7,000 1,070  282,519  
1996 248,607 7,000 965  256,572  
1997 225,394 7,000 1,041  233,435  
1998 203,433 7,000 1,070  211,503  
1999 183,173 7,000 1,096  191,269  
2000 164,181 7,000 1,180  172,361  
2001 138,657 7,000 1,345  147,002 5,000 
2002 113,417 7,000 1,513  121,930 6,000 
2003 92,772 7,500 2,320  102,592  
2004 100,346 7,500 2,620  110,466 6,068 
2005 99,227 7,500 2,570  109,297  
2006 92,894 7,500 2,605  102,999  
2007 85,546 7,500 2,640  95,686 6,000 
2008 78,779 7,500 3,000  89,279 10,071 
2009 75,457 7,500 9,123 6,000 98,080  
2010 72,275 7,000 6,000 8,000 93,275  
2011 69,227 7,000 4,000 10,000 90,227  
2012 64,184 7,000 3,000 12,000 86,184  
Source: my elaboration from Martelli (2010b), Videt (2011), party statements, estimates. 
PCF: due-paying members; real data except 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (estimates); after 2002 an 
alternative series exists which includes non due-paying members and remains stable around 130,000 
members. LCR: due-paying members; real data except 1992, 2008, 2010 and 2011 (estimates). LO: 
estimates, all members (including those without voting rights). PG and PT/POI: declared members; 







FRA14 Finances of political parties (nominal, €) 












2003 € 194,744,995 € 38,363,487 € 33,513,524 € 2,747,229 € 2,102,734  
2004 € 222,255,486 € 42,405,950 € 37,397,318 € 2,596,198 € 2,412,434  
2005 € 196,720,055 € 38,284,146 € 33,665,967 € 2,408,237 € 2,209,942  
2006 € 202,753,947 € 38,373,106 € 32,277,948 € 3,937,936 € 2,157,222  
2007 € 234,180,541 € 42,843,715 € 37,482,235 € 3,069,175 € 2,292,305  
2008 € 188,882,160 € 38,408,937 € 31,559,485 € 3,629,050 € 2,736,346 € 484,056 
2009 € 198,568,775 € 39,504,610 € 31,547,710 € 3,188,639 € 3,463,094 € 1,305,167 
2010 € 187,234,351 € 39,622,668 € 32,004,975 € 3,101,772 € 3,187,870 € 1,328,051 
YEAR % % % % % % 
2003 100.00% 19.70% 17.21% 1.41% 1.08% 0.00% 
2004 100.00% 19.08% 16.83% 1.17% 1.09% 0.00% 
2005 100.00% 19.46% 17.11% 1.22% 1.12% 0.00% 
2006 100.00% 18.93% 15.92% 1.94% 1.06% 0.00% 
2007 100.00% 18.30% 16.01% 1.31% 0.98% 0.00% 
2008 100.00% 20.33% 16.71% 1.92% 1.45% 0.26% 
2009 100.00% 19.89% 15.89% 1.61% 1.74% 0.66% 
2010 100.00% 21.16% 17.09% 1.66% 1.70% 0.71% 





FRA15 Party leaders  
YEAR NAME 
PCF Secretary (Secrétaire general, from 1994 Secrétaire national) 
1972-1994 Georges Marchais 
1994-2001 Robert Hue 
2001-2010 Marie-George Buffet 
2010-present Pierre Laurent 
LO Collective leadership  
 
 Spokesperson (porte-parole): 
1973-2008 Arlette Laguiller  
2008-present Nathalie Arthaud 
 Informal leader: 
1956-2009 Robert Barcia (Hardy) 
LCR Collective leadership  
 Main spokesperson (porte-parole): 
1966-2002 Alain Krivine 
2002-2009 Olivier Besancenot 
NPA Collective leadership  
 Main spokesperson (porte-parole): 
2009-2011 Olivier Besancenot 
2011-2012 Christine Poupin 
 Myriam Martin 
2011-present Christine Poupin 
PG  
 Informal leader: 
2008-2010 Jean-Luc Mélenchon  
 President (Président) 
2010-present Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
 Martine Billard 
PT  
 Secretary (Secrétaire) 
1991-2007 Daniel Gluckstein 
 Informal leader: 
1953-2008 Pierre Lambert 
POI Collective leadership 
























FRA16 Sociology of members, PCF 
 1954 1959 1966  1979 1997 
 PCF PCF PCF  PCF PCF 
GENDER    GENDER   
Men 79.8% 78.1% 74.5% Men 65.0% 60.0% 
Women 20.2% 21.9% 25.5% Women 35.0% 40.0% 
AGE    AGE   
<26 10.2% 5.5% 9.4% <30 24.5% 10.5% 
26-39 35.6% 38.4% 33.1% 30-59 59.9% 65.1% 
>40 54.2% 56.1% 57.5% >59 15.6% 24.4% 
PROFESSION    PROFESSION   
    Core working-class 59.9% 43.7% 
Blue-collar 




worker 14.5% 14.9%  
White-collar worker 
17.6% 17.1% 
    Intermediate professions 10.2% 10.3% 
Peasant 9.4% 8.2%  Upper professions 3.4% 5.9% 
Self-employed 5.0% 6.7%  Self-employed 5.9% 2.5% 
Inactive 26.2% 24.9%  Inactive & unemployed 30.8% 47.9% 
    Retired 15.5% 24.5% 
Source: my elaboration from Lazar (1992), Platone (1985) and Platone & Ranger (2000). 
Notes: membership surveys.  
 
